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authorcvs2svn <admin@example.com>2009-06-25 14:33:51 +0000
committercvs2svn <admin@example.com>2009-06-25 14:33:51 +0000
commit3944e6efcea0baa7128a89353d149b37100c0ece (patch)
tree64c1ad6d7af88839fd67d630ca81c768fd1191cd /src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
parent2eabc3aa42ad7d46a1723621f8e34e533342f67a (diff)
downloadopenbsd-OPENBSD_4_6_BASE.tar.gz
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This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create tag 'OPENBSD_4_6_BASE'.OPENBSD_4_6_BASE
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c2845
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 2845 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 80b45eb86f..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2845 +0,0 @@
1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124
125#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
126#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
127
128#include <stdio.h>
129#include "ssl_locl.h"
130#include "kssl_lcl.h"
131#include <openssl/buffer.h>
132#include <openssl/rand.h>
133#include <openssl/objects.h>
134#include <openssl/evp.h>
135#include <openssl/hmac.h>
136#include <openssl/x509.h>
137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
138#include <openssl/dh.h>
139#endif
140#include <openssl/bn.h>
141#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
142#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
143#endif
144#include <openssl/md5.h>
145
146static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
147#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
148static int nid2curve_id(int nid);
149#endif
150
151static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
152 {
153 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
154 return(SSLv3_server_method());
155 else
156 return(NULL);
157 }
158
159IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
160 ssl3_accept,
161 ssl_undefined_function,
162 ssl3_get_server_method)
163
164int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
165 {
166 BUF_MEM *buf;
167 unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
168 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
169 long num1;
170 int ret= -1;
171 int new_state,state,skip=0;
172
173 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
174 ERR_clear_error();
175 clear_sys_error();
176
177 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
178 cb=s->info_callback;
179 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
180 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
181
182 /* init things to blank */
183 s->in_handshake++;
184 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
185
186 if (s->cert == NULL)
187 {
188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
189 return(-1);
190 }
191
192 for (;;)
193 {
194 state=s->state;
195
196 switch (s->state)
197 {
198 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
199 s->new_session=1;
200 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
201
202 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
203 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
205 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206
207 s->server=1;
208 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
209
210 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
211 {
212 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
213 return -1;
214 }
215 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
216
217 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
218 {
219 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
220 {
221 ret= -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
225 {
226 ret= -1;
227 goto end;
228 }
229 s->init_buf=buf;
230 }
231
232 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
233 {
234 ret= -1;
235 goto end;
236 }
237
238 s->init_num=0;
239
240 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
241 {
242 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
243 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
244 */
245 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
246
247 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
248 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
249 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
250 }
251 else
252 {
253 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
254 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
255 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
256 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
257 }
258 break;
259
260 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
261 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
262
263 s->shutdown=0;
264 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
265 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
266 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
267 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
268 s->init_num=0;
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 break;
272
273 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
274 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
275 break;
276
277 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
278 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
279 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
280
281 s->shutdown=0;
282 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
283 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
284 s->new_session = 2;
285 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
286 s->init_num=0;
287 break;
288
289 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
290 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
291 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
292 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
293#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
294 if (s->hit)
295 {
296 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
297 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
298 else
299 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
300 }
301#else
302 if (s->hit)
303 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
304#endif
305 else
306 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
307 s->init_num=0;
308 break;
309
310 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
311 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
312 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */
313 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)
314 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
315 {
316 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
317 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
318#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
319 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
320 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
321 else
322 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 skip = 1;
327 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
328 }
329#else
330 }
331 else
332 skip=1;
333
334 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
335#endif
336 s->init_num=0;
337 break;
338
339 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
340 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
341 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
342
343 /* clear this, it may get reset by
344 * send_server_key_exchange */
345 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
346#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
347 && !(l & SSL_KRB5)
348#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
349 )
350 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
351 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
352 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
353 * be able to handle this) */
354 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
355 else
356 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
357
358
359 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
360 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
361 *
362 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
363 * message only if the cipher suite is either
364 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
365 * server certificate contains the server's
366 * public key for key exchange.
367 */
368 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
369 || (l & SSL_kECDHE)
370 || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA))
371 || ((l & SSL_kRSA)
372 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
373 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
374 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
375 )
376 )
377 )
378 )
379 {
380 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
381 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
382 }
383 else
384 skip=1;
385
386 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
387 s->init_num=0;
388 break;
389
390 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
391 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
392 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
393 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
394 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
395 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
396 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
397 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
398 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
399 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
400 * and in RFC 2246): */
401 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) &&
402 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
403 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
404 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
405 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
406 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5))
407 {
408 /* no cert request */
409 skip=1;
410 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
411 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
412 }
413 else
414 {
415 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
416 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
417 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
418#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
419 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
420#else
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
422 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
423#endif
424 s->init_num=0;
425 }
426 break;
427
428 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
429 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
430 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
431 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
432 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
433 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
434 s->init_num=0;
435 break;
436
437 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
438 /* number of bytes to be flushed */
439 num1=BIO_ctrl(s->wbio,BIO_CTRL_INFO,0,NULL);
440 if (num1 > 0)
441 {
442 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
443 num1=BIO_flush(s->wbio);
444 if (num1 <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; }
445 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
446 }
447
448 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
449 break;
450
451 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
452 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
453 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
454 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
455 if (ret <= 0)
456 goto end;
457 if (ret == 2)
458 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
459 else {
460 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
461 {
462 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
463 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
464 }
465 s->init_num=0;
466 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
467 }
468 break;
469
470 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
471 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
472 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
473 if (ret <= 0)
474 goto end;
475 if (ret == 2)
476 {
477 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
478 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
479 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
480 * message is not sent.
