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author | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2002-03-12 00:05:45 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | cvs2svn <admin@example.com> | 2002-03-12 00:05:45 +0000 |
commit | 3779f2f4a8b544a7e4c362915322726b66cff114 (patch) | |
tree | b6d77e66cbfdf6c0d8953fba2917f26f86fa50f6 /src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | |
parent | f39945c2b3b0f9e4950384bdb8effdac6eed9199 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-OPENBSD_3_1_BASE.tar.gz openbsd-OPENBSD_3_1_BASE.tar.bz2 openbsd-OPENBSD_3_1_BASE.zip |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_3_1_BASE'.OPENBSD_3_1_BASE
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 920 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 920 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 0f4110cc64..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,920 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <time.h> | ||
61 | #include <errno.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | ||
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
72 | |||
73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | ||
74 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); | ||
75 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); | ||
76 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
77 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
78 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
79 | const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | ||
80 | |||
81 | static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL; | ||
82 | static int x509_store_ctx_num=0; | ||
83 | #if 0 | ||
84 | static int x509_store_num=1; | ||
85 | static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL; | ||
86 | #endif | ||
87 | |||
88 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) | ||
89 | { | ||
90 | return ok; | ||
91 | } | ||
92 | |||
93 | #if 0 | ||
94 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) | ||
95 | { | ||
96 | return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b); | ||
97 | } | ||
98 | #endif | ||
99 | |||
100 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
101 | { | ||
102 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | ||
103 | X509_NAME *xn; | ||
104 | int depth,i,ok=0; | ||
105 | int num; | ||
106 | int (*cb)(); | ||
107 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; | ||
108 | |||
109 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) | ||
110 | { | ||
111 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | ||
112 | return -1; | ||
113 | } | ||
114 | |||
115 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
116 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
117 | |||
118 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | ||
119 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | ||
120 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | ||
121 | { | ||
122 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | ||
123 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | ||
124 | { | ||
125 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
126 | goto end; | ||
127 | } | ||
128 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
129 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | ||
130 | } | ||
131 | |||
132 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | ||
133 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | ||
134 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | ||
135 | { | ||
136 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
137 | goto end; | ||
138 | } | ||
139 | |||
140 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
141 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
142 | depth=ctx->depth; | ||
143 | |||
144 | |||
145 | for (;;) | ||
146 | { | ||
147 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
148 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | ||
149 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | ||
150 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | ||
151 | * code later. | ||
152 | */ | ||
153 | |||
154 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
155 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
156 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break; | ||
157 | |||
158 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | ||
159 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | ||
160 | { | ||
161 | xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x); | ||
162 | if (xtmp != NULL) | ||
163 | { | ||
164 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) | ||
165 | { | ||
166 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
167 | goto end; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
170 | sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); | ||
171 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | ||
172 | x=xtmp; | ||
173 | num++; | ||
174 | /* reparse the full chain for | ||
175 | * the next one */ | ||
176 | continue; | ||
177 | } | ||
178 | } | ||
179 | break; | ||
180 | } | ||
181 | |||
182 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | ||
183 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | ||
184 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | ||
185 | |||
186 | /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it | ||
187 | * is self signed. | ||
188 | */ | ||
189 | |||
190 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
191 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | ||
192 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); | ||
193 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | ||
196 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | ||
197 | { | ||
198 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if | ||
199 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | ||
200 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | ||
201 | */ | ||
202 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | ||
203 | if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) | ||
204 | { | ||
205 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | ||
206 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
207 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | ||
