diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 911 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 911 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c deleted file mode 100644 index 453570cf74..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ /dev/null | |||
| @@ -1,911 +0,0 @@ | |||
| 1 | /* $OpenBSD: rsa_pmeth.c,v 1.43 2025/01/17 15:39:19 tb Exp $ */ | ||
| 2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | ||
| 3 | * project 2006. | ||
| 4 | */ | ||
| 5 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
| 6 | * Copyright (c) 2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
| 7 | * | ||
| 8 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
| 9 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
| 10 | * are met: | ||
| 11 | * | ||
| 12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
| 13 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
| 14 | * | ||
| 15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
| 16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
| 17 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
| 18 | * distribution. | ||
| 19 | * | ||
| 20 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
| 21 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
| 22 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
| 23 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
| 24 | * | ||
| 25 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
| 26 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
| 27 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
| 28 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
| 29 | * | ||
| 30 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
| 31 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
| 32 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
| 33 | * | ||
| 34 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
| 35 | * acknowledgment: | ||
| 36 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
| 37 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
| 38 | * | ||
| 39 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
| 40 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
| 41 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
| 42 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
| 43 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
| 44 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
| 45 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
| 46 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
| 47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
| 48 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
| 49 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
| 50 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
| 51 | * ==================================================================== | ||
| 52 | * | ||
| 53 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
| 54 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
| 55 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
| 56 | * | ||
| 57 | */ | ||
| 58 | |||
| 59 | #include <limits.h> | ||
| 60 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
| 61 | #include <stdlib.h> | ||
| 62 | #include <string.h> | ||
| 63 | |||
| 64 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
| 65 | |||
| 66 | #include <openssl/asn1t.h> | ||
| 67 | #include <openssl/bn.h> | ||
| 68 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
| 69 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
| 70 | #include <openssl/rsa.h> | ||
| 71 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
| 72 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
| 73 | |||
| 74 | #include "bn_local.h" | ||
| 75 | #include "evp_local.h" | ||
| 76 | #include "rsa_local.h" | ||
| 77 | |||
| 78 | /* RSA pkey context structure */ | ||
| 79 | |||
| 80 | typedef struct { | ||
| 81 | /* Key gen parameters */ | ||
| 82 | int nbits; | ||
| 83 | BIGNUM *pub_exp; | ||
| 84 | /* Keygen callback info */ | ||
| 85 | int gentmp[2]; | ||
| 86 | /* RSA padding mode */ | ||
| 87 | int pad_mode; | ||
| 88 | /* message digest */ | ||
| 89 | const EVP_MD *md; | ||
| 90 | /* message digest for MGF1 */ | ||
| 91 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md; | ||
| 92 | /* PSS salt length */ | ||
| 93 | int saltlen; | ||
| 94 | /* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */ | ||
| 95 | int min_saltlen; | ||
| 96 | /* Temp buffer */ | ||
| 97 | unsigned char *tbuf; | ||
| 98 | /* OAEP label */ | ||
| 99 | unsigned char *oaep_label; | ||
| 100 | size_t oaep_labellen; | ||
| 101 | } RSA_PKEY_CTX; | ||
| 102 | |||
| 103 | /* True if PSS parameters are restricted */ | ||
| 104 | #define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1) | ||
| 105 | |||
| 106 | static int | ||
| 107 | pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 108 | { | ||
| 109 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx; | ||
| 110 | |||
| 111 | if ((rctx = calloc(1, sizeof(RSA_PKEY_CTX))) == NULL) | ||
| 112 | return 0; | ||
| 113 | |||
| 114 | rctx->nbits = 2048; | ||
| 115 | |||
| 116 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
| 117 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | ||
| 118 | else | ||
| 119 | rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | ||
