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authorcvs2svn <admin@example.com>2011-08-03 21:43:07 +0000
committercvs2svn <admin@example.com>2011-08-03 21:43:07 +0000
commite19d8021cba737c4b0797c786c4bc2a2968c1b37 (patch)
tree5b7a4e7b024dc65cf061c1cb0f8f7d4f598478e7 /src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
parent0ec1e9d8f3e6f5f5e6ce75b21ea45e7d6aa64690 (diff)
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This commit was manufactured by cvs2git to create branch 'OPENBSD_5_0'.
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c1745
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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c
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1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <openssl/objects.h>
114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117#include "ssl_locl.h"
118
119const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
120
121#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
122static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
123 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
124 SSL_SESSION **psess);
125#endif
126
127SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
128 tls1_enc,
129 tls1_mac,
130 tls1_setup_key_block,
131 tls1_generate_master_secret,
132 tls1_change_cipher_state,
133 tls1_final_finish_mac,
134 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
135 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
136 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
137 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 tls1_alert_code,
139 };
140
141long tls1_default_timeout(void)
142 {
143 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
144 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
145 return(60*60*2);
146 }
147
148int tls1_new(SSL *s)
149 {
150 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
151 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
152 return(1);
153 }
154
155void tls1_free(SSL *s)
156 {
157#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
158 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
159 {
160 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
161 }
162#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
163 ssl3_free(s);
164 }
165
166void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
167 {
168 ssl3_clear(s);
169 s->version=TLS1_VERSION;
170 }
171
172#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
173static int nid_list[] =
174 {
175 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
176 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
177 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
178 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
179 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
180 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
181 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
182 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
183 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
184 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
185 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
186 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
187 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
188 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
189 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
190 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
191 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
192 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
193 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
194 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
195 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
196 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
197 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
198 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
199 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
200 };
201
202int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
203 {
204 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
205 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
206 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
207 return 0;
208 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
209 }
210
211int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
212 {
213 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
214 switch (nid)
215 {
216 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
217 return 1;
218 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
219 return 2;
220 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
221 return 3;
222 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 return 4;
224 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
225 return 5;
226 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
227 return 6;
228 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
229 return 7;
230 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
231 return 8;
232 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
233 return 9;
234 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
235 return 10;
236 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
237 return 11;
238 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
239 return 12;
240 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
241 return 13;
242 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
243 return 14;
244 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
245 return 15;
246 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
247 return 16;
248 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
249 return 17;
250 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
251 return 18;
252 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
253 return 19;
254 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
255 return 20;
256 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
257 return 21;
258 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
259 return 22;
260 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
261 return 23;
262 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
263 return 24;
264 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
265 return 25;
266 default:
267 return 0;
268 }
269 }
270#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
271
272#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
273unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
274 {
275 int extdatalen=0;
276 unsigned char *ret = p;
277
278 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
279 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
280 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
281 return p;
282
283 ret+=2;
284
285 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
286
287 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
288 {
289 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
290 unsigned long size_str;
291 long lenmax;
292
293 /* check for enough space.
294 4 for the servername type and entension length
295 2 for servernamelist length
296 1 for the hostname type
297 2 for hostname length
298 + hostname length
299 */
300
301 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
302 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
303 return NULL;
304
305 /* extension type and length */
306 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
307 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
308
309 /* length of servername list */
310 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
311
312 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
313 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
314 s2n(size_str,ret);
315 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
316 ret+=size_str;
317 }
318
319 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
320 if (s->new_session)
321 {
322 int el;
323
324 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
325 {
326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
327 return NULL;
328 }
329
330 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
331
332 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
333 s2n(el,ret);
334
335 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
336 {
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
338 return NULL;
339 }
340
341 ret += el;
342 }
343
344#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
345 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
346 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
347 {
348 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
349 long lenmax;
350
351 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
352 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
353 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
354 {
355 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
356 return NULL;
357 }
358
359 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
360 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
361 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
362 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
363 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
364 }
365 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
366 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
367 {
368 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
369 long lenmax;
370
371 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
372 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
373 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
374 {
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
376 return NULL;
377 }
378
379 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
380 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
381
382 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
383 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
384 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
385 * resolves this to two bytes.
