diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c | 888 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 888 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2facd1c6f6..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,888 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: rsa_eay.c,v 1.42 2016/07/07 11:53:12 bcook Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
60 | * | ||
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
63 | * are met: | ||
64 | * | ||
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
67 | * | ||
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
71 | * distribution. | ||
72 | * | ||
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | ||
77 | * | ||
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | ||
82 | * | ||
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
86 | * | ||
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
88 | * acknowledgment: | ||
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | ||
91 | * | ||
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
104 | * ==================================================================== | ||
105 | * | ||
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
109 | * | ||
110 | */ | ||
111 | |||
112 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
113 | #include <string.h> | ||
114 | |||
115 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
116 | |||
117 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
118 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
119 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
120 | |||
121 | static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
122 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); | ||
123 | static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
124 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); | ||
125 | static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
126 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); | ||
127 | static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, | ||
128 | unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); | ||
129 | static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); | ||
130 | static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa); | ||
131 | static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa); | ||
132 | |||
133 | static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = { | ||
134 | .name = "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA", | ||
135 | .rsa_pub_enc = RSA_eay_public_encrypt, | ||
136 | .rsa_pub_dec = RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */ | ||
137 | .rsa_priv_enc = RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */ | ||
138 | .rsa_priv_dec = RSA_eay_private_decrypt, | ||
139 | .rsa_mod_exp = RSA_eay_mod_exp, | ||
140 | .bn_mod_exp = BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */ | ||
141 | .init = RSA_eay_init, | ||
142 | .finish = RSA_eay_finish, | ||
143 | }; | ||
144 | |||
145 | const RSA_METHOD * | ||
146 | RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void) | ||
147 | { | ||
148 | return &rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth; | ||
149 | } | ||
150 | |||
151 | static int | ||
152 | RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, | ||
153 | RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
154 | { | ||
155 | BIGNUM *f, *ret; | ||
156 | int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; | ||
157 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | ||
158 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
159 | |||
160 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
161 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); | ||
162 | return -1; | ||
163 | } | ||
164 | |||
165 | if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { | ||
166 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
167 | return -1; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | |||
170 | /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ | ||
171 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
172 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { | ||
173 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
174 | return -1; | ||
175 | } | ||
176 | } | ||
177 | |||
178 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
179 | goto err; | ||
180 | |||
181 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
182 | f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
183 | ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
184 | num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
185 | buf = malloc(num); | ||
186 | |||
187 | if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { | ||
188 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
189 | goto err; | ||
190 | } | ||
191 | |||
192 | switch (padding) { | ||
193 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
194 | i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
195 | break; | ||
196 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
197 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
198 | i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0); | ||
199 | break; | ||
200 | #endif | ||
201 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
202 | i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
203 | break; | ||
204 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
205 | i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
206 | break; | ||
207 | default: | ||
208 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, | ||
209 | RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
210 | goto err; | ||
211 | } | ||
212 | if (i <= 0) | ||
213 | goto err; | ||
214 | |||
215 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) | ||
216 | goto err; | ||
217 | |||
218 | if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { | ||
219 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
220 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, | ||
221 | RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
222 | goto err; | ||
223 | } | ||
224 | |||
225 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) | ||
226 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, | ||
227 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
228 | goto err; | ||
229 | |||