481 */
482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
483 s->init_num = 0;
484 }
485 else
486 {
487 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
488 s->init_num=0;
489
490 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
491 * a client cert, it can be verified
492 */
493 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
494 &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),
495 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0]));
496 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
497 &(s->s3->finish_dgst2),
498 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]));
499 }
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
504
505 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
506 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
507 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
508
509 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
510 s->init_num=0;
511 break;
512
513 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
514 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
515 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
516 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
517 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
518 if (s->hit)
519 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
520#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
521 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
522 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
523#endif
524 else
525 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
526 s->init_num=0;
527 break;
528
529#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
530 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
531 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
532 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
533 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
534 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
535 s->init_num=0;
536 break;
537
538 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
539 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
540 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
541 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
543 s->init_num=0;
544 break;
545
546#endif
547
548 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
549 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
550
551 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
552 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
553 { ret= -1; goto end; }
554
555 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
556 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
557
558 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
559 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
560 s->init_num=0;
561
562 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
563 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
564 {
565 ret= -1;
566 goto end;
567 }
568
569 break;
570
571 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
572 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
573 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
574 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
575 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
576 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
577 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
578 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
579 if (s->hit)
580 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
581 else
582 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
583 s->init_num=0;
584 break;
585
586 case SSL_ST_OK:
587 /* clean a few things up */
588 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
589
590 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
591 s->init_buf=NULL;
592
593 /* remove buffering on output */
594 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
595
596 s->init_num=0;
597
598 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
599 {
600 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
601 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
602
603 s->new_session=0;
604
605 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
606
607 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
608 /* s->server=1; */
609 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
610
611 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
612 }
613
614 ret = 1;
615 goto end;
616 /* break; */
617
618 default:
619 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
620 ret= -1;
621 goto end;
622 /* break; */
623 }
624
625 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
626 {
627 if (s->debug)
628 {
629 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
630 goto end;
631 }
632
633
634 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
635 {
636 new_state=s->state;
637 s->state=state;
638 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
639 s->state=new_state;
640 }
641 }
642 skip=0;
643 }
644end:
645 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
646
647 s->in_handshake--;
648 if (cb != NULL)
649 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
650 return(ret);
651 }
652
653int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
654 {
655 unsigned char *p;
656
657 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
658 {
659 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
660 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
661 *(p++)=0;
662 *(p++)=0;
663 *(p++)=0;
664
665 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
666 /* number of bytes to write */
667 s->init_num=4;
668 s->init_off=0;
669 }
670
671 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
672 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
673 }
674
675int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
676 {
677 int ok;
678 long n;
679
680 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
681 * so permit appropriate message length */
682 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
683 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
684 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
685 -1,
686 s->max_cert_list,
687 &ok);
688 if (!ok) return((int)n);
689 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
690 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
691 {
692 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
693 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.)
694 * I hope that tmp.dh is the only thing that may need to be cleared
695 * when a handshake is not completed ... */
696#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
697 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
698 {
699 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
700 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
701 }
702#endif
703 return 2;
704 }
705 return 1;
706}
707
708int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
709 {
710 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
711 unsigned int cookie_len;
712 long n;
713 unsigned long id;
714 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
715 SSL_CIPHER *c;
716#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
717 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
718#endif
719 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
720
721 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
722 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
723 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
724 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
725 * TLSv1.
726 */
727 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
728 {
729 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
730 }
731 s->first_packet=1;
732 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
733 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
734 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
735 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
736 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
737 &ok);
738
739 if (!ok) return((int)n);
740 s->first_packet=0;
741 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
742
743 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
744 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
745 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
746 p+=2;
747
748 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
749 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
750 {
751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
752 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
753 {
754 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
755 s->version = s->client_version;
756 }
757 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
758 goto f_err;
759 }
760
761 /* load the client random */
762 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
763 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
764
765 /* get the session-id */
766 j= *(p++);
767
768 s->hit=0;
769 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
770 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
771 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
772 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
773 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
774 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
775 * an earlier library version)
776 */
777 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
778 {
779 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
780 goto err;
781 }
782 else
783 {
784 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
785 if (i == 1)
786 { /* previous session */
787 s->hit=1;
788 }
789 else if (i == -1)
790 goto err;
791 else /* i == 0 */
792 {
793 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
794 goto err;
795 }
796 }
797
798 p+=j;
799
800 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION)
801 {
802 /* cookie stuff */
803 cookie_len = *(p++);
804
805 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
806 s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
807 {
808 /* HelloVerifyMessage has already been sent */
809 if ( cookie_len != s->d1->cookie_len)
810 {
811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
813 goto f_err;
814 }
815 }
816
817 /*
818 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
819 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
820 * does not cause an overflow.
