Provide an SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION option that disallows

client-initiated renegotiation. The current default behaviour remains
unchanged.

ok beck@ reyk@

1 files changed, 9 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
index 6a1c837944..c57eacd770 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.8 2017/01/29 15:31:15 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssl_pkt.c,v 1.9 2017/01/31 15:35:46 jsing Exp $ */
 /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -1136,6 +1136,14 @@ start:
                  * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
                 goto start;
         }
+        /* Disallow client initiated renegotiation if configured. */
+        if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
+            S3I(s)->handshake_fragment_len >= 4 &&
+            S3I(s)->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO &&
+            (s->internal->options & SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION)) {
+                al = SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION;
+                goto f_err;
+        }
         /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
          * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
          * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)