230 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f,rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
231 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) | ||
232 | goto err; | ||
233 | |||
234 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
235 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
236 | j = BN_num_bytes(ret); | ||
237 | i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j])); | ||
238 | for (k = 0; k < num - i; k++) | ||
239 | to[k] = 0; | ||
240 | |||
241 | r = num; | ||
242 | err: | ||
243 | if (ctx != NULL) { | ||
244 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
245 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
246 | } | ||
247 | if (buf != NULL) { | ||
248 | explicit_bzero(buf, num); | ||
249 | free(buf); | ||
250 | } | ||
251 | return r; | ||
252 | } | ||
253 | |||
254 | static BN_BLINDING * | ||
255 | rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx) | ||
256 | { | ||
257 | BN_BLINDING *ret; | ||
258 | int got_write_lock = 0; | ||
259 | CRYPTO_THREADID cur; | ||
260 | |||
261 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
262 | |||
263 | if (rsa->blinding == NULL) { | ||
264 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
265 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
266 | got_write_lock = 1; | ||
267 | |||
268 | if (rsa->blinding == NULL) | ||
269 | rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); | ||
270 | } | ||
271 | |||
272 | ret = rsa->blinding; | ||
273 | if (ret == NULL) | ||
274 | goto err; | ||
275 | |||
276 | CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur); | ||
277 | if (!CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&cur, BN_BLINDING_thread_id(ret))) { | ||
278 | /* rsa->blinding is ours! */ | ||
279 | *local = 1; | ||
280 | } else { | ||
281 | /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */ | ||
282 | /* | ||
283 | * Instruct rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() | ||
284 | * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses | ||
285 | * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be | ||
286 | * stored outside the BN_BLINDING | ||
287 | */ | ||
288 | *local = 0; | ||
289 | |||
290 | if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) { | ||
291 | if (!got_write_lock) { | ||
292 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
293 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
294 | got_write_lock = 1; | ||
295 | } | ||
296 | |||
297 | if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) | ||
298 | rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx); | ||
299 | } | ||
300 | ret = rsa->mt_blinding; | ||
301 | } | ||
302 | |||
303 | err: | ||
304 | if (got_write_lock) | ||
305 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
306 | else | ||
307 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA); | ||
308 | return ret; | ||
309 | } | ||
310 | |||
311 | static int | ||
312 | rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) | ||
313 | { | ||
314 | if (unblind == NULL) | ||
315 | /* | ||
316 | * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor | ||
317 | * in BN_BLINDING. | ||
318 | */ | ||
319 | return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx); | ||
320 | else { | ||
321 | /* | ||
322 | * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor | ||
323 | * outside BN_BLINDING. | ||
324 | */ | ||
325 | int ret; | ||
326 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); | ||
327 | ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); | ||
328 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING); | ||
329 | return ret; | ||
330 | } | ||
331 | } | ||
332 | |||
333 | static int | ||
334 | rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind, BN_CTX *ctx) | ||
335 | { | ||
336 | /* | ||
337 | * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex | ||
338 | * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. | ||
339 | * If BN_BLINDING is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null: | ||
340 | * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, | ||
341 | * and will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. | ||
342 | * In both cases it's safe to access the blinding without a lock. | ||
343 | */ | ||
344 | return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx); | ||
345 | } | ||
346 | |||
347 | /* signing */ | ||
348 | static int | ||
349 | RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, | ||
350 | RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
351 | { | ||
352 | BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res; | ||
353 | int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1; | ||
354 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | ||
355 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
356 | int local_blinding = 0; | ||
357 | /* | ||
358 | * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind | ||
359 | * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store | ||
360 | * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. | ||
361 | */ | ||
362 | BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; | ||
363 | BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; | ||
364 | |||
365 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
366 | goto err; | ||
367 | |||
368 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
369 | f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
370 | ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
371 | num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
372 | buf = malloc(num); | ||
373 | |||
374 | if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) { | ||
375 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
376 | goto err; | ||
377 | } | ||
378 | |||
379 | switch (padding) { | ||
380 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
381 | i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
382 | break; | ||
383 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | ||
384 | i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
385 | break; | ||
386 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
387 | i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen); | ||
388 | break; | ||
389 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
390 | default: | ||
391 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, | ||
