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-.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_AEAD_CTX_init.3,v 1.16 2024/07/21 08:36:43 tb Exp $
-.\"
-.\" Copyright (c) 2014, Google Inc.
-.\" Parts of the text were written by Adam Langley and David Benjamin.
-.\" Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
-.\" Copyright (c) 2023 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-.\"
-.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
-.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-.\"
-.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 21 2024 $
-.Dt EVP_AEAD_CTX_INIT 3
-.Os
-.Sh NAME
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_new ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_free ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_init ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_open ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_key_length ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_max_overhead ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len ,
-.Nm EVP_AEAD_nonce_length ,
-.Nm EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm ,
-.Nm EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm ,
-.Nm EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305 ,
-.Nm EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305
-.Nd authenticated encryption with additional data
-.Sh SYNOPSIS
-.In openssl/evp.h
-.Ft EVP_AEAD_CTX *
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new void
-.Ft void
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_CTX_free
-.Fa "EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx"
-.Fc
-.Ft int
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_CTX_init
-.Fa "EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx"
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD *aead"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *key"
-.Fa "size_t key_len"
-.Fa "size_t tag_len"
-.Fa "ENGINE *engine"
-.Fc
-.Ft void
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup
-.Fa "EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx"
-.Fc
-.Ft int
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_CTX_open
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx"
-.Fa "unsigned char *out"
-.Fa "size_t *out_len"
-.Fa "size_t max_out_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *nonce"
-.Fa "size_t nonce_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *in"
-.Fa "size_t in_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *ad"
-.Fa "size_t ad_len"
-.Fc
-.Ft int
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx"
-.Fa "unsigned char *out"
-.Fa "size_t *out_len"
-.Fa "size_t max_out_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *nonce"
-.Fa "size_t nonce_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *in"
-.Fa "size_t in_len"
-.Fa "const unsigned char *ad"
-.Fa "size_t ad_len"
-.Fc
-.Ft size_t
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_key_length
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD *aead"
-.Fc
-.Ft size_t
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_max_overhead
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD *aead"
-.Fc
-.Ft size_t
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD *aead"
-.Fc
-.Ft size_t
-.Fo EVP_AEAD_nonce_length
-.Fa "const EVP_AEAD *aead"
-.Fc
-.Ft const EVP_AEAD *
-.Fo EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm
-.Fa void
-.Fc
-.Ft const EVP_AEAD *
-.Fo EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm
-.Fa void
-.Fc
-.Ft const EVP_AEAD *
-.Fo EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305
-.Fa void
-.Fc
-.Ft const EVP_AEAD *
-.Fo EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305
-.Fa void
-.Fc
-.Sh DESCRIPTION
-AEAD (Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data) couples
-confidentiality and integrity in a single primitive.
-AEAD algorithms take a key and can then seal and open individual
-messages.
-Each message has a unique, per-message nonce and, optionally, additional
-data which is authenticated but not included in the output.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new
-allocates a new context for use with
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_init .
-It can be cleaned up for reuse with
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup
-and must be freed with
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_free .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_free
-cleans up
-.Fa ctx
-and frees the space allocated to it.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_init
-initializes the context
-.Fa ctx
-for the given AEAD algorithm
-.Fa aead .
-The
-.Fa engine
-argument must be
-.Dv NULL
-for the default implementation;
-other values are not supported.
-Authentication tags may be truncated by passing a tag length.
-A
-.Fa tag_len
-argument of
-.Dv EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH ,
-which has the value 0, causes the default tag length to be used.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup
-frees any data allocated for the context
-.Fa ctx .
-After
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_cleanup ,
-.Fa ctx
-is in the same state as after
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_open
-authenticates the input
-.Fa in
-and optional additional data
-.Fa ad ,
-decrypting the input and writing it as output
-.Fa out .
-This function may be called (with the same
-.Vt EVP_AEAD_CTX )
-concurrently with itself or with
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal .
-At most the number of input bytes are written as output.
-In order to ensure success,
-.Fa max_out_len
-should be at least the same as the input length
-.Fa in_len .
-On successful return
-.Fa out_len
-is set to the actual number of bytes written.
-The length of the
-.Fa nonce
-specified with
-.Fa nonce_len
-must be equal to the result of EVP_AEAD_nonce_length for this AEAD.
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_open
-never results in partial output.
-If
-.Fa max_out_len
-is insufficient, zero will be returned and
-.Fa out_len
-will be set to zero.
-If the input and output are aliased then
-.Fa out
-must be <=
-.Fa in .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal
-encrypts and authenticates the input and authenticates any additional
-data provided in
-.Fa ad ,
-the encrypted input and authentication tag being written as output
-.Fa out .
-This function may be called (with the same
-.Vt EVP_AEAD_CTX )
-concurrently with itself or with
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_open .
-At most
-.Fa max_out_len
-bytes are written as output and, in order to ensure success, this value
-should be the
-.Fa in_len
-plus the result of
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_overhead .
-On successful return,
-.Fa out_len
-is set to the actual number of bytes written.
-The length of the
-.Fa nonce
-specified with
-.Fa nonce_len
-must be equal to the result of
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_nonce_length
-for this AEAD.
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal
-never results in a partial output.