| 120 | |||
| 121 | /* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */ | ||
| 122 | rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | ||
| 123 | rctx->min_saltlen = -1; | ||
| 124 | |||
| 125 | ctx->data = rctx; | ||
| 126 | ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp; | ||
| 127 | ctx->keygen_info_count = 2; | ||
| 128 | |||
| 129 | return 1; | ||
| 130 | } | ||
| 131 | |||
| 132 | static int | ||
| 133 | pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) | ||
| 134 | { | ||
| 135 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx; | ||
| 136 | |||
| 137 | if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst)) | ||
| 138 | return 0; | ||
| 139 | |||
| 140 | sctx = src->data; | ||
| 141 | dctx = dst->data; | ||
| 142 | dctx->nbits = sctx->nbits; | ||
| 143 | if (sctx->pub_exp != NULL) { | ||
| 144 | BN_free(dctx->pub_exp); | ||
| 145 | if ((dctx->pub_exp = BN_dup(sctx->pub_exp)) == NULL) | ||
| 146 | return 0; | ||
| 147 | } | ||
| 148 | dctx->pad_mode = sctx->pad_mode; | ||
| 149 | dctx->md = sctx->md; | ||
| 150 | dctx->mgf1md = sctx->mgf1md; | ||
| 151 | if (sctx->oaep_label != NULL) { | ||
| 152 | free(dctx->oaep_label); | ||
| 153 | if ((dctx->oaep_label = calloc(1, sctx->oaep_labellen)) == NULL) | ||
| 154 | return 0; | ||
| 155 | memcpy(dctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_label, sctx->oaep_labellen); | ||
| 156 | dctx->oaep_labellen = sctx->oaep_labellen; | ||
| 157 | } | ||
| 158 | |||
| 159 | return 1; | ||
| 160 | } | ||
| 161 | |||
| 162 | static int | ||
| 163 | setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) | ||
| 164 | { | ||
| 165 | if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) | ||
| 166 | return 1; | ||
| 167 | if ((ctx->tbuf = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey))) == NULL) { | ||
| 168 | RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 169 | return 0; | ||
| 170 | } | ||
| 171 | return 1; | ||
| 172 | } | ||
| 173 | |||
| 174 | static void | ||
| 175 | pkey_rsa_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 176 | { | ||
| 177 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 178 | |||
| 179 | if (rctx) { | ||
| 180 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); | ||
| 181 | free(rctx->tbuf); | ||
| 182 | free(rctx->oaep_label); | ||
| 183 | free(rctx); | ||
| 184 | } | ||
| 185 | } | ||
| 186 | |||
| 187 | static int | ||
| 188 | pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, | ||
| 189 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | ||
| 190 | { | ||
| 191 | int ret; | ||
| 192 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 193 | RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
| 194 | |||
| 195 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
| 196 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
| 197 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
| 198 | return -1; | ||
| 199 | } | ||
| 200 | |||
| 201 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
| 202 | if ((size_t)EVP_PKEY_size(ctx->pkey) < tbslen + 1) { | ||
| 203 | RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | ||
| 204 | return -1; | ||
| 205 | } | ||
| 206 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) { | ||
| 207 | RSAerror(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
| 208 | return -1; | ||
| 209 | } | ||
| 210 | memcpy(rctx->tbuf, tbs, tbslen); | ||
| 211 | rctx->tbuf[tbslen] = | ||
| 212 | RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md)); | ||
| 213 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen + 1, rctx->tbuf, sig, | ||
| 214 | rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | ||
| 215 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | ||
| 216 | unsigned int sltmp; | ||
| 217 | |||
| 218 | ret = RSA_sign(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, sig, | ||
| 219 | &sltmp, rsa); | ||
| 220 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 221 | return ret; | ||
| 222 | ret = sltmp; | ||
| 223 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
| 224 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 225 | return -1; | ||
| 226 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 227 | tbs, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, rctx->saltlen)) | ||
| 228 | return -1; | ||
| 229 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 230 | sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
| 231 | } else { | ||
| 232 | return -1; | ||
| 233 | } | ||
| 234 | } else { | ||
| 235 | ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
| 236 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
| 237 | } | ||
| 238 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 239 | return ret; | ||
| 240 | *siglen = ret; | ||
| 241 | return 1; | ||
| 242 | } | ||
| 243 | |||
| 244 | static int | ||
| 245 | pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *rout, size_t *routlen, | ||
| 246 | const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen) | ||
| 247 | { | ||
| 248 | int ret; | ||
| 249 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 250 | |||
| 251 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
| 252 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
