The upcoming x509 alt chains diff tightens the trust requirements

for certificates. This (from OpenSSL) ensures that the current
"default" behaviour remains the same.  We should revisit this
later
ok jsing@

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_trs.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_trs.c
index 42fb97f571..5be7abdf08 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_trs.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_trs.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: x509_trs.c,v 1.20 2015/02/10 11:22:21 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: x509_trs.c,v 1.21 2016/11/06 10:31:34 beck Exp $ */
 /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
  * project 1999.
  */
@@ -116,6 +116,22 @@ X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags)
 
         if (id == -1)
                 return 1;
+        /*
+         * XXX beck/jsing This enables self signed certs to be trusted for
+         * an unspecified id/trust flag value (this is NOT the
+         * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT), which was the longstanding
+         * openssl behaviour. boringssl does not have this behaviour.
+         *
+         * This should be revisited, but changing the default "not default"
+         * may break things.
+         */
+        if (id == 0) {
+                int rv;
+                rv = obj_trust(NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, x, 0);
+                if (rv != X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED)
+                        return rv;
+                return trust_compat(NULL, x, 0);
+        }
         idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(id);
         if (idx == -1)
                 return default_trust(id, x, flags);