Remove bogus length checks from EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305()

The length checks for EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305() seal/open were incorrect
and are no longer necessary (not to mention that the comment failed to
match the code). Remove these since the underlying ChaCha implementation
will now handle the same sized inputs at these functions can.

Issue flagged by and ok tb@

1 files changed, 1 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
index 4fd92eb04e..3b29364586 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.21 2019/03/27 15:34:01 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.22 2022/08/20 18:51:09 jsing Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter <reyk@openbsd.org>
@@ -124,21 +124,8 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
         poly1305_state poly1305;
         const unsigned char *iv;
-        const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
         uint64_t ctr;
 
-        /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
-         * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
-         * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
-         * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
-         * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
-         * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
-         * the warning. */
-        if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-                EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
                 EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
                 return 0;
@@ -188,7 +175,6 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
         const unsigned char *iv = nonce;
         poly1305_state poly1305;
-        const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
         size_t plaintext_len;
         uint64_t ctr = 0;
 
@@ -197,18 +183,6 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 return 0;
         }
 
-        /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
-         * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
-         * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
-         * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
-         * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
-         * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
-         * the warning. */
-        if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-                EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
                 EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
                 return 0;