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authorcvs2svn <admin@example.com>2008-02-26 10:48:17 +0000
committercvs2svn <admin@example.com>2008-02-26 10:48:17 +0000
commitf73a33b004c9c6281768846f2609a4496ce518a3 (patch)
treecd1f342f086d6b52c792f34136f57e906cf705e8 /src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
parentb89c0dd40131bd782fa134e50e256db35c015e98 (diff)
downloadopenbsd-OPENBSD_4_3_BASE.tar.gz
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This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_4_3_BASE'.OPENBSD_4_3_BASE
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c1333
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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
deleted file mode 100644
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--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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@@ -1,1333 +0,0 @@
1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <time.h>
61#include <errno.h>
62
63#include "cryptlib.h"
64#include <openssl/crypto.h>
65#include <openssl/lhash.h>
66#include <openssl/buffer.h>
67#include <openssl/evp.h>
68#include <openssl/asn1.h>
69#include <openssl/x509.h>
70#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71#include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
74static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
75static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
76static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
77static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
78static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
79static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
80static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
81const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
82
83
84static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
85 {
86 return ok;
87 }
88
89#if 0
90static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
91 {
92 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
93 }
94#endif
95
96int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
97 {
98 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
99 X509_NAME *xn;
100 int depth,i,ok=0;
101 int num;
102 int (*cb)();
103 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
104
105 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
106 {
107 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
108 return -1;
109 }
110
111 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
112
113 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
114 * present and that the first entry is in place */
115 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
116 {
117 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
118 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
119 {
120 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
121 goto end;
122 }
123 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
124 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
125 }
126
127 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
128 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
129 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
130 {
131 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
132 goto end;
133 }
134
135 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
136 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
137 depth=ctx->depth;
138
139
140 for (;;)
141 {
142 /* If we have enough, we break */
143 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
144 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
145 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
146 * code later.
147 */
148
149 /* If we are self signed, we break */
150 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
151 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
152
153 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
154 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
155 {
156 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
157 if (xtmp != NULL)
158 {
159 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
160 {
161 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
162 goto end;
163 }
164 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
165 sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
166 ctx->last_untrusted++;
167 x=xtmp;
168 num++;
169 /* reparse the full chain for
170 * the next one */
171 continue;
172 }
173 }
174 break;
175 }
176
177 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
178 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
179 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
180
181 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
182 * is self signed.
183 */
184
185 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
186 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
187 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
188 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
189 {
190 /* we have a self signed certificate */
191 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
192 {
193 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
194 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
195 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
196 */
197 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
198 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
199 {
200 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
201 ctx->current_cert=x;
202 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
203 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
204 ok=cb(0,ctx);
205 if (!ok) goto end;
206 }
207 else
208 {
209 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
210 * so we get any trust settings.
211 */
212 X509_free(x);
213 x = xtmp;
214 sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
215 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
216 }
217 }
218 else
219 {
220 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
221 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
222 ctx->last_untrusted--;
223 num--;
224 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
225 }
226 }
227
228 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
229 for (;;)
230 {
231 /* If we have enough, we break */
232 if (depth < num) break;
233
234 /* If we are self signed, we break */
235 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
236 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
237
238 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
239
240 if (ok < 0) return ok;
241 if (ok == 0) break;
242
243 x = xtmp;
244 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
245 {
246 X509_free(xtmp);
247 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
248 return 0;
249 }
250 num++;
251 }
252
253 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
254 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
255
256 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
257 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
258 {
259 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
260 {
261 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
262 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
263 else
264 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
265 ctx->current_cert=x;
266 }
267 else
268 {
269
270 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
271 num++;
272 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
273 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
274 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
275 chain_ss=NULL;
276 }
277
278 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
279 ok=cb(0,ctx);
280 if (!ok) goto end;
281 }
282
283 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
284 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
285
286 if (!ok) goto end;
287
288 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
289
290 if (ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
291
292 if (!ok) goto end;
293
294 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
295 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
296
297 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
298 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
299 */
300
301 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
302 if(!ok) goto end;
303
304 /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
