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| author | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2025-04-14 17:32:06 +0000 |
| commit | b1ddde874c215cc8891531ed92876f091b7eb83e (patch) | |
| tree | edb6da6af7e865d488dc1a29309f1e1ec226e603 /src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | |
| parent | f0a36529837a161734c802ae4c42e84e42347be2 (diff) | |
| download | openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.gz openbsd-tb_20250414.tar.bz2 openbsd-tb_20250414.zip | |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'tb_20250414'.tb_20250414
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 429 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 429 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2c1e427093..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,429 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.44 2024/03/25 03:41:16 joshua Exp $ */ | ||
| 2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
| 3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
| 4 | * | ||
| 5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
| 6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
| 8 | * | ||
| 9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
| 10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
| 11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
| 12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
| 13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
| 14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 15 | * | ||
| 16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
| 17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
| 18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
| 19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
| 20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
| 21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
| 22 | * | ||
| 23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 25 | * are met: | ||
| 26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
| 27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
| 30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
| 31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
| 32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
| 33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
| 34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
| 36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
| 37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
| 38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
| 39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
| 40 | * | ||
| 41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
| 42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
| 44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
| 45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
| 46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
| 47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
| 49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
| 50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
| 51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 52 | * | ||
| 53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
| 54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
| 55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
| 56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
| 57 | */ | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | #include <ctype.h> | ||
| 60 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
| 61 | #include <string.h> | ||
| 62 | |||
| 63 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
| 64 | |||
| 65 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
| 66 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
| 67 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
| 68 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
| 69 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
| 70 | |||
| 71 | #include "evp_local.h" | ||
| 72 | #include "x509_local.h" | ||
| 73 | |||
| 74 | int | ||
| 75 | X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
| 76 | { | ||
| 77 | int i; | ||
| 78 | X509_CINF *ai, *bi; | ||
| 79 | |||
| 80 | ai = a->cert_info; | ||
| 81 | bi = b->cert_info; | ||
| 82 | i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); | ||
| 83 | if (i) | ||
| 84 | return (i); | ||
| 85 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | ||
| 86 | } | ||
| 87 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp); | ||
| 88 | |||
| 89 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
| 90 | unsigned long | ||
| 91 | X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) | ||
| 92 | { | ||
| 93 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
| 94 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; | ||
| 95 | unsigned char md[16]; | ||
| 96 | char *f = NULL; | ||
| 97 | |||
| 98 | if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 99 | goto err; | ||
| 100 | |||
| 101 | if ((f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0)) == NULL) | ||
| 102 | goto err; | ||
| 103 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) | ||
| 104 | goto err; | ||
| 105 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) | ||
| 106 | goto err; | ||
| 107 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, | ||
| 108 | (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, | ||
| 109 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) | ||
| 110 | goto err; | ||
| 111 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) | ||
| 112 | goto err; | ||
| 113 | |||
| 114 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
| 115 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
| 116 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
| 117 | |||
| 118 | err: | ||
| 119 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); | ||
| 120 | free(f); | ||
| 121 | |||
| 122 | return ret; | ||
| 123 | } | ||
| 124 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_issuer_and_serial_hash); | ||
