diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 369 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 369 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 407e1e07ad..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_cmp.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,369 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: x509_cmp.c,v 1.26 2015/07/29 14:58:34 jsing Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <ctype.h> | ||
60 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
61 | #include <string.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
64 | |||
65 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
68 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
69 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
70 | |||
71 | int | ||
72 | X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
73 | { | ||
74 | int i; | ||
75 | X509_CINF *ai, *bi; | ||
76 | |||
77 | ai = a->cert_info; | ||
78 | bi = b->cert_info; | ||
79 | i = ASN1_STRING_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber); | ||
80 | if (i) | ||
81 | return (i); | ||
82 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer)); | ||
83 | } | ||
84 | |||
85 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
86 | unsigned long | ||
87 | X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a) | ||
88 | { | ||
89 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
90 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx; | ||
91 | unsigned char md[16]; | ||
92 | char *f; | ||
93 | |||
94 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); | ||
95 | f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0); | ||
96 | if (f == NULL) | ||
97 | goto err; | ||
98 | if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)) | ||
99 | goto err; | ||
100 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f))) | ||
101 | goto err; | ||
102 | free(f); | ||
103 | f = NULL; | ||
104 | if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, | ||
105 | (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data, | ||
106 | (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length)) | ||
107 | goto err; | ||
108 | if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL)) | ||
109 | goto err; | ||
110 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
111 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
112 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
113 | |||
114 | err: | ||
115 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | ||
116 | free(f); | ||
117 | return (ret); | ||
118 | } | ||
119 | #endif | ||
120 | |||
121 | int | ||
122 | X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
123 | { | ||
124 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
125 | } | ||
126 | |||
127 | int | ||
128 | X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
129 | { | ||
130 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject)); | ||
131 | } | ||
132 | |||
133 | int | ||
134 | X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) | ||
135 | { | ||
136 | return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer)); | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
139 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
140 | int | ||
141 | X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b) | ||
142 | { | ||
143 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20); | ||
144 | } | ||
145 | #endif | ||
146 | |||
147 | X509_NAME * | ||
148 | X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a) | ||
149 | { | ||
150 | return (a->cert_info->issuer); | ||
151 | } | ||
152 | |||
153 | unsigned long | ||
154 | X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x) | ||
155 | { | ||
156 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
157 | } | ||
158 | |||
159 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
160 | unsigned long | ||
161 | X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | ||
162 | { | ||
163 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer)); | ||
164 | } | ||
165 | #endif | ||
166 | |||
167 | X509_NAME * | ||
168 | X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a) | ||
169 | { | ||
170 | return (a->cert_info->subject); | ||
171 | } | ||
172 | |||
173 | ASN1_INTEGER * | ||
174 | X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a) | ||
175 | { | ||
176 | return (a->cert_info->serialNumber); | ||
177 | } | ||
178 | |||
179 | unsigned long | ||
180 | X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x) | ||
181 | { | ||
182 | return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject)); | ||
183 | } | ||
184 | |||
185 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
186 | unsigned long | ||
187 | X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x) | ||
188 | { | ||
189 | return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject)); | ||
190 | } | ||
191 | #endif | ||
192 | |||
193 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
194 | /* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for | ||
195 | * this to work. NB: Although "cmp" operations are generally | ||
196 | * prototyped to take "const" arguments (eg. for use in | ||
197 | * STACKs), the way X509 handling is - these operations may | ||
198 | * involve ensuring the hashes are up-to-date and ensuring | ||
199 | * certain cert information is cached. So this is the point | ||
200 | * where the "depth-first" constification tree has to halt | ||
201 | * with an evil cast. | ||
202 | */ | ||
203 | int | ||
204 | X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b) | ||
205 | { | ||
206 | /* ensure hash is valid */ | ||
207 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0); | ||