305 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
306 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
307 else
308 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
309 if (0)
310 {
311end:
312 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
313 }
314 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
315 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
316 return ok;
317 }
318
319
320/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
321 */
322
323static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
324{
325 int i;
326 X509 *issuer;
327 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
328 {
329 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
330 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
331 return issuer;
332 }
333 return NULL;
334}
335
336/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
337
338static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
339{
340 int ret;
341 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
342 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
343 return 1;
344 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
345 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
346 return 0;
347
348 ctx->error = ret;
349 ctx->current_cert = x;
350 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
351 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
352 return 0;
353}
354
355/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
356
357static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
358{
359 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
360 if (*issuer)
361 {
362 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
363 return 1;
364 }
365 else
366 return 0;
367}
368
369
370/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
371 * with the supplied purpose
372 */
373
374static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
375{
376#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
377 return 1;
378#else
379 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca;
380 X509 *x;
381 int (*cb)();
382 int proxy_path_length = 0;
383 int allow_proxy_certs = !!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
384 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
385
386 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
387 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
388 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
389 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
390 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
391 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
392 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
393 */
394 must_be_ca = -1;
395
396 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their software
397 happy */
398 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
399 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
400
401 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
402 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
403 {
404 int ret;
405 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
406 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
407 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
408 {
409 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
410 ctx->error_depth = i;
411 ctx->current_cert = x;
412 ok=cb(0,ctx);
413 if (!ok) goto end;
414 }
415 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
416 {
417 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
418 ctx->error_depth = i;
419 ctx->current_cert = x;
420 ok=cb(0,ctx);
421 if (!ok) goto end;
422 }
423 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
424 switch(must_be_ca)
425 {
426 case -1:
427 if ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
428 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
429 {
430 ret = 0;
431 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
432 }
433 else
434 ret = 1;
435 break;
436 case 0:
437 if (ret != 0)
438 {
439 ret = 0;
440 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
441 }
442 else
443 ret = 1;
444 break;
445 default:
446 if ((ret == 0)
447 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
448 && (ret != 1)))
449 {
450 ret = 0;
451 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
452 }
453 else
454 ret = 1;
455 break;
456 }
457 if (ret == 0)
458 {
459 ctx->error_depth = i;
460 ctx->current_cert = x;
461 ok=cb(0,ctx);
462 if (!ok) goto end;
463 }
464 if (ctx->purpose > 0)
465 {
466 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose,
467 must_be_ca > 0);
468 if ((ret == 0)
469 || ((ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
470 && (ret != 1)))
471 {
472 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
473 ctx->error_depth = i;
474 ctx->current_cert = x;
475 ok=cb(0,ctx);
476 if (!ok) goto end;
477 }
478 }
479 /* Check pathlen */
480 if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
481 && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
482 {
483 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
484 ctx->error_depth = i;
485 ctx->current_cert = x;
486 ok=cb(0,ctx);
487 if (!ok) goto end;
488 }
489 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
490 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
491 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
492 CA certificate. */
493 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
494 {
495 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci =
496 X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo,
497 NULL, NULL);
498 if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint &&
499 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint)
500 < i)
501 {
502 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
503 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
504 ctx->error_depth = i;
505 ctx->current_cert = x;
506 ok=cb(0,ctx);
507 if (!ok) goto end;
508 }
509 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
510 proxy_path_length++;
511 must_be_ca = 0;
512 }
513 else
514 must_be_ca = 1;
515 }
516 ok = 1;
517 end:
518 return ok;
519#endif
520}
521
522static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
523{
524#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
525 return 1;
526#else
527 int i, ok;
528 X509 *x;
529 int (*cb)();
530 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
531/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
532 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
533 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
534 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0);
535 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
536 return 1;
537 ctx->error_depth = i;
538 ctx->current_cert = x;
539 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
540 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
541 else
542 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
543 ok = cb(0, ctx);
544 return ok;
545#endif
546}
547
548static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
549 {
550 int i, last, ok;
551 if (!(ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
552 return 1;
553 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
554 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
555 else
556 last = 0;
557 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
558 {
559 ctx->error_depth = i;
560 ok = check_cert(ctx);
561 if (!ok) return ok;
562 }
563 return 1;
564 }
565
566static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
567 {
568 X509_CRL *crl = NULL;
569 X509 *x;
570 int ok, cnum;
571 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
572 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
573 ctx->current_cert = x;
574 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
575 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
576 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
577 * notify callback
578 */
579 if(!ok)
580 {
581 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
582 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
583 goto err;
584 }
585 ctx->current_crl = crl;
586 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
587 if (!ok) goto err;
588 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
589 err:
590 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
591 X509_CRL_free(crl);
592 return ok;
593
594 }
595
596/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to certificate: currently just a
597 * subject lookup: maybe use AKID later...
