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authorcvs2svn <admin@example.com>2005-03-12 00:02:08 +0000
committercvs2svn <admin@example.com>2005-03-12 00:02:08 +0000
commit259e36b1c57849c281afb8526bab11e7ba2592e2 (patch)
treed0e478b7669f593934b32e564b5611b40796a4b1 /src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
parent9a03506f8308b6023a12f108a2072feb958607a6 (diff)
downloadopenbsd-OPENBSD_3_7_BASE.tar.gz
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This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_3_7_BASE'.OPENBSD_3_7_BASE
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c1228
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1228 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
deleted file mode 100644
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@@ -1,1228 +0,0 @@
1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <time.h>
61#include <errno.h>
62
63#include "cryptlib.h"
64#include <openssl/crypto.h>
65#include <openssl/lhash.h>
66#include <openssl/buffer.h>
67#include <openssl/evp.h>
68#include <openssl/asn1.h>
69#include <openssl/x509.h>
70#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71#include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
82
83
84static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
85 {
86 return ok;
87 }
88
89#if 0
90static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
91 {
92 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
93 }
94#endif
95
96int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
97 {
98 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
99 X509_NAME *xn;
100 int depth,i,ok=0;
101 int num;
102 int (*cb)();
103 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
104
105 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
106 {
107 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
108 return -1;
109 }
110
111 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
112
113 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
114 * present and that the first entry is in place */
115 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
116 {
117 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
118 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
119 {
120 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
121 goto end;
122 }
123 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
124 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
125 }
126
127 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
128 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
129 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
130 {
131 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
132 goto end;
133 }
134
135 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
136 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
137 depth=ctx->depth;
138
139
140 for (;;)
141 {
142 /* If we have enough, we break */
143 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
144 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
145 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
146 * code later.
147 */
148
149 /* If we are self signed, we break */
150 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
151 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
152
153 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
154 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
155 {
156 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
157 if (xtmp != NULL)
158 {
159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
160 {
161 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
162 goto end;
163 }
164 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
165 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
166 ctx->last_untrusted++;
167 x=xtmp;
168 num++;
169 /* reparse the full chain for
170 * the next one */
171 continue;
172 }
173 }
174 break;
175 }
176
177 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
178 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
179 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
180
181 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
182 * is self signed.
183 */
184
185 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
186 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
187 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
188 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
189 {
190 /* we have a self signed certificate */
191 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
192 {
193 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
194 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
195 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
196 */
197 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
198 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
199 {
200 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
201 ctx->current_cert=x;
202 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
203 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
204 ok=cb(0,ctx);
205 if (!ok) goto end;
206 }
207 else
208 {
209 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
210 * so we get any trust settings.
211 */
212 X509_free(x);
213 x = xtmp;
214 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
215 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
216 }
217 }
218 else
219 {
220 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
221 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
222 ctx->last_untrusted--;
223 num--;
224 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
225 }
226 }
227
228 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
229 for (;;)
230 {
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 if (depth < num) break;
233
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
236 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
237
238 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
239
240 if (ok < 0) return ok;
241 if (ok == 0) break;
242
243 x = xtmp;
244 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
245 {
246 X509_free(xtmp);
247 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
248 return 0;
249 }
250 num++;
251 }
252
253 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
254 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
255
256 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
257 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
258 {
259 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
260 {
261 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
262 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
263 else
264 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
265 ctx->current_cert=x;
266 }
267 else
268 {
269
270 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
271 num++;
272 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
273 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
274 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
275 chain_ss=NULL;
276 }
277
278 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
279 ok=cb(0,ctx);
280 if (!ok) goto end;
281 }
282
283 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
284 if (ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx);
285
286 if (!ok) goto end;
287
288 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
289
290 if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
291
292 if (!ok) goto end;
293
294 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
295 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
296
297 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
298 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
299 */
300
301 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
302 if(!ok) goto end;
303
304 /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
305 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
306 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
307 else
308 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
309 if (0)
310 {
311end:
312 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
313 }
314 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
315 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
316 return ok;
317 }
318
319
320/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
321 */
322
323static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
324{
325 int i;
326 X509 *issuer;
327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
328 {
329 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
330 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
331 return issuer;
332 }
333 return NULL;
334}
335
336/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
337
338static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
339{
340 int ret;
341 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
342 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
343 return 1;
