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1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include "cryptlib.h"
114#include <openssl/bn.h>
115#include <openssl/rsa.h>
116#include <openssl/rand.h>
117
118#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
119
120static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
122static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
124static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
129static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
132 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
133 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
134 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
135 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
136 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
137 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
138 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
139 RSA_eay_init,
140 RSA_eay_finish,
141 0, /* flags */
142 NULL,
143 0, /* rsa_sign */
144 0 /* rsa_verify */
145 };
146
147const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
148 {
149 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
150 }
151
152static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
153 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
154 {
155 BIGNUM f,ret;
156 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
157 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
158 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
159
160 BN_init(&f);
161 BN_init(&ret);
162 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
163 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
164 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
165 {
166 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
167 goto err;
168 }
169
170 switch (padding)
171 {
172 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
173 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
174 break;
175#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
176 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
177 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
178 break;
179#endif
180 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
181 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
182 break;
183 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
184 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
185 break;
186 default:
187 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
188 goto err;
189 }
190 if (i <= 0) goto err;
191
192 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
193
194 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
195 {
196 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
197 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
198 goto err;
199 }
200
201 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
202 {
203 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
204 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
205 goto err;
206 }
207
208 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
209 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
210
211 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
212 * length of the modulus */
213 j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
214 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
215 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
216 to[k]=0;
217
218 r=num;
219err:
220 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
221 BN_clear_free(&f);
222 BN_clear_free(&ret);
223 if (buf != NULL)
224 {
225 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
226 OPENSSL_free(buf);
227 }
228 return(r);
229 }
230
231static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
232 {
233 int ret = 1;
234 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
235 /* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
236 if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
237 ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
238 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
239 return ret;
240 }
241
242#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
243 do { \
244 if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
245 ((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
246 !rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
247 err_instr \
248 } while(0)
249
250static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
251 {
252 BIGNUM *A, *Ai;
253 BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
254
255 /* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
256
257 /* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
258 * this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
259 * of binary compatibility can't */
260
261 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
262 A = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
263 if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
264 {
265 /* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
266 RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
267 if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
268 }
269 else
270 {
271 if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
272 }
273 if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
274
275 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
276 goto err;
277 ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
278 BN_free(Ai);
279err:
280 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
281 return ret;
282 }
283
284/* signing */
285static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
286 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
287 {
288 BIGNUM f,ret, *res;
289 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
290 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
291 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
292 int local_blinding = 0;
293 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
294
295 BN_init(&f);
296 BN_init(&ret);
297
298 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
299 {
300 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
301 return -1;
302 }
303
304 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
305 {
306 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
307 return -1;
308 }
309
310 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
311 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
312 {
313 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
314 {
315 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
316 return -1;
317 }
318 }
319
320 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
321 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
322 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
323 {
324 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
325 goto err;
326 }
327
328 switch (padding)
329 {
330 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
331 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
332 break;
333 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
334 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
335 break;
336 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
337 default:
338 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
339 goto err;
340 }
341 if (i <= 0) goto err;
342
343 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
344
345 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
346 {
347 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
348 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
349 goto err;
350 }
351
352 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
353 blinding = rsa->blinding;
354
355 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
356 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
357 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
358 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
359 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
360 * factors) */
361 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
362 {
363 if (blinding == NULL)
364 {
365 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
366 goto err;
367 }
368 }
369
370 if (blinding != NULL)
371 {
372 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
373 {
374 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
375
376 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
377 if (blinding == NULL)
378 goto err;
379 local_blinding = 1;
380 }
381 }
382
383 if (blinding)
384 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
385
386 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
387 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
388 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
389 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
390 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
391 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
392 {
393 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err;
394 }
395 else
396 {
397 BIGNUM local_d;
398 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
399
400 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
401 {
402 BN_init(&local_d);
403 d = &local_d;
404 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
405 }
406 else
407 d = rsa->d;
408 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
409 }
410
411 if (blinding)
412 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
413
414 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
415 {
416 BN_sub(&f, rsa->n, &ret);
417 if (BN_cmp(&ret, &f))
418 res = &f;
419 else
420 res = &ret;
421 }
422 else
423 res = &ret;
424
425 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
426 * length of the modulus */
427 j=BN_num_bytes(res);
428 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
429 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
430 to[k]=0;
431
432 r=num;
433err:
434 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
435 BN_clear_free(&ret);
436 BN_clear_free(&f);
437 if (local_blinding)
438 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
439 if (buf != NULL)
440 {
441 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
442 OPENSSL_free(buf);
443 }
444 return(r);
445 }
446
447static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
448 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
449 {
450 BIGNUM f,ret;
451 int j,num=0,r= -1;
452 unsigned char *p;
453 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
454 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
455 int local_blinding = 0;
456 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
457
458 BN_init(&f);
459 BN_init(&ret);
460 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
461 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
462
463 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
464
465 if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
466 {
467 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
468 goto err;
469 }
470
471 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
