resolve conflicts

1 files changed, 260 insertions, 49 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
index 793ea43e90..f7bdeb3b9d 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/hmac.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 #include <openssl/des.h>
 #endif
@@ -158,68 +159,75 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
                         unsigned char *out, int olen)
         {
         int chunk;
-        unsigned int j;
-        HMAC_CTX ctx;
-        HMAC_CTX ctx_tmp;
+        size_t j;
+        EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
+        EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
         unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-        unsigned int A1_len;
+        size_t A1_len;
         int ret = 0;
         
         chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
         OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
 
-        HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
-        HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
-        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
+        if (!mac_key)
+                goto err;
+        if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
                 goto err;
-        if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,sec,sec_len,md, NULL))
+        if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
                 goto err;
-        if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+        if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
                 goto err;
-        if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+        if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
                 goto err;
-        if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+        if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
                 goto err;
-        if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+        if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
                 goto err;
-        if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+        if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
                 goto err;
-        if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
                 goto err;
 
         for (;;)
                 {
-                if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+                /* Reinit mac contexts */
+                if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
                         goto err;
-                if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx_tmp,NULL,0,NULL,NULL)) /* re-init */
+                if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
                         goto err;
-                if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
+                if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (!HMAC_Update(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
+                if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (seed1 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
+                if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (seed2 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
+                if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (seed3 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
+                if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (seed4 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
+                if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
                         goto err;
-                if (seed5 != NULL && !HMAC_Update(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
+                if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
                         goto err;
 
                 if (olen > chunk)
                         {
-                        if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,out,&j))
+                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
                                 goto err;
                         out+=j;
                         olen-=j;
-                        if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len)) /* calc the next A1 value */
+                        /* calc the next A1 value */
+                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
                                 goto err;
                         }
                 else    /* last one */
                         {
-                        if (!HMAC_Final(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
+                        if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
                                 goto err;
                         memcpy(out,A1,olen);
                         break;
@@ -227,8 +235,9 @@ static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
                 }
         ret = 1;
 err:
-        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
-        HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
         OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
         return ret;
         }
@@ -256,6 +265,8 @@ static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
                 if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
         }       
         len=slen/count;
+        if (count == 1)
+                slen = 0;
         S1=sec;
         memset(out1,0,olen);
         for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
@@ -284,7 +295,7 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
              unsigned char *tmp, int num)
         {
         int ret;
-        ret = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+        ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                  TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
                  s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                  s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -358,7 +369,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
                 {
                 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
                         s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
-                        else
+                else
                         s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
 
                 if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
@@ -445,7 +456,11 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
         j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
                        cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
         /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
-        k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
+        /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+                k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
+        else
+                k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
         if (    (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
                 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
                 {
@@ -474,10 +489,14 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
                 }
 
         memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
-        mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
-                        mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
-        EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
-        EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+
+        if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+                {
+                mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
+                                mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
+                EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
+                EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
+                }
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -487,7 +506,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
                 /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
                  * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
                  */
-                if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+                if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                                 exp_label,exp_label_len,
                                 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                                 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -498,7 +517,7 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
 
                 if (k > 0)
                         {
-                        if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+                        if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                                         TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
                                         s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                                         s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
@@ -524,7 +543,19 @@ printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
         }
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-        EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+        if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
+                {
+                EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
+                }
+        else    
+                EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
+
+        /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
+        if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
+                EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
+                                *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
+
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
 printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
 { int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
@@ -606,7 +637,8 @@ printf("\nkey block\n");
 { int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
 #endif
 
-        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS))
+        if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
+                && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
                 {
                 /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
                  * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
@@ -640,14 +672,14 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
         SSL3_RECORD *rec;
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
         unsigned long l;
-        int bs,i,ii,j,k,n=0;
+        int bs,i,ii,j,k,pad=0;
         const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
 
         if (send)
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
+                        int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
                         OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
@@ -655,13 +687,34 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
                         enc=NULL;
                 else
+                        {
+                        int ivlen;
                         enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
+                        /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
+                        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+                                && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                                ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
+                        else
+                                ivlen = 0;
+                        if (ivlen > 1)
+                                {
+                                if ( rec->data != rec->input)
+                                        /* we can't write into the input stream:
+                                         * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
+                                         */
+                                        fprintf(stderr,
+                                                "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
+                                                __FILE__, __LINE__);
+                                else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
+                                        return -1;
+                                }
+                        }
                 }
         else
                 {
                 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
                         {
-                        n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
+                        int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
                         OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
                         }
                 ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
@@ -687,7 +740,43 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                 l=rec->length;
                 bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
 