344 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
345 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
346 return 0;
347
348 ctx->error = ret;
349 ctx->current_cert = x;
350 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
351 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
352 return 0;
353}
354
355/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
356
357static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
358{
359 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
360 if (*issuer)
361 {
362 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
363 return 1;
364 }
365 else
366 return 0;
367}
368
369
370/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
371 * with the supplied purpose
372 */
373
374static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
375{
376#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
377 return 1;
378#else
379 int i, ok=0;
380 X509 *x;
381 int (*cb)();
382 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
383 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
384 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
385 {
386 int ret;
387 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
388 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
389 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
390 {
391 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
392 ctx->error_depth = i;
393 ctx->current_cert = x;
394 ok=cb(0,ctx);
395 if (!ok) goto end;
396 }
397 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i);
398 if ((ret == 0)
399 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
400 && (ret != 1)))
401 {
402 if (i)
403 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
404 else
405 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
406 ctx->error_depth = i;
407 ctx->current_cert = x;
408 ok=cb(0,ctx);
409 if (!ok) goto end;
410 }
411 /* Check pathlen */
412 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
413 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1)))
414 {
415 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
416 ctx->error_depth = i;
417 ctx->current_cert = x;
418 ok=cb(0,ctx);
419 if (!ok) goto end;
420 }
421 }
422 ok = 1;
423 end:
424 return ok;
425#endif
426}
427
428static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
429{
430#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
431 return 1;
432#else
433 int i, ok;
434 X509 *x;
435 int (*cb)();
436 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
437/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
438 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
439 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
440 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
441 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
442 return 1;
443 ctx->error_depth = i;
444 ctx->current_cert = x;
445 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
446 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
447 else
448 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
449 ok = cb(0, ctx);
450 return ok;
451#endif
452}
453
454static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455 {
456 int i, last, ok;
457 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
458 return 1;
459 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
460 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
461 else
462 last = 0;
463 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
464 {
465 ctx->error_depth = i;
466 ok = check_cert(ctx);
467 if (!ok) return ok;
468 }
469 return 1;
470 }
471
472static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
473 {
474 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
475 X509 *x;
476 int ok, cnum;
477 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
478 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
479 ctx->current_cert = x;
480 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
481 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
482 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
483 * notify callback
484 */
485 if(!ok)
486 {
487 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
488 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
489 goto err;
490 }
491 ctx->current_crl = crl;
492 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
493 if (!ok) goto err;
494 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
495 err:
496 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
497 X509_CRL_free(crl);
498 return ok;
499
500 }
501
502/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
503 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
504 * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
505 */
506static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
507 {
508 int ok;
509 X509_OBJECT xobj;
510 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
511 if (!ok) return 0;
512 *crl = xobj.data.crl;
513 return 1;
514 }
515
516/* Check CRL validity */
517static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
518 {
519 X509 *issuer = NULL;
520 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
521 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
522 time_t *ptime;
523 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
524 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
525 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
526 * is next certificate in chain.
527 */
528 if(cnum < chnum)
529 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
530 else
531 {
532 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
533 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
534 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
535 {
536 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
537 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
538 if(!ok) goto err;
539 }
540 }
541
542 if(issuer)
543 {
544 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
545 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
546 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
547 {
548 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
549 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
550 if(!ok) goto err;
551 }
552
553 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
554 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
555
556 if(!ikey)
557 {
558 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
559 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
560 if (!ok) goto err;
561 }
562 else
563 {
564 /* Verify CRL signature */
565 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
566 {
567 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
568 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
569 if (!ok) goto err;
570 }
571 }
572 }
573
574 /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
575 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
576 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
577 else
578 ptime = NULL;
579
580 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
581 if (i == 0)
582 {
583 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
584 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
585 if (!ok) goto err;
586 }
587
588 if (i > 0)
589 {
590 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
591 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
592 if (!ok) goto err;
593 }
594
595 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
596 {
597 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
598
599 if (i == 0)
600 {
601 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
602 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
603 if (!ok) goto err;
604 }
605
606 if (i < 0)
607 {
608 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
609 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
610 if (!ok) goto err;
611 }
612 }
613
614 ok = 1;
615
616 err:
617 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
618 return ok;
619 }
620
621/* Check certificate against CRL */
622static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
623 {
624 int idx, ok;
625 X509_REVOKED rtmp;
626 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
627 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
628 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
629 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
630 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
631 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
632 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
633 */
634 if(idx >= 0)
635 {
636 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
637 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
638 if (!ok) return 0;
639 }
640
641 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
642 return 1;
643
644 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
645 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
646 * rejected.