392 | RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
393 | goto err; | ||
394 | } | ||
395 | if (i <= 0) | ||
396 | goto err; | ||
397 | |||
398 | if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL) | ||
399 | goto err; | ||
400 | |||
401 | if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { | ||
402 | /* usually the padding functions would catch this */ | ||
403 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, | ||
404 | RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
405 | goto err; | ||
406 | } | ||
407 | |||
408 | if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { | ||
409 | blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); | ||
410 | if (blinding == NULL) { | ||
411 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, | ||
412 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
413 | goto err; | ||
414 | } | ||
415 | } | ||
416 | |||
417 | if (blinding != NULL) { | ||
418 | if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { | ||
419 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, | ||
420 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
421 | goto err; | ||
422 | } | ||
423 | if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) | ||
424 | goto err; | ||
425 | } | ||
426 | |||
427 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
428 | (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL && | ||
429 | rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL)) { | ||
430 | if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) | ||
431 | goto err; | ||
432 | } else { | ||
433 | BIGNUM d; | ||
434 | |||
435 | BN_init(&d); | ||
436 | BN_with_flags(&d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
437 | |||
438 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) | ||
439 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, | ||
440 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
441 | goto err; | ||
442 | |||
443 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, &d, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
444 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) { | ||
445 | goto err; | ||
446 | } | ||
447 | } | ||
448 | |||
449 | if (blinding) | ||
450 | if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) | ||
451 | goto err; | ||
452 | |||
453 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
454 | BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret); | ||
455 | if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0) | ||
456 | res = f; | ||
457 | else | ||
458 | res = ret; | ||
459 | } else | ||
460 | res = ret; | ||
461 | |||
462 | /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the | ||
463 | * length of the modulus */ | ||
464 | j = BN_num_bytes(res); | ||
465 | i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j])); | ||
466 | for (k = 0; k < num - i; k++) | ||
467 | to[k] = 0; | ||
468 | |||
469 | r = num; | ||
470 | err: | ||
471 | if (ctx != NULL) { | ||
472 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
473 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
474 | } | ||
475 | if (buf != NULL) { | ||
476 | explicit_bzero(buf, num); | ||
477 | free(buf); | ||
478 | } | ||
479 | return r; | ||
480 | } | ||
481 | |||
482 | static int | ||
483 | RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, | ||
484 | RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
485 | { | ||
486 | BIGNUM *f, *ret; | ||
487 | int j, num = 0, r = -1; | ||
488 | unsigned char *p; | ||
489 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | ||
490 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
491 | int local_blinding = 0; | ||
492 | /* | ||
493 | * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind | ||
494 | * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store | ||
495 | * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure. | ||
496 | */ | ||
497 | BIGNUM *unblind = NULL; | ||
498 | BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL; | ||
499 | |||
500 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
501 | goto err; | ||
502 | |||
503 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
504 | f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
505 | ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
506 | num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
507 | buf = malloc(num); | ||
508 | |||
509 | if (!f || !ret || !buf) { | ||
510 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
511 | goto err; | ||
512 | } | ||
513 | |||
514 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
515 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
516 | if (flen > num) { | ||
517 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
518 | RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
519 | goto err; | ||
520 | } | ||
521 | |||
522 | /* make data into a big number */ | ||
523 | if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL) | ||
524 | goto err; | ||
525 | |||
526 | if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { | ||
527 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
528 | RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
529 | goto err; | ||
530 | } | ||
531 | |||
532 | if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) { | ||
533 | blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx); | ||
534 | if (blinding == NULL) { | ||
535 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
536 | ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
537 | goto err; | ||
538 | } | ||
539 | } | ||
540 | |||
541 | if (blinding != NULL) { | ||
542 | if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) { | ||
543 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
544 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
545 | goto err; | ||
546 | } | ||
547 | if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx)) | ||
548 | goto err; | ||
549 | } | ||
550 | |||
551 | /* do the decrypt */ | ||
552 | if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) || | ||
553 | (rsa->p != NULL && rsa->q != NULL && rsa->dmp1 != NULL && | ||
554 | rsa->dmq1 != NULL && rsa->iqmp != NULL)) { | ||
555 | if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) | ||
556 | goto err; | ||
557 | } else { | ||
558 | BIGNUM d; | ||
559 | |||
560 | BN_init(&d); | ||