| 253 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 254 | return -1; | ||
| 255 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 256 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); | ||
| 257 | if (ret < 1) | ||
| 258 | return 0; | ||
| 259 | ret--; | ||
| 260 | if (rctx->tbuf[ret] != | ||
| 261 | RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md))) { | ||
| 262 | RSAerror(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH); | ||
| 263 | return 0; | ||
| 264 | } | ||
| 265 | if (ret != EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
| 266 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
| 267 | return 0; | ||
| 268 | } | ||
| 269 | if (rout) | ||
| 270 | memcpy(rout, rctx->tbuf, ret); | ||
| 271 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { | ||
| 272 | size_t sltmp; | ||
| 273 | |||
| 274 | ret = int_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0, | ||
| 275 | rout, &sltmp, sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); | ||
| 276 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 277 | return 0; | ||
| 278 | ret = sltmp; | ||
| 279 | } else { | ||
| 280 | return -1; | ||
| 281 | } | ||
| 282 | } else { | ||
| 283 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
| 284 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
| 285 | } | ||
| 286 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 287 | return ret; | ||
| 288 | *routlen = ret; | ||
| 289 | return 1; | ||
| 290 | } | ||
| 291 | |||
| 292 | static int | ||
| 293 | pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig, size_t siglen, | ||
| 294 | const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) | ||
| 295 | { | ||
| 296 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 297 | RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
| 298 | size_t rslen; | ||
| 299 | |||
| 300 | if (rctx->md) { | ||
| 301 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) | ||
| 302 | return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen, | ||
| 303 | sig, siglen, rsa); | ||
| 304 | if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) { | ||
| 305 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
| 306 | return -1; | ||
| 307 | } | ||
| 308 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
| 309 | if (pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(ctx, NULL, &rslen, sig, | ||
| 310 | siglen) <= 0) | ||
| 311 | return 0; | ||
| 312 | } else if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
| 313 | int ret; | ||
| 314 | |||
| 315 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 316 | return -1; | ||
| 317 | ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 318 | rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
| 319 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 320 | return 0; | ||
| 321 | ret = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, tbs, rctx->md, | ||
| 322 | rctx->mgf1md, rctx->tbuf, rctx->saltlen); | ||
| 323 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 324 | return 0; | ||
| 325 | return 1; | ||
| 326 | } else { | ||
| 327 | return -1; | ||
| 328 | } | ||
| 329 | } else { | ||
| 330 | int ret; | ||
| 331 | |||
| 332 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 333 | return -1; | ||
| 334 | |||
| 335 | if ((ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, | ||
| 336 | rctx->pad_mode)) <= 0) | ||
| 337 | return 0; | ||
| 338 | |||
| 339 | rslen = ret; | ||
| 340 | } | ||
| 341 | |||
| 342 | if (rslen != tbslen || timingsafe_bcmp(tbs, rctx->tbuf, rslen)) | ||
| 343 | return 0; | ||
| 344 | |||
| 345 | return 1; | ||
| 346 | } | ||
| 347 | |||
| 348 | static int | ||
| 349 | pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, | ||
| 350 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) | ||
| 351 | { | ||
| 352 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 353 | int ret; | ||
| 354 | |||
| 355 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 356 | int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); | ||
| 357 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 358 | return -1; | ||
| 359 | if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, | ||
| 360 | in, inlen, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, | ||
| 361 | rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) | ||
| 362 | return -1; | ||
| 363 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, | ||
| 364 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
| 365 | } else { | ||
| 366 | ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
| 367 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
| 368 | } | ||
| 369 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 370 | return ret; | ||
| 371 | *outlen = ret; | ||
| 372 | return 1; | ||
| 373 | } | ||
| 374 | |||
| 375 | static int | ||
| 376 | pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outlen, | ||
| 377 | const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen) | ||
| 378 | { | ||
| 379 | int ret; | ||
| 380 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 381 | |||
| 382 | if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 383 | if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) | ||
| 384 | return -1; | ||
| 385 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 386 | ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); | ||