821 */
822 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
823 {
824 /* too much data */
825 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
826 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
827 goto f_err;
828 }
829
830 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
831 if ( (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
832 cookie_len > 0)
833 {
834 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
835
836 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
837 {
838 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
839 cookie_len) == 0)
840 {
841 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
842 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
843 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
844 goto f_err;
845 }
846 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
847 }
848 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
849 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
850 {
851 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
852 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
853 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
854 goto f_err;
855 }
856 }
857
858 p += cookie_len;
859 }
860
861 n2s(p,i);
862 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
863 {
864 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
865 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
866 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
867 goto f_err;
868 }
869 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
870 {
871 /* not enough data */
872 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
873 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
874 goto f_err;
875 }
876 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
877 == NULL))
878 {
879 goto err;
880 }
881 p+=i;
882
883 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
884 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
885 {
886 j=0;
887 id=s->session->cipher->id;
888
889#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
890 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
891#endif
892 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
893 {
894 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
895#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
896 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
897 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
898#endif
899 if (c->id == id)
900 {
901 j=1;
902 break;
903 }
904 }
905 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
906 {
907 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
908 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
909 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
910 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
911 * enabled, though. */
912 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
913 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
914 {
915 s->session->cipher = c;
916 j = 1;
917 }
918 }
919 if (j == 0)
920 {
921 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
922 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
923 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
924 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
925 goto f_err;
926 }
927 }
928
929 /* compression */
930 i= *(p++);
931 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
932 {
933 /* not enough data */
934 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
935 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
936 goto f_err;
937 }
938 q=p;
939 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
940 {
941 if (p[j] == 0) break;
942 }
943
944 p+=i;
945 if (j >= i)
946 {
947 /* no compress */
948 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
949 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
950 goto f_err;
951 }
952
953#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
954 /* TLS extensions*/
955 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION)
956 {
957 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
958 {
959 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
961 goto f_err;
962 }
963 }
964 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
966 goto err;
967 }
968#endif
969 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
970 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
971 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
972 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
973#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
974 if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL)
975 { /* See if we have a match */
976 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
977
978 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
979 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
980 {
981 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
982 v=comp->id;
983 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
984 {
985 if (v == q[o])
986 {
987 done=1;
988 break;
989 }
990 }
991 if (done) break;
992 }
993 if (done)
994 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
995 else
996 comp=NULL;
997 }
998#endif
999
1000 /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */
1001#if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test
1002 * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b,
1003 * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */
1004 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
1005 {
1006 if (p < (d+n))
1007 {
1008 /* wrong number of bytes,
1009 * there could be more to follow */
1010 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1011 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1012 goto f_err;
1013 }
1014 }
1015#endif
1016
1017 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1018 * pick a cipher */
1019
1020 if (!s->hit)
1021 {
1022#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1023 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1024#else
1025 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1026#endif
1027 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1028 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1029 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1030 if (ciphers == NULL)
1031 {
1032 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1034 goto f_err;
1035 }
1036 ciphers=NULL;
1037 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1038 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1039
1040 if (c == NULL)
1041 {
1042 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1043 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1044 goto f_err;
1045 }
1046 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1047 }
1048 else
1049 {
1050 /* Session-id reuse */
1051#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1052 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1053 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1054 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1055
1056 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1057 {
1058 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1059 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1060 {
1061 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1062 if (c->algorithms & SSL_eNULL)
1063 nc=c;
1064 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1065 ec=c;
1066 }
1067 if (nc != NULL)
1068 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1069 else if (ec != NULL)
1070 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1071 else
1072 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1073 }
1074 else
1075#endif
1076 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1077 }
1078
1079 /* we now have the following setup.
1080 * client_random
1081 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1082 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1083 * compression - basically ignored right now
1084 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1085 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1086 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1087 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1088 */
1089
1090 ret=1;
1091 if (0)
1092 {
1093f_err:
1094 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1095 }
1096err:
1097 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1098 return(ret);
1099 }
1100
1101int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1102 {
1103 unsigned char *buf;
1104 unsigned char *p,*d;
1105 int i,sl;
1106 unsigned long l,Time;
1107
1108 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1109 {
1110 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1111 p=s->s3->server_random;
1112 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1113 l2n(Time,p);
1114 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1115 return -1;
1116 /* Do the message type and length last */
1117 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1118
1119 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1120 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1121
1122 /* Random stuff */
1123 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1124 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1125
1126 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1127 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1128 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1129 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1130 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1131 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1132 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1133 *
1134 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1135 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1136 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1137 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1138 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1139 * is unaffected.
