Import of SSLeay-0.9.0b with RSA and IDEA stubbed + OpenBSD build

functionality for shared libs.

Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.

Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.

1 files changed, 704 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1be91edba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@
+/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include "lhash.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "evp.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "objects.h"
+#include "pem.h"
+
+#ifndef NOPROTO
+static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
+static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
+#else
+static int null_callback();
+static int internal_verify();
+#endif
+
+char *X509_version="X509 part of SSLeay 0.9.0b 29-Jun-1998";
+static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL;
+static int x509_store_ctx_num=0;
+#if 0
+static int x509_store_num=1;
+static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL;
+#endif
+
+static int null_callback(ok,e)
+int ok;
+X509_STORE_CTX *e;
+        {
+        return(ok);
+        }
+
+#if 0
+static int x509_subject_cmp(a,b)
+X509 **a,**b;
+        {
+        return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b));
+        }
+#endif
+
+int X509_verify_cert(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
+        X509_NAME *xn;
+        X509_OBJECT obj;
+        int depth,i,ok=0;
+        int num;
+        int (*cb)();
+        STACK *sktmp=NULL;
+
+        if (ctx->cert == NULL)
+                {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
+                return(-1);
+                }
+
+        cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+        if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+
+        /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
+         * present and that the first entry is in place */
+        if (ctx->chain == NULL)
+                {
+                if (    ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) ||
+                        (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert)))
+                        {
+                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                ctx->last_untrusted=1;
+                }
+
+        /* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */
+        if ((ctx->untrusted != NULL) && (sktmp=sk_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
+                {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                goto end;
+                }
+
+        num=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+        x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+        depth=ctx->depth;
+
+
+        for (;;)
+                {
+                /* If we have enough, we break */
+                if (depth <= num) break;
+
+                /* If we are self signed, we break */
+                xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+                if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
+                if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
+                        {
+                        xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn);
+                        if (xtmp != NULL)
+                                {
+                                if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp))
+                                        {
+                                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                                        goto end;
+                                        }
+                                CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+                                sk_delete_ptr(sktmp,(char *)xtmp);
+                                ctx->last_untrusted++;
+                                x=xtmp;
+                                num++;
+                                /* reparse the full chain for
+                                 * the next one */
+                                continue;
+                                }
+                        }
+                break;
+                }
+
+        /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
+         * certificates.  We now need to add at least one trusted one,
+         * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
+
+        i=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+        x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x))
+                == 0)
+                {
+                /* we have a self signed certificate */
+                if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
+                        {
+                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
+                        ctx->current_cert=x;
+                        ctx->error_depth=i-1;
+                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
+                        if (!ok) goto end;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        /* worry more about this one elsewhere */
+                        chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain);
+                        ctx->last_untrusted--;
+                        num--;
+                        x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
+                        }
+                }
+
+        /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
+        for (;;)
+                {
+                /* If we have enough, we break */
+                if (depth <= num) break;
+
+                /* If we are self signed, we break */
+                xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+                if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj);
+                if (ok != X509_LU_X509)
+                        {
+                        if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY)
+                                {
+                                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+                                X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY);
+                                return(ok);
+                                }
+                        else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL)
+                                {
+                                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+                                /* not good :-(, break anyway */
+                                return(ok);
+                                }
+                        break;
+                        }
+                x=obj.data.x509;
+                if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509))
+                        {
+                        X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj);
+                        X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                num++;
+                }
+
+        /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
+        xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0)
+                {
+                if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0))
+                        {
+                        if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
+                        else
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
+                        ctx->current_cert=x;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+
+                        sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss);
+                        num++;
+                        ctx->last_untrusted=num;
+                        ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
+                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
+                        chain_ss=NULL;
+                        }
+
+                ctx->error_depth=num-1;
+                ok=cb(0,ctx);
+                if (!ok) goto end;
+                }
+
+        /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
+        X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
+
+        /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */
+        if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL)
+                ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx);
+        else
+                ok=internal_verify(ctx);
+end:
+        if (sktmp != NULL) sk_free(sktmp);
+        if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
+        return(ok);
+        }
+
+static int internal_verify(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        int i,ok=0,n;
+        X509 *xs,*xi;
+        EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
+        int (*cb)();
+
+        cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb;
+        if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback;
+
+        n=sk_num(ctx->chain);
+        ctx->error_depth=n-1;
+        n--;
+        xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+        if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi),
+                X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0)
+                xs=xi;
+        else
+                {
+                if (n <= 0)
+                        {
+                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
+                        ctx->current_cert=xi;
+                        ok=cb(0,ctx);
+                        goto end;
+                        }
+                else
+                        {
+                        n--;
+                        ctx->error_depth=n;
+                        xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+                        }
+                }
+
+/*      ctx->error=0;  not needed */
+        while (n >= 0)
+                {
+                ctx->error_depth=n;
+                if (!xs->valid)
+                        {
+                        if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
+                                {
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
+                                ctx->current_cert=xi;
+                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                                if (!ok) goto end;
+                                }
+                        if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
+                                {
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
+                                ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                                if (!ok) goto end;
+                                }
+                        pkey=NULL;
+
+                        i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs));