| 387 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 388 | return ret; | ||
| 389 | ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, | ||
| 390 | ret, ret, rctx->oaep_label, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, | ||
| 391 | rctx->mgf1md); | ||
| 392 | } else { | ||
| 393 | ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, | ||
| 394 | rctx->pad_mode); | ||
| 395 | } | ||
| 396 | if (ret < 0) | ||
| 397 | return ret; | ||
| 398 | *outlen = ret; | ||
| 399 | return 1; | ||
| 400 | } | ||
| 401 | |||
| 402 | static int | ||
| 403 | check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding) | ||
| 404 | { | ||
| 405 | if (md == NULL) | ||
| 406 | return 1; | ||
| 407 | |||
| 408 | if (padding == RSA_NO_PADDING) { | ||
| 409 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
| 410 | return 0; | ||
| 411 | } | ||
| 412 | |||
| 413 | if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) { | ||
| 414 | if (RSA_X931_hash_id(EVP_MD_type(md)) == -1) { | ||
| 415 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST); | ||
| 416 | return 0; | ||
| 417 | } | ||
| 418 | } else { | ||
| 419 | /* List of all supported RSA digests. */ | ||
| 420 | /* RFC 8017 and NIST CSOR. */ | ||
| 421 | switch(EVP_MD_type(md)) { | ||
| 422 | case NID_sha1: | ||
| 423 | case NID_sha224: | ||
| 424 | case NID_sha256: | ||
| 425 | case NID_sha384: | ||
| 426 | case NID_sha512: | ||
| 427 | case NID_sha512_224: | ||
| 428 | case NID_sha512_256: | ||
| 429 | case NID_sha3_224: | ||
| 430 | case NID_sha3_256: | ||
| 431 | case NID_sha3_384: | ||
| 432 | case NID_sha3_512: | ||
| 433 | case NID_md5: | ||
| 434 | case NID_md5_sha1: | ||
| 435 | case NID_md4: | ||
| 436 | case NID_ripemd160: | ||
| 437 | return 1; | ||
| 438 | |||
| 439 | default: | ||
| 440 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST); | ||
| 441 | return 0; | ||
| 442 | } | ||
| 443 | } | ||
| 444 | |||
| 445 | return 1; | ||
| 446 | } | ||
| 447 | |||
| 448 | static int | ||
| 449 | pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) | ||
| 450 | { | ||
| 451 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 452 | |||
| 453 | switch (type) { | ||
| 454 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING: | ||
| 455 | if (p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING && p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
| 456 | if (!check_padding_md(rctx->md, p1)) | ||
| 457 | return 0; | ||
| 458 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
| 459 | if (!(ctx->operation & | ||
| 460 | (EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN | EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY))) | ||
| 461 | goto bad_pad; | ||
| 462 | if (!rctx->md) | ||
| 463 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); | ||
| 464 | } else if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | ||
| 465 | goto bad_pad; | ||
| 466 | } | ||
| 467 | if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 468 | if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT)) | ||
| 469 | goto bad_pad; | ||
| 470 | if (!rctx->md) | ||
| 471 | rctx->md = EVP_sha1(); | ||
| 472 | } | ||
| 473 | rctx->pad_mode = p1; | ||
| 474 | return 1; | ||
| 475 | } | ||
| 476 | bad_pad: | ||
| 477 | RSAerror(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE); | ||
| 478 | return -2; | ||
| 479 | |||
| 480 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PADDING: | ||
| 481 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->pad_mode; | ||
| 482 | return 1; | ||
| 483 | |||
| 484 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: | ||
| 485 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN: | ||
| 486 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) { | ||
| 487 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
| 488 | return -2; | ||
| 489 | } | ||
| 490 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) { | ||
| 491 | *(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen; | ||
| 492 | } else { | ||
| 493 | if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) | ||
| 494 | return -2; | ||
| 495 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
| 496 | if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && | ||
| 497 | ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) { | ||
| 498 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
| 499 | return -2; | ||
| 500 | } | ||
| 501 | if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST && | ||
| 502 | rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md)) || | ||
| 503 | (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) { | ||
| 504 | RSAerror(RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL); | ||
| 505 | return 0; | ||
| 506 | } | ||
| 507 | } | ||
| 508 | rctx->saltlen = p1; | ||
| 509 | } | ||
| 510 | return 1; | ||
| 511 | |||
| 512 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS: | ||
| 513 | if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) { | ||
| 514 | RSAerror(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); | ||
| 515 | return -2; | ||
| 516 | } | ||
| 517 | rctx->nbits = p1; | ||
| 518 | return 1; | ||
| 519 | |||
| 520 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PUBEXP: | ||