208 | if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp); | ||
209 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
210 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
211 | } | ||
212 | else | ||
213 | { | ||
214 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | ||
215 | * so we get any trust settings. | ||
216 | */ | ||
217 | X509_free(x); | ||
218 | x = xtmp; | ||
219 | sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | ||
220 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
221 | } | ||
222 | } | ||
223 | else | ||
224 | { | ||
225 | /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */ | ||
226 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | ||
227 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | ||
228 | num--; | ||
229 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
230 | } | ||
231 | } | ||
232 | |||
233 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | ||
234 | for (;;) | ||
235 | { | ||
236 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
237 | if (depth < num) break; | ||
238 | |||
239 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
240 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
241 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break; | ||
242 | |||
243 | ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); | ||
244 | |||
245 | if (ok < 0) return ok; | ||
246 | if (ok == 0) break; | ||
247 | |||
248 | x = xtmp; | ||
249 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x)) | ||
250 | { | ||
251 | X509_free(xtmp); | ||
252 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
253 | return 0; | ||
254 | } | ||
255 | num++; | ||
256 | } | ||
257 | |||
258 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | ||
259 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
260 | |||
261 | /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */ | ||
262 | if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) | ||
263 | { | ||
264 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) | ||
265 | { | ||
266 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | ||
267 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | ||
268 | else | ||
269 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | ||
270 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
271 | } | ||
272 | else | ||
273 | { | ||
274 | |||
275 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); | ||
276 | num++; | ||
277 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | ||
278 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | ||
279 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | ||
280 | chain_ss=NULL; | ||
281 | } | ||
282 | |||
283 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | ||
284 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
285 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
286 | } | ||
287 | |||
288 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | ||
289 | if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx); | ||
290 | |||
291 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
292 | |||
293 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | ||
294 | |||
295 | if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); | ||
296 | |||
297 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
298 | |||
299 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | ||
300 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
301 | |||
302 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ | ||
303 | if (ctx->verify != NULL) | ||
304 | ok=ctx->verify(ctx); | ||
305 | else | ||
306 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | ||
307 | if (0) | ||
308 | { | ||
309 | end: | ||
310 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
311 | } | ||
312 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); | ||
313 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | ||
314 | return ok; | ||
315 | } | ||
316 | |||
317 | |||
318 | /* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any) | ||
319 | */ | ||
320 | |||
321 | static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) | ||
322 | { | ||
323 | int i; | ||
324 | X509 *issuer; | ||
325 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) | ||
326 | { | ||
327 | issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
328 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) | ||
329 | return issuer; | ||
330 | } | ||
331 | return NULL; | ||
332 | } | ||
333 | |||
334 | /* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */ | ||
335 | |||
336 | static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) | ||
337 | { | ||
338 | int ret; | ||
339 | ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x); | ||
340 | if (ret == X509_V_OK) | ||
341 | return 1; | ||
342 | /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */ | ||
343 | if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK)) | ||
344 | return 0; | ||
345 | |||
346 | ctx->error = ret; | ||
347 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
348 | ctx->current_issuer = issuer; | ||
349 | if (ctx->verify_cb) | ||
350 | return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); | ||
351 | return 0; | ||
352 | } | ||
353 | |||
354 | /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ | ||
355 | |||
356 | static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
357 | { | ||
358 | *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); | ||
359 | if (*issuer) | ||
360 | { | ||
361 | CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
362 | return 1; | ||
363 | } | ||
364 | else | ||
365 | return 0; | ||
366 | } | ||
367 | |||
368 | |||
369 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency | ||
370 | * with the supplied purpose | ||
371 | */ | ||
372 | |||
373 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
374 | { | ||
375 | #ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
376 | return 1; | ||
377 | #else | ||
378 | int i, ok=0; | ||
379 | X509 *x; | ||
380 | int (*cb)(); | ||
381 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
382 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
383 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | ||
384 | for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) | ||
385 | { | ||
386 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
