diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 491 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 491 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c deleted file mode 100644 index b7d2460754..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,491 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
61 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
62 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
63 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
64 | |||
65 | #ifndef RSA_NULL | ||
66 | |||
67 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
68 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
69 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
70 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
71 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
72 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
73 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
74 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding); | ||
75 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa); | ||
76 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); | ||
77 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | ||
78 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={ | ||
79 | "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | ||
80 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | ||
81 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt, | ||
82 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt, | ||
83 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt, | ||
84 | RSA_eay_mod_exp, | ||
85 | BN_mod_exp_mont, | ||
86 | RSA_eay_init, | ||
87 | RSA_eay_finish, | ||
88 | 0, | ||
89 | NULL, | ||
90 | }; | ||
91 | |||
92 | RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) | ||
93 | { | ||
94 | return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth); | ||
95 | } | ||
96 | |||
97 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
98 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
99 | { | ||
100 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
101 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
102 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
103 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
104 | |||
105 | BN_init(&f); | ||
106 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
107 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
108 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
109 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
110 | { | ||
111 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
112 | goto err; | ||
113 | } | ||
114 | |||
115 | switch (padding) | ||
116 | { | ||
117 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
118 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
119 | break; | ||
120 | #ifndef NO_SHA | ||
121 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
122 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0); | ||
123 | break; | ||
124 | #endif | ||
125 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
126 | i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
127 | break; | ||
128 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
129 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
130 | break; | ||
131 | default: | ||
132 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
133 | goto err; | ||
134 | } | ||
135 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
136 | |||
137 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
138 | |||
139 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
140 | { | ||
141 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
142 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
143 | goto err; | ||
144 | } | ||
145 | |||
146 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
147 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
148 | |||
149 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
150 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
151 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
152 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
153 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
154 | to[k]=0; | ||
155 | |||
156 | r=num; | ||
157 | err: | ||
158 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
159 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
160 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
161 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
162 | { | ||
163 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
164 | Free(buf); | ||
165 | } | ||
166 | return(r); | ||
167 | } | ||
168 | |||
169 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
170 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
171 | { | ||
172 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
173 | int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1; | ||
174 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
175 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
176 | |||
177 | BN_init(&f); | ||
178 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
179 | |||
180 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
181 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
182 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
183 | { | ||
184 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
185 | goto err; | ||
186 | } | ||
187 | |||
188 | switch (padding) | ||
189 | { | ||
190 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
191 | i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
192 | break; | ||
193 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
194 | i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen); | ||
195 | break; | ||
196 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
197 | default: | ||
198 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
199 | goto err; | ||
200 | } | ||
201 | if (i <= 0) goto err; | ||
202 | |||
203 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
204 | |||
205 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
206 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
207 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
208 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
209 | |||
210 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
211 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
212 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
213 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
214 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
215 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
216 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
217 | else | ||
218 | { | ||
219 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err; | ||
220 | } | ||
221 | |||
222 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
223 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
224 | |||
225 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
226 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
227 | j=BN_num_bytes(&ret); | ||
228 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j])); | ||
229 | for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++) | ||
230 | to[k]=0; | ||
231 | |||
232 | r=num; | ||
233 | err: | ||
234 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
235 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
236 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
237 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
238 | { | ||
239 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
240 | Free(buf); | ||
241 | } | ||
242 | return(r); | ||
243 | } | ||
244 | |||
245 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
246 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
247 | { | ||
248 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
249 | int j,num=0,r= -1; | ||
250 | unsigned char *p; | ||
251 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
252 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
253 | |||
254 | BN_init(&f); | ||
255 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
256 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
257 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
258 | |||
259 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
260 | |||
261 | if ((buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num)) == NULL) | ||
262 | { | ||
263 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
264 | goto err; | ||
265 | } | ||
266 | |||
267 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
