diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 815 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 815 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 3ddb2303d3..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,815 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <time.h> | ||
61 | #include <errno.h> | ||
62 | |||
63 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
64 | #include <openssl/crypto.h> | ||
65 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/buffer.h> | ||
67 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
68 | #include <openssl/asn1.h> | ||
69 | #include <openssl/x509.h> | ||
70 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
71 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
72 | |||
73 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | ||
74 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
75 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
76 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
77 | const char *X509_version="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | ||
78 | |||
79 | static STACK_OF(CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS) *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL; | ||
80 | static int x509_store_ctx_num=0; | ||
81 | #if 0 | ||
82 | static int x509_store_num=1; | ||
83 | static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL; | ||
84 | #endif | ||
85 | |||
86 | static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) | ||
87 | { | ||
88 | return(ok); | ||
89 | } | ||
90 | |||
91 | #if 0 | ||
92 | static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b) | ||
93 | { | ||
94 | return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b)); | ||
95 | } | ||
96 | #endif | ||
97 | |||
98 | int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
99 | { | ||
100 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | ||
101 | X509_NAME *xn; | ||
102 | X509_OBJECT obj; | ||
103 | int depth,i,ok=0; | ||
104 | int num; | ||
105 | int (*cb)(); | ||
106 | STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL; | ||
107 | |||
108 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) | ||
109 | { | ||
110 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | ||
111 | return(-1); | ||
112 | } | ||
113 | |||
114 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
115 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
116 | |||
117 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | ||
118 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | ||
119 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | ||
120 | { | ||
121 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || | ||
122 | (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert))) | ||
123 | { | ||
124 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
125 | goto end; | ||
126 | } | ||
127 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
128 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | ||
129 | } | ||
130 | |||
131 | /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */ | ||
132 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL | ||
133 | && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | ||
134 | { | ||
135 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
136 | goto end; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
139 | num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
140 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
141 | depth=ctx->depth; | ||
142 | |||
143 | |||
144 | for (;;) | ||
145 | { | ||
146 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
147 | if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take | ||
148 | * note of it and, if appropriate, use the | ||
149 | * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error | ||
150 | * code later. | ||
151 | */ | ||
152 | |||
153 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
154 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
155 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | ||
156 | break; | ||
157 | |||
158 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | ||
159 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | ||
160 | { | ||
161 | xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn); | ||
162 | if (xtmp != NULL) | ||
163 | { | ||
164 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp)) | ||
165 | { | ||
166 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
167 | goto end; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
170 | sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp); | ||
171 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | ||
172 | x=xtmp; | ||
173 | num++; | ||
174 | /* reparse the full chain for | ||
175 | * the next one */ | ||
176 | continue; | ||
177 | } | ||
178 | } | ||
179 | break; | ||
180 | } | ||
181 | |||
182 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | ||
183 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | ||
184 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | ||
185 | |||
186 | i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
187 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | ||
188 | xn = X509_get_subject_name(x); | ||
189 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(xn,X509_get_issuer_name(x)) | ||
190 | == 0) | ||
191 | { | ||
192 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | ||
193 | if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if | ||
196 | * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact | ||
197 | * match to avoid possible impersonation. | ||
198 | */ | ||
199 | ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj); | ||
200 | if ((ok != X509_LU_X509) || X509_cmp(x, obj.data.x509)) | ||
201 | { | ||
202 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | ||
203 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
204 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | ||
205 | if(ok == X509_LU_X509) X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
206 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
207 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
208 | } | ||
209 | else | ||
210 | { | ||
211 | /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version | ||
212 | * so we get any trust settings. | ||
213 | */ | ||
214 | X509_free(x); | ||
215 | x = obj.data.x509; | ||
216 | sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x); | ||
217 | ctx->last_untrusted=0; | ||
218 | } | ||
219 | } | ||
220 | else | ||
221 | { | ||
222 | /* worry more about this one elsewhere */ | ||
223 | chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); | ||
224 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | ||
225 | num--; | ||
226 | x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
227 | } | ||
228 | } | ||
229 | |||
230 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | ||
231 | for (;;) | ||
232 | { | ||
233 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
234 | if (depth < num) break; | ||
235 | |||
236 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