| 125 | #endif | ||
| 126 | |||
| 127 | int | ||
| 128 | X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
| 129 | { | ||
| 130 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
| 131 | } | ||
| 132 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_issuer_name_cmp); | ||
| 133 | |||
| 134 | int | ||
| 135 | X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
| 136 | { | ||
| 137 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); | ||
| 138 | } | ||
| 139 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_subject_name_cmp); | ||
| 140 | |||
| 141 | int | ||
| 142 | X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) | ||
| 143 | { | ||
| 144 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); | ||
| 145 | } | ||
| 146 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_CRL_cmp); | ||
| 147 | |||
| 148 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
| 149 | int | ||
| 150 | X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) | ||
| 151 | { | ||
| 152 | return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CRL_HASH_LEN); | ||
| 153 | } | ||
| 154 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_CRL_match); | ||
| 155 | #endif | ||
| 156 | |||
| 157 | X509_NAME * | ||
| 158 | X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a) | ||
| 159 | { | ||
| 160 | return (a->cert_info->issuer); | ||
| 161 | } | ||
| 162 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_issuer_name); | ||
| 163 | |||
| 164 | unsigned long | ||
| 165 | X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) | ||
| 166 | { | ||
| 167 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
| 168 | } | ||
| 169 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_issuer_name_hash); | ||
| 170 | |||
| 171 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
| 172 | unsigned long | ||
| 173 | X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | ||
| 174 | { | ||
| 175 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
| 176 | } | ||
| 177 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_issuer_name_hash_old); | ||
| 178 | #endif | ||
| 179 | |||
| 180 | X509_NAME * | ||
| 181 | X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a) | ||
| 182 | { | ||
| 183 | return (a->cert_info->subject); | ||
| 184 | } | ||
| 185 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_subject_name); | ||
| 186 | |||
| 187 | ASN1_INTEGER * | ||
| 188 | X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) | ||
| 189 | { | ||
| 190 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); | ||
| 191 | } | ||
| 192 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_serialNumber); | ||
| 193 | |||
| 194 | const ASN1_INTEGER * | ||
| 195 | X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a) | ||
| 196 | { | ||
| 197 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); | ||
| 198 | } | ||
| 199 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get0_serialNumber); | ||
| 200 | |||
| 201 | unsigned long | ||
| 202 | X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) | ||
| 203 | { | ||
| 204 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); | ||
| 205 | } | ||
| 206 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_subject_name_hash); | ||
| 207 | |||
| 208 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
| 209 | unsigned long | ||
| 210 | X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | ||
| 211 | { | ||
| 212 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); | ||
| 213 | } | ||
| 214 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_subject_name_hash_old); | ||
| 215 | #endif | ||
| 216 | |||
| 217 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
| 218 | /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for | ||
| 219 | * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally | ||
| 220 | * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in | ||
| 221 | * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may | ||
| 222 | * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | ||
| 223 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point | ||
| 224 | * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt | ||
| 225 | * with an evil cast. | ||
| 226 | */ | ||
| 227 | int | ||
| 228 | X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
| 229 | { | ||
| 230 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | ||
| 231 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | ||
| 232 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | ||
| 233 | |||
| 234 | return memcmp(a->hash, b->hash, X509_CERT_HASH_LEN); | ||
| 235 | } | ||
| 236 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_cmp); | ||
| 237 | #endif | ||
| 238 | |||
| 239 | int | ||
| 240 | X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) | ||
| 241 | { | ||
| 242 | int ret; | ||
| 243 | |||
| 244 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ | ||
| 245 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { | ||
| 246 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | ||
| 247 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 248 | return -2; | ||
| 249 | } | ||
| 250 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { | ||
| 251 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | ||
| 252 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 253 | return -2; | ||
| 254 | } | ||
| 255 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; | ||
| 256 | if (ret) | ||
| 257 | return ret; | ||
| 258 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); | ||
| 259 | } | ||
| 260 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_NAME_cmp); | ||
| 261 | |||
| 262 | unsigned long | ||
| 263 | X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) | ||
| 264 | { | ||
| 265 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
| 266 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | ||
| 267 | |||
| 268 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | ||
| 269 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | ||