-If
-.Fa max_out_len
-is insufficient, zero will be returned and
-.Fa out_len
-will be set to zero.
-If the input and output are aliased then
-.Fa out
-must be <=
-.Fa in .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_key_length ,
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_overhead ,
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len ,
-and
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_nonce_length
-provide information about the AEAD algorithm
-.Fa aead .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len
-returns the maximum tag length that can be used with the given
-.Fa aead .
-This is the largest value that can be passed as the
-.Fa tag_len
-argument to
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_init .
-No built-in
-.Vt EVP_AEAD
-object has a maximum tag length larger than the constant
-.Dv EVP_AEAD_MAX_TAG_LENGTH .
-.Pp
-All cipher algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated.
-The following ciphers are available:
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent
-.It Fn EVP_aead_aes_128_gcm
-AES-128 in Galois Counter Mode, using a
-.Fa key_len
-of 16 bytes and a
-.Fa nonce_len
-of 12 bytes.
-.It Fn EVP_aead_aes_256_gcm
-AES-256 in Galois Counter Mode, using a
-.Fa key_len
-of 32 bytes and a
-.Fa nonce_len
-of 12 bytes.
-.It Fn EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305
-ChaCha20 with a Poly1305 authenticator, using a
-.Fa key_len
-of 32 bytes and a
-.Fa nonce_len
-of 12 bytes.
-The constant
-.Dv EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN
-specifies the length of the authentication tag in bytes and has a value of 16.
-.It Fn EVP_aead_xchacha20_poly1305
-XChaCha20 with a Poly1305 authenticator, using a
-.Fa key_len
-of 32 bytes and a
-.Fa nonce_len
-of 24 bytes.
-.El
-.Pp
-Unless compatibility with other implementations
-like OpenSSL or BoringSSL is required, using the
-.Sy EVP_AEAD
-interface to AEAD ciphers is recommended
-in preference to the functions documented in the
-.Xr EVP_EncryptInit 3 ,
-.Xr EVP_aes_256_gcm 3 ,
-and
-.Xr EVP_chacha20_poly1305 3
-manual pages.
-The code then becomes transparent to the AEAD cipher used
-and much more flexible.
-It is also safer to use as it prevents common mistakes with the EVP APIs.
-.Sh RETURN VALUES
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new
-returns the new
-.Vt EVP_AEAD_CTX
-object on success;
-otherwise
-.Dv NULL
-is returned and
-.Va errno
-is set to
-.Er ENOMEM .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_init ,
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_open ,
-and
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal
-return 1 for success or zero for failure.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_key_length
-returns the length of the key used for this AEAD.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_overhead
-returns the maximum number of additional bytes added by the act of
-sealing data with the AEAD.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_max_tag_len
-returns the maximum tag length when using this AEAD.
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_nonce_length
-returns the length of the per-message nonce.
-.Sh EXAMPLES
-Encrypt a string using ChaCha20-Poly1305:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-const EVP_AEAD *aead = EVP_aead_chacha20_poly1305();
-static const unsigned char nonce[32] = {0};
-size_t buf_len, nonce_len;
-EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx;
-
-ctx = EVP_AEAD_CTX_new();
-EVP_AEAD_CTX_init(ctx, aead, key32, EVP_AEAD_key_length(aead),
-    EVP_AEAD_DEFAULT_TAG_LENGTH, NULL);
-nonce_len = EVP_AEAD_nonce_length(aead);
-
-EVP_AEAD_CTX_seal(ctx, out, &out_len, BUFSIZE, nonce,
-    nonce_len, in, in_len, NULL, 0);
-
-EVP_AEAD_CTX_free(ctx);
-.Ed
-.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr evp 3 ,
-.Xr EVP_EncryptInit 3
-.Sh STANDARDS
-.Rs
-.%A A. Langley
-.%A W. Chang
-.%A N. Mavrogiannopoulos
-.%A J. Strombergson
-.%A S. Josefsson
-.%D June 2016
-.%R RFC 7905
-.%T ChaCha20-Poly1305 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A S. Arciszewski
-.%D October 2018
-.%R draft-arciszewski-xchacha-02
-.%T XChaCha: eXtended-nonce ChaCha and AEAD_XChaCha20_Poly1305
-.Re
-.Sh HISTORY
-AEAD is based on the implementation by
-.An Adam Langley
-.\" OpenSSL commit 9a8646510b Sep 9 12:13:24 2013 -0400
-for Chromium/BoringSSL and first appeared in
-.Ox 5.6 .
-.Pp
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_new
-and
-.Fn EVP_AEAD_CTX_free
-first appeared in
-.Ox 7.1 .
-.Sh CAVEATS
-The original publications and code by
-.An Adam Langley
-used a modified AEAD construction that is incompatible with the common
-style used by AEAD in TLS and incompatible with RFC 7905:
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A A. Langley
-.%A W. Chang
-.%D November 2013
-.%R draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-04
-.%T ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS
-.Re
-.Pp
-.Rs
-.%A Y. Nir
-.%A A. Langley
-.%D June 2018
-.%R RFC 8439
-.%T ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols
-.Re
-.Pp
-In particular, the original version used a
-.Fa nonce_len
-of 8 bytes.