237 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
238 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | ||
239 | break; | ||
240 | |||
241 | ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj); | ||
242 | if (ok != X509_LU_X509) | ||
243 | { | ||
244 | if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) | ||
245 | { | ||
246 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
247 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY); | ||
248 | return(ok); | ||
249 | } | ||
250 | else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) | ||
251 | { | ||
252 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
253 | /* not good :-(, break anyway */ | ||
254 | return(ok); | ||
255 | } | ||
256 | break; | ||
257 | } | ||
258 | x=obj.data.x509; | ||
259 | if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,obj.data.x509)) | ||
260 | { | ||
261 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
262 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
263 | return(0); | ||
264 | } | ||
265 | num++; | ||
266 | } | ||
267 | |||
268 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | ||
269 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
270 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0) | ||
271 | { | ||
272 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0)) | ||
273 | { | ||
274 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | ||
275 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | ||
276 | else | ||
277 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | ||
278 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
279 | } | ||
280 | else | ||
281 | { | ||
282 | |||
283 | sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss); | ||
284 | num++; | ||
285 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | ||
286 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | ||
287 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | ||
288 | chain_ss=NULL; | ||
289 | } | ||
290 | |||
291 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | ||
292 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
293 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
294 | } | ||
295 | |||
296 | /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */ | ||
297 | if(ctx->purpose > 0) ok = check_chain_purpose(ctx); | ||
298 | |||
299 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
300 | |||
301 | /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */ | ||
302 | |||
303 | if(ctx->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx); | ||
304 | |||
305 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
306 | |||
307 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | ||
308 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
309 | |||
310 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ | ||
311 | if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL) | ||
312 | ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx); | ||
313 | else | ||
314 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | ||
315 | if (0) | ||
316 | { | ||
317 | end: | ||
318 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
319 | } | ||
320 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp); | ||
321 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | ||
322 | return(ok); | ||
323 | } | ||
324 | |||
325 | /* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency | ||
326 | * with the supplied purpose | ||
327 | */ | ||
328 | |||
329 | static int check_chain_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
330 | { | ||
331 | #ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
332 | return 1; | ||
333 | #else | ||
334 | int i, ok=0; | ||
335 | X509 *x; | ||
336 | int (*cb)(); | ||
337 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
338 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
339 | /* Check all untrusted certificates */ | ||
340 | for(i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) { | ||
341 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
342 | if(!X509_check_purpose(x, ctx->purpose, i)) { | ||
343 | if(i) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; | ||
344 | else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE; | ||
345 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
346 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
347 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
348 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
349 | } | ||
350 | /* Check pathlen */ | ||
351 | if((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) | ||
352 | && (i > (x->ex_pathlen + 1))) { | ||
353 | ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED; | ||
354 | ctx->error_depth = i; | ||
355 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
356 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
357 | if(!ok) goto end; | ||
358 | } | ||
359 | } | ||
360 | ok = 1; | ||
361 | end: | ||
362 | return(ok); | ||
363 | #endif | ||
364 | } | ||
365 | |||
366 | static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
367 | { | ||
368 | #ifdef NO_CHAIN_VERIFY | ||
369 | return 1; | ||
370 | #else | ||
371 | int i, ok; | ||
372 | X509 *x; | ||
373 | int (*cb)(); | ||
374 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
375 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
376 | /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */ | ||
377 | i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
378 | x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); | ||
379 | ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->trust, 0); | ||
380 | if(ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) return 1; | ||
381 | ctx->error_depth = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; | ||
382 | ctx->current_cert = x; | ||
383 | if(ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED; | ||
384 | else ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED; | ||
385 | ok = cb(0, ctx); | ||
386 | return(ok); | ||
387 | #endif | ||
388 | } | ||
389 | |||
390 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
391 | { | ||
392 | int i,ok=0,n; | ||
393 | X509 *xs,*xi; | ||
394 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | ||
395 | int (*cb)(); | ||
396 | |||
397 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
398 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
399 | |||
400 | n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); | ||
401 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; | ||
402 | n--; | ||
403 | xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
404 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi), | ||
405 | X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0) | ||
406 | xs=xi; | ||
407 | else | ||
408 | { | ||
409 | if (n <= 0) | ||
410 | { | ||
411 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | ||
412 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
413 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
414 | goto end; | ||
415 | } | ||
416 | else | ||
417 | { | ||
418 | n--; | ||
419 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
