move back read_hash and enc_read_ctx into ssl_st. wpa_supplicant and

other perversions touches them sickly and unnaturally.

1 files changed, 8 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
index 34e6d58c00..2768d7ed9c 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/d1_pkt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.54 2017/01/23 06:45:30 beck Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: d1_pkt.c,v 1.55 2017/01/23 08:08:06 beck Exp $ */
 /*
  * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
  * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
@@ -375,12 +375,12 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
 
 
         /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
-        if ((sess != NULL) && (s->internal->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
-            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->internal->read_hash) != NULL)) {
-                /* s->internal->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
+        if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
+            (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
+                /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
                 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
                 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-                mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->internal->read_hash);
+                mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
 
                 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
@@ -393,14 +393,14 @@ dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
                  */
                 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
                         /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
-                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
+                    (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
                     orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
                         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
                         goto f_err;
                 }
 
-                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->internal->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
                         /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
                          * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
                          * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ start:
                 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
                  * are doing a handshake for the first time */
                 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
-                        (s->internal->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
+                        (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
                         al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
                         SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
                         goto f_err;