598 * Also might look up any included CRLs too (e.g PKCS#7 signedData).
599 */
600static int get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **crl, X509 *x)
601 {
602 int ok;
603 X509_OBJECT xobj;
604 ok = X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx, X509_LU_CRL, X509_get_issuer_name(x), &xobj);
605 if (!ok) return 0;
606 *crl = xobj.data.crl;
607 return 1;
608 }
609
610/* Check CRL validity */
611static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
612 {
613 X509 *issuer = NULL;
614 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
615 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum, i;
616 time_t *ptime;
617 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
618 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
619 /* Find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
620 * is next certificate in chain.
621 */
622 if(cnum < chnum)
623 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
624 else
625 {
626 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
627 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
628 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
629 {
630 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
631 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
632 if(!ok) goto err;
633 }
634 }
635
636 if(issuer)
637 {
638 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
639 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
640 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
641 {
642 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
643 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
644 if(!ok) goto err;
645 }
646
647 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
648 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
649
650 if(!ikey)
651 {
652 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
653 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
654 if (!ok) goto err;
655 }
656 else
657 {
658 /* Verify CRL signature */
659 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
660 {
661 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
662 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
663 if (!ok) goto err;
664 }
665 }
666 }
667
668 /* OK, CRL signature valid check times */
669 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
670 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
671 else
672 ptime = NULL;
673
674 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
675 if (i == 0)
676 {
677 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
678 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
679 if (!ok) goto err;
680 }
681
682 if (i > 0)
683 {
684 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
685 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
686 if (!ok) goto err;
687 }
688
689 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
690 {
691 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
692
693 if (i == 0)
694 {
695 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
696 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
697 if (!ok) goto err;
698 }
699
700 if (i < 0)
701 {
702 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
703 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
704 if (!ok) goto err;
705 }
706 }
707
708 ok = 1;
709
710 err:
711 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
712 return ok;
713 }
714
715/* Check certificate against CRL */
716static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
717 {
718 int idx, ok;
719 X509_REVOKED rtmp;
720 STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts;
721 X509_EXTENSION *ext;
722 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL */
723 rtmp.serialNumber = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
724 /* Sort revoked into serial number order if not already sorted.
725 * Do this under a lock to avoid race condition.
726 */
727 if (!sk_X509_REVOKED_is_sorted(crl->crl->revoked))
728 {
729 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
730 sk_X509_REVOKED_sort(crl->crl->revoked);
731 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
732 }
733 idx = sk_X509_REVOKED_find(crl->crl->revoked, &rtmp);
734 /* If found assume revoked: want something cleverer than
735 * this to handle entry extensions in V2 CRLs.
736 */
737 if(idx >= 0)
738 {
739 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
740 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
741 if (!ok) return 0;
742 }
743
744 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
745 return 1;
746
747 /* See if we have any critical CRL extensions: since we
748 * currently don't handle any CRL extensions the CRL must be
749 * rejected.
750 * This code accesses the X509_CRL structure directly: applications
751 * shouldn't do this.