386 */
387 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
388 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
389 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
390 }
391#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
392
393 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
394 {
395 int ticklen;
396 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
397 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
398 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
399 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
400 {
401 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
402 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
403 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
404 return NULL;
405 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
406 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
407 ticklen);
408 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
409 }
410 else
411 ticklen = 0;
412 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
413 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
414 goto skip_ext;
415 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
416 * rest for ticket
417 */
418 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
419 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
420 s2n(ticklen,ret);
421 if (ticklen)
422 {
423 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
424 ret += ticklen;
425 }
426 }
427 skip_ext:
428
429#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
430 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
432 {
433 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
434
435 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
436 return NULL;
437 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
438 return NULL;
439
440 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
441 s2n(col + 2, ret);
442 s2n(col, ret);
443 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
444 ret += col;
445 }
446#endif
447
448 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
449 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
450 {
451 int i;
452 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
453 OCSP_RESPID *id;
454
455 idlen = 0;
456 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
457 {
458 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
459 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
460 if (itmp <= 0)
461 return NULL;
462 idlen += itmp + 2;
463 }
464
465 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
466 {
467 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
468 if (extlen < 0)
469 return NULL;
470 }
471 else
472 extlen = 0;
473
474 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
475 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
476 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
477 return NULL;
478 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
479 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
480 s2n(idlen, ret);
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
482 {
483 /* save position of id len */
484 unsigned char *q = ret;
485 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
486 /* skip over id len */
487 ret += 2;
488 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
489 /* write id len */
490 s2n(itmp, q);
491 }
492 s2n(extlen, ret);
493 if (extlen > 0)
494 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
495 }
496
497 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
498 return p;
499
500 s2n(extdatalen,p);
501 return ret;
502 }
503
504unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
505 {
506 int extdatalen=0;
507 unsigned char *ret = p;
508
509 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
510 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
511 return p;
512
513 ret+=2;
514 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
515
516 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
517 {
518 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
519
520 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
521 s2n(0,ret);
522 }
523
524 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
525 {
526 int el;
527
528 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
529 {
530 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
531 return NULL;
532 }
533
534 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
535
536 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
537 s2n(el,ret);
538
539 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
540 {
541 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
542 return NULL;
543 }
544
545 ret += el;
546 }
547
548#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
549 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
550 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
551 {
552 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
553 long lenmax;
554
555 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
556 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
557 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
558 {
559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
560 return NULL;
561 }
562
563 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
564 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
565 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
566 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
567 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
568
569 }
570 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
571#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
572
573 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
574 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
575 {
576 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
577 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
578 s2n(0,ret);
579 }
580
581 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
582 {
583 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
584 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
585 s2n(0,ret);
586 }
587
588#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
589 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
590 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
591 {
592 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
593
594 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
595 return NULL;
596 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
597 return NULL;
598
599 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
600 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
601 s2n(sol, ret);
602 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
603 ret += sol;
604 }
605#endif
606 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
607 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
608 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
609 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
610 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
611 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
612 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
613 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
614 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
615 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
616 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
617 ret+=36;
618
619 }
620
621 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
622 return p;
623
624 s2n(extdatalen,p);
625 return ret;
626 }
627
628int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
629 {
630 unsigned short type;
631 unsigned short size;
632 unsigned short len;
633 unsigned char *data = *p;
634 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
635
636 s->servername_done = 0;
637 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
638
639 if (data >= (d+n-2))
640 goto ri_check;
641 n2s(data,len);
642
643 if (data > (d+n-len))
644 goto ri_check;
645
646 while (data <= (d+n-4))
647 {
648 n2s(data,type);
649 n2s(data,size);
650
651 if (data+size > (d+n))
652 goto ri_check;
653#if 0
654 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
655#endif
656 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
657 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
658 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
659/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
660
661 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
662 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
663 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
664 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
665 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
666 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
667 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
668 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
669 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
670 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
671 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
672 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
673 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
674 the value of the Host: field.