| 521 | if (p2 == NULL || !BN_is_odd((BIGNUM *)p2) || | ||
| 522 | BN_is_one((BIGNUM *)p2)) { | ||
| 523 | RSAerror(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE); | ||
| 524 | return -2; | ||
| 525 | } | ||
| 526 | BN_free(rctx->pub_exp); | ||
| 527 | rctx->pub_exp = p2; | ||
| 528 | return 1; | ||
| 529 | |||
| 530 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD: | ||
| 531 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD: | ||
| 532 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 533 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
| 534 | return -2; | ||
| 535 | } | ||
| 536 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD) | ||
| 537 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
| 538 | else | ||
| 539 | rctx->md = p2; | ||
| 540 | return 1; | ||
| 541 | |||
| 542 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: | ||
| 543 | if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode)) | ||
| 544 | return 0; | ||
| 545 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
| 546 | if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2)) | ||
| 547 | return 1; | ||
| 548 | RSAerror(RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | ||
| 549 | return 0; | ||
| 550 | } | ||
| 551 | rctx->md = p2; | ||
| 552 | return 1; | ||
| 553 | |||
| 554 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_MD: | ||
| 555 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
| 556 | return 1; | ||
| 557 | |||
| 558 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD: | ||
| 559 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD: | ||
| 560 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING && | ||
| 561 | rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 562 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD); | ||
| 563 | return -2; | ||
| 564 | } | ||
| 565 | if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_MGF1_MD) { | ||
| 566 | if (rctx->mgf1md) | ||
| 567 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md; | ||
| 568 | else | ||
| 569 | *(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md; | ||
| 570 | } else { | ||
| 571 | if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) { | ||
| 572 | if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2)) | ||
| 573 | return 1; | ||
| 574 | RSAerror(RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED); | ||
| 575 | return 0; | ||
| 576 | } | ||
| 577 | rctx->mgf1md = p2; | ||
| 578 | } | ||
| 579 | return 1; | ||
| 580 | |||
| 581 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: | ||
| 582 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 583 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
| 584 | return -2; | ||
| 585 | } | ||
| 586 | free(rctx->oaep_label); | ||
| 587 | if (p2 != NULL && p1 > 0) { | ||
| 588 | rctx->oaep_label = p2; | ||
| 589 | rctx->oaep_labellen = p1; | ||
| 590 | } else { | ||
| 591 | rctx->oaep_label = NULL; | ||
| 592 | rctx->oaep_labellen = 0; | ||
| 593 | } | ||
| 594 | return 1; | ||
| 595 | |||
| 596 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_LABEL: | ||
| 597 | if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { | ||
| 598 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE); | ||
| 599 | return -2; | ||
| 600 | } | ||
| 601 | *(unsigned char **)p2 = rctx->oaep_label; | ||
| 602 | return rctx->oaep_labellen; | ||
| 603 | |||
| 604 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: | ||
| 605 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN: | ||
| 606 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS | ||
| 607 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN: | ||
| 608 | #endif | ||
| 609 | return 1; | ||
| 610 | |||
| 611 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT: | ||
| 612 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT: | ||
| 613 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS | ||
| 614 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT: | ||
| 615 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT: | ||
| 616 | #endif | ||
| 617 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
| 618 | return 1; | ||
| 619 | |||
| 620 | /* fall through */ | ||
| 621 | case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY: | ||
| 622 | RSAerror(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); | ||
| 623 | return -2; | ||
| 624 | |||
| 625 | default: | ||
| 626 | return -2; | ||
| 627 | |||
| 628 | } | ||
| 629 | } | ||
| 630 | |||
| 631 | static int | ||
| 632 | pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) | ||
| 633 | { | ||
| 634 | const char *errstr; | ||
| 635 | |||
| 636 | if (!value) { | ||
| 637 | RSAerror(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING); | ||
| 638 | return 0; | ||
| 639 | } | ||
| 640 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) { | ||
| 641 | int pm; | ||
| 642 | if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) | ||
| 643 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; | ||
| 644 | else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) | ||
| 645 | pm = RSA_NO_PADDING; | ||
| 646 | else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0 || strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) | ||