268 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
269 | if (flen > num) | ||
270 | { | ||
271 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
272 | goto err; | ||
273 | } | ||
274 | |||
275 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
276 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
277 | |||
278 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) && (rsa->blinding == NULL)) | ||
279 | RSA_blinding_on(rsa,ctx); | ||
280 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
281 | if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
282 | |||
283 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
284 | if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
285 | ((rsa->p != NULL) && | ||
286 | (rsa->q != NULL) && | ||
287 | (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && | ||
288 | (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && | ||
289 | (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) ) | ||
290 | { if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; } | ||
291 | else | ||
292 | { | ||
293 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) | ||
294 | goto err; | ||
295 | } | ||
296 | |||
297 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_BLINDING) | ||
298 | if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret,rsa->blinding,ctx)) goto err; | ||
299 | |||
300 | p=buf; | ||
301 | j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
302 | |||
303 | switch (padding) | ||
304 | { | ||
305 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
306 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
307 | break; | ||
308 | #ifndef NO_SHA | ||
309 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
310 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0); | ||
311 | break; | ||
312 | #endif | ||
313 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
314 | r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
315 | break; | ||
316 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
317 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num); | ||
318 | break; | ||
319 | default: | ||
320 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
321 | goto err; | ||
322 | } | ||
323 | if (r < 0) | ||
324 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
325 | |||
326 | err: | ||
327 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
328 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
329 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
330 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
331 | { | ||
332 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
333 | Free(buf); | ||
334 | } | ||
335 | return(r); | ||
336 | } | ||
337 | |||
338 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, unsigned char *from, | ||
339 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
340 | { | ||
341 | BIGNUM f,ret; | ||
342 | int i,num=0,r= -1; | ||
343 | unsigned char *p; | ||
344 | unsigned char *buf=NULL; | ||
345 | BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; | ||
346 | |||
347 | BN_init(&f); | ||
348 | BN_init(&ret); | ||
349 | ctx=BN_CTX_new(); | ||
350 | if (ctx == NULL) goto err; | ||
351 | |||
352 | num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
353 | buf=(unsigned char *)Malloc(num); | ||
354 | if (buf == NULL) | ||
355 | { | ||
356 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
357 | goto err; | ||
358 | } | ||
359 | |||
360 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
361 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
362 | if (flen > num) | ||
363 | { | ||
364 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
365 | goto err; | ||
366 | } | ||
367 | |||
368 | if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err; | ||
369 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
370 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)) | ||
371 | { | ||
372 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_n=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
373 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_n,rsa->n,ctx)) | ||
374 | goto err; | ||
375 | } | ||
376 | |||
377 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx, | ||
378 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err; | ||
379 | |||
380 | p=buf; | ||
381 | i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); | ||
382 | |||
383 | switch (padding) | ||
384 | { | ||
385 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
386 | r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
387 | break; | ||
388 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
389 | r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num); | ||
390 | break; | ||
391 | default: | ||
392 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
393 | goto err; | ||
394 | } | ||
395 | if (r < 0) | ||
396 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
397 | |||
398 | err: | ||
399 | if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
400 | BN_clear_free(&f); | ||
401 | BN_clear_free(&ret); | ||
402 | if (buf != NULL) | ||
403 | { | ||
404 | memset(buf,0,num); | ||
405 | Free(buf); | ||
406 | } | ||
407 | return(r); | ||
408 | } | ||
409 | |||
410 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa) | ||
411 | { | ||
412 | BIGNUM r1,m1; | ||
413 | int ret=0; | ||
414 | BN_CTX *ctx; | ||
415 | |||
416 | if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; | ||
417 | BN_init(&m1); | ||
418 | BN_init(&r1); | ||
419 | |||
420 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) | ||
421 | { | ||
422 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) | ||
423 | { | ||
424 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_p=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
425 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_p,rsa->p, | ||
426 | ctx)) | ||
427 | goto err; | ||
428 | } | ||
429 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) | ||
430 | { | ||
431 | if ((rsa->_method_mod_q=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) != NULL) | ||
432 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(rsa->_method_mod_q,rsa->q, | ||
433 | ctx)) | ||
434 | goto err; | ||
435 | } | ||
436 | } | ||
437 | |||
438 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
439 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx, | ||
440 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err; | ||
441 | |||
442 | if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
443 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx, | ||
444 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err; | ||
445 | |||
446 | if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err; | ||
447 | /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
448 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */ | ||
449 | if (r0->neg) | ||
450 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
451 | |||
452 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err; | ||
453 | if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err; | ||
454 | /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
455 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
456 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
457 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
458 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
459 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
460 | */ | ||
461 | if (r0->neg) | ||
462 | if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err; | ||
463 | if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err; | ||
464 | if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err; | ||
465 | |||
466 | ret=1; | ||
467 | err: | ||
468 | BN_clear_free(&m1); | ||
469 | BN_clear_free(&r1); | ||
470 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
471 | return(ret); | ||
472 | } | ||
473 | |||
474 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) | ||
475 | { | ||
476 | rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | ||
477 | return(1); | ||
478 | } | ||
479 | |||
480 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) | ||
481 | { | ||
482 | if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL) | ||
483 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | ||
484 | if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL) | ||
485 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | ||
486 | if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL) | ||
487 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | ||
488 | return(1); | ||
489 | } | ||
490 | |||
491 | #endif | ||