summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c774
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 774 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
deleted file mode 100644
index be4ac96ce3..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,774 +0,0 @@
1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include "cryptlib.h"
114#include <openssl/bn.h>
115#include <openssl/rsa.h>
116#include <openssl/rand.h>
117
118#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
119
120static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
122static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
124static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
129static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
132 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
133 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
134 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
135 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
136 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
137 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
138 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
139 RSA_eay_init,
140 RSA_eay_finish,
141 0, /* flags */
142 NULL,
143 0, /* rsa_sign */
144 0 /* rsa_verify */
145 };
146
147const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
148 {
149 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
150 }
151
152static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
153 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
154 {
155 BIGNUM f,ret;
156 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
157 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
158 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
159
160 BN_init(&f);
161 BN_init(&ret);
162 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
163 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
164 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
165 {
166 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
167 goto err;
168 }
169
170 switch (padding)
171 {
172 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
173 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
174 break;
175#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
176 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
177 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
178 break;
179#endif
180 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
181 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
182 break;
183 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
184 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
185 break;
186 default:
187 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
188 goto err;
189 }
190 if (i <= 0) goto err;
191
192 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
193
194 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
195 {
196 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
197 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
198 goto err;
199 }
200
201 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
202 {
203 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
204 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
205 goto err;
206 }
207
208 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
209 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
210
211 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
212 * length of the modulus */
213 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
214 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
215 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
216 to[k]=0;
217
218 r=num;
219err:
220 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
221 BN_clear_free(&f);
222 BN_clear_free(&ret);
223 if (buf != NULL)
224 {
225 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
226 OPENSSL_free(buf);
227 }
228 return(r);
229 }
230
231static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
232 {
233 int ret = 1;
234 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
235 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
236 if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
237 ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
238 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
239 return ret;
240 }
241
242#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
243 do { \
244 if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
245 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
246 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
247 err_instr \
248 } while(0)
249
250static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
251 {
252 BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
253 BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
254
255 /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
256
257 /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
258 * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
259 * of binary compatibility can't */
260
261 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
262 A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
263 if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
264 {
265 /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
266 RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
267 if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
268 }
269 else
270 {
271 if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
272 }
273 if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
274
275 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
276 goto err;
277 ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
278 BN_free(Ai);
279err:
280 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
281 return ret;
282 }
283
284/* signing */
285static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
286 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
287 {
288 BIGNUM f,ret, *res;
289 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
290 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
291 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
292 int local_blinding = 0;
293 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
294
295 BN_init(&f);
296 BN_init(&ret);
297
298 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
299 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
300 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
301 {
302 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 goto err;
304 }
305
306 switch (padding)
307 {
308 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
309 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
310 break;
311 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
312 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
313 break;
314 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
315 default:
316 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
317 goto err;
318 }
319 if (i <= 0) goto err;
320
321 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
322
323 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
324 {
325 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
326 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
327 goto err;
328 }
329
330 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
331 blinding = rsa->blinding;
332
333 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
334 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
335 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
336 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
337 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
338 * factors) */
339 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
340 {
341 if (blinding == NULL)
342 {
343 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
344 goto err;
345 }
346 }
347
348 if (blinding != NULL)
349 {
350 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
351 {
352 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
353
354 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
355 if (blinding == NULL)
356 goto err;
357 local_blinding = 1;
358 }
359 }
360
361 if (blinding)
362 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
363
364 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
365 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
366 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
367 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
368 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
369 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
370 {
371 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err;
372 }
373 else
374 {
375 BIGNUM local_d;
376 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
377
378 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
379 {
380 BN_init(&local_d);
381 d = &local_d;
382 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
383 }
384 else
385 d = rsa->d;
386 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
387 }
388
389 if (blinding)
390 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
391
392 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
393 {
394 BN_sub(&f, rsa->n, &ret);
395 if (BN_cmp(&ret, &f))
396 res = &f;
397 else
398 res = &ret;
399 }
400 else
401 res = &ret;
402
403 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
404 * length of the modulus */
405 j=BN_num_bytes(res);
406 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
407 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
408 to[k]=0;
409
410 r=num;
411err:
412 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
413 BN_clear_free(&ret);
414 BN_clear_free(&f);
415 if (local_blinding)
416 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
417 if (buf != NULL)
418 {
419 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
420 OPENSSL_free(buf);
421 }
422 return(r);
423 }
424
425static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
426 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
427 {
428 BIGNUM f,ret;
429 int j,num=0,r= -1;
430 unsigned char *p;
431 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
432 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
433 int local_blinding = 0;
434 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
435
436 BN_init(&f);
437 BN_init(&ret);
438 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
439 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
440
441 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
442
443 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
444 {