1140 */
1141 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1142 && !s->hit)
1143 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1144
1145 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1146 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1147 {
1148 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1149 return -1;
1150 }
1151 *(p++)=sl;
1152 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1153 p+=sl;
1154
1155 /* put the cipher */
1156 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1157 p+=i;
1158
1159 /* put the compression method */
1160#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1161 *(p++)=0;
1162#else
1163 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1164 *(p++)=0;
1165 else
1166 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1167#endif
1168#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1169 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1170 {
1171 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1172 return -1;
1173 }
1174#endif
1175 /* do the header */
1176 l=(p-d);
1177 d=buf;
1178 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1179 l2n3(l,d);
1180
1181 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1182 /* number of bytes to write */
1183 s->init_num=p-buf;
1184 s->init_off=0;
1185 }
1186
1187 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1188 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1189 }
1190
1191int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1192 {
1193 unsigned char *p;
1194
1195 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1196 {
1197 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1198
1199 /* do the header */
1200 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1201 *(p++)=0;
1202 *(p++)=0;
1203 *(p++)=0;
1204
1205 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1206 /* number of bytes to write */
1207 s->init_num=4;
1208 s->init_off=0;
1209 }
1210
1211 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1212 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1213 }
1214
1215int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1216 {
1217#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1218 unsigned char *q;
1219 int j,num;
1220 RSA *rsa;
1221 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1222 unsigned int u;
1223#endif
1224#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1225 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1226#endif
1227#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1228 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1229 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1230 int encodedlen = 0;
1231 int curve_id = 0;
1232 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1233#endif
1234 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1235 unsigned char *p,*d;
1236 int al,i;
1237 unsigned long type;
1238 int n;
1239 CERT *cert;
1240 BIGNUM *r[4];
1241 int nr[4],kn;
1242 BUF_MEM *buf;
1243 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1244
1245 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1246 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1247 {
1248 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK;
1249 cert=s->cert;
1250
1251 buf=s->init_buf;
1252
1253 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1254 n=0;
1255#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1256 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1257 {
1258 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1259 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1260 {
1261 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1262 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1263 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1264 if(rsa == NULL)
1265 {
1266 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1267 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1268 goto f_err;
1269 }
1270 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1271 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1272 }
1273 if (rsa == NULL)
1274 {
1275 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1276 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1277 goto f_err;
1278 }
1279 r[0]=rsa->n;
1280 r[1]=rsa->e;
1281 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1282 }
1283 else
1284#endif
1285#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1286 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1287 {
1288 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1289 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1290 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1291 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1292 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1293 if (dhp == NULL)
1294 {
1295 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1296 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1297 goto f_err;
1298 }
1299
1300 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1301 {
1302 DH_free(dh);
1303 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1304 goto err;
1305 }
1306
1307 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1308 {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1310 goto err;
1311 }
1312
1313 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1314 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1315 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1316 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1317 {
1318 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1319 {
1320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1321 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1322 goto err;
1323 }
1324 }
1325 else
1326 {
1327 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1328 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1329 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1330 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1331 {
1332 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1333 goto err;
1334 }
1335 }
1336 r[0]=dh->p;
1337 r[1]=dh->g;
1338 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1339 }
1340 else
1341#endif
1342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1343 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1344 {
1345 const EC_GROUP *group;
1346
1347 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1348 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1349 {
1350 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1351 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1352 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1353 }
1354 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1355 {
1356 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1358 goto f_err;
1359 }
1360
1361 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1362 {
1363 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1365 goto err;
1366 }
1367
1368 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1369 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1370 {
1371 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1372 goto err;
1373 }
1374 if (!EC_KEY_up_ref(ecdhp))
1375 {
1376 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1377 goto err;
1378 }
1379 ecdh = ecdhp;
1380
1381 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1382 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1383 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1384 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1385 {
1386 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1387 {
1388 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1389 goto err;
1390 }
1391 }
1392
1393 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1394 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1395 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1396 {
1397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1398 goto err;
1399 }
1400
1401 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1402 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1403 {
1404 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1405 goto err;
1406 }
1407
1408 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1409 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1410 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1411 */
1412 if ((curve_id =
1413 nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1414 == 0)
1415 {
1416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1417 goto err;
1418 }
1419
1420 /* Encode the public key.
1421 * First check the size of encoding and
1422 * allocate memory accordingly.
1423 */
1424 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1425 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1426 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1427 NULL, 0, NULL);
1428
1429 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1430 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1431 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1432 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1433 {
1434 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1435 goto err;
1436 }
1437
1438
1439 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1440 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1441 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1442 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1443
1444 if (encodedlen == 0)
1445 {
1446 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1447 goto err;
1448 }
1449
1450 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1451
1452 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1453 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1454 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1455 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1456 * structure.