472 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
473 if (flen > num)
474 {
475 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
476 goto err;
477 }
478
479 /* make data into a big number */
480 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
481
482 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
483 {
484 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
485 goto err;
486 }
487
488 BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
489 blinding = rsa->blinding;
490
491 /* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
492 * But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
493 * (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
494 * lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
495 * thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
496 * factors) */
497 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
498 {
499 if (blinding == NULL)
500 {
501 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
502 goto err;
503 }
504 }
505
506 if (blinding != NULL)
507 {
508 if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
509 {
510 /* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
511
512 blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
513 if (blinding == NULL)
514 goto err;
515 local_blinding = 1;
516 }
517 }
518
519 if (blinding)
520 if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
521
522 /* do the decrypt */
523 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
524 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
525 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
526 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
527 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
528 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
529 {
530 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err;
531 }
532 else
533 {
534 BIGNUM local_d;
535 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
536
537 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
538 {
539 d = &local_d;
540 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
541 }
542 else
543 d = rsa->d;
544 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
545 goto err;
546 }
547
548 if (blinding)
549 if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
550
551 p=buf;
552 j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
553
554 switch (padding)
555 {
556 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
557 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
558 break;
559#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
560 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
561 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
562 break;
563#endif
564 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
565 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
566 break;
567 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
568 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
569 break;
570 default:
571 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
572 goto err;
573 }
574 if (r < 0)
575 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
576
577err:
578 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
579 BN_clear_free(&f);
580 BN_clear_free(&ret);
581 if (local_blinding)
582 BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
583 if (buf != NULL)
584 {
585 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
586 OPENSSL_free(buf);
587 }
588 return(r);
589 }
590
591/* signature verification */
592static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
593 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
594 {
595 BIGNUM f,ret;
596 int i,num=0,r= -1;
597 unsigned char *p;
598 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
599 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
600
601 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
602 {
603 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
604 return -1;
605 }
606
607 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
608 {
609 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
610 return -1;
611 }
612
613 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
614 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
615 {
616 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
617 {
618 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
619 return -1;
620 }
621 }
622
623 BN_init(&f);
624 BN_init(&ret);
625 ctx=BN_CTX_new();
626 if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
627
628 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
629 buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
630 if (buf == NULL)
631 {
632 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
633 goto err;
634 }
635
636 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
637 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
638 if (flen > num)
639 {
640 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
641 goto err;
642 }
643
644 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
645
646 if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
647 {
648 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
649 goto err;
650 }
651
652 /* do the decrypt */
653
654 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
655 {
656 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n,
657 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
658 goto err;
659 }
660
661 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
662 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
663
664 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret.d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
665 BN_sub(&ret, rsa->n, &ret);
666
667 p=buf;
668 i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p);
669
670 switch (padding)
671 {
672 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
673 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
674 break;
675 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
676 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
677 break;
678 default:
679 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
680 goto err;
681 }
682 if (r < 0)
683 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
684
685err:
686 if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
687 BN_clear_free(&f);
688 BN_clear_free(&ret);
689 if (buf != NULL)
690 {
691 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
692 OPENSSL_free(buf);
693 }
694 return(r);
695 }
696
697static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
698 {
699 BIGNUM r1,m1,vrfy;
700 BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1;
701 BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1;
702 int ret=0;
703 BN_CTX *ctx;
704
705 BN_init(&m1);
706 BN_init(&r1);
707 BN_init(&vrfy);
708 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
709
710 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
711 {
712 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p,
713 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->p, ctx))
714 goto err;
715 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
716 CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->q, ctx))
717 goto err;
718 }
719
720 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
721 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
722 {
723 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
724 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
725 }
726 else
727 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
728 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
729 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
730
731 if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
732 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
733 {
734 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
735 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
736 }
737 else
738 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
739 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
740 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
741
742 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
743 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
744 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
745 if (r0->neg)
746 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
747
748 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
749 if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
750 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
751 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
752 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
753 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
754 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
755 * they ensure p > q [steve]
756 */
757 if (r0->neg)
758 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
759 if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
760 if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
761
762 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
763 {
764 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
765 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
766 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
767 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
768 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
769 if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
770 if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
771 if (vrfy.neg)
772 if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
773 if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
774 {
775 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
776 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
777 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
778
779 BIGNUM local_d;
780 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
781
782 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME))
783 {
784 d = &local_d;
785 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME);
786 }
787 else
788 d = rsa->d;
789 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
790 }
791 }
792 ret=1;
793err:
794 BN_clear_free(&m1);
795 BN_clear_free(&r1);
796 BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
797 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
798 return(ret);
799 }
800
801static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
802 {
803 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
804 return(1);
805 }
806
807static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
808 {
809 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
810 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
811 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
812 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
813 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
814 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
815 return(1);
816 }
817
818#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-22 17:24:08 +0000