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1/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include "cryptlib.h"
114#include <openssl/bn.h>
115#include <openssl/rsa.h>
116#include <openssl/rand.h>
117
118#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && !defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
119
120static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
121 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
122static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
123 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
124static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
125 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
126static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
127 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
128static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
129static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
130static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
131static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
132 "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
133 RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
134 RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
135 RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
136 RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
137 RSA_eay_mod_exp,
138 BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
139 RSA_eay_init,
140 RSA_eay_finish,
141 0, /* flags */
142 NULL,
143 0, /* rsa_sign */
144 0, /* rsa_verify */
145 NULL /* rsa_keygen */
146 };
147
148const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
149 {
150 return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
151 }
152
153static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
154 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
155 {
156 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
157 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
158 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
159 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
160
161 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
162 {
163 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
164 return -1;
165 }
166
167 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
168 {
169 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
170 return -1;
171 }
172
173 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
174 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
175 {
176 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
177 {
178 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
179 return -1;
180 }
181 }
182
183 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
184 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
185 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
186 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
187 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
188 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
189 if (!f || !ret || !buf)
190 {
191 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
192 goto err;
193 }
194
195 switch (padding)
196 {
197 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
198 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
199 break;
200#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
201 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
202 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
203 break;
204#endif
205 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
206 i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
207 break;
208 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
209 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
210 break;
211 default:
212 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
213 goto err;
214 }
215 if (i <= 0) goto err;
216
217 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
218
219 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
220 {
221 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
222 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
223 goto err;
224 }
225
226 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
227 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
228 goto err;
229
230 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
231 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
232
233 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
234 * length of the modulus */
235 j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
236 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
237 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
238 to[k]=0;
239
240 r=num;
241err:
242 if (ctx != NULL)
243 {
244 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
245 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
246 }
247 if (buf != NULL)
248 {
249 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
250 OPENSSL_free(buf);
251 }
252 return(r);
253 }
254
255static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
256{
257 BN_BLINDING *ret;
258 int got_write_lock = 0;
259
260 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
261
262 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
263 {
264 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
265 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
266 got_write_lock = 1;
267
268 if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
269 rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
270 }
271
272 ret = rsa->blinding;
273 if (ret == NULL)
274 goto err;
275
276 if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id())
277 {
278 /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
279
280 *local = 1;
281 }
282 else
283 {
284 /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
285
286 *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
287 * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
288 * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
289 * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
290 */
291
292 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
293 {
294 if (!got_write_lock)
295 {
296 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
297 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
298 got_write_lock = 1;
299 }
300
301 if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
302 rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
303 }
304 ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
305 }
306
307 err:
308 if (got_write_lock)
309 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
310 else
311 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
312 return ret;
313}
314
315static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
316 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
317{
318 if (local)
319 return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
320 else
321 {
322 int ret;
323 CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
324 ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
325 CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
326 return ret;
327 }
328}
329
330static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
331 BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
332{
333 if (local)
334 return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
335 else
336 {
337 int ret;
338 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
339 ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
340 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
341 return ret;
342 }
343}
344
345/* signing */
346static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
347 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
348 {
349 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
350 int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
351 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
352 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
353 int local_blinding = 0;
354 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
355
356 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
357 {
358 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
359 return -1;
360 }
361
362 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
363 {
364 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
365 return -1;
366 }
367
368 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
369 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
370 {
371 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
372 {
373 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
374 return -1;
375 }
376 }
377
378 if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
379 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
380 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
381 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
382 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
383 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
384 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
385 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
386 {
387 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
388 goto err;
389 }
390
391 switch (padding)
392 {
393 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
394 i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
395 break;
396 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
397 i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
398 break;
399 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
400 i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
401 break;
402 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
403 default:
404 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
405 goto err;
406 }
407 if (i <= 0) goto err;
408
409 if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
410
411 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
412 {
413 /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
414 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
415 goto err;
416 }
417
418 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
419 {
420 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
421 if (blinding == NULL)
422 {
423 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
424 goto err;
425 }
426 }
427
428 if (blinding != NULL)
429 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
430 goto err;
431
432 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
433 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
434 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
435 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
436 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
437 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
438 {
439 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
440 }
441 else
442 {
443 BIGNUM local_d;
444 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
445
446 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
447 {
448 BN_init(&local_d);
449 d = &local_d;
450 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
451 }
452 else
453 d= rsa->d;
454
455 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
456 if(!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
457 goto err;
458
459 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
460 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
461 }
462
463 if (blinding)
464 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
465 goto err;
466
467 if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
468 {
469 BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
470 if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
471 res = f;
472 else
473 res = ret;
474 }
475 else
476 res = ret;
477
478 /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
479 * length of the modulus */
480 j=BN_num_bytes(res);
481 i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
482 for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
483 to[k]=0;
484
485 r=num;
486err:
487 if (ctx != NULL)
488 {
489 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
490 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
491 }
492 if (buf != NULL)
493 {
494 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
495 OPENSSL_free(buf);
496 }
497 return(r);
498 }
499
500static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
501 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
502 {
503 BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
504 int j,num=0,r= -1;
505 unsigned char *p;
506 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
507 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
508 int local_blinding = 0;
509 BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
510