675 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
676 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
677 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
678 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
679
680*/
681
682 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
683 {
684 unsigned char *sdata;
685 int servname_type;
686 int dsize;
687
688 if (size < 2)
689 {
690 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
691 return 0;
692 }
693 n2s(data,dsize);
694 size -= 2;
695 if (dsize > size )
696 {
697 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
698 return 0;
699 }
700
701 sdata = data;
702 while (dsize > 3)
703 {
704 servname_type = *(sdata++);
705 n2s(sdata,len);
706 dsize -= 3;
707
708 if (len > dsize)
709 {
710 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
711 return 0;
712 }
713 if (s->servername_done == 0)
714 switch (servname_type)
715 {
716 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
717 if (!s->hit)
718 {
719 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
720 {
721 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
722 return 0;
723 }
724 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
725 {
726 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
727 return 0;
728 }
729 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
730 {
731 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
732 return 0;
733 }
734 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
735 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
736 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
737 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
738 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
739 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
740 return 0;
741 }
742 s->servername_done = 1;
743
744 }
745 else
746 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
747 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
748 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
749
750 break;
751
752 default:
753 break;
754 }
755
756 dsize -= len;
757 }
758 if (dsize != 0)
759 {
760 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
761 return 0;
762 }
763
764 }
765
766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
767 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
768 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
769 {
770 unsigned char *sdata = data;
771 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
772
773 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
774 {
775 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
776 return 0;
777 }
778 if (!s->hit)
779 {
780 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
781 {
782 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
783 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
784 }
785 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
786 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
787 {
788 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
789 return 0;
790 }
791 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
792 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
793 }
794#if 0
795 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
796 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
797 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
798 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
799 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
800#endif
801 }
802 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
803 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
804 {
805 unsigned char *sdata = data;
806 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
807 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
808
809 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
810 {
811 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
812 return 0;
813 }
814 if (!s->hit)
815 {
816 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
817 {
818 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
819 return 0;
820 }
821 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
822 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
823 {
824 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
825 return 0;
826 }
827 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
828 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
829 }
830#if 0
831 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
832 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
833 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
834 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
835 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
836#endif
837 }
838#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
839#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
840 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
841 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
842 {
843 unsigned char *sdata = data;
844
845 if (size < 2)
846 {
847 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
848 return 0;
849 }
850 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
851 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
852 {
853 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
854 return 0;
855 }
856
857 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
858 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
859 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
860 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
861 else
862 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
863 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
864 {
865 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
866 return 0;
867 }
868 }
869#endif
870 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
871 {
872 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
873 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
874 {
875 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
876 return 0;
877 }
878 }
879 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
880 {
881 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
882 return 0;
883 renegotiate_seen = 1;
884 }
885 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
886 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
887 {
888
889 if (size < 5)
890 {
891 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
892 return 0;
893 }
894
895 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
896 size--;
897 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
898 {
899 const unsigned char *sdata;
900 int dsize;
901 /* Read in responder_id_list */
902 n2s(data,dsize);
903 size -= 2;
904 if (dsize > size )
905 {
906 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
907 return 0;
908 }
909 while (dsize > 0)
910 {
911 OCSP_RESPID *id;
912 int idsize;
913 if (dsize < 4)
914 {
915 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
916 return 0;
917 }
918 n2s(data, idsize);
919 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
920 size -= 2 + idsize;
921 if (dsize < 0)
922 {
923 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
924 return 0;
925 }
926 sdata = data;
927 data += idsize;
928 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
929 &sdata, idsize);
930 if (!id)
931 {
932 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
933 return 0;
934 }
935 if (data != sdata)
936 {
937 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
938 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
939 return 0;
940 }
941 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
942 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
943 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
944 {
945 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
946 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
947 return 0;
948 }
949 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
950 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
951 {
952 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
953 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
954 return 0;
955 }
956 }
957
958 /* Read in request_extensions */
959 if (size < 2)
960 {
961 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
962 return 0;
963 }
964 n2s(data,dsize);
965 size -= 2;
966 if (dsize != size)
967 {
968 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
969 return 0;
970 }
971 sdata = data;
972 if (dsize > 0)
973 {
974 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
975 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
976 &sdata, dsize);
977 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
978 || (data + dsize != sdata))
979 {
980 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
981 return 0;
982 }
983 }
984 }
985 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
986 * so ignore it.