208 | X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0); | ||
209 | |||
210 | return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); | ||
211 | } | ||
212 | #endif | ||
213 | |||
214 | int | ||
215 | X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) | ||
216 | { | ||
217 | int ret; | ||
218 | |||
219 | /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */ | ||
220 | if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) { | ||
221 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL); | ||
222 | if (ret < 0) | ||
223 | return -2; | ||
224 | } | ||
225 | if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) { | ||
226 | ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL); | ||
227 | if (ret < 0) | ||
228 | return -2; | ||
229 | } | ||
230 | ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen; | ||
231 | if (ret) | ||
232 | return ret; | ||
233 | return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen); | ||
234 | } | ||
235 | |||
236 | unsigned long | ||
237 | X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x) | ||
238 | { | ||
239 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
240 | unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; | ||
241 | |||
242 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | ||
243 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | ||
244 | if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(), | ||
245 | NULL)) | ||
246 | return 0; | ||
247 | |||
248 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
249 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
250 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
251 | return (ret); | ||
252 | } | ||
253 | |||
254 | |||
255 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 | ||
256 | /* I now DER encode the name and hash it. Since I cache the DER encoding, | ||
257 | * this is reasonably efficient. */ | ||
258 | |||
259 | unsigned long | ||
260 | X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x) | ||
261 | { | ||
262 | EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; | ||
263 | unsigned long ret = 0; | ||
264 | unsigned char md[16]; | ||
265 | |||
266 | /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */ | ||
267 | i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL); | ||
268 | EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); | ||
269 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL) && | ||
270 | EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length) && | ||
271 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL)) | ||
272 | ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | | ||
273 | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) | | ||
274 | ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | | ||
275 | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)) & | ||
276 | 0xffffffffL; | ||
277 | EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); | ||
278 | |||
279 | return (ret); | ||
280 | } | ||
281 | #endif | ||
282 | |||
283 | /* Search a stack of X509 for a match */ | ||
284 | X509 * | ||
285 | X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name, | ||
286 | ASN1_INTEGER *serial) | ||
287 | { | ||
288 | int i; | ||
289 | X509_CINF cinf; | ||
290 | X509 x, *x509 = NULL; | ||
291 | |||
292 | if (!sk) | ||
293 | return NULL; | ||
294 | |||
295 | x.cert_info = &cinf; | ||
296 | cinf.serialNumber = serial; | ||
297 | cinf.issuer = name; | ||
298 | |||
299 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | ||
300 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
301 | if (X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(x509, &x) == 0) | ||
302 | return (x509); | ||
303 | } | ||
304 | return (NULL); | ||
305 | } | ||
306 | |||
307 | X509 * | ||
308 | X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name) | ||
309 | { | ||
310 | X509 *x509; | ||
311 | int i; | ||
312 | |||
313 | for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { | ||
314 | x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i); | ||
315 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x509), name) == 0) | ||
316 | return (x509); | ||
317 | } | ||
318 | return (NULL); | ||
319 | } | ||
320 | |||
321 | EVP_PKEY * | ||
322 | X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x) | ||
323 | { | ||
324 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) | ||
325 | return (NULL); | ||
326 | return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | ||
327 | } | ||
328 | |||
329 | ASN1_BIT_STRING * | ||
330 | X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x) | ||
331 | { | ||
332 | if (!x) | ||
333 | return NULL; | ||
334 | return x->cert_info->key->public_key; | ||
335 | } | ||
336 | |||
337 | int | ||
338 | X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k) | ||
339 | { | ||
340 | EVP_PKEY *xk; | ||
341 | int ret; | ||
342 | |||
343 | xk = X509_get_pubkey(x); | ||
344 | |||
345 | if (xk) | ||
346 | ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k); | ||
347 | else | ||
348 | ret = -2; | ||
349 | |||
350 | switch (ret) { | ||
351 | case 1: | ||
352 | break; | ||
353 | case 0: | ||
354 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, | ||
355 | X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH); | ||
356 | break; | ||
357 | case -1: | ||
358 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, | ||
359 | X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH); | ||
360 | break; | ||
361 | case -2: | ||
362 | X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, | ||
363 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE); | ||
364 | } | ||
365 | EVP_PKEY_free(xk); | ||
366 | if (ret > 0) | ||
367 | return 1; | ||
368 | return 0; | ||
369 | } | ||