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1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <time.h>
61#include <errno.h>
62
63#include "cryptlib.h"
64#include <openssl/crypto.h>
65#include <openssl/lhash.h>
66#include <openssl/buffer.h>
67#include <openssl/evp.h>
68#include <openssl/asn1.h>
69#include <openssl/x509.h>
70#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71#include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73/* CRL score values */
74
75/* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
78
79/* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
82
83/* CRL times valid */
84
85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
86
87/* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
90
91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
98
99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
102
103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
106
107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
110
111static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142 {
143 return ok;
144 }
145
146#if 0
147static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148 {
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150 }
151#endif
152
153int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154 {
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156 X509_NAME *xn;
157 int bad_chain = 0;
158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
159 int depth,i,ok=0;
160 int num;
161 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
162 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
163 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
164 {
165 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
166 return -1;
167 }
168
169 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
170
171 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
172 * present and that the first entry is in place */
173 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
174 {
175 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
176 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
177 {
178 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
179 goto end;
180 }
181 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
182 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
183 }
184
185 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
186 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
187 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
188 {
189 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
190 goto end;
191 }
192
193 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
194 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
195 depth=param->depth;
196
197
198 for (;;)
199 {
200 /* If we have enough, we break */
201 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
204 * code later.
205 */
206
207 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
209 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
210
211 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
213 {
214 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
215 if (xtmp != NULL)
216 {
217 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
218 {
219 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
220 goto end;
221 }
222 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
223 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
224 ctx->last_untrusted++;
225 x=xtmp;
226 num++;
227 /* reparse the full chain for
228 * the next one */
229 continue;
230 }
231 }
232 break;
233 }
234
235 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
236 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
237 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
238
239 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
240 * is self signed.
241 */
242
243 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
244 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
245 xn = X509_get_subject_name(x);
246 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
247 {
248 /* we have a self signed certificate */
249 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
250 {
251 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
252 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
253 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
254 */
255 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
256 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
257 {
258 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
259 ctx->current_cert=x;
260 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
261 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
262 bad_chain = 1;
263 ok=cb(0,ctx);
264 if (!ok) goto end;
265 }
266 else
267 {
268 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
269 * so we get any trust settings.
270 */
271 X509_free(x);
272 x = xtmp;
273 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
274 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
275 }
276 }
277 else
278 {
279 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
280 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
281 ctx->last_untrusted--;
282 num--;
283 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
284 }
285 }
286
287 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
288 for (;;)
289 {
290 /* If we have enough, we break */
291 if (depth < num) break;
292
293 /* If we are self signed, we break */
294 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
295 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
296
297 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
298
299 if (ok < 0) return ok;
300 if (ok == 0) break;
301
302 x = xtmp;
303 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
304 {
305 X509_free(xtmp);
306 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
307 return 0;
308 }
309 num++;
310 }
311
312 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
313 xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x);
314
315 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
316 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
317 {
318 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
319 {
320 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
321 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
322 else
323 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
324 ctx->current_cert=x;
325 }
326 else
327 {
328
329 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
330 num++;
331 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
332 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
333 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
334 chain_ss=NULL;
335 }
336
337 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
338 bad_chain = 1;
339 ok=cb(0,ctx);
340 if (!ok) goto end;
341 }
342
343 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
344 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
345
346 if (!ok) goto end;
347
348 /* Check name constraints */
349
350 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
351
352 if (!ok) goto end;
353
354 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
355
356 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
357
358 if (!ok) goto end;
359
360 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
361 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
362
363 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
364 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
365 */
366
367 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
368 if(!ok) goto end;
369
370 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
371 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
372 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
373 else
374 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
375 if(!ok) goto end;
376
377#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
378 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
379 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
380 if (!ok) goto end;
381 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
382 if (!ok) goto end;
383#endif
384
385 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
386 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
387 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
388 if(!ok) goto end;
389 if (0)
390 {
391end:
392 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
393 }