987 */
988 else
989 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
990 }
991
992 /* session ticket processed earlier */
993 data+=size;
994 }
995
996 *p = data;
997
998 ri_check:
999
1000 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1001
1002 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session &&
1003 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1004 {
1005 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1006 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1007 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1008 return 0;
1009 }
1010
1011 return 1;
1012 }
1013
1014int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1015 {
1016 unsigned short type;
1017 unsigned short size;
1018 unsigned short len;
1019 unsigned char *data = *p;
1020 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1021 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1022
1023 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1024 goto ri_check;
1025
1026 n2s(data,len);
1027
1028 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1029 {
1030 n2s(data,type);
1031 n2s(data,size);
1032
1033 if (data+size > (d+n))
1034 goto ri_check;
1035
1036 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1037 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1038 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1039
1040 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1041 {
1042 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1043 {
1044 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1045 return 0;
1046 }
1047 tlsext_servername = 1;
1048 }
1049
1050#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1051 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1052 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1053 {
1054 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1055 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1056
1057 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1058 {
1059 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1060 return 0;
1061 }
1062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1063 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1064 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1065 {
1066 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1067 return 0;
1068 }
1069 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1070 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1071#if 0
1072 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1073 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1074 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1075 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1076 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1077#endif
1078 }
1079#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1080
1081 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1082 {
1083 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1084 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1085 {
1086 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1087 return 0;
1088 }
1089 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1090 || (size > 0))
1091 {
1092 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1093 return 0;
1094 }
1095 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1096 }
1097#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1098 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1099 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1100 {
1101 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1102
1103 if (size < 2)
1104 {
1105 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1106 return 0;
1107 }
1108 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1109 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1110 {
1111 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1112 return 0;
1113 }
1114
1115 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1116 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1117 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1118 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1119 else
1120 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1121
1122 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1123 {
1124 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127 }
1128#endif
1129 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1130 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1131 {
1132 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1133 * a status request message.
1134 */
1135 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1136 {
1137 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1138 return 0;
1139 }
1140 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1141 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1142 }
1143 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1144 {
1145 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1146 return 0;
1147 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1148 }
1149 data+=size;
1150 }
1151
1152 if (data != d+n)
1153 {
1154 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1155 return 0;
1156 }
1157
1158 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1159 {
1160 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1161 {
1162 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1163 {
1164 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1165 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1166 {
1167 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1168 return 0;
1169 }
1170 }
1171 else
1172 {
1173 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1174 return 0;
1175 }
1176 }
1177 }
1178
1179 *p = data;
1180
1181 ri_check:
1182
1183 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1184 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1185 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1186 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1187 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1188 * absence on initial connect only.
1189 */
1190 if (!renegotiate_seen
1191 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1192 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1193 {
1194 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1196 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1197 return 0;
1198 }
1199
1200 return 1;
1201 }
1202
1203
1204int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1205 {
1206#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1207 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1208 * and elliptic curves we support.
