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author | miod <> | 2015-07-15 16:45:24 +0000 |
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committer | miod <> | 2015-07-15 16:45:24 +0000 |
commit | 5e5345d98de4daff42970efd7f3fab2802710b20 (patch) | |
tree | 7cadd2f8dc53b5a5314943bf5d5c539b26c70410 /src/lib/libssl/ssl_algs.c | |
parent | 3cddaeeea39827924b6b7ffc99df9f511a635fa7 (diff) | |
download | openbsd-5e5345d98de4daff42970efd7f3fab2802710b20.tar.gz openbsd-5e5345d98de4daff42970efd7f3fab2802710b20.tar.bz2 openbsd-5e5345d98de4daff42970efd7f3fab2802710b20.zip |
Do not allow TS_check_signer_name() with signer == NULL from
int_TS_RESP_verify_token(). Coverity CID 21710.
Looking further, int_TS_RESP_verify_token() will only initialize signer to
something non-NULL if TS_VFY_SIGNATURE is set in ctx->flags. But guess what?
TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX() in ts/ts_verify_ctx.c, which is the TS_VERIFY_CTX
constructor, explicitely clears this bit, with:
ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE);
followed by more conditional flag clears.
Of course, nothing prevents the user to fiddle with ctx->flags afterwards. This
is exactly what ts.c in usr.bin/openssl does. This is gross, mistakes will
happen.
ok beck@
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/ssl_algs.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions