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authorschwarze <>2019-08-25 19:24:00 +0000
committerschwarze <>2019-08-25 19:24:00 +0000
commit778a6d338bf2610d12d814b4a503d2638cfc8d1d (patch)
treeb5109bcc1c452d104f90693aee6a22d0e945d314 /src
parent533a7ff91759c413fd387c34db7eef7bfcad50eb (diff)
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Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of
not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. Patch from Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> and Annie Yousar via OpenSSL commit feac7a1c Jul 25 18:55:16 2018 +0200, still under a free license. OK tb@.
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn.h91
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/man/BN_generate_prime.328
2 files changed, 93 insertions, 26 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn.h
index cd94e39345..cc1f467523 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: bn.h,v 1.38 2018/02/20 17:13:14 jsing Exp $ */ 1/* $OpenBSD: bn.h,v 1.39 2019/08/25 19:23:59 schwarze Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) 2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1997 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved. 3 * All rights reserved.
4 * 4 *
@@ -308,24 +308,79 @@ int BN_GENCB_call(BN_GENCB *cb, int a, int b);
308#define BN_prime_checks 0 /* default: select number of iterations 308#define BN_prime_checks 0 /* default: select number of iterations
309 based on the size of the number */ 309 based on the size of the number */
310 310
311/* number of Miller-Rabin iterations for an error rate of less than 2^-80 311/*
312 * for random 'b'-bit input, b >= 100 (taken from table 4.4 in the Handbook 312 * BN_prime_checks_for_size() returns the number of Miller-Rabin
313 * of Applied Cryptography [Menezes, van Oorschot, Vanstone; CRC Press 1996]; 313 * iterations that will be done for checking that a random number
314 * original paper: Damgaard, Landrock, Pomerance: Average case error estimates 314 * is probably prime. The error rate for accepting a composite
315 * for the strong probable prime test. -- Math. Comp. 61 (1993) 177-194) */ 315 * number as prime depends on the size of the prime |b|. The error
316#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 1300 ? 2 : \ 316 * rates used are for calculating an RSA key with 2 primes, and so
317 (b) >= 850 ? 3 : \ 317 * the level is what you would expect for a key of double the size
318 (b) >= 650 ? 4 : \ 318 * of the prime.
319 (b) >= 550 ? 5 : \ 319 *
320 (b) >= 450 ? 6 : \ 320 * This table is generated using the algorithm of FIPS PUB 186-4
321 (b) >= 400 ? 7 : \ 321 * Digital Signature Standard (DSS), section F.1, page 117.
322 (b) >= 350 ? 8 : \ 322 * (https://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4)
323 (b) >= 300 ? 9 : \ 323 *
324 (b) >= 250 ? 12 : \ 324 * The following magma script was used to generate the output:
325 (b) >= 200 ? 15 : \ 325 * securitybits:=125;
326 (b) >= 150 ? 18 : \ 326 * k:=1024;
327 /* b >= 100 */ 27) 327 * for t:=1 to 65 do
328 * for M:=3 to Floor(2*Sqrt(k-1)-1) do
329 * S:=0;
330 * // Sum over m
331 * for m:=3 to M do
332 * s:=0;
333 * // Sum over j
334 * for j:=2 to m do
335 * s+:=(RealField(32)!2)^-(j+(k-1)/j);
336 * end for;
337 * S+:=2^(m-(m-1)*t)*s;
338 * end for;
339 * A:=2^(k-2-M*t);
340 * B:=8*(Pi(RealField(32))^2-6)/3*2^(k-2)*S;
341 * pkt:=2.00743*Log(2)*k*2^-k*(A+B);
342 * seclevel:=Floor(-Log(2,pkt));
343 * if seclevel ge securitybits then
344 * printf "k: %5o, security: %o bits (t: %o, M: %o)\n",k,seclevel,t,M;
345 * break;
346 * end if;
347 * end for;
348 * if seclevel ge securitybits then break; end if;
349 * end for;
350 *
351 * It can be run online at:
352 * http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/calc
353 *
354 * And will output:
355 * k: 1024, security: 129 bits (t: 6, M: 23)
356 *
357 * k is the number of bits of the prime, securitybits is the level
358 * we want to reach.
359 *
360 * prime length | RSA key size | # MR tests | security level
361 * -------------+--------------|------------+---------------
362 * (b) >= 6394 | >= 12788 | 3 | 256 bit
363 * (b) >= 3747 | >= 7494 | 3 | 192 bit
364 * (b) >= 1345 | >= 2690 | 4 | 128 bit
365 * (b) >= 1080 | >= 2160 | 5 | 128 bit
366 * (b) >= 852 | >= 1704 | 5 | 112 bit
367 * (b) >= 476 | >= 952 | 5 | 80 bit
368 * (b) >= 400 | >= 800 | 6 | 80 bit
369 * (b) >= 347 | >= 694 | 7 | 80 bit
370 * (b) >= 308 | >= 616 | 8 | 80 bit
371 * (b) >= 55 | >= 110 | 27 | 64 bit
372 * (b) >= 6 | >= 12 | 34 | 64 bit
373 */
328 374
375#define BN_prime_checks_for_size(b) ((b) >= 3747 ? 3 : \
376 (b) >= 1345 ? 4 : \
377 (b) >= 476 ? 5 : \
378 (b) >= 400 ? 6 : \
379 (b) >= 347 ? 7 : \
380 (b) >= 308 ? 8 : \
381 (b) >= 55 ? 27 : \
382 /* b >= 6 */ 34)
383
329#define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8) 384#define BN_num_bytes(a) ((BN_num_bits(a)+7)/8)
330 385
331/* Note that BN_abs_is_word didn't work reliably for w == 0 until 0.9.8 */ 386/* Note that BN_abs_is_word didn't work reliably for w == 0 until 0.9.8 */
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/BN_generate_prime.3 b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/BN_generate_prime.3
index 2369b6f24f..7db27fd627 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/BN_generate_prime.3
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/BN_generate_prime.3
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
1.\" $OpenBSD: BN_generate_prime.3,v 1.17 2019/06/10 14:58:48 schwarze Exp $ 1.\" $OpenBSD: BN_generate_prime.3,v 1.18 2019/08/25 19:24:00 schwarze Exp $
2.\" full merge up to: OpenSSL b3696a55 Sep 2 09:35:50 2017 -0400 2.\" full merge up to: OpenSSL f987a4dd Jun 27 10:12:08 2019 +0200
3.\" selective merge up to: OpenSSL df75c2bf Dec 9 01:02:36 2018 +0100
4.\" 3.\"
5.\" This file was written by Ulf Moeller <ulf@openssl.org> 4.\" This file was written by Ulf Moeller <ulf@openssl.org>
6.\" Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>, and Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>. 5.\" Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>, and Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>.
@@ -51,7 +50,7 @@
51.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED 50.\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
52.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. 51.\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
53.\" 52.\"
54.Dd $Mdocdate: June 10 2019 $ 53.Dd $Mdocdate: August 25 2019 $
55.Dt BN_GENERATE_PRIME 3 54.Dt BN_GENERATE_PRIME 3
56.Os 55.Os
57.Sh NAME 56.Sh NAME
@@ -156,6 +155,8 @@ Deprecated:
156.Fn BN_generate_prime_ex 155.Fn BN_generate_prime_ex
157generates a pseudo-random prime number of at least bit length 156generates a pseudo-random prime number of at least bit length
158.Fa bits . 157.Fa bits .
158The returned number is probably prime, but there is a very small
159probability of returning a non-prime number.
159If 160If
160.Fa ret 161.Fa ret
161is not 162is not
@@ -212,8 +213,6 @@ If
212is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so that (p-1)/2 213is true, it will be a safe prime (i.e. a prime p so that (p-1)/2
213is also prime). 214is also prime).
214.Pp 215.Pp
215The prime number generation has a negligible error probability.
216.Pp
217.Fn BN_is_prime_ex 216.Fn BN_is_prime_ex
218and 217and
219.Fn BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex 218.Fn BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex
@@ -251,8 +250,21 @@ If
251.Fa nchecks 250.Fa nchecks
252== 251==
253.Dv BN_prime_checks , 252.Dv BN_prime_checks ,
254a number of iterations is used that yields a false positive rate of at 253a number of iterations is used that yields a false positive rate
255most 2^-80 for random input. 254of at most 2\(ha-64 for random input.
255The error rate depends on the size of the prime
256and goes down for bigger primes.
257The rate is 2\(ha-80 starting at 308 bits, 2\(ha-112 at 852 bits,
2582\(ha-128 at 1080 bits, 2\(ha-192 at 3747 bits
259and 2\(ha-256 at 6394 bits.
260.Pp
261When the source of the prime is not random or not trusted, the
262number of checks needs to be much higher to reach the same level
263of assurance: It should equal half of the targeted security level
264in bits (rounded up to the next integer if necessary).
265For instance, to reach the 128 bit security level,
266.Fa nchecks
267should be set to 64.
256.Pp 268.Pp
257If 269If
258.Fa cb 270.Fa cb