387 | if (!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i)) | ||
388 | { | ||
389 | if (i) | ||
390 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | ||
391 | else | ||
392 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | ||
393 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
394 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
395 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
396 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
397 | } | ||
398 | /* Check pathlen */ | ||
399 | if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | ||
400 | && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) | ||
401 | { | ||
402 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | ||
403 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
404 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
405 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
406 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
407 | } | ||
408 | } | ||
409 | ok = 1; | ||
410 | end: | ||
411 | return ok; | ||
412 | #endif | ||
413 | } | ||
414 | |||
415 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
416 | { | ||
417 | #ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
418 | return 1; | ||
419 | #else | ||
420 | int i, ok; | ||
421 | X509 *x; | ||
422 | int (*cb)(); | ||
423 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
424 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
425 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ | ||
426 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
427 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
428 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0); | ||
429 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) | ||
430 | return 1; | ||
431 | ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
432 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
433 | if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) | ||
434 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | ||
435 | else | ||
436 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | ||
437 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | ||
438 | return ok; | ||
439 | #endif | ||
440 | } | ||
441 | |||
442 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
443 | { | ||
444 | int i,ok=0,n; | ||
445 | X509 *xs,*xi; | ||
446 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | ||
447 | time_t *ptime; | ||
448 | int (*cb)(); | ||
449 | |||
450 | cb=ctx->verify_cb; | ||
451 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
452 | |||
453 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
454 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; | ||
455 | n--; | ||
456 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
457 | if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) | ||
458 | ptime = &ctx->check_time; | ||
459 | else | ||
460 | ptime = NULL; | ||
461 | if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) | ||
462 | xs=xi; | ||
463 | else | ||
464 | { | ||
465 | if (n <= 0) | ||
466 | { | ||
467 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | ||
468 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
469 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
470 | goto end; | ||
471 | } | ||
472 | else | ||
473 | { | ||
474 | n--; | ||
475 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
476 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
477 | } | ||
478 | } | ||
479 | |||
480 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | ||
481 | while (n >= 0) | ||
482 | { | ||
483 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
484 | if (!xs->valid) | ||
485 | { | ||
486 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | ||
487 | { | ||
488 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
489 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
490 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
491 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
492 | } | ||
493 | if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | ||
494 | { | ||
495 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
496 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
497 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
498 | if (!ok) | ||
499 | { | ||
500 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
501 | goto end; | ||
502 | } | ||
503 | } | ||
504 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
505 | pkey=NULL; | ||
506 | |||
507 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime); | ||
508 | if (i == 0) | ||
509 | { | ||
510 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | ||
511 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
512 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
513 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
514 | } | ||
515 | if (i > 0) | ||
516 | { | ||
517 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
518 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
519 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
520 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
521 | } | ||
522 | xs->valid=1; | ||
523 | } | ||
524 | |||
525 | i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime); | ||
526 | if (i == 0) | ||
527 | { | ||
528 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | ||
529 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
530 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
531 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
532 | } | ||
533 | |||
534 | if (i < 0) | ||
535 | { | ||
536 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
537 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
538 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
539 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
540 | } | ||
541 | |||
542 | /* CRL CHECK */ | ||
543 | |||
544 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | ||
545 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
546 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | ||
547 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
548 | |||
549 | n--; | ||
550 | if (n >= 0) | ||
551 | { | ||
552 | xi=xs; | ||
553 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
554 | } | ||
555 | } | ||
556 | ok=1; | ||
557 | end: | ||
