diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c | 393 |
1 files changed, 386 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c index 7f7784847b..dd06a768b3 100644 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/evp_pbe.c | |||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: evp_pbe.c,v 1.38 2024/01/27 16:26:25 tb Exp $ */ | 1 | /* $OpenBSD: evp_pbe.c,v 1.39 2024/01/27 17:14:33 tb Exp $ */ |
2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | 2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL |
3 | * project 1999. | 3 | * project 1999. |
4 | */ | 4 | */ |
@@ -59,14 +59,16 @@ | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | 59 | #include <stdio.h> |
60 | #include <string.h> | 60 | #include <string.h> |
61 | 61 | ||
62 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | 62 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> |
63 | |||
64 | #include <openssl/err.h> | 63 | #include <openssl/err.h> |
65 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | 64 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
65 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/pkcs12.h> | 67 | #include <openssl/pkcs12.h> |
67 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | 68 | #include <openssl/x509.h> |
68 | 69 | ||
69 | #include "evp_local.h" | 70 | #include "evp_local.h" |
71 | #include "hmac_local.h" | ||
70 | 72 | ||
71 | /* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */ | 73 | /* Password based encryption (PBE) functions */ |
72 | 74 | ||
@@ -96,14 +98,12 @@ static const struct pbe_config pbe_outer[] = { | |||
96 | .md_nid = NID_sha1, | 98 | .md_nid = NID_sha1, |
97 | .keygen = PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen, | 99 | .keygen = PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen, |
98 | }, | 100 | }, |
99 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC | ||
100 | { | 101 | { |
101 | .pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2, | 102 | .pbe_nid = NID_id_pbkdf2, |
102 | .cipher_nid = -1, | 103 | .cipher_nid = -1, |
103 | .md_nid = -1, | 104 | .md_nid = -1, |
104 | .keygen = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen, | 105 | .keygen = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen, |
105 | }, | 106 | }, |
106 | #endif | ||
107 | { | 107 | { |
108 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, | 108 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, |
109 | .cipher_nid = NID_rc4, | 109 | .cipher_nid = NID_rc4, |
@@ -140,14 +140,12 @@ static const struct pbe_config pbe_outer[] = { | |||
140 | .md_nid = NID_sha1, | 140 | .md_nid = NID_sha1, |
141 | .keygen = PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen, | 141 | .keygen = PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen, |
142 | }, | 142 | }, |
143 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HMAC | ||
144 | { | 143 | { |
145 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbes2, | 144 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbes2, |
146 | .cipher_nid = -1, | 145 | .cipher_nid = -1, |
147 | .md_nid = -1, | 146 | .md_nid = -1, |
148 | .keygen = PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen, | 147 | .keygen = PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen, |
149 | }, | 148 | }, |
150 | #endif | ||
151 | { | 149 | { |
152 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, | 150 | .pbe_nid = NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, |
153 | .cipher_nid = NID_rc2_64_cbc, | 151 | .cipher_nid = NID_rc2_64_cbc, |
@@ -341,6 +339,387 @@ EVP_PBE_CipherInit(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj, const char *pass, int passlen, | |||
341 | return 1; | 339 | return 1; |
342 | } | 340 | } |
343 | 341 | ||
342 | int | ||
343 | PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx, const char *pass, int passlen, | ||
344 | ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) | ||
345 | { | ||
346 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | ||
347 | unsigned char md_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | ||
348 | unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | ||
349 | int i; | ||
350 | PBEPARAM *pbe; | ||
351 | int saltlen, iter; | ||
352 | unsigned char *salt; | ||
353 | const unsigned char *pbuf; | ||
354 | int mdsize; | ||
355 | int rv = 0; | ||
356 | |||
357 | /* Extract useful info from parameter */ | ||
358 | if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || | ||
359 | param->value.sequence == NULL) { | ||
360 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
361 | return 0; | ||
362 | } | ||
363 | |||
364 | mdsize = EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
365 | if (mdsize < 0) | ||
366 | return 0; | ||
367 | |||
368 | pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; | ||
369 | if (!(pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &pbuf, param->value.sequence->length))) { | ||
370 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
371 | return 0; | ||
372 | } | ||
373 | |||
374 | if (!pbe->iter) | ||
375 | iter = 1; | ||
376 | else if ((iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter)) <= 0) { | ||
377 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS); | ||
378 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
379 | return 0; | ||
380 | } | ||
381 | salt = pbe->salt->data; | ||
382 | saltlen = pbe->salt->length; | ||
383 | |||
384 | if (!pass) | ||
385 | passlen = 0; | ||
386 | else if (passlen == -1) | ||
387 | passlen = strlen(pass); | ||
388 | |||
389 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | ||
390 | |||
391 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL)) | ||
392 | goto err; | ||
393 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, pass, passlen)) | ||
394 | goto err; | ||
395 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, salt, saltlen)) | ||
396 | goto err; | ||
397 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, md_tmp, NULL)) | ||
398 | goto err; | ||
399 | for (i = 1; i < iter; i++) { | ||
400 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, md, NULL)) | ||
401 | goto err; | ||
402 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, md_tmp, mdsize)) | ||
403 | goto err; | ||
404 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex (&ctx, md_tmp, NULL)) | ||
405 | goto err; | ||
406 | } | ||
407 | if ((size_t)EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher) > sizeof(md_tmp)) { | ||
408 | EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); | ||
