OpenSSL 0.9.7 stable 2002 05 08 merge

1 files changed, 93 insertions, 29 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c
index 7064262def..6424f775e2 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c
@@ -64,8 +64,6 @@
 static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s);
 static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s);
 static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck);
-static int ssl_session_num=0;
-static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *ssl_session_meth=NULL;
 
 SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(SSL *ssl)
 /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */
@@ -91,10 +89,8 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl)
 int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
              CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
         {
-        ssl_session_num++;
-        return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(ssl_session_num-1,
-                &ssl_session_meth,
-                argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func));
+        return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp,
+                        new_func, dup_func, free_func);
         }
 
 int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg)
@@ -126,15 +122,49 @@ SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void)
         ss->prev=NULL;
         ss->next=NULL;
         ss->compress_meth=0;
-        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data);
+        CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
         return(ss);
         }
 
+/* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1
+ * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly
+ * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much
+ * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations
+ * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call
+ * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly
+ * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might
+ * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */
+
+#define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10
+static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id,
+                                unsigned int *id_len)
+{
+        unsigned int retry = 0;
+        do
+                RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len);
+        while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) &&
+                (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS));
+        if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)
+                return 1;
+        /* else - woops a session_id match */
+        /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
+         * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
+         * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
+         * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
+         * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
+         * and make a reservation for it if it does not
+         * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
+         */
+        return 0;
+}
+
 int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
         {
         /* This gets used by clients and servers. */
 
+        unsigned int tmp;
         SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL;
+        GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id;
 
         if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0);
 
@@ -173,25 +203,46 @@ int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session)
                         SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
                         return(0);
                         }
-
-                for (;;)
+                /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */
+                CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                if(s->generate_session_id)
+                        cb = s->generate_session_id;
+                else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id)
+                        cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id;
+                CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
+                /* Choose a session ID */
+                tmp = ss->session_id_length;
+                if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp))
                         {
-                        SSL_SESSION *r;
-
-                        RAND_pseudo_bytes(ss->session_id,ss->session_id_length);
-                        CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-                        r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions, ss);
-                        CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-                        if (r == NULL) break;
-                        /* else - woops a session_id match */
-                        /* XXX We should also check the external cache --
-                         * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and
-                         * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions
-                         * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means
-                         * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists
-                         * and make a reservation for it if it does not
-                         * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well).
-                         */
+                        /* The callback failed */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero.
+                 * nor set it higher than it was. */
+                if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length))
+                        {
+                        /* The callback set an illegal length */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
+                        }
+                /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */
+                if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION))
+                        memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp);
+                else
+                        ss->session_id_length = tmp;
+                /* Finally, check for a conflict */
+                if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id,
+                                                ss->session_id_length))
+                        {
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,
+                                SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT);
+                        SSL_SESSION_free(ss);
+                        return(0);
                         }
                 }
         else
@@ -423,10 +474,10 @@ static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck)
         if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0))
                 {
                 if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
-                r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
-                if (r != NULL)
+                if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c)
                         {
                         ret=1;
+                        r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c);
                         SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c);
                         }
 
@@ -465,7 +516,7 @@ void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss)
                 }
 #endif
 
-        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(ssl_session_meth,ss,&ss->ex_data);
+        CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data);
 
         memset(ss->key_arg,0,SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH);
         memset(ss->master_key,0,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
@@ -503,6 +554,17 @@ int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session)
                                 session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout;
                         }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+                if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ &&
+                    session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0)
+                {
+                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1);
+                    memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ,
+                            session->krb5_client_princ_len);
+                    s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0';
+                }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
+
                 /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/
                 CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION);
                 if (s->session != NULL)
@@ -594,6 +656,8 @@ static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p)
                 }
         }
 
+static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *)
+
 void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
         {
         unsigned long i;
@@ -606,7 +670,7 @@ void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t)
         CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
         i=tp.cache->down_load;
         tp.cache->down_load=0;
-        lh_doall_arg(tp.cache,(void (*)())timeout,&tp);
+        lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp);
         tp.cache->down_load=i;
         CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX);
         }