420 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
421 | } | ||
422 | } | ||
423 | |||
424 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | ||
425 | while (n >= 0) | ||
426 | { | ||
427 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
428 | if (!xs->valid) | ||
429 | { | ||
430 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | ||
431 | { | ||
432 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
433 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
434 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
435 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
436 | } | ||
437 | if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | ||
438 | { | ||
439 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
440 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
441 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
442 | if (!ok) | ||
443 | { | ||
444 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
445 | goto end; | ||
446 | } | ||
447 | } | ||
448 | EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); | ||
449 | pkey=NULL; | ||
450 | |||
451 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs)); | ||
452 | if (i == 0) | ||
453 | { | ||
454 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | ||
455 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
456 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
457 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
458 | } | ||
459 | if (i > 0) | ||
460 | { | ||
461 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
462 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
463 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
464 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
465 | } | ||
466 | xs->valid=1; | ||
467 | } | ||
468 | |||
469 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs)); | ||
470 | if (i == 0) | ||
471 | { | ||
472 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | ||
473 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
474 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
475 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
476 | } | ||
477 | |||
478 | if (i < 0) | ||
479 | { | ||
480 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
481 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
482 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
483 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
484 | } | ||
485 | |||
486 | /* CRL CHECK */ | ||
487 | |||
488 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | ||
489 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
490 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | ||
491 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
492 | |||
493 | n--; | ||
494 | if (n >= 0) | ||
495 | { | ||
496 | xi=xs; | ||
497 | xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
498 | } | ||
499 | } | ||
500 | ok=1; | ||
501 | end: | ||
502 | return(ok); | ||
503 | } | ||
504 | |||
505 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm) | ||
506 | { | ||
507 | char *str; | ||
508 | ASN1_UTCTIME atm; | ||
509 | time_t offset; | ||
510 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | ||
511 | int i,j; | ||
512 | |||
513 | p=buff1; | ||
514 | i=ctm->length; | ||
515 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | ||
516 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0); | ||
517 | memcpy(p,str,10); | ||
518 | p+=10; | ||
519 | str+=10; | ||
520 | |||
521 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | ||
522 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | ||
523 | else { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); } | ||
524 | *(p++)='Z'; | ||
525 | *(p++)='\0'; | ||
526 | |||
527 | if (*str == 'Z') | ||
528 | offset=0; | ||
529 | else | ||
530 | { | ||
531 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) | ||
532 | return(0); | ||
533 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | ||
534 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | ||
535 | if (*str == '-') | ||
536 | offset= -offset; | ||
537 | } | ||
538 | atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME; | ||
539 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | ||
540 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | ||
541 | |||
542 | X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset*60); | ||
543 | |||
544 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | ||
545 | if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */ | ||
546 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | ||
547 | if (j < 50) j+=100; | ||
548 | |||
549 | if (i < j) return (-1); | ||
550 | if (i > j) return (1); | ||
551 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | ||
552 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | ||
553 | return(-1); | ||
554 | else | ||
555 | return(i); | ||
556 | } | ||
557 | |||
558 | ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, long adj) | ||
559 | { | ||
560 | time_t t; | ||
561 | |||
562 | time(&t); | ||
563 | t+=adj; | ||
564 | return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t)); | ||
565 | } | ||
566 | |||
567 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) | ||
568 | { | ||
569 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | ||
570 | int i,j; | ||
571 | |||
572 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1); | ||
573 | |||
574 | for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++) | ||
575 | { | ||
576 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i)); | ||
577 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
578 | { | ||
579 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | ||
580 | return(0); | ||
581 | } | ||
582 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | ||
583 | break; | ||
584 | else | ||
585 | { | ||
586 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
587 | ktmp=NULL; | ||
588 | } | ||
589 | } | ||
590 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
591 | { | ||
592 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | ||
593 | return(0); | ||
594 | } | ||
595 | |||
596 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | ||
597 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | ||
598 | { | ||
599 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j)); | ||
600 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | ||
601 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2); | ||
602 | } | ||
603 | |||
604 | if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | ||
605 | EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp); | ||
606 | return(1); | ||
607 | } | ||
608 | |||
609 | int X509_STORE_add_cert(X509_STORE *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
610 | { | ||
611 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | ||
612 | int ret=1; | ||
613 | |||
614 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | ||
615 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | ||
616 | if (obj == NULL) | ||
617 | { | ||
618 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
619 | return(0); | ||