409 | goto err; | ||
410 | } | ||
411 | memcpy(key, md_tmp, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher)); | ||
412 | if ((size_t)EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher) > 16) { | ||
413 | EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE); | ||
414 | goto err; | ||
415 | } | ||
416 | memcpy(iv, md_tmp + (16 - EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)), | ||
417 | EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)); | ||
418 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de)) | ||
419 | goto err; | ||
420 | explicit_bzero(md_tmp, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); | ||
421 | explicit_bzero(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH); | ||
422 | explicit_bzero(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); | ||
423 | |||
424 | rv = 1; | ||
425 | err: | ||
426 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | ||
427 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
428 | |||
429 | return rv; | ||
430 | } | ||
431 | |||
432 | /* | ||
433 | * PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key derivation function PBKDF2. | ||
434 | */ | ||
435 | |||
436 | int | ||
437 | PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, | ||
438 | int saltlen, int iter, const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out) | ||
439 | { | ||
440 | unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4]; | ||
441 | int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen; | ||
442 | unsigned long i = 1; | ||
443 | HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx; | ||
444 | |||
445 | mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest); | ||
446 | if (mdlen < 0) | ||
447 | return 0; | ||
448 | |||
449 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl); | ||
450 | p = out; | ||
451 | tkeylen = keylen; | ||
452 | if (!pass) | ||
453 | passlen = 0; | ||
454 | else if (passlen == -1) | ||
455 | passlen = strlen(pass); | ||
456 | if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) { | ||
457 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
458 | return 0; | ||
459 | } | ||
460 | while (tkeylen) { | ||
461 | if (tkeylen > mdlen) | ||
462 | cplen = mdlen; | ||
463 | else | ||
464 | cplen = tkeylen; | ||
465 | /* | ||
466 | * We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) | ||
467 | * but just in case... | ||
468 | */ | ||
469 | itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff); | ||
470 | itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff); | ||
471 | itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff); | ||
472 | itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff); | ||
473 | if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) { | ||
474 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
475 | return 0; | ||
476 | } | ||
477 | if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen) || | ||
478 | !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4) || | ||
479 | !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { | ||
480 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
481 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | ||
482 | return 0; | ||
483 | } | ||
484 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | ||
485 | memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen); | ||
486 | for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) { | ||
487 | if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) { | ||
488 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
489 | return 0; | ||
490 | } | ||
491 | if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen) || | ||
492 | !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { | ||
493 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
494 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | ||
495 | return 0; | ||
496 | } | ||
497 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | ||
498 | for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++) | ||
499 | p[k] ^= digtmp[k]; | ||
500 | } | ||
501 | tkeylen -= cplen; | ||
502 | i++; | ||
503 | p += cplen; | ||
504 | } | ||
505 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); | ||
506 | return 1; | ||
507 | } | ||
508 | |||
509 | int | ||
510 | PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, const unsigned char *salt, | ||
511 | int saltlen, int iter, int keylen, unsigned char *out) | ||
512 | { | ||
513 | return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, | ||
514 | EVP_sha1(), keylen, out); | ||
515 | } | ||
516 | |||
517 | /* | ||
518 | * Now the key derivation function itself. This is a bit evil because | ||
519 | * it has to check the ASN1 parameters are valid: and there are quite a | ||
520 | * few of them... | ||
521 | */ | ||
522 | |||
523 | int | ||
524 | PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, | ||
525 | ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) | ||
526 | { | ||
527 | const unsigned char *pbuf; | ||
528 | int plen; | ||
529 | PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; | ||
530 | const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; | ||
531 | |||
532 | int rv = 0; | ||
533 | |||
534 | if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || | ||
535 | param->value.sequence == NULL) { | ||
536 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
537 | goto err; | ||
538 | } | ||
539 | |||
540 | pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; | ||
541 | plen = param->value.sequence->length; | ||
542 | if (!(pbe2 = d2i_PBE2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) { | ||
543 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
544 | goto err; | ||
545 | } | ||
546 | |||
547 | /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */ | ||
548 | |||
549 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->keyfunc->algorithm) != NID_id_pbkdf2) { | ||
550 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_DERIVATION_FUNCTION); | ||
551 | goto err; | ||
552 | } | ||
553 | |||
554 | /* Let's see if we recognise the encryption algorithm. */ | ||
555 | cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm); | ||
556 | if (!cipher) { | ||
557 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); | ||
558 | goto err; | ||
559 | } | ||
560 | |||
561 | /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */ | ||
562 | if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de)) | ||
563 | goto err; | ||
564 | if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) { | ||
