Replace trivial uses of ASN1_STRING_data()

Almost entirely mechanical diff that ensures that for read-only accesses
we use the const correct ASN1_STRING_get0_data(). Arguably, in most
places the better fix would be to reach into ASN1_STRING but then we
have to think and bikeshed...

ok beck kenjiro

1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
index d38bb3b460..e9a778bb88 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ts/ts_rsp_verify.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ts_rsp_verify.c,v 1.31 2025/05/10 05:54:39 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ts_rsp_verify.c,v 1.32 2025/12/05 14:19:27 tb Exp $ */
 /* Written by Zoltan Glozik (zglozik@stones.com) for the OpenSSL
  * project 2002.
  */
@@ -667,7 +667,7 @@ TS_get_status_text(STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) *text)
                 ASN1_UTF8STRING *current = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(text, i);
                 if (i > 0)
                         strlcat(result, "/", length);
-                strlcat(result, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_data(current), length);
+                strlcat(result, (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(current), length);
         }
         return result;
 }
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ TS_check_imprints(X509_ALGOR *algor_a, unsigned char *imprint_a, unsigned len_a,
 
         /* Compare octet strings. */
         ret = len_a == (unsigned) ASN1_STRING_length(b->hashed_msg) &&
-            memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
+            memcmp(imprint_a, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(b->hashed_msg), len_a) == 0;
 
 err:
         if (!ret)