561 | BN_with_flags(&d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
562 | |||
563 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) | ||
564 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, | ||
565 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
566 | goto err; | ||
567 | |||
568 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, &d, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
569 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) { | ||
570 | goto err; | ||
571 | } | ||
572 | } | ||
573 | |||
574 | if (blinding) | ||
575 | if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx)) | ||
576 | goto err; | ||
577 | |||
578 | p = buf; | ||
579 | j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */ | ||
580 | |||
581 | switch (padding) { | ||
582 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
583 | r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num); | ||
584 | break; | ||
585 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
586 | case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING: | ||
587 | r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0); | ||
588 | break; | ||
589 | #endif | ||
590 | case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING: | ||
591 | r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num); | ||
592 | break; | ||
593 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
594 | r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num); | ||
595 | break; | ||
596 | default: | ||
597 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
598 | RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
599 | goto err; | ||
600 | } | ||
601 | if (r < 0) | ||
602 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, | ||
603 | RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
604 | |||
605 | err: | ||
606 | if (ctx != NULL) { | ||
607 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
608 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
609 | } | ||
610 | if (buf != NULL) { | ||
611 | explicit_bzero(buf, num); | ||
612 | free(buf); | ||
613 | } | ||
614 | return r; | ||
615 | } | ||
616 | |||
617 | /* signature verification */ | ||
618 | static int | ||
619 | RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, | ||
620 | RSA *rsa, int padding) | ||
621 | { | ||
622 | BIGNUM *f, *ret; | ||
623 | int i, num = 0, r = -1; | ||
624 | unsigned char *p; | ||
625 | unsigned char *buf = NULL; | ||
626 | BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; | ||
627 | |||
628 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
629 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); | ||
630 | return -1; | ||
631 | } | ||
632 | |||
633 | if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) { | ||
634 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
635 | return -1; | ||
636 | } | ||
637 | |||
638 | /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */ | ||
639 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
640 | if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) { | ||
641 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
642 | return -1; | ||
643 | } | ||
644 | } | ||
645 | |||
646 | if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) | ||
647 | goto err; | ||
648 | |||
649 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
650 | f = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
651 | ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
652 | num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n); | ||
653 | buf = malloc(num); | ||
654 | |||
655 | if (!f || !ret || !buf) { | ||
656 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
657 | goto err; | ||
658 | } | ||
659 | |||
660 | /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things | ||
661 | * and chops off the top '0' bytes */ | ||
662 | if (flen > num) { | ||
663 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, | ||
664 | RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN); | ||
665 | goto err; | ||
666 | } | ||
667 | |||
668 | if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL) | ||
669 | goto err; | ||
670 | |||
671 | if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) { | ||
672 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, | ||
673 | RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS); | ||
674 | goto err; | ||
675 | } | ||
676 | |||
677 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) | ||
678 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, | ||
679 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
680 | goto err; | ||
681 | |||
682 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
683 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) | ||
684 | goto err; | ||
685 | |||
686 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING && (ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12) | ||
687 | if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret)) | ||
688 | goto err; | ||
689 | |||
690 | p = buf; | ||
691 | i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); | ||
692 | |||
693 | switch (padding) { | ||
694 | case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: | ||
695 | r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num); | ||
696 | break; | ||
697 | case RSA_X931_PADDING: | ||
698 | r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num); | ||
699 | break; | ||
700 | case RSA_NO_PADDING: | ||
701 | r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num); | ||
702 | break; | ||
703 | default: | ||
704 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, | ||
705 | RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
706 | goto err; | ||
707 | } | ||
708 | if (r < 0) | ||
709 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, | ||
710 | RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED); | ||
711 | |||
712 | err: | ||
713 | if (ctx != NULL) { | ||
714 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
715 | BN_CTX_free(ctx); | ||
716 | } | ||
717 | if (buf != NULL) { | ||
718 | explicit_bzero(buf, num); | ||
719 | free(buf); | ||
720 | } | ||
721 | return r; | ||
722 | } | ||
723 | |||
724 | static int | ||
725 | RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) | ||
726 | { | ||
727 | BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy; | ||
728 | BIGNUM dmp1, dmq1, c, pr1; | ||