+                        if (i == 0)
+                                {
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
+                                ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                                if (!ok) goto end;
+                                }
+                        if (i > 0)
+                                {
+                                ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
+                                ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                                ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                                if (!ok) goto end;
+                                }
+                        xs->valid=1;
+                        }
+
+                i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs));
+                if (i == 0)
+                        {
+                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
+                        ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                        ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                        if (!ok) goto end;
+                        }
+
+                if (i < 0)
+                        {
+                        ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
+                        ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                        ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
+                        if (!ok) goto end;
+                        }
+
+                /* CRL CHECK */
+
+                /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
+                ctx->current_cert=xs;
+                ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
+                if (!ok) goto end;
+
+                n--;
+                if (n >= 0)
+                        {
+                        xi=xs;
+                        xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n);
+                        }
+                }
+        ok=1;
+end:
+        return(ok);
+        }
+
+int X509_cmp_current_time(ctm)
+ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm;
+        {
+        char *str;
+        ASN1_UTCTIME atm;
+        time_t offset;
+        char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
+        int i,j;
+
+        p=buff1;
+        i=ctm->length;
+        str=(char *)ctm->data;
+        if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0);
+        memcpy(p,str,10);
+        p+=10;
+        str+=10;
+
+        if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
+                { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
+        else    { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); }
+        *(p++)='Z';
+        *(p++)='\0';
+
+        if (*str == 'Z')
+                offset=0;
+        else
+                {
+                if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-'))
+                        return(0);
+                offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
+                offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
+                if (*str == '-')
+                        offset=-offset;
+                }
+        atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME;
+        atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
+        atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
+
+        X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset);
+
+        i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
+        if (i < 70) i+=100;
+        j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
+        if (j < 70) j+=100;
+
+        if (i < j) return (-1);
+        if (i > j) return (1);
+        i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
+        if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
+                return(-1);
+        else
+                return(i);
+        }
+
+ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(s, adj)
+ASN1_UTCTIME *s;
+long adj;
+        {
+        time_t t;
+
+        time(&t);
+        t+=adj;
+        return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t));
+        }
+
+int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(pkey,chain)
+EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+STACK *chain;
+        {
+        EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
+        int i,j;
+
+        if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1);
+
+        for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++)
+                {
+                ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i));
+                if (ktmp == NULL)
+                        {
+                        X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
+                        break;
+                else
+                        {
+                        ktmp=NULL;
+                        }
+                }
+        if (ktmp == NULL)
+                {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
+                return(0);
+                }
+
+        /* first, populate the other certs */
+        for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
+                {
+                ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j));
+                EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
+                }
+        
+        if (pkey != NULL)
+                EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
+        return(1);
+        }
+
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(x)
+X509 *x;
+        {
+        if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+                return(NULL);
+        return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
+        }
+
+int X509_check_private_key(x,k)
+X509 *x;
+EVP_PKEY *k;
+        {
+        EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL;
+        int ok=0;
+
+        xk=X509_get_pubkey(x);
+        if (xk->type != k->type) goto err;
+        switch (k->type)
+                {
+#ifndef NO_RSA
+        case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+                if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0) goto err;
+                if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) goto err;
+                break;
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DSA
+        case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+                if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0)
+                        goto err;
+                break;
+#endif
+#ifndef NO_DH
+        case EVP_PKEY_DH:
+                /* No idea */
+                goto err;
+#endif
+        default:
+                goto err;
+                }
+
+        ok=1;
+err:
+        return(ok);
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx,x)
+X509_STORE *ctx;
+X509 *x;
+        {
+        X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
+        int ret=1;
+
+        if (x == NULL) return(0);
+        obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
+        if (obj == NULL)
+                {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        obj->type=X509_LU_X509;
+        obj->data.x509=x;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+        X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+        r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+        if (r != NULL)
+                { /* oops, put it back */
+                lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
+                Free(obj);
+                lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+                ret=0;
+                }
+
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+        return(ret);    
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx,x)
+X509_STORE *ctx;
+X509_CRL *x;
+        {
+        X509_OBJECT *obj,*r;
+        int ret=1;
+
+        if (x == NULL) return(0);
+        obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT));
+        if (obj == NULL)
+                {
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                return(0);
+                }
+        obj->type=X509_LU_CRL;
+        obj->data.crl=x;
+
+        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+        X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj);
+
+        r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+        if (r != NULL)
+                { /* oops, put it back */
+                lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj);
+                X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj);
+                Free(obj);
+                lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r);
+                X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE);
+                ret=0;
+                }
+
+        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE);
+
+        return(ret);    
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)
+long argl;
+char *argp;
+int (*new_func)();
+int (*dup_func)();
+void (*free_func)();
+        {
+        x509_store_ctx_num++;
+        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1,
+                &x509_store_ctx_method,
+                argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,idx,data)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int idx;
+char *data;
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data));
+        }
+
+char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,idx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int idx;
+        {
+        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx));
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        return(ctx->error);
+        }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,err)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+int err;
+        {
+        ctx->error=err;
+        }
+
+int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        return(ctx->error_depth);
+        }
+
+X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        return(ctx->current_cert);
+        }
+
+STACK *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(ctx)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+        {
+        return(ctx->chain);
+        }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx,x)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+X509 *x;
+        {
+        ctx->cert=x;
+        }
+
+void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx,sk)
+X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
+STACK *sk;
+        {
+        ctx->untrusted=sk;
+        }
+
+