511 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
512 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
513 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
514 br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
515 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
516 num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
517 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
518 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
519 {
520 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
521 goto err;
522 }
523
524 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
525 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
526 if (flen > num)
527 {
528 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
529 goto err;
530 }
531
532 /* make data into a big number */
533 if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
534
535 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
536 {
537 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
538 goto err;
539 }
540
541 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
542 {
543 blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
544 if (blinding == NULL)
545 {
546 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
547 goto err;
548 }
549 }
550
551 if (blinding != NULL)
552 if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
553 goto err;
554
555 /* do the decrypt */
556 if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
557 ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
558 (rsa->q != NULL) &&
559 (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
560 (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
561 (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
562 {
563 if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
564 }
565 else
566 {
567 BIGNUM local_d;
568 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
569
570 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
571 {
572 d = &local_d;
573 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
574 }
575 else
576 d = rsa->d;
577
578 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
579 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
580 goto err;
581 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
582 rsa->_method_mod_n))
583 goto err;
584 }
585
586 if (blinding)
587 if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
588 goto err;
589
590 p=buf;
591 j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
592
593 switch (padding)
594 {
595 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
596 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
597 break;
598#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
599 case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
600 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
601 break;
602#endif
603 case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
604 r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
605 break;
606 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
607 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
608 break;
609 default:
610 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
611 goto err;
612 }
613 if (r < 0)
614 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
615
616err:
617 if (ctx != NULL)
618 {
619 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
620 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
621 }
622 if (buf != NULL)
623 {
624 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
625 OPENSSL_free(buf);
626 }
627 return(r);
628 }
629
630/* signature verification */
631static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
632 unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
633 {
634 BIGNUM *f,*ret;
635 int i,num=0,r= -1;
636 unsigned char *p;
637 unsigned char *buf=NULL;
638 BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
639
640 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
641 {
642 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
643 return -1;
644 }
645
646 if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
647 {
648 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
649 return -1;
650 }
651
652 /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
653 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
654 {
655 if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
656 {
657 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
658 return -1;
659 }
660 }
661
662 if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
663 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
664 f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
665 ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
666 num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
667 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
668 if(!f || !ret || !buf)
669 {
670 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
671 goto err;
672 }
673
674 /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
675 * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
676 if (flen > num)
677 {
678 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
679 goto err;
680 }
681
682 if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
683
684 if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
685 {
686 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
687 goto err;
688 }
689
690 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
691 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
692 goto err;
693
694 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
695 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
696
697 if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
698 BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
699
700 p=buf;
701 i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
702
703 switch (padding)
704 {
705 case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
706 r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
707 break;
708 case RSA_X931_PADDING:
709 r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
710 break;
711 case RSA_NO_PADDING:
712 r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
713 break;
714 default:
715 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
716 goto err;
717 }
718 if (r < 0)
719 RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
720
721err:
722 if (ctx != NULL)
723 {
724 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
725 BN_CTX_free(ctx);
726 }
727 if (buf != NULL)
728 {
729 OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
730 OPENSSL_free(buf);
731 }
732 return(r);
733 }
734
735static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
736 {
737 BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
738 BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
739 BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
740 int ret=0;
741
742 BN_CTX_start(ctx);
743 r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
744 m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
745 vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
746
747 {
748 BIGNUM local_p, local_q;
749 BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
750
751 /* Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the
752 * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag (unless RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME is set)
753 */
754 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
755 {
756 BN_init(&local_p);
757 p = &local_p;
758 BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
759
760 BN_init(&local_q);
761 q = &local_q;
762 BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
763 }
764 else
765 {
766 p = rsa->p;
767 q = rsa->q;
768 }
769
770 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
771 {
772 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, p, ctx))
773 goto err;
774 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, q, ctx))
775 goto err;
776 }
777 }
778
779 if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
780 if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx))
781 goto err;
782
783 /* compute I mod q */
784 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
785 {
786 c = &local_c;
787 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
788 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
789 }
790 else
791 {
792 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
793 }
794
795 /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
796 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
797 {
798 dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
799 BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
800 }
801 else
802 dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
803 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
804 rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
805
806 /* compute I mod p */
807 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
808 {
809 c = &local_c;
810 BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
811 if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
812 }
813 else
814 {
815 if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
816 }
817
818 /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
819 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
820 {
821 dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
822 BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
823 }
824 else
825 dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
826 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
827 rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
828
829 if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
830 /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
831 * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
832 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
833 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
834
835 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
836
837 /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
838 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
839 {
840 pr1 = &local_r1;
841 BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
842 }
843 else
844 pr1 = r1;
845 if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
846
847 /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
848 * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
849 * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
850 * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
851 * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
852 * they ensure p > q [steve]
853 */
854 if (BN_is_negative(r0))
855 if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
856 if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
857 if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
858
859 if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
860 {
861 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
862 /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
863 * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
864 * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
865 * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
866 if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
867 if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
868 if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
869 if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
870 if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
871 {
872 /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
873 * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
874 * mod_exp and return that instead. */
875
876 BIGNUM local_d;
877 BIGNUM *d = NULL;
878
879 if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
880 {
881 d = &local_d;
882 BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
883 }
884 else
885 d = rsa->d;
886 if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
887 rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
888 }
889 }
890 ret=1;
891err:
892 BN_CTX_end(ctx);
893 return(ret);
894 }
895
896static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
897 {
898 rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
899 return(1);
900 }
901
902static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
903 {
904 if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
905 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
906 if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
907 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
908 if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
909 BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
910 return(1);
911 }
912
913#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-04 23:49:27 +0000