1209 */
1210 int using_ecc = 0;
1211 int i;
1212 unsigned char *j;
1213 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1214 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1215
1216 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1217 {
1218 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1219
1220 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1221 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1222 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1223 {
1224 using_ecc = 1;
1225 break;
1226 }
1227 }
1228 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION);
1229 if (using_ecc)
1230 {
1231 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1232 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1233 {
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1235 return -1;
1236 }
1237 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1238 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1239 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1240 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1241
1242 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1243 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1244 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2;
1245 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1246 {
1247 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1248 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1249 return -1;
1250 }
1251 for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <=
1252 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++)
1253 s2n(i,j);
1254 }
1255#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1256
1257#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1258 {
1259 int r = 1;
1260
1261 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1262 {
1263 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1264 if (!r)
1265 return -1;
1266 }
1267
1268 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1269 {
1270 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1271 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1272
1273 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1274 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1275 else
1276 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1277 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1278 {
1279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1280 return -1;
1281 }
1282 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1283 }
1284
1285 if (r == 2)
1286 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1287 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1288 }
1289#endif
1290
1291 return 1;
1292 }
1293
1294int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1295 {
1296#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1297 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1298 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1299 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1300 */
1301
1302 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1303 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1304 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1305 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1306
1307 if (using_ecc)
1308 {
1309 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1310 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1311 {
1312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1313 return -1;
1314 }
1315 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1316 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1317 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1318 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1319 }
1320#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1321
1322 return 1;
1323 }
1324
1325int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1326 {
1327 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1328 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1329
1330#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1331 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1332 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1333 */
1334 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1335 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1336 */
1337#endif
1338
1339 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1340 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1341 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1342 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1343
1344 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1345 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1346 * the certificate has changed.
1347 */
1348 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1349 {
1350 int r;
1351 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1352 switch (r)
1353 {
1354 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1355 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1356 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1357 break;
1358 /* status request response should be sent */
1359 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1360 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1361 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1362 else
1363 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1364 break;
1365 /* something bad happened */
1366 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1367 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1368 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1369 goto err;
1370 }
1371 }
1372 else
1373 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1374
1375#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1376 {
1377 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1378 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1379 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1380
1381 int r = 1;
1382
1383 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1384 {
1385 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1386 if (!r)
1387 {
1388 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1389 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1390 goto err;
1391 }
1392 }
1393
1394 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1395 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1396 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1397
1398 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1399 {
1400 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1401 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1402 {
1403 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1404 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1405
1406 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1407 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1408 else
1409 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1410 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1411 {
1412 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1413 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1414 goto err;
1415 }
1416 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1417 }
1418 }
1419
1420 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1421 {
1422 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1423 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1424 * abort the handshake.
1425 */
1426 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1427 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1428 }
1429 }
1430
1431#endif
1432 err:
1433 switch (ret)
1434 {
1435 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1436 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1437 return -1;
1438
1439 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1440 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1441 return 1;
1442
1443 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1444 s->servername_done=0;
1445 default:
1446 return 1;
1447 }
1448 }
1449
1450int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1451 {
1452 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1453 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1454
1455#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1456 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, then server
1457 * must return a an EC point formats lists containing uncompressed.
1458 */
1459 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1460 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1461 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1462 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1463 {
1464 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1465 size_t i;
1466 unsigned char *list;
1467 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1468 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist == NULL) || (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length == 0))
1469 {
1470 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1471 return -1;
1472 }
1473 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1474 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1475 {
1476 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1477 {
1478 found_uncompressed = 1;
1479 break;
1480 }
1481 }
1482 if (!found_uncompressed)
1483 {
1484 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1485 return -1;
1486 }
1487 }
1488 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1489#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1490
1491 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1492 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1493 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1494 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1495
1496#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1497 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1498 {
1499 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1500 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1501
1502 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1503 {
1504 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1505 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1506 }
1507
1508 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1509 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1510 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1511 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1512 {
1513 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1514 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1515 }
1516 }
1517#endif
1518
1519 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1520 * tell the callback
1521 */
1522 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1523 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1524 {
1525 int r;
1526 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1527 * there is no response.