647 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
648 * shouldn't do this.
649 */
650
651 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
652
653 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
654 {
655 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
656 if (ext->critical > 0)
657 {
658 ctx->error =
659 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
660 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
661 if(!ok) return 0;
662 break;
663 }
664 }
665 return 1;
666 }
667
668static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
669 {
670 int i,ok=0,n;
671 X509 *xs,*xi;
672 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
673 time_t *ptime;
674 int (*cb)();
675
676 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
677
678 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
679 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
680 n--;
681 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
682 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
683 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
684 else
685 ptime = NULL;
686 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
687 xs=xi;
688 else
689 {
690 if (n <= 0)
691 {
692 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
693 ctx->current_cert=xi;
694 ok=cb(0,ctx);
695 goto end;
696 }
697 else
698 {
699 n--;
700 ctx->error_depth=n;
701 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
702 }
703 }
704
705/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
706 while (n >= 0)
707 {
708 ctx->error_depth=n;
709 if (!xs->valid)
710 {
711 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
712 {
713 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
714 ctx->current_cert=xi;
715 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
716 if (!ok) goto end;
717 }
718 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
719 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
720 * this is a waste of time. That check should
721 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
722 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
723 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
724 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
725 * been declared trusted. */
726 {
727 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
728 ctx->current_cert=xs;
729 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
730 if (!ok)
731 {
732 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
733 goto end;
734 }
735 }
736 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
737 pkey=NULL;
738
739 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
740 if (i == 0)
741 {
742 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
743 ctx->current_cert=xs;
744 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
745 if (!ok) goto end;
746 }
747 if (i > 0)
748 {
749 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
750 ctx->current_cert=xs;
751 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
752 if (!ok) goto end;
753 }
754 xs->valid=1;
755 }
756
757 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
758 if (i == 0)
759 {
760 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
761 ctx->current_cert=xs;
762 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
763 if (!ok) goto end;
764 }
765
766 if (i < 0)
767 {
768 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
769 ctx->current_cert=xs;
770 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
771 if (!ok) goto end;
772 }
773
774 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
775 ctx->current_cert=xs;
776 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
777 if (!ok) goto end;
778
779 n--;
780 if (n >= 0)
781 {
782 xi=xs;
783 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
784 }
785 }
786 ok=1;
787end:
788 return ok;
789 }
790
791int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
792{
793 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
794}
795
796int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
797 {
798 char *str;
799 ASN1_TIME atm;
800 long offset;
801 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
802 int i,j;
803
804 p=buff1;
805 i=ctm->length;
806 str=(char *)ctm->data;
807 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
808 {
809 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
810 memcpy(p,str,10);
811 p+=10;
812 str+=10;
813 }
814 else
815 {
816 if (i < 13) return 0;
817 memcpy(p,str,12);
818 p+=12;
819 str+=12;
820 }
821
822 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
823 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
824 else
825 {
826 *(p++)= *(str++);
827 *(p++)= *(str++);
828 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
829 if (*str == '.')