| 270 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | ||
| 271 | NULL)) | ||
| 272 | return 0; | ||
| 273 | |||
| 274 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
| 275 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
| 276 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
| 277 | return (ret); | ||
| 278 | } | ||
| 279 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_NAME_hash); | ||
| 280 | |||
| 281 | |||
| 282 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
| 283 | /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | ||
| 284 | * this is reasonably efficient. */ | ||
| 285 | |||
| 286 | unsigned long | ||
| 287 | X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | ||
| 288 | { | ||
| 289 | EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx; | ||
| 290 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
| 291 | unsigned char md[16]; | ||
| 292 | |||
| 293 | if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 294 | return ret; | ||
| 295 | |||
| 296 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | ||
| 297 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | ||
| 298 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && | ||
| 299 | EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && | ||
| 300 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL)) | ||
| 301 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | | ||
| 302 | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
| 303 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | | ||
| 304 | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
| 305 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
| 306 | |||
| 307 | EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); | ||
| 308 | |||
| 309 | return ret; | ||
| 310 | } | ||
| 311 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_NAME_hash_old); | ||
| 312 | #endif | ||
| 313 | |||
| 314 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | ||
| 315 | X509 * | ||
| 316 | X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, | ||
| 317 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) | ||
| 318 | { | ||
| 319 | int i; | ||
| 320 | X509_CINF cinf; | ||
| 321 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; | ||
| 322 | |||
| 323 | if (!sk) | ||
| 324 | return NULL; | ||
| 325 | |||
| 326 | x.cert_info = &cinf; | ||
| 327 | cinf.serialNumber = serial; | ||
| 328 | cinf.issuer = name; | ||
| 329 | |||
| 330 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | ||
| 331 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
| 332 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | ||
| 333 | return (x509); | ||
| 334 | } | ||
| 335 | return (NULL); | ||
| 336 | } | ||
| 337 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial); | ||
| 338 | |||
| 339 | X509 * | ||
| 340 | X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) | ||
| 341 | { | ||
| 342 | X509 *x509; | ||
| 343 | int i; | ||
| 344 | |||
| 345 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | ||
| 346 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
| 347 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | ||
| 348 | return (x509); | ||
| 349 | } | ||
| 350 | return (NULL); | ||
| 351 | } | ||
| 352 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_find_by_subject); | ||
| 353 | |||
| 354 | EVP_PKEY * | ||
| 355 | X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) | ||
| 356 | { | ||
| 357 | if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL) | ||
| 358 | return (NULL); | ||
| 359 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | ||
| 360 | } | ||
| 361 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_pubkey); | ||
| 362 | |||
| 363 | EVP_PKEY * | ||
| 364 | X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x) | ||
| 365 | { | ||
| 366 | if (x == NULL || x->cert_info == NULL) | ||
| 367 | return (NULL); | ||
| 368 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info->key)); | ||
| 369 | } | ||
| 370 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get0_pubkey); | ||
| 371 | |||
| 372 | ASN1_BIT_STRING * | ||
| 373 | X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) | ||
| 374 | { | ||
| 375 | if (!x) | ||
| 376 | return NULL; | ||
| 377 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; | ||
| 378 | } | ||
| 379 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr); | ||
| 380 | |||
| 381 | int | ||
| 382 | X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k) | ||
| 383 | { | ||
| 384 | const EVP_PKEY *xk; | ||
| 385 | int ret; | ||
| 386 | |||
| 387 | xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x); | ||
| 388 | |||
| 389 | if (xk) | ||
| 390 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | ||
| 391 | else | ||
| 392 | ret = -2; | ||
| 393 | |||
| 394 | switch (ret) { | ||
| 395 | case 1: | ||
| 396 | break; | ||
| 397 | case 0: | ||
| 398 | X509error(X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | ||
| 399 | break; | ||
| 400 | case -1: | ||
| 401 | X509error(X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | ||
| 402 | break; | ||
| 403 | case -2: | ||
| 404 | X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | ||
| 405 | } | ||
| 406 | if (ret > 0) | ||
| 407 | return 1; | ||
| 408 | return 0; | ||
| 409 | } | ||
| 410 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_check_private_key); | ||
| 411 | |||
| 412 | /* | ||
| 413 | * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference | ||
| 414 | * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of | ||
| 415 | * each X509 structure. | ||
| 416 | */ | ||
| 417 | STACK_OF(X509) * | ||
| 418 | X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
| 419 | { | ||
| 420 | STACK_OF(X509) *ret; | ||
| 421 | size_t i; | ||
| 422 | |||
| 423 | ret = sk_X509_dup(chain); | ||
| 424 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) | ||
| 425 | X509_up_ref(sk_X509_value(ret, i)); | ||
| 426 | |||
| 427 | return ret; | ||
| 428 | } | ||
| 429 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_chain_up_ref); | ||