565 | EVPerror(EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR); | ||
566 | goto err; | ||
567 | } | ||
568 | |||
569 | rv = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(ctx, pass, passlen, | ||
570 | pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, c, md, en_de); | ||
571 | |||
572 | err: | ||
573 | PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); | ||
574 | |||
575 | return rv; | ||
576 | } | ||
577 | |||
578 | int | ||
579 | PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, | ||
580 | ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) | ||
581 | { | ||
582 | unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; | ||
583 | const unsigned char *pbuf; | ||
584 | int saltlen, iter, plen; | ||
585 | int rv = 0; | ||
586 | unsigned int keylen = 0; | ||
587 | int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid; | ||
588 | PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; | ||
589 | const EVP_MD *prfmd; | ||
590 | |||
591 | if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) { | ||
592 | EVPerror(EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); | ||
593 | return 0; | ||
594 | } | ||
595 | keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); | ||
596 | if (keylen > sizeof key) { | ||
597 | EVPerror(EVP_R_BAD_KEY_LENGTH); | ||
598 | return 0; | ||
599 | } | ||
600 | |||
601 | /* Decode parameter */ | ||
602 | |||
603 | if (!param || (param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { | ||
604 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
605 | return 0; | ||
606 | } | ||
607 | |||
608 | pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; | ||
609 | plen = param->value.sequence->length; | ||
610 | |||
611 | if (!(kdf = d2i_PBKDF2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen)) ) { | ||
612 | EVPerror(EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
613 | return 0; | ||
614 | } | ||
615 | |||
616 | /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */ | ||
617 | |||
618 | if (kdf->keylength && | ||
619 | (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)){ | ||
620 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH); | ||
621 | goto err; | ||
622 | } | ||
623 | |||
624 | if (kdf->prf) | ||
625 | prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm); | ||
626 | else | ||
627 | prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1; | ||
628 | |||
629 | if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL)) { | ||
630 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); | ||
631 | goto err; | ||
632 | } | ||
633 | |||
634 | prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid); | ||
635 | if (prfmd == NULL) { | ||
636 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); | ||
637 | goto err; | ||
638 | } | ||
639 | |||
640 | if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { | ||
641 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE); | ||
642 | goto err; | ||
643 | } | ||
644 | |||
645 | /* it seems that its all OK */ | ||
646 | salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data; | ||
647 | saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length; | ||
648 | if ((iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter)) <= 0) { | ||
649 | EVPerror(EVP_R_UNSUPORTED_NUMBER_OF_ROUNDS); | ||
650 | goto err; | ||
651 | } | ||
652 | if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, | ||
653 | keylen, key)) | ||
654 | goto err; | ||
655 | |||
656 | rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); | ||
657 | |||
658 | err: | ||
659 | explicit_bzero(key, keylen); | ||
660 | PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); | ||
661 | |||
662 | return rv; | ||
663 | } | ||
664 | |||
665 | void | ||
666 | PKCS12_PBE_add(void) | ||
667 | { | ||
668 | } | ||
669 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(PKCS12_PBE_add); | ||
670 | |||
671 | int | ||
672 | PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, | ||
673 | ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) | ||
674 | { | ||
675 | PBEPARAM *pbe; | ||
676 | int saltlen, iter, ret; | ||
677 | unsigned char *salt; | ||
678 | const unsigned char *pbuf; | ||
679 | unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH], iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; | ||
680 | |||
681 | /* Extract useful info from parameter */ | ||
682 | if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || | ||
683 | param->value.sequence == NULL) { | ||
684 | PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
685 | return 0; | ||
686 | } | ||
687 | |||
688 | pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; | ||
689 | if (!(pbe = d2i_PBEPARAM(NULL, &pbuf, param->value.sequence->length))) { | ||
690 | PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
691 | return 0; | ||
692 | } | ||
693 | |||
694 | if (!pbe->iter) | ||
695 | iter = 1; | ||
696 | else if ((iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pbe->iter)) <= 0) { | ||
697 | PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_DECODE_ERROR); | ||
698 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
699 | return 0; | ||
700 | } | ||
701 | salt = pbe->salt->data; | ||
702 | saltlen = pbe->salt->length; | ||
703 | if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_KEY_ID, | ||
704 | iter, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher), key, md)) { | ||
705 | PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_KEY_GEN_ERROR); | ||
706 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
707 | return 0; | ||
708 | } | ||
709 | if (!PKCS12_key_gen(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, PKCS12_IV_ID, | ||
710 | iter, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher), iv, md)) { | ||
711 | PKCS12error(PKCS12_R_IV_GEN_ERROR); | ||
712 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
713 | return 0; | ||
714 | } | ||
715 | PBEPARAM_free(pbe); | ||
716 | ret = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, en_de); | ||
717 | explicit_bzero(key, EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH); | ||
718 | explicit_bzero(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH); | ||
719 | return ret; | ||
720 | } | ||
721 | LCRYPTO_ALIAS(PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen); | ||
722 | |||
344 | /* | 723 | /* |
345 | * XXX - remove the functions below in the next major bump | 724 | * XXX - remove the functions below in the next major bump |
346 | */ | 725 | */ |