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Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c490
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 490 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 86b1ad9e83..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/cms/cms_kari.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,490 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: cms_kari.c,v 1.17 2024/11/01 18:34:06 tb Exp $ */
2/*
3 * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
4 * project.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 2013 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 * distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * acknowledgment:
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 */
54
55#include <stdlib.h>
56#include <string.h>
57
58#include <openssl/asn1.h>
59#include <openssl/cms.h>
60#include <openssl/err.h>
61#include <openssl/evp.h>
62
63#include "cms_local.h"
64
65/* Key Agreement Recipient Info (KARI) routines */
66
67int
68CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg,
69 ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pukm)
70{
71 if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
72 CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
73 return 0;
74 }
75 if (palg)
76 *palg = ri->d.kari->keyEncryptionAlgorithm;
77 if (pukm)
78 *pukm = ri->d.kari->ukm;
79
80 return 1;
81}
82LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg);
83
84/* Retrieve recipient encrypted keys from a kari */
85
86STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *
87CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
88{
89 if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
90 CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
91 return NULL;
92 }
93 return ri->d.kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
94}
95LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_reks);
96
97int
98CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **pubalg,
99 ASN1_BIT_STRING **pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer,
100 ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
101{
102 CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
103
104 if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
105 CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
106 return 0;
107 }
108 oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
109 if (issuer)
110 *issuer = NULL;
111 if (sno)
112 *sno = NULL;
113 if (keyid)
114 *keyid = NULL;
115 if (pubalg)
116 *pubalg = NULL;
117 if (pubkey)
118 *pubkey = NULL;
119 if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
120 if (issuer)
121 *issuer = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
122 if (sno)
123 *sno = oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
124 } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
125 if (keyid)
126 *keyid = oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier;
127 } else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_PUBKEY) {
128 if (pubalg)
129 *pubalg = oik->d.originatorKey->algorithm;
130 if (pubkey)
131 *pubkey = oik->d.originatorKey->publicKey;
132 } else
133 return 0;
134
135 return 1;
136}
137LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id);
138
139int
140CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert)
141{
142 CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik;
143
144 if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
145 CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
146 return -2;
147 }
148 oik = ri->d.kari->originator;
149 if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
150 return cms_ias_cert_cmp(oik->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
151 else if (oik->type == CMS_OIK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
152 return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(oik->d.subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
153
154 return -1;
155}
156LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_orig_id_cmp);
157
158int
159CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek,
160 ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **tm,
161 CMS_OtherKeyAttribute **other, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno)
162{
163 CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
164
165 if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL) {
166 if (issuer)
167 *issuer = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->issuer;
168 if (sno)
169 *sno = rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber->serialNumber;
170 if (keyid)
171 *keyid = NULL;
172 if (tm)
173 *tm = NULL;
174 if (other)
175 *other = NULL;
176 } else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER) {
177 if (keyid)
178 *keyid = rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier;
179 if (tm)
180 *tm = rid->d.rKeyId->date;
181 if (other)
182 *other = rid->d.rKeyId->other;
183 if (issuer)
184 *issuer = NULL;
185 if (sno)
186 *sno = NULL;
187 } else
188 return 0;
189
190 return 1;
191}
192LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_get0_id);
193
194int
195CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek, X509 *cert)
196{
197 CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientIdentifier *rid = rek->rid;
198
199 if (rid->type == CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL)
200 return cms_ias_cert_cmp(rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, cert);
201 else if (rid->type == CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER)
202 return cms_keyid_cert_cmp(rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, cert);
203 else
204 return -1;
205}
206LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_cert_cmp);
207
208int
209CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pk)
210{
211 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
212 CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari = ri->d.kari;
213
214 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
215 kari->pctx = NULL;
216 if (!pk)
217 return 1;
218 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
219 if (!pctx || !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx))
220 goto err;
221 kari->pctx = pctx;
222 return 1;
223
224 err:
225 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
226 return 0;
227}
228LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_set0_pkey);
229
230EVP_CIPHER_CTX *
231CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
232{
233 if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE)
234 return ri->d.kari->ctx;
235 return NULL;
236}
237LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx);
238
239/*
240 * Derive KEK and decrypt/encrypt with it to produce either the original CEK
241 * or the encrypted CEK.