752 */
753
754 exts = crl->crl->extensions;
755
756 for (idx = 0; idx < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); idx++)
757 {
758 ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, idx);
759 if (ext->critical > 0)
760 {
761 ctx->error =
762 X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
763 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
764 if(!ok) return 0;
765 break;
766 }
767 }
768 return 1;
769 }
770
771static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
772 {
773 int i,ok=0,n;
774 X509 *xs,*xi;
775 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
776 time_t *ptime;
777 int (*cb)();
778
779 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
780
781 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
782 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
783 n--;
784 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
785 if (ctx->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
786 ptime = &ctx->check_time;
787 else
788 ptime = NULL;
789 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
790 xs=xi;
791 else
792 {
793 if (n <= 0)
794 {
795 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
796 ctx->current_cert=xi;
797 ok=cb(0,ctx);
798 goto end;
799 }
800 else
801 {
802 n--;
803 ctx->error_depth=n;
804 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
805 }
806 }
807
808/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
809 while (n >= 0)
810 {
811 ctx->error_depth=n;
812 if (!xs->valid)
813 {
814 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
815 {
816 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
817 ctx->current_cert=xi;
818 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
819 if (!ok) goto end;
820 }
821 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
822 /* XXX For the final trusted self-signed cert,
823 * this is a waste of time. That check should
824 * optional so that e.g. 'openssl x509' can be
825 * used to detect invalid self-signatures, but
826 * we don't verify again and again in SSL
827 * handshakes and the like once the cert has
828 * been declared trusted. */
829 {
830 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
831 ctx->current_cert=xs;
832 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
833 if (!ok)
834 {
835 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
836 goto end;
837 }
838 }
839 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
840 pkey=NULL;
841
842 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs), ptime);
843 if (i == 0)
844 {
845 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
846 ctx->current_cert=xs;
847 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
848 if (!ok) goto end;
849 }
850 if (i > 0)
851 {
852 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
853 ctx->current_cert=xs;
854 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
855 if (!ok) goto end;
856 }
857 xs->valid=1;
858 }
859
860 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs), ptime);
861 if (i == 0)
862 {
863 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
864 ctx->current_cert=xs;
865 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
866 if (!ok) goto end;
867 }
868
869 if (i < 0)
870 {
871 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
872 ctx->current_cert=xs;
873 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
874 if (!ok) goto end;
875 }
876
877 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
878 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
879 ctx->current_cert=xs;
880 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
881 if (!ok) goto end;
882
883 n--;
884 if (n >= 0)
885 {
886 xi=xs;
887 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
888 }
889 }
890 ok=1;
891end:
892 return ok;
893 }
894
895int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm)
896{
897 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
898}
899
900int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
901 {
902 char *str;
903 ASN1_TIME atm;
904 long offset;
905 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
906 int i,j;
907
908 p=buff1;
909 i=ctm->length;
910 str=(char *)ctm->data;
911 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
912 {
913 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
914 memcpy(p,str,10);
915 p+=10;
916 str+=10;
917 }
918 else
919 {
920 if (i < 13) return 0;
921 memcpy(p,str,12);
922 p+=12;
923 str+=12;
924 }
925
926 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
927 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
928 else
929 {
930 *(p++)= *(str++);
931 *(p++)= *(str++);
932 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
933 if (*str == '.')
934 {
935 str++;
936 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
937 }
938
939 }
940 *(p++)='Z';
941 *(p++)='\0';
942
943 if (*str == 'Z')
944 offset=0;
945 else
946 {
947 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
948 return 0;
949 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
950 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
951 if (*str == '-')
952 offset= -offset;
953 }
954 atm.type=ctm->type;
955 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
956 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
957
958 if (X509_time_adj(&atm,-offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
959 return 0;
960
961 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
962 {
963 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
964 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
965 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
966 if (j < 50) j+=100;
967
968 if (i < j) return -1;
969 if (i > j) return 1;
970 }
971 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
972 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
973 return -1;
974 else
975 return i;
976 }
977
978ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
979{
980 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
981}
982
983ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *in_tm)
984 {
985 time_t t;
986 int type = -1;
987
988 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
989 else time(&t);
990
991 t+=adj;
992 if (s) type = s->type;
993 if (type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t);
994 if (type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(s, t);
995 return ASN1_TIME_set(s, t);
996 }
997
998int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
999 {
1000 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1001 int i,j;
1002
1003 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1004
1005 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1006 {
1007 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1008 if (ktmp == NULL)
1009 {
1010 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1011 return 0;
1012 }
1013 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1014 break;
1015 else
1016 {
1017 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1018 ktmp=NULL;
1019 }
1020 }
1021 if (ktmp == NULL)
1022 {
1023 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1024 return 0;
1025 }
1026
1027 /* first, populate the other certs */
1028 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1029 {
1030 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1031 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1032 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1033 }
1034
1035 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1036 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1037 return 1;
1038 }
1039
1040int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1041 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1042 {
1043 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1044 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1045 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1046 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1047 }
1048
1049int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1050 {
1051 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1052 }
1053
1054void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1055 {
1056 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1057 }
1058
1059int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1060 {
1061 return ctx->error;
1062 }
1063
1064void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1065 {