394 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
395 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
396 return ok;
397 }
398
399
400/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
401 */
402
403static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
404{
405 int i;
406 X509 *issuer;
407 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
408 {
409 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
410 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
411 return issuer;
412 }
413 return NULL;
414}
415
416/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
417
418static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
419{
420 int ret;
421 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
422 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
423 return 1;
424 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
425 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
426 return 0;
427
428 ctx->error = ret;
429 ctx->current_cert = x;
430 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
431 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
432 return 0;
433}
434
435/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
436
437static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
438{
439 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
440 if (*issuer)
441 {
442 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
443 return 1;
444 }
445 else
446 return 0;
447}
448
449
450/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
451 * with the supplied purpose
452 */
453
454static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455{
456#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
457 return 1;
458#else
459 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
460 X509 *x;
461 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
462 int proxy_path_length = 0;
463 int purpose;
464 int allow_proxy_certs;
465 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
466
467 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
468 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
469 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
470 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
471 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
472 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
473 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
474 */
475 must_be_ca = -1;
476
477 /* CRL path validation */
478 if (ctx->parent)
479 {
480 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
481 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
482 }
483 else
484 {
485 allow_proxy_certs =
486 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
487 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
488 software happy */
489 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
490 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
491 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
492 }
493
494 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
495 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
496 {
497 int ret;
498 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
499 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
500 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
501 {
502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
503 ctx->error_depth = i;
504 ctx->current_cert = x;
505 ok=cb(0,ctx);
506 if (!ok) goto end;
507 }
508 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
509 {
510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
511 ctx->error_depth = i;
512 ctx->current_cert = x;
513 ok=cb(0,ctx);
514 if (!ok) goto end;
515 }
516 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
517 switch(must_be_ca)
518 {
519 case -1:
520 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
521 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
522 {
523 ret = 0;
524 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
525 }
526 else
527 ret = 1;
528 break;
529 case 0:
530 if (ret != 0)
531 {
532 ret = 0;
533 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
534 }
535 else
536 ret = 1;
537 break;
538 default:
539 if ((ret == 0)
540 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
541 && (ret != 1)))
542 {
543 ret = 0;
544 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
545 }
546 else
547 ret = 1;
548 break;
549 }
550 if (ret == 0)
551 {
552 ctx->error_depth = i;
553 ctx->current_cert = x;
554 ok=cb(0,ctx);
555 if (!ok) goto end;
556 }
557 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
558 {
559 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
560 if ((ret == 0)
561 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
562 && (ret != 1)))
563 {
564 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
565 ctx->error_depth = i;
566 ctx->current_cert = x;
567 ok=cb(0,ctx);
568 if (!ok) goto end;
569 }
570 }
571 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
572 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
573 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
574 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
575 {
576 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
577 ctx->error_depth = i;
578 ctx->current_cert = x;
579 ok=cb(0,ctx);
580 if (!ok) goto end;
581 }
582 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
583 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
584 plen++;
585 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
586 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
587 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
588 CA certificate. */
589 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
590 {
591 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
592 {
593 ctx->error =
594 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
595 ctx->error_depth = i;
596 ctx->current_cert = x;
597 ok=cb(0,ctx);
598 if (!ok) goto end;
599 }
600 proxy_path_length++;
601 must_be_ca = 0;
602 }
603 else
604 must_be_ca = 1;
605 }
606 ok = 1;
607 end:
608 return ok;
609#endif
610}
611
612static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
613 {
614 X509 *x;
615 int i, j, rv;
616 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
617 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
618 {
619 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
620 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
621 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
622 continue;
623 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
624 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
625 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
626 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
627 */
628 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
629 {
630 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
631 if (nc)
632 {
633 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
634 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
635 {
636 ctx->error = rv;
637 ctx->error_depth = i;
638 ctx->current_cert = x;
639 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
640 return 0;
641 }
642 }
643 }
644 }
645 return 1;
646 }
647
648static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
649{
650#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
651 return 1;
652#else
653 int i, ok;
654 X509 *x;
655 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
656 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
657/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
658 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
659 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
660 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
661 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
662 return 1;
663 ctx->error_depth = i;
664 ctx->current_cert = x;
665 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
666 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
667 else
668 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
669 ok = cb(0, ctx);
670 return ok;
671#endif
672}
673
674static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
675 {
676 int i, last, ok;
677 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
678 return 1;
679 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
680 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
681 else
682 {
683 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
684 if (ctx->parent)
685 return 1;
686 last = 0;
687 }