| 647 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING; | ||
| 648 | else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) | ||
| 649 | pm = RSA_X931_PADDING; | ||
| 650 | else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) | ||
| 651 | pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING; | ||
| 652 | else { | ||
| 653 | RSAerror(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); | ||
| 654 | return -2; | ||
| 655 | } | ||
| 656 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx, pm); | ||
| 657 | } | ||
| 658 | |||
| 659 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) { | ||
| 660 | int saltlen; | ||
| 661 | |||
| 662 | if (strcmp(value, "digest") == 0) | ||
| 663 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST; | ||
| 664 | else if (strcmp(value, "max") == 0) | ||
| 665 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX; | ||
| 666 | else if (strcmp(value, "auto") == 0) | ||
| 667 | saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO; | ||
| 668 | else { | ||
| 669 | /* | ||
| 670 | * Accept the special values -1, -2, -3 since that's | ||
| 671 | * what atoi() historically did. Lower values are later | ||
| 672 | * rejected in EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN anyway. | ||
| 673 | */ | ||
| 674 | saltlen = strtonum(value, -3, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
| 675 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
| 676 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
| 677 | return -2; | ||
| 678 | } | ||
| 679 | } | ||
| 680 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); | ||
| 681 | } | ||
| 682 | |||
| 683 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) { | ||
| 684 | int nbits; | ||
| 685 | |||
| 686 | nbits = strtonum(value, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
| 687 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
| 688 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_KEYBITS); | ||
| 689 | return -2; | ||
| 690 | } | ||
| 691 | |||
| 692 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits); | ||
| 693 | } | ||
| 694 | |||
| 695 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) { | ||
| 696 | BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL; | ||
| 697 | int ret; | ||
| 698 | |||
| 699 | if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value)) | ||
| 700 | return 0; | ||
| 701 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, pubexp); | ||
| 702 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 703 | BN_free(pubexp); | ||
| 704 | return ret; | ||
| 705 | } | ||
| 706 | |||
| 707 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) | ||
| 708 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, | ||
| 709 | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | ||
| 710 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); | ||
| 711 | |||
| 712 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { | ||
| 713 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0) | ||
| 714 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, | ||
| 715 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value); | ||
| 716 | |||
| 717 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0) | ||
| 718 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, | ||
| 719 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value); | ||
| 720 | |||
| 721 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) { | ||
| 722 | int saltlen; | ||
| 723 | |||
| 724 | /* | ||
| 725 | * Accept the special values -1, -2, -3 since that's | ||
| 726 | * what atoi() historically did. Lower values are later | ||
| 727 | * rejected in EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN anyway. | ||
| 728 | */ | ||
| 729 | saltlen = strtonum(value, -3, INT_MAX, &errstr); | ||
| 730 | if (errstr != NULL) { | ||
| 731 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN); | ||
| 732 | return -2; | ||
| 733 | } | ||
| 734 | |||
| 735 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen); | ||
| 736 | } | ||
| 737 | } | ||
| 738 | |||
| 739 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) | ||
| 740 | return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT, | ||
| 741 | EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value); | ||
| 742 | |||
| 743 | if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) { | ||
| 744 | unsigned char *lab; | ||
| 745 | long lablen; | ||
| 746 | int ret; | ||
| 747 | |||
| 748 | if ((lab = string_to_hex(value, &lablen)) == NULL) | ||
| 749 | return 0; | ||
| 750 | ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_rsa_oaep_label(ctx, lab, lablen); | ||
| 751 | if (ret <= 0) | ||
| 752 | free(lab); | ||
| 753 | |||
| 754 | return ret; | ||
| 755 | } | ||
| 756 | |||
| 757 | return -2; | ||
| 758 | } | ||
| 759 | |||
| 760 | /* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary. */ | ||
| 761 | static int | ||
| 762 | rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 763 | { | ||
| 764 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 765 | |||
| 766 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
| 767 | return 1; | ||
| 768 | |||
| 769 | /* If all parameters are default values then do not set PSS. */ | ||
| 770 | if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && | ||