620 | } | ||
621 | obj->type=X509_LU_X509; | ||
622 | obj->data.x509=x; | ||
623 | |||
624 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
625 | |||
626 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | ||
627 | |||
628 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,obj); | ||
629 | if (r != NULL) | ||
630 | { /* oops, put it back */ | ||
631 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,obj); | ||
632 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
633 | Free(obj); | ||
634 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,r); | ||
635 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
636 | ret=0; | ||
637 | } | ||
638 | |||
639 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
640 | |||
641 | return(ret); | ||
642 | } | ||
643 | |||
644 | int X509_STORE_add_crl(X509_STORE *ctx, X509_CRL *x) | ||
645 | { | ||
646 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | ||
647 | int ret=1; | ||
648 | |||
649 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | ||
650 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | ||
651 | if (obj == NULL) | ||
652 | { | ||
653 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
654 | return(0); | ||
655 | } | ||
656 | obj->type=X509_LU_CRL; | ||
657 | obj->data.crl=x; | ||
658 | |||
659 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
660 | |||
661 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | ||
662 | |||
663 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,obj); | ||
664 | if (r != NULL) | ||
665 | { /* oops, put it back */ | ||
666 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,obj); | ||
667 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
668 | Free(obj); | ||
669 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,r); | ||
670 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
671 | ret=0; | ||
672 | } | ||
673 | |||
674 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
675 | |||
676 | return(ret); | ||
677 | } | ||
678 | |||
679 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | ||
680 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | ||
681 | { | ||
682 | x509_store_ctx_num++; | ||
683 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1, | ||
684 | &x509_store_ctx_method, | ||
685 | argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); | ||
686 | } | ||
687 | |||
688 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) | ||
689 | { | ||
690 | return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data)); | ||
691 | } | ||
692 | |||
693 | void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) | ||
694 | { | ||
695 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx)); | ||
696 | } | ||
697 | |||
698 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
699 | { | ||
700 | return(ctx->error); | ||
701 | } | ||
702 | |||
703 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) | ||
704 | { | ||
705 | ctx->error=err; | ||
706 | } | ||
707 | |||
708 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
709 | { | ||
710 | return(ctx->error_depth); | ||
711 | } | ||
712 | |||
713 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
714 | { | ||
715 | return(ctx->current_cert); | ||
716 | } | ||
717 | |||
718 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
719 | { | ||
720 | return(ctx->chain); | ||
721 | } | ||
722 | |||
723 | STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) | ||
724 | { | ||
725 | int i; | ||
726 | X509 *x; | ||
727 | STACK_OF(X509) *chain; | ||
728 | if(!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL; | ||
729 | for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { | ||
730 | x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); | ||
731 | CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
732 | } | ||
733 | return(chain); | ||
734 | } | ||
735 | |||
736 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) | ||
737 | { | ||
738 | ctx->cert=x; | ||
739 | } | ||
740 | |||
741 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) | ||
742 | { | ||
743 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | ||
744 | } | ||
745 | |||
746 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) | ||
747 | { | ||
748 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); | ||
749 | } | ||
750 | |||
751 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) | ||
752 | { | ||
753 | return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); | ||
754 | } | ||
755 | |||
756 | /* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust | ||
757 | * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its | ||
758 | * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by | ||
759 | * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default | ||
760 | * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value. | ||
761 | * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own | ||
762 | * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they | ||
763 | * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server. | ||
764 | */ | ||
765 | |||
766 | int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, | ||
767 | int purpose, int trust) | ||
768 | { | ||
769 | int idx; | ||
770 | /* If purpose not set use default */ | ||
771 | if(!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; | ||
772 | /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ | ||
773 | if(purpose) { | ||
774 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
775 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); | ||
776 | if(idx == -1) { | ||
777 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
778 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
779 | return 0; | ||
780 | } | ||
781 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
782 | if(ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { | ||
783 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); | ||
784 | if(idx == -1) { | ||
785 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
786 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); | ||
787 | return 0; | ||
788 | } | ||
789 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
790 | } | ||
791 | /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ | ||
792 | if(!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; | ||
793 | } | ||
794 | if(trust) { | ||
795 | idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); | ||
796 | if(idx == -1) { | ||
797 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, | ||
798 | X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); | ||
799 | return 0; | ||
800 | } | ||
801 | } | ||
802 | |||
803 | if(purpose) ctx->purpose = purpose; | ||
804 | if(trust) ctx->trust = trust; | ||
805 | return 1; | ||
806 | } | ||
807 | |||
808 | |||
809 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509) | ||
810 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) | ||
811 | |||
812 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) | ||
813 | |||
814 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||
815 | IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) | ||