1528 */
1529 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1530 {
1531 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1532 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1533 }
1534 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1535 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1536 if (r == 0)
1537 {
1538 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1539 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1540 }
1541 if (r < 0)
1542 {
1543 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1545 }
1546 }
1547
1548 switch (ret)
1549 {
1550 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1551 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1552 return -1;
1553
1554 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1555 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1556 return 1;
1557
1558 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1559 s->servername_done=0;
1560 default:
1561 return 1;
1562 }
1563 }
1564
1565/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client
1566 * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS
1567 * session ticket extension at the same time.
1568 */
1569
1570int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
1571 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
1572 {
1573 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
1574 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
1575 unsigned short i;
1576
1577 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
1578 * to permit stateful resumption.
1579 */
1580 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1581 return 1;
1582
1583 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
1584 return 1;
1585 if (p >= limit)
1586 return -1;
1587 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
1588 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1589 {
1590 i = *(p++);
1591 p+= i;
1592 if (p >= limit)
1593 return -1;
1594 }
1595 /* Skip past cipher list */
1596 n2s(p, i);
1597 p+= i;
1598 if (p >= limit)
1599 return -1;
1600 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
1601 i = *(p++);
1602 p += i;
1603 if (p > limit)
1604 return -1;
1605 /* Now at start of extensions */
1606 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
1607 return 1;
1608 n2s(p, i);
1609 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
1610 {
1611 unsigned short type, size;
1612 n2s(p, type);
1613 n2s(p, size);
1614 if (p + size > limit)
1615 return 1;
1616 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1617 {
1618 /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will
1619 * trigger a full handshake
1620 */
1621 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1622 return 1;
1623 /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket
1624 * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake
1625 */
1626 if (size == 0)
1627 {
1628 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1629 return 0; /* Cache miss */
1630 }
1631 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1632 {
1633 /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of
1634 * generating the session from ticket now,
1635 * trigger abbreviated handshake based on
1636 * external mechanism to calculate the master
1637 * secret later. */
1638 return 0;
1639 }
1640 return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len,
1641 ret);
1642 }
1643 p += size;
1644 }
1645 return 1;
1646 }
1647
1648static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
1649 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
1650 SSL_SESSION **psess)
1651 {
1652 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1653 unsigned char *sdec;
1654 const unsigned char *p;
1655 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
1656 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
1657 HMAC_CTX hctx;
1658 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
1659 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
1660 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
1661 if (eticklen < 48)
1662 goto tickerr;
1663 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
1664 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
1665 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
1666 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
1667 {
1668 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
1669 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
1670 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
1671 if (rv < 0)
1672 return -1;
1673 if (rv == 0)
1674 goto tickerr;
1675 if (rv == 2)
1676 renew_ticket = 1;
1677 }
1678 else
1679 {
1680 /* Check key name matches */
1681 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
1682 goto tickerr;
1683 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
1684 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
1685 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
1686 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
1687 }
1688 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
1689 * integrity checks on ticket.
1690 */
1691 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
1692 if (mlen < 0)
1693 {
1694 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1695 return -1;
1696 }
1697 eticklen -= mlen;
1698 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
1699 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
1700 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
1701 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
1702 if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
1703 goto tickerr;
1704 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
1705 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
1706 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1707 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
1708 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
1709 if (!sdec)
1710 {
1711 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1712 return -1;
1713 }
1714 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
1715 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
1716 goto tickerr;
1717 slen += mlen;
1718 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1719 p = sdec;
1720
1721 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
1722 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
1723 if (sess)
1724 {
1725 /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to
1726 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
1727 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
1728 * as required by standard.
1729 */
1730 if (sesslen)
1731 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
1732 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
1733 *psess = sess;
1734 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket;
1735 return 1;
1736 }
1737 /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to
1738 * send a new ticket
1739 */
1740 tickerr:
1741 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1742 return 0;
1743 }
1744
1745#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-05-13 06:37:39 +0000