1457 */
1458 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1459
1460 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1461 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1462 */
1463 r[0]=NULL;
1464 r[1]=NULL;
1465 r[2]=NULL;
1466 r[3]=NULL;
1467 }
1468 else
1469#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1470 {
1471 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1472 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1473 goto f_err;
1474 }
1475 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1476 {
1477 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1478 n+=2+nr[i];
1479 }
1480
1481 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL))
1482 {
1483 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1484 == NULL)
1485 {
1486 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1487 goto f_err;
1488 }
1489 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1490 }
1491 else
1492 {
1493 pkey=NULL;
1494 kn=0;
1495 }
1496
1497 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1498 {
1499 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1500 goto err;
1501 }
1502 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1503 p= &(d[4]);
1504
1505 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1506 {
1507 s2n(nr[i],p);
1508 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1509 p+=nr[i];
1510 }
1511
1512#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1513 if (type & SSL_kECDHE)
1514 {
1515 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1516 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1517 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1518 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1519 * the actual encoded point itself
1520 */
1521 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1522 p += 1;
1523 *p = 0;
1524 p += 1;
1525 *p = curve_id;
1526 p += 1;
1527 *p = encodedlen;
1528 p += 1;
1529 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1530 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1531 encodedlen);
1532 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1533 p += encodedlen;
1534 }
1535#endif
1536
1537 /* not anonymous */
1538 if (pkey != NULL)
1539 {
1540 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1541 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1542#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1543 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1544 {
1545 q=md_buf;
1546 j=0;
1547 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1548 {
1549 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1550 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1551 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1552 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1553 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1554 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1555 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1556 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1557 (unsigned int *)&i);
1558 q+=i;
1559 j+=i;
1560 }
1561 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1562 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1563 {
1564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1565 goto err;
1566 }
1567 s2n(u,p);
1568 n+=u+2;
1569 }
1570 else
1571#endif
1572#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1573 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1574 {
1575 /* lets do DSS */
1576 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1577 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1578 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1579 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1580 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1581 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1582 {
1583 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1584 goto err;
1585 }
1586 s2n(i,p);
1587 n+=i+2;
1588 }
1589 else
1590#endif
1591#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1592 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1593 {
1594 /* let's do ECDSA */
1595 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1596 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1597 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1598 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1599 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1600 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1601 {
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1603 goto err;
1604 }
1605 s2n(i,p);
1606 n+=i+2;
1607 }
1608 else
1609#endif
1610 {
1611 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1612 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1613 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1614 goto f_err;
1615 }
1616 }
1617
1618 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1619 l2n3(n,d);
1620
1621 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1622 * it off */
1623 s->init_num=n+4;
1624 s->init_off=0;
1625 }
1626
1627 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1628 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1629 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1630f_err:
1631 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1632err:
1633#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1634 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1635 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1636#endif
1637 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1638 return(-1);
1639 }
1640
1641int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1642 {
1643 unsigned char *p,*d;
1644 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1645 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1646 X509_NAME *name;
1647 BUF_MEM *buf;
1648
1649 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1650 {
1651 buf=s->init_buf;
1652
1653 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1654
1655 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1656 p++;
1657 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1658 d[0]=n;
1659 p+=n;
1660 n++;
1661
1662 off=n;
1663 p+=2;
1664 n+=2;
1665
1666 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1667 nl=0;
1668 if (sk != NULL)
1669 {
1670 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1671 {
1672 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1673 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1674 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1675 {
1676 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1677 goto err;
1678 }
1679 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1680 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1681 {
1682 s2n(j,p);
1683 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1684 n+=2+j;
1685 nl+=2+j;
1686 }
1687 else
1688 {
1689 d=p;
1690 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1691 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1692 n+=j;
1693 nl+=j;
1694 }
1695 }
1696 }
1697 /* else no CA names */
1698 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1699 s2n(nl,p);
1700
1701 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1702 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1703 l2n3(n,d);
1704
1705 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1706 * it off */
1707
1708 s->init_num=n+4;
1709 s->init_off=0;
1710#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1711 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1712
1713 /* do the header */
1714 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1715 *(p++)=0;
1716 *(p++)=0;
1717 *(p++)=0;
1718 s->init_num += 4;
1719#endif
1720
1721 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1722 }
1723
1724 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1725 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1726err:
1727 return(-1);
1728 }
1729
1730int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1731 {
1732 int i,al,ok;
1733 long n;
1734 unsigned long l;
1735 unsigned char *p;
1736#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1737 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1738 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1739#endif
1740#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1741 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1742 DH *dh_srvr;
1743#endif
1744#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1745 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1746#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1747
1748#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1749 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1750 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1751 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1752 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1753#endif
1754
1755 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1756 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1757 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1758 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1759 2048, /* ??? */
1760 &ok);
1761
1762 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1763 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1764
1765 l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms;
1766
1767#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1768 if (l & SSL_kRSA)
1769 {
1770 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1771 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1772 {
1773 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1774 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1775 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1776 * be sent already */
1777 if (rsa == NULL)
1778 {
1779 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
1781 goto f_err;
1782
1783 }
1784 }
1785 else
1786 {
1787 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1788 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
1789 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1790 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
1791 {
1792 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1794 goto f_err;
1795 }
1796 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
1797 }
1798
1799 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */
1800 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION &&
1801 s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1802 {
1803 n2s(p,i);
1804 if (n != i+2)
1805 {
1806 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
1807 {
1808 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1809 goto err;
1810 }
1811 else
1812 p-=2;
1813 }
1814 else
1815 n=i;
1816 }
1817
1818 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1819
1820 al = -1;
1821
1822 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
1823 {
1824 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1825 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1826 }
1827
1828 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
1829 {
1830 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
1831 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
1832 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
1833 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
1834 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
1835 * protocol version.