558 | return ok; | ||
559 | } | ||
560 | |||
561 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm) | ||
562 | { | ||
563 | return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); | ||
564 | } | ||
565 | |||
566 | int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) | ||
567 | { | ||
568 | char *str; | ||
569 | ASN1_TIME atm; | ||
570 | time_t offset; | ||
571 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | ||
572 | int i,j; | ||
573 | |||
574 | p=buff1; | ||
575 | i=ctm->length; | ||
576 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | ||
577 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | ||
578 | { | ||
579 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0; | ||
580 | memcpy(p,str,10); | ||
581 | p+=10; | ||
582 | str+=10; | ||
583 | } | ||
584 | else | ||
585 | { | ||
586 | if (i < 13) return 0; | ||
587 | memcpy(p,str,12); | ||
588 | p+=12; | ||
589 | str+=12; | ||
590 | } | ||
591 | |||
592 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | ||
593 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | ||
594 | else | ||
595 | { | ||
596 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
597 | *(p++)= *(str++); | ||
598 | /* Skip any fractional seconds... */ | ||
599 | if (*str == '.') | ||
600 | { | ||
601 | str++; | ||
602 | while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++; | ||
603 | } | ||
604 | |||
605 | } | ||
606 | *(p++)='Z'; | ||
607 | *(p++)='\0'; | ||
608 | |||
609 | if (*str == 'Z') | ||
610 | offset=0; | ||
611 | else | ||
612 | { | ||
613 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) | ||
614 | return 0; | ||
615 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | ||
616 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | ||
617 | if (*str == '-') | ||
618 | offset= -offset; | ||
619 | } | ||
620 | atm.type=ctm->type; | ||
621 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | ||
622 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | ||
623 | |||
624 | X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time); | ||
625 | |||
626 | if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) | ||
627 | { | ||
628 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | ||
629 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | ||
630 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | ||
631 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | ||
632 | |||
633 | if (i < j) return -1; | ||
634 | if (i > j) return 1; | ||
635 | } | ||
636 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | ||
637 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | ||
638 | return -1; | ||
639 | else | ||
640 | return i; | ||
641 | } | ||
642 | |||
643 | ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) | ||
644 | { | ||
645 | return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); | ||
646 | } | ||
647 | |||
648 | ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm) | ||
649 | { | ||
650 | time_t t; | ||
651 | |||
652 | if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; | ||
653 | else time(&t); | ||
654 | |||
655 | t+=adj; | ||
656 | if (!s) return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t); | ||
657 | if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t); | ||
658 | return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t); | ||
659 | } | ||
660 | |||
661 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
662 | { | ||
663 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | ||
664 | int i,j; | ||
665 | |||
666 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; | ||
667 | |||
668 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
669 | { | ||
670 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); | ||
671 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
672 | { | ||
673 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | ||
674 | return 0; | ||
675 | } | ||
676 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | ||
677 | break; | ||
678 | else | ||
679 | { | ||
680 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
681 | ktmp=NULL; | ||
682 | } | ||
683 | } | ||
684 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
685 | { | ||
686 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | ||
687 | return 0; | ||
688 | } | ||
689 | |||
690 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | ||
691 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | ||
692 | { | ||
693 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); | ||
694 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | ||
695 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | ||
696 | } | ||
697 | |||
698 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | ||
699 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
700 | return 1; | ||
701 | } | ||
702 | |||
703 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | ||
704 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | ||
705 | { | ||
706 | x509_store_ctx_num++; | ||
707 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1, | ||
708 | &x509_store_ctx_method, | ||
709 | argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func); | ||
710 | } | ||
711 | |||
712 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) | ||
713 | { | ||
714 | return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data); | ||
715 | } | ||
716 | |||
717 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) | ||
718 | { | ||
719 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx); | ||
720 | } | ||
721 | |||
722 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
723 | { | ||
724 | return ctx->error; | ||
725 | } | ||
726 | |||
727 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | ||
728 | { | ||
729 | ctx->error=err; | ||
730 | } | ||
731 | |||
732 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
733 | { | ||
734 | return ctx->error_depth; | ||
735 | } | ||
736 | |||
737 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
738 | { | ||
739 | return ctx->current_cert; | ||
740 | } | ||
741 | |||
742 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
743 | { | ||
744 | return ctx->chain; | ||
745 | } | ||
746 | |||
747 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
748 | { | ||
749 | int i; | ||
750 | X509 *x; | ||
751 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | ||
