use timing-safe compares for checking results in signature verification

(there are no known attacks, this is just inexpensive prudence)

feedback and ok tb@ jsing@

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
index e1fbdcb5df..93492ac503 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_saos.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rsa_saos.c,v 1.23 2017/05/02 03:59:45 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_saos.c,v 1.24 2018/09/05 00:55:33 djm Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
                 goto err;
 
         if ((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len ||
-            memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0) {
+            timingsafe_bcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0) {
                 RSAerror(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
         } else
                 ret = 1;