830 {
831 str++;
832 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
833 }
834
835 }
836 *(p++)='Z';
837 *(p++)='\0';
838
839 if (*str == 'Z')
840 offset=0;
841 else
842 {
843 if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
844 return 0;
845 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
846 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
847 if (*str == '-')
848 offset= -offset;
849 }
850 atm.type=ctm->type;
851 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
852 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
853
854 X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time);
855
856 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
857 {
858 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
859 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
860 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
861 if (j < 50) j+=100;
862
863 if (i < j) return -1;
864 if (i > j) return 1;
865 }
866 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
867 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
868 return -1;
869 else
870 return i;
871 }
872
873ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
874{
875 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
876}
877
878ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
879 {
880 time_t t;
881 int type = -1;
882
883 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
884 else time(&t);
885
886 t+=adj;
887 if (s) type = s->type;
888 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
889 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
890 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
891 }
892
893int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
894 {
895 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
896 int i,j;
897
898 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
899
900 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
901 {
902 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
903 if (ktmp == NULL)
904 {
905 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
906 return 0;
907 }
908 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
909 break;
910 else
911 {
912 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
913 ktmp=NULL;
914 }
915 }
916 if (ktmp == NULL)
917 {
918 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
919 return 0;
920 }
921
922 /* first, populate the other certs */
923 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
924 {
925 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
926 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
927 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
928 }
929
930 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
931 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
932 return 1;
933 }
934
935int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
936 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
937 {
938 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
939 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
940 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
941 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
942 }
943
944int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
945 {
946 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
947 }
948
949void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
950 {
951 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
952 }
953
954int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
955 {
956 return ctx->error;
957 }
958
959void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
960 {
961 ctx->error=err;
962 }
963
964int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
965 {
966 return ctx->error_depth;
967 }
968
969X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
970 {
971 return ctx->current_cert;
972 }
973
974STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
975 {
976 return ctx->chain;
977 }
978
979STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
980 {
981 int i;
982 X509 *x;
983 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
984 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
985 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
986 {
987 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
988 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
989 }
990 return chain;
991 }
992
993void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
994 {
995 ctx->cert=x;
996 }
997
998void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
999 {
1000 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1001 }
1002
1003int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1004 {
1005 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1006 }
1007
1008int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1009 {
1010 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1011 }
1012
1013/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1014 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1015 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1016 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1017 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1018 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1019 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1020 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1021 */
1022
1023int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1024 int purpose, int trust)
1025{
1026 int idx;
1027 /* If purpose not set use default */
1028 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1029 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1030 if (purpose)
1031 {
1032 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1033 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1034 if (idx == -1)
1035 {
1036 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1037 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1038 return 0;
1039 }
1040 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1041 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1042 {
1043 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1044 if (idx == -1)
1045 {
1046 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1047 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1048 return 0;
1049 }
1050 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1051 }
1052 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1053 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1054 }
1055 if (trust)
1056 {
1057 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1058 if (idx == -1)
1059 {
1060 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1061 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1062 return 0;
1063 }
1064 }
1065
1066 if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
1067 if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
1068 return 1;
1069}
1070
1071X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1072{
1073 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1074 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1075 if (!ctx)
1076 {
1077 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1078 return NULL;
1079 }
1080 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1081 return ctx;
1082}
1083
1084void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1085{
1086 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1087 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1088}
1089
1090int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1091 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1092 {
1093 ctx->ctx=store;
1094 ctx->current_method=0;
1095 ctx->cert=x509;
1096 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1097 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1098 ctx->check_time=0;
1099 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1100 ctx->valid=0;
1101 ctx->chain=NULL;
1102 ctx->depth=9;
1103 ctx->error=0;
1104 ctx->error_depth=0;
1105 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1106 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1107
1108 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1109 * use defaults.
1110 */
1111
1112
1113 if (store)
1114 {
1115 ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
1116 ctx->trust=store->trust;
1117 ctx->flags = store->flags;
1118 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1119 }
1120 else
1121 {
1122 ctx->purpose = 0;
1123 ctx->trust = 0;
1124 ctx->flags = 0;
1125 ctx->cleanup = 0;
1126 }
1127
1128 if (store && store->check_issued)
1129 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1130 else
1131 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1132
1133 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1134 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1135 else
1136 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1137
1138 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1139 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1140 else
1141 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1142
1143 if (store && store->verify)
1144 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1145 else
1146 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1147
1148 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1149 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1150 else
1151 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1152
1153 if (store && store->get_crl)
1154 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1155 else
1156 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1157
1158 if (store && store->check_crl)
1159 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1160 else
1161 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1162
1163 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1164 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1165 else
1166 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1167
1168
1169 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1170 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1171 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1172 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1173 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1174 &(ctx->ex_data)))
1175 {
1176 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1177 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1178 return 0;
1179 }
1180 return 1;
1181 }
1182
1183/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1184 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1185 */
1186
1187void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1188{
1189 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1190 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1191}
1192
1193void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1194 {
1195 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1196 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1197 {
1198 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1199 ctx->chain=NULL;
1200 }
1201 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1202 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1203 }
1204
1205void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
1206 {
1207 ctx->flags |= flags;
1208 }
1209
1210void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
1211 {
1212 ctx->check_time = t;
1213 ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
1214 }
1215
1216void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1217 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1218 {
1219 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1220 }
1221
1222IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1223IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1224
1225IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1226
1227IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1228IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-14 10:49:14 +0000