1836 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
1837 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1838 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
1839 {
1840 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1842
1843 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
1844 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
1845 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
1846 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1847 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
1848 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
1849 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
1850 }
1851 }
1852
1853 if (al != -1)
1854 {
1855 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
1856 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
1857 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
1858 ERR_clear_error();
1859 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1860 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1861 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1862 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865
1866 s->session->master_key_length=
1867 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1868 s->session->master_key,
1869 p,i);
1870 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1871 }
1872 else
1873#endif
1874#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1875 if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
1876 {
1877 n2s(p,i);
1878 if (n != i+2)
1879 {
1880 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
1881 {
1882 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 else
1886 {
1887 p-=2;
1888 i=(int)n;
1889 }
1890 }
1891
1892 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
1893 {
1894 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1895 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1896 goto f_err;
1897 }
1898 else
1899 {
1900 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
1901 {
1902 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1903 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1904 goto f_err;
1905 }
1906 else
1907 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
1908 }
1909
1910 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
1911 if (pub == NULL)
1912 {
1913 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1914 goto err;
1915 }
1916
1917 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
1918
1919 if (i <= 0)
1920 {
1921 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1922 goto err;
1923 }
1924
1925 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1926 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
1927
1928 BN_clear_free(pub);
1929 pub=NULL;
1930 s->session->master_key_length=
1931 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1932 s->session->master_key,p,i);
1933 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
1934 }
1935 else
1936#endif
1937#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1938 if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
1939 {
1940 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
1941 krb5_data enc_ticket;
1942 krb5_data authenticator;
1943 krb5_data enc_pms;
1944 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
1945 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
1946 EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
1947 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
1948 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
1949 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
1950 int padl, outl;
1951 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
1952 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
1953
1954 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
1955
1956 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
1957
1958 n2s(p,i);
1959 enc_ticket.length = i;
1960
1961 if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6)
1962 {
1963 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1964 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1965 goto err;
1966 }
1967
1968 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
1969 p+=enc_ticket.length;
1970
1971 n2s(p,i);
1972 authenticator.length = i;
1973
1974 if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6)
1975 {
1976 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1977 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1978 goto err;
1979 }
1980
1981 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
1982 p+=authenticator.length;
1983
1984 n2s(p,i);
1985 enc_pms.length = i;
1986 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
1987 p+=enc_pms.length;
1988
1989 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
1990 ** after decryption
1991 */
1992 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
1993 {
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1995 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
1996 goto err;
1997 }
1998
1999 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2000 enc_pms.length + 6))
2001 {
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2003 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2004 goto err;
2005 }
2006
2007 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2008 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2009 {
2010#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2011 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2012 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2013 if (kssl_err.text)
2014 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2015#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2016 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2017 kssl_err.reason);
2018 goto err;
2019 }
2020
2021 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2022 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2023 */
2024 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2025 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2026 {
2027#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2028 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2029 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2030 if (kssl_err.text)
2031 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2032#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2033 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2034 kssl_err.reason);
2035 goto err;
2036 }
2037
2038 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2039 {
2040 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2041 goto err;
2042 }
2043
2044#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2045 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2046#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2047
2048 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2049 if (enc == NULL)
2050 goto err;
2051
2052 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2053
2054 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2055 {
2056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2057 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2058 goto err;
2059 }
2060 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2061 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2062 {
2063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2064 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2065 goto err;
2066 }
2067 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2068 {
2069 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2070 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2071 goto err;
2072 }
2073 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2074 {
2075 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2076 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2077 goto err;
2078 }
2079 outl += padl;
2080 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2081 {
2082 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2083 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2084 goto err;
2085 }
2086 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2087 {
2088 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2089 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2090 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2091 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2092 * the protocol version.
2093 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2094 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2095 */
2096 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2097 {
2098 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2099 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2100 goto err;
2101 }
2102 }
2103
2104 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2105
2106 s->session->master_key_length=
2107 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2108 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2109
2110 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2111 {
2112 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2113 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2114 {
2115 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2116 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2117 }
2118 }
2119
2120
2121 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2122 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2123 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2124 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2125 */
2126 }
2127 else
2128#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2129
2130#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2131 if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE))
2132 {
2133 int ret = 1;
2134 int field_size = 0;
2135 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2136 const EC_GROUP *group;
2137 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2138
2139 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2140 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2141 {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2143 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2144 goto err;
2145 }
2146
2147 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2148 if (l & SSL_kECDH)
2149 {
2150 /* use the certificate */
2151 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2152 }
2153 else
2154 {
2155 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2156 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2157 */
2158 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2159 }
2160
2161 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2162 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2163
2164 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2165 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2166 {
2167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2168 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2169 goto err;
2170 }
2171
2172 /* Let's get client's public key */
2173 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2174 {
2175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2176 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2177 goto err;
2178 }
2179
2180 if (n == 0L)
2181 {
2182 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2183
2184 if (l & SSL_kECDHE)
2185 {
2186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2188 goto f_err;
2189 }
2190 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2191 == NULL) ||
2192 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2193 {
2194 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2195 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2196 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2197 * never executed. When that support is
2198 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2199 * received in the certificate is
2200 * authorized for key agreement.