752 | if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; | ||
753 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
754 | { | ||
755 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | ||
756 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
757 | } | ||
758 | return chain; | ||
759 | } | ||
760 | |||
761 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
762 | { | ||
763 | ctx->cert=x; | ||
764 | } | ||
765 | |||
766 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
767 | { | ||
768 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | ||
769 | } | ||
770 | |||
771 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) | ||
772 | { | ||
773 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | ||
774 | } | ||
775 | |||
776 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) | ||
777 | { | ||
778 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | ||
779 | } | ||
780 | |||
781 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust | ||
782 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | ||
783 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | ||
784 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | ||
785 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | ||
786 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | ||
787 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | ||
788 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | ||
789 | */ | ||
790 | |||
791 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | ||
792 | int purpose, int trust) | ||
793 | { | ||
794 | int idx; | ||
795 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | ||
796 | if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; | ||
797 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | ||
798 | if (purpose) | ||
799 | { | ||
800 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
801 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | ||
802 | if (idx == -1) | ||
803 | { | ||
804 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
805 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
806 | return 0; | ||
807 | } | ||
808 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
809 | if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) | ||
810 | { | ||
811 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | ||
812 | if (idx == -1) | ||
813 | { | ||
814 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
815 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
816 | return 0; | ||
817 | } | ||
818 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
819 | } | ||
820 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | ||
821 | if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; | ||
822 | } | ||
823 | if (trust) | ||
824 | { | ||
825 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | ||
826 | if (idx == -1) | ||
827 | { | ||
828 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
829 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | ||
830 | return 0; | ||
831 | } | ||
832 | } | ||
833 | |||
834 | if (purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose; | ||
835 | if (trust) ctx->trust = trust; | ||
836 | return 1; | ||
837 | } | ||
838 | |||
839 | X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) | ||
840 | { | ||
841 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
842 | ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
843 | if (ctx) memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX)); | ||
844 | return ctx; | ||
845 | } | ||
846 | |||
847 | void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
848 | { | ||
849 | X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); | ||
850 | OPENSSL_free(ctx); | ||
851 | } | ||
852 | |||
853 | void X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, | ||
854 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
855 | { | ||
856 | ctx->ctx=store; | ||
857 | ctx->current_method=0; | ||
858 | ctx->cert=x509; | ||
859 | ctx->untrusted=chain; | ||
860 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
861 | ctx->purpose=0; | ||
862 | ctx->trust=0; | ||
863 | ctx->check_time=0; | ||
864 | ctx->flags=0; | ||
865 | ctx->other_ctx=NULL; | ||
866 | ctx->valid=0; | ||
867 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
868 | ctx->depth=9; | ||
869 | ctx->error=0; | ||
870 | ctx->error_depth=0; | ||
871 | ctx->current_cert=NULL; | ||
872 | ctx->current_issuer=NULL; | ||
873 | ctx->check_issued = check_issued; | ||
874 | ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; | ||
875 | ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; | ||
876 | ctx->verify = store->verify; | ||
877 | ctx->cleanup = 0; | ||
878 | memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | ||
879 | } | ||
880 | |||
881 | /* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. | ||
882 | * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. | ||
883 | */ | ||
884 | |||
885 | void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
886 | { | ||
887 | ctx->other_ctx = sk; | ||
888 | ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; | ||
889 | } | ||
890 | |||
891 | void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
892 | { | ||
893 | if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx); | ||
894 | if (ctx->chain != NULL) | ||
895 | { | ||
896 | sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free); | ||
897 | ctx->chain=NULL; | ||
898 | } | ||
899 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(x509_store_ctx_method,ctx,&(ctx->ex_data)); | ||
900 | memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); | ||
901 | } | ||
902 | |||
903 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags) | ||
904 | { | ||
905 | ctx->flags |= flags; | ||
906 | } | ||
907 | |||
908 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t) | ||
909 | { | ||
910 | ctx->check_time = t; | ||
911 | ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME; | ||
912 | } | ||
913 | |||
914 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) | ||
915 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | ||
916 | |||
917 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | ||
918 | |||
919 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||
920 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||