445 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
446 goto err;
447 }
448
449 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
450 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
451 if (flen > num)
452 {
453 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
454 goto err;
455 }
456
457 /* make data into a big number */
458 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
459
460 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
461 {
462 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
463 goto err;
464 }
465
466 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
467 blinding = rsa->blinding;
468
469 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
470 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
471 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
472 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
473 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
474 * factors) */
475 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
476 {
477 if (blinding == NULL)
478 {
479 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
480 goto err;
481 }
482 }
483
484 if (blinding != NULL)
485 {
486 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
487 {
488 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
489
490 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
491 if (blinding == NULL)
492 goto err;
493 local_blinding = 1;
494 }
495 }
496
497 if (blinding)
498 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
499
500 /* do the decrypt */
501 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
502 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
503 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
504 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
505 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
506 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
507 {
508 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err;
509 }
510 else
511 {
512 BIGNUM local_d;
513 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
514
515 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
516 {
517 d = &local_d;
518 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
519 }
520 else
521 d = rsa->d;
522 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
523 goto err;
524 }
525
526 if (blinding)
527 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
528
529 p=buf;
530 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
531
532 switch (padding)
533 {
534 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
535 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
536 break;
537#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
538 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
539 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
540 break;
541#endif
542 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
543 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
544 break;
545 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
546 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
547 break;
548 default:
549 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
550 goto err;
551 }
552 if (r < 0)
553 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
554
555err:
556 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
557 BN_clear_free(&f);
558 BN_clear_free(&ret);
559 if (local_blinding)
560 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
561 if (buf != NULL)
562 {
563 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
564 OPENSSL_free(buf);
565 }
566 return(r);
567 }
568
569/* signature verification */
570static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
571 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
572 {
573 BIGNUM f,ret;
574 int i,num=0,r= -1;
575 unsigned char *p;
576 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
577 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
578
579 BN_init(&f);
580 BN_init(&ret);
581 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
582 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
583
584 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
585 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
586 if (buf == NULL)
587 {
588 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
589 goto err;
590 }
591
592 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
593 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
594 if (flen > num)
595 {
596 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
597 goto err;
598 }
599
600 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
601
602 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
603 {
604 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
605 goto err;
606 }
607
608 /* do the decrypt */
609
610 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
611 {
612 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
613 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
614 goto err;
615 }
616
617 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
618 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
619
620 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret.d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
621 BN_sub(&ret, rsa->n, &ret);
622
623 p=buf;
624 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
625
626 switch (padding)
627 {
628 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
629 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
630 break;
631 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
632 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
633 break;
634 default:
635 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
636 goto err;
637 }
638 if (r < 0)
639 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
640
641err:
642 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
643 BN_clear_free(&f);
644 BN_clear_free(&ret);
645 if (buf != NULL)
646 {
647 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
648 OPENSSL_free(buf);
649 }
650 return(r);
651 }
652
653static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
654 {
655 BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
656 BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
657 BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
658 int ret=0;
659 BN_CTX *ctx;
660
661 BN_init(&m1);
662 BN_init(&r1);
663 BN_init(&vrfy);
664 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
665
666 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
667 {
668 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p,
669 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->p, ctx))
670 goto err;
671 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
672 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->q, ctx))
673 goto err;
674 }
675
676 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
677 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
678 {
679 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
680 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
681 }
682 else
683 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
684 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
685 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
686
687 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
688 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
689 {
690 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
691 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
692 }
693 else
694 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
695 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
696 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
697
698 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
699 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
700 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
701 if (r0->neg)
702 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
703
704 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
705 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
706 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
707 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
708 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
709 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
710 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
711 * they ensure p > q [steve]
712 */
713 if (r0->neg)
714 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
715 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
716 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
717
718 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
719 {
720 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
721 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
722 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
723 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
724 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
725 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
726 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
727 if (vrfy.neg)
728 if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
729 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
730 {
731 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
732 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
733 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
734
735 BIGNUM local_d;
736 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
737
738 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
739 {
740 d = &local_d;
741 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
742 }
743 else
744 d = rsa->d;
745 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
746 }
747 }
748 ret=1;
749err:
750 BN_clear_free(&m1);
751 BN_clear_free(&r1);
752 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
753 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
754 return(ret);
755 }
756
757static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
758 {
759 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
760 return(1);
761 }
762
763static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
764 {
765 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
766 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
767 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
768 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
769 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
770 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
771 return(1);
772 }
773
774#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-24 14:42:20 +0000