2201 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2202 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2203 * group.
2204 */
2205 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2206 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2207 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2208 goto f_err;
2209 }
2210
2211 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2212 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2213 {
2214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2215 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2216 goto err;
2217 }
2218 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2219 }
2220 else
2221 {
2222 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2223 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2224 */
2225 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2226 {
2227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2228 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2229 goto err;
2230 }
2231
2232 /* Get encoded point length */
2233 i = *p;
2234 p += 1;
2235 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2236 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2237 {
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2240 goto err;
2241 }
2242 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2243 * currently, so set it to the start
2244 */
2245 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2246 }
2247
2248 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2249 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2250 if (field_size <= 0)
2251 {
2252 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2253 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2254 goto err;
2255 }
2256 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2257 if (i <= 0)
2258 {
2259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2260 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2261 goto err;
2262 }
2263
2264 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2265 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2266 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2267 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2268 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2269
2270 /* Compute the master secret */
2271 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2272 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2273
2274 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2275 return (ret);
2276 }
2277 else
2278#endif
2279 {
2280 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2282 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2283 goto f_err;
2284 }
2285
2286 return(1);
2287f_err:
2288 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2289#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2290err:
2291#endif
2292#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2293 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2294 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2295 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2296 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2297 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2298#endif
2299 return(-1);
2300 }
2301
2302int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2303 {
2304 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2305 unsigned char *p;
2306 int al,ok,ret=0;
2307 long n;
2308 int type=0,i,j;
2309 X509 *peer;
2310
2311 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2312 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2313 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2314 -1,
2315 514, /* 514? */
2316 &ok);
2317
2318 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2319
2320 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2321 {
2322 peer=s->session->peer;
2323 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2324 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2325 }
2326 else
2327 {
2328 peer=NULL;
2329 pkey=NULL;
2330 }
2331
2332 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2333 {
2334 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2335 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2336 {
2337 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2339 goto f_err;
2340 }
2341 ret=1;
2342 goto end;
2343 }
2344
2345 if (peer == NULL)
2346 {
2347 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2348 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2349 goto f_err;
2350 }
2351
2352 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2353 {
2354 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2355 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2356 goto f_err;
2357 }
2358
2359 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2360 {
2361 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2362 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2363 goto f_err;
2364 }
2365
2366 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2367 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2368 n2s(p,i);
2369 n-=2;
2370 if (i > n)
2371 {
2372 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2373 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2374 goto f_err;
2375 }
2376
2377 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2378 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2379 {
2380 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2381 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2382 goto f_err;
2383 }
2384
2385#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2386 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2387 {
2388 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2389 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2390 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2391 if (i < 0)
2392 {
2393 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2394 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2395 goto f_err;
2396 }
2397 if (i == 0)
2398 {
2399 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2400 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2401 goto f_err;
2402 }
2403 }
2404 else
2405#endif
2406#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2407 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2408 {
2409 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2410 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2411 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2412 if (j <= 0)
2413 {
2414 /* bad signature */
2415 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2417 goto f_err;
2418 }
2419 }
2420 else
2421#endif
2422#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2423 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2424 {
2425 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2426 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2427 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2428 if (j <= 0)
2429 {
2430 /* bad signature */
2431 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2432 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2433 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2434 goto f_err;
2435 }
2436 }
2437 else
2438#endif
2439 {
2440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2441 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2442 goto f_err;
2443 }
2444
2445
2446 ret=1;
2447 if (0)
2448 {
2449f_err:
2450 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2451 }
2452end:
2453 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2454 return(ret);
2455 }
2456
2457int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2458 {
2459 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2460 X509 *x=NULL;
2461 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2462 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2463 unsigned char *d;
2464 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2465
2466 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2467 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2468 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2469 -1,
2470 s->max_cert_list,
2471 &ok);
2472
2473 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2474
2475 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2476 {
2477 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2478 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2479 {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2481 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2482 goto f_err;
2483 }
2484 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2485 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2486 {
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2488 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2489 goto f_err;
2490 }
2491 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2492 return(1);
2493 }
2494
2495 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2496 {
2497 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2498 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2499 goto f_err;
2500 }
2501 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2502
2503 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2504 {
2505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2506 goto err;
2507 }
2508
2509 n2l3(p,llen);
2510 if (llen+3 != n)
2511 {
2512 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2513 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2514 goto f_err;
2515 }
2516 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2517 {
2518 n2l3(p,l);
2519 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2520 {
2521 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2523 goto f_err;
2524 }
2525
2526 q=p;
2527 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2528 if (x == NULL)
2529 {
2530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2531 goto err;
2532 }
2533 if (p != (q+l))
2534 {
2535 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2536 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2537 goto f_err;
2538 }
2539 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2540 {
2541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2542 goto err;
2543 }
2544 x=NULL;
2545 nc+=l+3;
2546 }
2547
2548 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2549 {
2550 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2551 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2552 {
