use timing-safe compares for checking results in signature verification

(there are no known attacks, this is just inexpensive prudence)

feedback and ok tb@ jsing@

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
index b4a4e730c0..ea6401b3da 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.20 2017/08/28 17:41:59 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.21 2018/09/05 00:55:33 djm Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2006.
  */
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen,
                         return 0;
         }
 
-        if (rslen != tbslen || memcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
+        if (rslen != tbslen || timingsafe_bcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen))
                 return 0;
 
         return 1;