-                if ((bs != 1) && send)
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+                        {
+                        unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
+
+                        seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
+
+                        if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
+                                {
+                                unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
+
+                                s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
+                                memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
+                                memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
+                                }
+                        else
+                                {
+                                memcpy(buf,seq,8);
+                                for (i=7; i>=0; i--)    /* increment */
+                                        {
+                                        ++seq[i];
+                                        if (seq[i] != 0) break; 
+                                        }
+                                }
+
+                        buf[8]=rec->type;
+                        buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
+                        buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
+                        buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
+                        buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
+                        pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
+                        if (send)
+                                {
+                                l+=pad;
+                                rec->length+=pad;
+                                }
+                        }
+                else if ((bs != 1) && send)
                         {
                         i=bs-((int)l%bs);
 
@@ -728,13 +817,25 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                         {
                         if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
                                 {
+                                if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION)
+                                        return -1;
                                 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_ENC,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
                                 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
                                 return 0;
                                 }
                         }
                 
-                EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+                i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
+                if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
+                                                ?(i<0)
+                                                :(i==0))
+                        return -1;      /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
+                if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
+                        {
+                        rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                        rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                        rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
+                        }
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 {
@@ -784,8 +885,19 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
                                         return -1;
                                         }
                                 }
-                        rec->length-=i;
+                        rec->length -=i;
+                        if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
+                                && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ds) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+                                {
+                                if (bs > (int)rec->length)
+                                        return -1;
+                                rec->data += bs;    /* skip the explicit IV */
+                                rec->input += bs;
+                                rec->length -= bs;
+                                }
                         }
+                if (pad && !send)
+                        rec->length -= pad;
                 }
         return(1);
         }
@@ -841,7 +953,7 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
 
         for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
                 {
-                if (mask & s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2)
+                if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
                         {
                         int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
                         if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
@@ -860,7 +972,7 @@ int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
                         }
                 }
                 
-        if (!tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+        if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                         str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
                         s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
                         out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
@@ -970,6 +1082,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
         const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
         int col = 0, sol = 0;
 
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
         printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
 #endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
@@ -986,7 +1099,7 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
                 }
 #endif
 
-        tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+        tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
                 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
                 co, col,
@@ -994,6 +1107,16 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
                 so, sol,
                 p,len,
                 s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
+#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
+        fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
+        BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
+#endif
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
         printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
@@ -1001,6 +1124,95 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
         return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
         }
 
+int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
+         const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
+         size_t contextlen, int use_context)
+        {
+        unsigned char *buff;
+        unsigned char *val = NULL;
+        size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
+        int rv;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+        printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
+#endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+        buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
+        if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
+
+        /* construct PRF arguments
+         * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
+         * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
+         * does not create a prohibited label.
+         */
+        vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
+        if (use_context)
+                {
+                vallen += 2 + contextlen;
+                }
+
+        val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
+        if (val == NULL) goto err2;
+        currentvalpos = 0;
+        memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
+        currentvalpos += llen;
+        memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+        memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+        currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+
+        if (use_context)
+                {
+                val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
+                currentvalpos++;
+                val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
+                currentvalpos++;
+                if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
+                        {
+                        memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
+                        }
+                }
+
+        /* disallow prohibited labels
+         * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
+         * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
+         * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
+         */
+        if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+        if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+        if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+        if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
+                 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
+
+        rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
+                      val, vallen,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      NULL, 0,
+                      s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
+                      out,buff,olen);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+        printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
+#endif  /* KSSL_DEBUG */
+        goto ret;
+err1:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
+        rv = 0;
+        goto ret;
+err2:
+        SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+        rv = 0;
+ret:
+        if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
+        if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
+        return(rv);
+        }
+
 int tls1_alert_code(int code)
         {
         switch (code)
@@ -1042,4 +1254,3 @@ int tls1_alert_code(int code)
         default:                        return(-1);
                 }
         }
-