729 | int ret = 0; | ||
730 | |||
731 | BN_CTX_start(ctx); | ||
732 | r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
733 | m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
734 | vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx); | ||
735 | if (r1 == NULL || m1 == NULL || vrfy == NULL) { | ||
736 | RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_MOD_EXP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
737 | goto err; | ||
738 | } | ||
739 | |||
740 | { | ||
741 | BIGNUM p, q; | ||
742 | |||
743 | /* | ||
744 | * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery intialization uses the | ||
745 | * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag | ||
746 | */ | ||
747 | BN_init(&p); | ||
748 | BN_init(&q); | ||
749 | BN_with_flags(&p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
750 | BN_with_flags(&q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
751 | |||
752 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) { | ||
753 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_p, | ||
754 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, &p, ctx) || | ||
755 | !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q, | ||
756 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, &q, ctx)) { | ||
757 | goto err; | ||
758 | } | ||
759 | } | ||
760 | } | ||
761 | |||
762 | if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC) | ||
763 | if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_n, | ||
764 | CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
765 | goto err; | ||
766 | |||
767 | /* compute I mod q */ | ||
768 | BN_init(&c); | ||
769 | BN_with_flags(&c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
770 | |||
771 | if (!BN_mod(r1, &c, rsa->q, ctx)) | ||
772 | goto err; | ||
773 | |||
774 | /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */ | ||
775 | BN_init(&dmq1); | ||
776 | BN_with_flags(&dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
777 | |||
778 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, &dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, | ||
779 | rsa->_method_mod_q)) | ||
780 | goto err; | ||
781 | |||
782 | /* compute I mod p */ | ||
783 | BN_with_flags(&c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
784 | |||
785 | if (!BN_mod(r1, &c, rsa->p, ctx)) | ||
786 | goto err; | ||
787 | |||
788 | /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */ | ||
789 | BN_init(&dmp1); | ||
790 | BN_with_flags(&dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
791 | |||
792 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, &dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, | ||
793 | rsa->_method_mod_p)) | ||
794 | goto err; | ||
795 | |||
796 | if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1)) | ||
797 | goto err; | ||
798 | |||
799 | /* | ||
800 | * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does | ||
801 | * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size | ||
802 | */ | ||
803 | if (BN_is_negative(r0)) | ||
804 | if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) | ||
805 | goto err; | ||
806 | |||
807 | if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx)) | ||
808 | goto err; | ||
809 | |||
810 | /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */ | ||
811 | BN_init(&pr1); | ||
812 | BN_with_flags(&pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
813 | |||
814 | if (!BN_mod(r0, &pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) | ||
815 | goto err; | ||
816 | |||
817 | /* | ||
818 | * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of | ||
819 | * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still | ||
820 | * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following | ||
821 | * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence. | ||
822 | * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because | ||
823 | * they ensure p > q [steve] | ||
824 | */ | ||
825 | if (BN_is_negative(r0)) | ||
826 | if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p)) | ||
827 | goto err; | ||
828 | if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx)) | ||
829 | goto err; | ||
830 | if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1)) | ||
831 | goto err; | ||
832 | |||
833 | if (rsa->e && rsa->n) { | ||
834 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
835 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) | ||
836 | goto err; | ||
837 | /* | ||
838 | * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation | ||
839 | * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of | ||
840 | * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check | ||
841 | * for absolute equality, just congruency. | ||
842 | */ | ||
843 | if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) | ||
844 | goto err; | ||
845 | if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) | ||
846 | goto err; | ||
847 | if (BN_is_negative(vrfy)) | ||
848 | if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) | ||
849 | goto err; | ||
850 | if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) { | ||
851 | /* | ||
852 | * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak | ||
853 | * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) | ||
854 | * mod_exp and return that instead. | ||
855 | */ | ||
856 | BIGNUM d; | ||
857 | |||
858 | BN_init(&d); | ||
859 | BN_with_flags(&d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); | ||
860 | |||
861 | if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, &d, rsa->n, ctx, | ||
862 | rsa->_method_mod_n)) { | ||
863 | goto err; | ||
864 | } | ||
865 | } | ||
866 | } | ||
867 | ret = 1; | ||
868 | err: | ||
869 | BN_CTX_end(ctx); | ||
870 | return ret; | ||
871 | } | ||
872 | |||
873 | static int | ||
874 | RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa) | ||
875 | { | ||
876 | rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE; | ||
877 | return 1; | ||
878 | } | ||
879 | |||
880 | static int | ||
881 | RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa) | ||
882 | { | ||
883 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n); | ||
884 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p); | ||
885 | BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q); | ||
886 | |||
887 | return 1; | ||
888 | } | ||