This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_5_7_BASE'.OPENBSD_5_7_BASE

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 369 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 030e29bde7..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,369 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.25 2014/09/26 19:31:09 miod Exp $ */
-/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * This package is an SSL implementation written
- * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
- * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
- * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
- * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
- * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
- * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
- * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
- * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
- * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
- * the code are not to be removed.
- * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
- * as the author of the parts of the library used.
- * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
- * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
- *    must display the following acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
- *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
- *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
- *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
- *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
- *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
- * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
- * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
- * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
- * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
- * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
- * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
- * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
- * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
- * SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
- * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
- * copied and put under another distribution licence
- * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
- */
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/asn1.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/objects.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-
-int
-X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
-        int i;
-        X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
-
-        ai = a->cert_info;
-        bi = b->cert_info;
-        i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
-        if (i)
-                return (i);
-        return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long
-X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
-{
-        unsigned long ret = 0;
-        EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
-        unsigned char md[16];
-        char *f;
-
-        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-        f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
-        if (f == NULL)
-                goto err;
-        if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-                goto err;
-        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
-                goto err;
-        free(f);
-        f = NULL;
-        if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx,
-            (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
-            (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
-                goto err;
-        if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
-                goto err;
-        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
-            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
-            0xffffffffL;
-
-err:
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-        free(f);
-        return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-
-int
-X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
-}
-
-int
-X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-int
-X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
-{
-        return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
-}
-#endif
-
-X509_NAME *
-X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
-{
-        return (a->cert_info->issuer);
-}
-
-unsigned long
-X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long
-X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
-}
-#endif
-
-X509_NAME *
-X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
-{
-        return (a->cert_info->subject);
-}
-
-ASN1_INTEGER *
-X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
-{
-        return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
-}
-
-unsigned long
-X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
-}
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-unsigned long
-X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
-{
-        return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
-/* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for
- * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally
- * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in
- * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may
- * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring
- * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point
- * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt
- * with an evil cast.
- */
-int
-X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
-{
-        /* ensure hash is valid */
-        X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
-        X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
-
-        return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
-{
-        int ret;
-
-        /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
-        if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
-                ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
-                if (ret < 0)
-                        return -2;
-        }
-        if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
-                ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
-                if (ret < 0)
-                        return -2;
-        }
-        ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
-        if (ret)
-                return ret;
-        return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
-}
-
-unsigned long
-X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
-{
-        unsigned long ret = 0;
-        unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-        /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
-        i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
-        if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
-            NULL))
-                return 0;
-
-        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
-            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
-            0xffffffffL;
-        return (ret);
-}
-
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
-/* I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
- * this is reasonably efficient. */
-
-unsigned long
-X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
-{
-        EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
-        unsigned long ret = 0;
-        unsigned char md[16];
-
-        /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
-        i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
-        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
-        if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) &&
-            EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) &&
-            EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
-                ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) |
-                    ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
-                    ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) |
-                    ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) &
-                    0xffffffffL;
-        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
-
-        return (ret);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* Search a stack of X509 for a match */
-X509 *
-X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
-    ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
-{
-        int i;
-        X509_CINF cinf;
-        X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
-
-        if (!sk)
-                return NULL;
-
-        x.cert_info = &cinf;
-        cinf.serialNumber = serial;
-        cinf.issuer = name;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
-                x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-                if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0)
-                        return (x509);
-        }
-        return (NULL);
-}
-
-X509 *
-X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
-{
-        X509 *x509;
-        int i;
-
-        for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
-                x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
-                if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0)
-                        return (x509);
-        }
-        return (NULL);
-}
-
-EVP_PKEY *
-X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
-{
-        if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
-                return (NULL);
-        return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
-}
-
-ASN1_BIT_STRING *
-X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
-{
-        if (!x)
-                return NULL;
-        return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
-}
-
-int
-X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
-{
-        EVP_PKEY *xk;
-        int ret;
-
-        xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-
-        if (xk)
-                ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
-        else
-                ret = -2;
-
-        switch (ret) {
-        case 1:
-                break;
-        case 0:
-                X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
-                    X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
-                break;
-        case -1:
-                X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
-                    X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
-                break;
-        case -2:
-                X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,
-                    X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
-        }
-        EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
-        if (ret > 0)
-                return 1;
-        return 0;
-}