1066 ctx->error=err;
1067 }
1068
1069int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1070 {
1071 return ctx->error_depth;
1072 }
1073
1074X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1075 {
1076 return ctx->current_cert;
1077 }
1078
1079STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1080 {
1081 return ctx->chain;
1082 }
1083
1084STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1085 {
1086 int i;
1087 X509 *x;
1088 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1089 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1090 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1091 {
1092 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1093 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1094 }
1095 return chain;
1096 }
1097
1098void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1099 {
1100 ctx->cert=x;
1101 }
1102
1103void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1104 {
1105 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1106 }
1107
1108int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1109 {
1110 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1111 }
1112
1113int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1114 {
1115 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1116 }
1117
1118/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1119 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1120 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1121 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1122 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1123 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1124 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1125 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1126 */
1127
1128int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1129 int purpose, int trust)
1130{
1131 int idx;
1132 /* If purpose not set use default */
1133 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1134 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1135 if (purpose)
1136 {
1137 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1138 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1139 if (idx == -1)
1140 {
1141 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1142 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1143 return 0;
1144 }
1145 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1146 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1147 {
1148 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1149 if (idx == -1)
1150 {
1151 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1152 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1153 return 0;
1154 }
1155 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1156 }
1157 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1158 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1159 }
1160 if (trust)
1161 {
1162 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1163 if (idx == -1)
1164 {
1165 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1166 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1167 return 0;
1168 }
1169 }
1170
1171 if (purpose && !ctx->purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose;
1172 if (trust && !ctx->trust) ctx->trust = trust;
1173 return 1;
1174}
1175
1176X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1177{
1178 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1179 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1180 if (!ctx)
1181 {
1182 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1183 return NULL;
1184 }
1185 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1186 return ctx;
1187}
1188
1189void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1190{
1191 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1192 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1193}
1194
1195int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1196 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1197 {
1198 ctx->ctx=store;
1199 ctx->current_method=0;
1200 ctx->cert=x509;
1201 ctx->untrusted=chain;
1202 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
1203 ctx->check_time=0;
1204 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
1205 ctx->valid=0;
1206 ctx->chain=NULL;
1207 ctx->depth=9;
1208 ctx->error=0;
1209 ctx->error_depth=0;
1210 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
1211 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
1212
1213 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
1214 * use defaults.
1215 */
1216
1217
1218 if (store)
1219 {
1220 ctx->purpose=store->purpose;
1221 ctx->trust=store->trust;
1222 ctx->flags = store->flags;
1223 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
1224 }
1225 else
1226 {
1227 ctx->purpose = 0;
1228 ctx->trust = 0;
1229 ctx->flags = 0;
1230 ctx->cleanup = 0;
1231 }
1232
1233 if (store && store->check_issued)
1234 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1235 else
1236 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1237
1238 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1239 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1240 else
1241 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1242
1243 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1244 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1245 else
1246 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1247
1248 if (store && store->verify)
1249 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1250 else
1251 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1252
1253 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1254 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1255 else
1256 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
1257
1258 if (store && store->get_crl)
1259 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
1260 else
1261 ctx->get_crl = get_crl;
1262
1263 if (store && store->check_crl)
1264 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
1265 else
1266 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
1267
1268 if (store && store->cert_crl)
1269 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
1270 else
1271 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
1272
1273
1274 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
1275 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
1276 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
1277 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
1278 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
1279 &(ctx->ex_data)))
1280 {
1281 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1282 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1283 return 0;
1284 }
1285 return 1;
1286 }
1287
1288/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
1289 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
1290 */
1291
1292void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1293{
1294 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
1295 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
1296}
1297
1298void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1299 {
1300 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
1301 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
1302 {
1303 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
1304 ctx->chain=NULL;
1305 }
1306 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
1307 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
1308 }
1309
1310void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags)
1311 {
1312 ctx->flags |= flags;
1313 }
1314
1315void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, long flags, time_t t)
1316 {
1317 ctx->check_time = t;
1318 ctx->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME;
1319 }
1320
1321void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1322 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
1323 {
1324 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
1325 }
1326
1327IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
1328IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
1329
1330IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
1331
1332IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
1333IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2026-01-08 19:35:16 +0000