242 */
243
244static int
245cms_kek_cipher(unsigned char **pout, size_t *poutlen, const unsigned char *in,
246 size_t inlen, CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, int enc)
247{
248 /* Key encryption key */
249 unsigned char kek[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
250 size_t keklen;
251 int rv = 0;
252 unsigned char *out = NULL;
253 int outlen;
254
255 keklen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kari->ctx);
256 if (keklen > EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH)
257 return 0;
258 /* Derive KEK */
259 if (EVP_PKEY_derive(kari->pctx, kek, &keklen) <= 0)
260 goto err;
261 /* Set KEK in context */
262 if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(kari->ctx, NULL, NULL, kek, NULL, enc))
263 goto err;
264 /* obtain output length of ciphered key */
265 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, NULL, &outlen, in, inlen))
266 goto err;
267 out = malloc(outlen);
268 if (out == NULL)
269 goto err;
270 if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(kari->ctx, out, &outlen, in, inlen))
271 goto err;
272 *pout = out;
273 *poutlen = (size_t)outlen;
274 rv = 1;
275
276 err:
277 explicit_bzero(kek, keklen);
278 if (!rv)
279 free(out);
280 (void)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(kari->ctx);
281 /* FIXME: WHY IS kari->pctx freed here? /RL */
282 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kari->pctx);
283 kari->pctx = NULL;
284
285 return rv;
286}
287
288int
289CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
290 CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek)
291{
292 int rv = 0;
293 unsigned char *enckey = NULL, *cek = NULL;
294 size_t enckeylen;
295 size_t ceklen;
296 CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
297
298 enckeylen = rek->encryptedKey->length;
299 enckey = rek->encryptedKey->data;
300 /* Setup all parameters to derive KEK */
301 if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1))
302 goto err;
303 /* Attempt to decrypt CEK */
304 if (!cms_kek_cipher(&cek, &ceklen, enckey, enckeylen, ri->d.kari, 0))
305 goto err;
306 ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
307 freezero(ec->key, ec->keylen);
308 ec->key = cek;
309 ec->keylen = ceklen;
310 cek = NULL;
311 rv = 1;
312
313 err:
314 free(cek);
315
316 return rv;
317}
318LCRYPTO_ALIAS(CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_decrypt);
319
320/* Create ephemeral key and initialise context based on it */
321static int
322cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, EVP_PKEY *pk)
323{
324 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
325 EVP_PKEY *ekey = NULL;
326 int rv = 0;
327
328 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
329 if (!pctx)
330 goto err;
331 if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0)
332 goto err;
333 if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &ekey) <= 0)
334 goto err;
335 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
336 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ekey, NULL);
337 if (!pctx)
338 goto err;
339 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0)
340 goto err;
341 kari->pctx = pctx;
342 rv = 1;
343
344 err:
345 if (!rv)
346 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
347 EVP_PKEY_free(ekey);
348
349 return rv;
350}
351
352/* Initialise a kari based on passed certificate and key */
353
354int
355cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk,
356 unsigned int flags)
357{
358 CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
359 CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek = NULL;
360
361 ri->d.kari = (CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo_it);
362 if (!ri->d.kari)
363 return 0;
364 ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE;
365
366 kari = ri->d.kari;
367 kari->version = 3;
368
369 rek = (CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it);
370 if (rek == NULL)
371 return 0;
372
373 if (!sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_push(kari->recipientEncryptedKeys, rek)) {
374 ASN1_item_free((ASN1_VALUE *)rek, &CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_it);
375 return 0;
376 }
377
378 if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) {
379 rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_KEYIDENTIFIER;
380 rek->rid->d.rKeyId = (CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_RecipientKeyIdentifier_it);
381 if (rek->rid->d.rKeyId == NULL)
382 return 0;
383 if (!cms_set1_keyid(&rek->rid->d.rKeyId->subjectKeyIdentifier, recip))
384 return 0;
385 } else {
386 rek->rid->type = CMS_REK_ISSUER_SERIAL;
387 if (!cms_set1_ias(&rek->rid->d.issuerAndSerialNumber, recip))
388 return 0;
389 }
390
391 /* Create ephemeral key */
392 if (!cms_kari_create_ephemeral_key(kari, pk))
393 return 0;
394
395 EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk);
396 rek->pkey = pk;
397
398 return 1;
399}
400
401static int
402cms_wrap_init(CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher)
403{
404 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = kari->ctx;
405 const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher;
406 int keylen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher);
407
408 /* If a suitable wrap algorithm is already set nothing to do */
409 kekcipher = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx);
410
411 if (kekcipher) {
412 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
413 return 0;
414 return 1;
415 }
416 /*
417 * Pick a cipher based on content encryption cipher. If it is DES3 use
418 * DES3 wrap otherwise use AES wrap similar to key size.
419 */
420#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
421#if 0
422 /*
423 * XXX - we do not currently support DES3 wrap and probably should just
424 * drop this code.
425 */
426 if (EVP_CIPHER_type(cipher) == NID_des_ede3_cbc)
427 kekcipher = EVP_des_ede3_wrap();
428 else
429#endif
430#endif
431 if (keylen <= 16)
432 kekcipher = EVP_aes_128_wrap();
433 else if (keylen <= 24)
434 kekcipher = EVP_aes_192_wrap();
435 else
436 kekcipher = EVP_aes_256_wrap();
437
438 return EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL);
439}
440
441/* Encrypt content key in key agreement recipient info */
442
443int
444cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
445{
446 CMS_KeyAgreeRecipientInfo *kari;
447 CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
448 CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey *rek;
449 STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey) *reks;
450 int i;
451
452 if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) {
453 CMSerror(CMS_R_NOT_KEY_AGREEMENT);
454 return 0;
455 }
456 kari = ri->d.kari;
457 reks = kari->recipientEncryptedKeys;
458 ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
459 /* Initialise wrap algorithm parameters */
460 if (!cms_wrap_init(kari, ec->cipher))
461 return 0;
462 /*
463 * If no originator key set up initialise for ephemeral key the public key
464 * ASN1 structure will set the actual public key value.
465 */
466 if (kari->originator->type == -1) {
467 CMS_OriginatorIdentifierOrKey *oik = kari->originator;
468 oik->type = CMS_OIK_PUBKEY;
469 oik->d.originatorKey = (CMS_OriginatorPublicKey *)ASN1_item_new(&CMS_OriginatorPublicKey_it);
470 if (!oik->d.originatorKey)
471 return 0;
472 }
473 /* Initialise KDF algorithm */
474 if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0))
475 return 0;
476 /* For each rek, derive KEK, encrypt CEK */
477 for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_num(reks); i++) {
478 unsigned char *enckey;
479 size_t enckeylen;
480 rek = sk_CMS_RecipientEncryptedKey_value(reks, i);
481 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kari->pctx, rek->pkey) <= 0)
482 return 0;
483 if (!cms_kek_cipher(&enckey, &enckeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen,
484 kari, 1))
485 return 0;
486 ASN1_STRING_set0(rek->encryptedKey, enckey, enckeylen);
487 }
488
489 return 1;
490}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-23 15:19:15 +0000