2553 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2554 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2555 goto f_err;
2556 }
2557 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2558 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2559 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2560 {
2561 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2562 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2563 goto f_err;
2564 }
2565 }
2566 else
2567 {
2568 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2569 if (i <= 0)
2570 {
2571 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2572 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2573 goto f_err;
2574 }
2575 }
2576
2577 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2578 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2579 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
2580 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2581
2582 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2583 * when we arrive here. */
2584 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2585 {
2586 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2587 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
2588 {
2589 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2590 goto err;
2591 }
2592 }
2593 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2594 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2595 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
2596 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2597 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
2598
2599 sk=NULL;
2600
2601 ret=1;
2602 if (0)
2603 {
2604f_err:
2605 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2606 }
2607err:
2608 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
2609 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
2610 return(ret);
2611 }
2612
2613int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2614 {
2615 unsigned long l;
2616 X509 *x;
2617
2618 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
2619 {
2620 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2621 if (x == NULL &&
2622 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
2623 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
2624 & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
2625 != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))
2626 {
2627 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2628 return(0);
2629 }
2630
2631 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
2632 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2633 s->init_num=(int)l;
2634 s->init_off=0;
2635 }
2636
2637 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2638 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2639 }
2640
2641
2642#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2643/* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */
2644static int nid2curve_id(int nid)
2645{
2646 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001)
2647 * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */
2648 switch (nid) {
2649 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
2650 return 1;
2651 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
2652 return 2;
2653 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
2654 return 3;
2655 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
2656 return 4;
2657 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
2658 return 5;
2659 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
2660 return 6;
2661 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
2662 return 7;
2663 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
2664 return 8;
2665 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
2666 return 9;
2667 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
2668 return 10;
2669 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
2670 return 11;
2671 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
2672 return 12;
2673 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
2674 return 13;
2675 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
2676 return 14;
2677 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
2678 return 15;
2679 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
2680 return 16;
2681 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
2682 return 17;
2683 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
2684 return 18;
2685 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
2686 return 19;
2687 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
2688 return 20;
2689 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
2690 return 21;
2691 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
2692 return 22;
2693 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
2694 return 23;
2695 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
2696 return 24;
2697 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
2698 return 25;
2699 default:
2700 return 0;
2701 }
2702}
2703#endif
2704#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
2705int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2706 {
2707 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
2708 {
2709 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
2710 int len, slen;
2711 unsigned int hlen;
2712 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2713 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2714 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2715 unsigned char key_name[16];
2716
2717 /* get session encoding length */
2718 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2719 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2720 * too long
2721 */
2722 if (slen > 0xFF00)
2723 return -1;
2724 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2725 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2726 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2727 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2728 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2729 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2730 */
2731 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
2732 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2733 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
2734 return -1;
2735 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
2736 if (!senc)
2737 return -1;
2738 p = senc;
2739 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2740
2741 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2742 /* do the header */
2743 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
2744 /* Skip message length for now */
2745 p += 3;
2746 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2747 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2748 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2749 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2750 * from parent ctx.
2751 */
2752 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2753 {
2754 if (s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2755 &hctx, 1) < 0)
2756 {
2757 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2758 return -1;
2759 }
2760 }
2761 else
2762 {
2763 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
2764 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2765 s->ctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2766 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2767 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2768 memcpy(key_name, s->ctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2769 }
2770 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
2771 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2772 p += 2;
2773 /* Output key name */
2774 macstart = p;
2775 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2776 p += 16;
2777 /* output IV */
2778 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2779 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2780 /* Encrypt session data */
2781 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2782 p += len;
2783 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2784 p += len;
2785 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2786
2787 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2788 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2789 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2790
2791 p += hlen;
2792 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2793 /* Total length */
2794 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2795 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
2796 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
2797 p += 4;
2798 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
2799
2800 /* number of bytes to write */
2801 s->init_num= len;
2802 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2803 s->init_off=0;
2804 OPENSSL_free(senc);
2805 }
2806
2807 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2808 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2809 }
2810
2811int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2812 {
2813 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
2814 {
2815 unsigned char *p;
2816 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2817 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2818 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2819 * + (ocsp response)
2820 */
2821 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2822 return -1;
2823
2824 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2825
2826 /* do the header */
2827 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
2828 /* message length */
2829 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
2830 /* status type */
2831 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
2832 /* length of OCSP response */
2833 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2834 /* actual response */
2835 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2836 /* number of bytes to write */
2837 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
2838 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2839 s->init_off = 0;
2840 }
2841
2842 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2843 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2844 }
2845#endif
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