| 771 | rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO) | ||
| 772 | return 1; | ||
| 773 | |||
| 774 | rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md, | ||
| 775 | rctx->saltlen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO ? 0 : rctx->saltlen); | ||
| 776 | if (rsa->pss == NULL) | ||
| 777 | return 0; | ||
| 778 | |||
| 779 | return 1; | ||
| 780 | } | ||
| 781 | |||
| 782 | static int | ||
| 783 | pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) | ||
| 784 | { | ||
| 785 | RSA *rsa = NULL; | ||
| 786 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 787 | BN_GENCB *pcb = NULL; | ||
| 788 | BN_GENCB cb = {0}; | ||
| 789 | int ret = 0; | ||
| 790 | |||
| 791 | if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) { | ||
| 792 | if ((rctx->pub_exp = BN_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 793 | goto err; | ||
| 794 | if (!BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4)) | ||
| 795 | goto err; | ||
| 796 | } | ||
| 797 | |||
| 798 | if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) | ||
| 799 | goto err; | ||
| 800 | if (ctx->pkey_gencb != NULL) { | ||
| 801 | pcb = &cb; | ||
| 802 | evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx); | ||
| 803 | } | ||
| 804 | if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb)) | ||
| 805 | goto err; | ||
| 806 | if (!rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) | ||
| 807 | goto err; | ||
| 808 | if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa)) | ||
| 809 | goto err; | ||
| 810 | rsa = NULL; | ||
| 811 | |||
| 812 | ret = 1; | ||
| 813 | |||
| 814 | err: | ||
| 815 | RSA_free(rsa); | ||
| 816 | |||
| 817 | return ret; | ||
| 818 | } | ||
| 819 | |||
| 820 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = { | ||
| 821 | .pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA, | ||
| 822 | .flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, | ||
| 823 | |||
| 824 | .init = pkey_rsa_init, | ||
| 825 | .copy = pkey_rsa_copy, | ||
| 826 | .cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup, | ||
| 827 | |||
| 828 | .keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen, | ||
| 829 | |||
| 830 | .sign = pkey_rsa_sign, | ||
| 831 | |||
| 832 | .verify = pkey_rsa_verify, | ||
| 833 | |||
| 834 | .verify_recover = pkey_rsa_verifyrecover, | ||
| 835 | |||
| 836 | .encrypt = pkey_rsa_encrypt, | ||
| 837 | |||
| 838 | .decrypt = pkey_rsa_decrypt, | ||
| 839 | |||
| 840 | .ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl, | ||
| 841 | .ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str | ||
| 842 | }; | ||
| 843 | |||
| 844 | /* | ||
| 845 | * Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter | ||
| 846 | * sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage. | ||
| 847 | */ | ||
| 848 | |||
| 849 | static int | ||
| 850 | pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) | ||
| 851 | { | ||
| 852 | RSA *rsa; | ||
| 853 | RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; | ||
| 854 | const EVP_MD *md; | ||
| 855 | const EVP_MD *mgf1md; | ||
| 856 | int min_saltlen, max_saltlen; | ||
| 857 | |||
| 858 | /* Should never happen */ | ||
| 859 | if (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) | ||
| 860 | return 0; | ||
| 861 | rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; | ||
| 862 | |||
| 863 | /* If no restrictions just return */ | ||
| 864 | if (rsa->pss == NULL) | ||
| 865 | return 1; | ||
| 866 | |||
| 867 | /* Get and check parameters */ | ||
| 868 | if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen)) | ||
| 869 | return 0; | ||
| 870 | |||
| 871 | /* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */ | ||
| 872 | max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md); | ||
| 873 | if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1) | ||
| 874 | max_saltlen--; | ||
| 875 | if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) { | ||
| 876 | RSAerror(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH); | ||
| 877 | return 0; | ||
| 878 | } | ||
| 879 | rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen; | ||
| 880 | |||
| 881 | /* | ||
| 882 | * Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to | ||
| 883 | * use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl | ||
| 884 | */ | ||
| 885 | |||
| 886 | rctx->md = md; | ||
| 887 | rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md; | ||
| 888 | rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen; | ||
| 889 | |||
| 890 | return 1; | ||
| 891 | } | ||
| 892 | |||
| 893 | const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = { | ||
| 894 | .pkey_id = EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, | ||
| 895 | .flags = EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN, | ||
| 896 | |||
| 897 | .init = pkey_rsa_init, | ||
| 898 | .copy = pkey_rsa_copy, | ||
| 899 | .cleanup = pkey_rsa_cleanup, | ||
| 900 | |||
| 901 | .keygen = pkey_rsa_keygen, | ||
| 902 | |||
| 903 | .sign_init = pkey_pss_init, | ||
| 904 | .sign = pkey_rsa_sign, | ||
| 905 | |||
| 906 | .verify_init = pkey_pss_init, | ||
| 907 | .verify = pkey_rsa_verify, | ||
| 908 | |||
| 909 | .ctrl = pkey_rsa_ctrl, | ||
| 910 | .ctrl_str = pkey_rsa_ctrl_str | ||
| 911 | }; | ||