688 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
689 {
690 ctx->error_depth = i;
691 ok = check_cert(ctx);
692 if (!ok) return ok;
693 }
694 return 1;
695 }
696
697static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
698 {
699 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
700 X509 *x;
701 int ok, cnum;
702 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
703 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
704 ctx->current_cert = x;
705 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
706 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
707 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
708 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
709 {
710 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
711 if (ctx->get_crl)
712 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
713 else
714 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
715 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
716 * notify callback
717 */
718 if(!ok)
719 {
720 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
721 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
722 goto err;
723 }
724 ctx->current_crl = crl;
725 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
726 if (!ok)
727 goto err;
728
729 if (dcrl)
730 {
731 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
732 if (!ok)
733 goto err;
734 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
735 if (!ok)
736 goto err;
737 }
738 else
739 ok = 1;
740
741 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
742 if (ok != 2)
743 {
744 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
745 if (!ok)
746 goto err;
747 }
748
749 X509_CRL_free(crl);
750 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
751 crl = NULL;
752 dcrl = NULL;
753 }
754 err:
755 X509_CRL_free(crl);
756 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
757
758 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
759 return ok;
760
761 }
762
763/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
764
765static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
766 {
767 time_t *ptime;
768 int i;
769 if (notify)
770 ctx->current_crl = crl;
771 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
772 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
773 else
774 ptime = NULL;
775
776 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
777 if (i == 0)
778 {
779 if (!notify)
780 return 0;
781 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
782 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
783 return 0;
784 }
785
786 if (i > 0)
787 {
788 if (!notify)
789 return 0;
790 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
791 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
792 return 0;
793 }
794
795 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
796 {
797 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
798
799 if (i == 0)
800 {
801 if (!notify)
802 return 0;
803 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
804 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
805 return 0;
806 }
807 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
808 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
809 {
810 if (!notify)
811 return 0;
812 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
813 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
814 return 0;
815 }
816 }
817
818 if (notify)
819 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
820
821 return 1;
822 }
823
824static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
825 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
826 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
827 {
828 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
829 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
830 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
831 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
832 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
833
834 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
835 {
836 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
837 reasons = *preasons;
838 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
839
840 if (crl_score > best_score)
841 {
842 best_crl = crl;
843 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
844 best_score = crl_score;
845 best_reasons = reasons;
846 }
847 }
848
849 if (best_crl)
850 {
851 if (*pcrl)
852 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
853 *pcrl = best_crl;
854 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
855 *pscore = best_score;
856 *preasons = best_reasons;
857 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
858 if (*pdcrl)
859 {
860 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
861 *pdcrl = NULL;
862 }
863 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
864 }
865
866 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
867 return 1;
868
869 return 0;
870 }
871
872/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
873 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
874 */
875
876static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
877 {
878 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
879 int i;
880 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
881 if (i >= 0)
882 {
883 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
884 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
885 return 0;
886 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
887 }
888 else
889 exta = NULL;
890
891 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
892
893 if (i >= 0)
894 {
895
896 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
897 return 0;
898 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
899 }
900 else
901 extb = NULL;
902
903 if (!exta && !extb)
904 return 1;
905
906 if (!exta || !extb)
907 return 0;
908
909
910 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
911 return 0;
912
913 return 1;
914 }
915
916/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
917
918static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
919 {
920 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
921 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
922 return 0;
923 /* Base must have a CRL number */
924 if (!base->crl_number)
925 return 0;
926 /* Issuer names must match */
927 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
928 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
929 return 0;
930 /* AKID and IDP must match */
931 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
932 return 0;
933 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
934 return 0;
935 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
936 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
937 return 0;
938 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
939 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
940 return 1;
941 return 0;
942 }
943
944/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
945 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
946 */
947
948static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
949 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
950 {
951 X509_CRL *delta;
952 int i;
953 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
954 return;
955 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
956 return;
957 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
958 {
959 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
960 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
961 {
962 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
963 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
964 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
965 *dcrl = delta;
966 return;
967 }
968 }
969 *dcrl = NULL;
970 }
971
972/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
973 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
974 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
975 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
976 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
977 */
978
979static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
980 unsigned int *preasons,
981 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
982 {
983
984 int crl_score = 0;
985 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
986
987 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
988
989 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
990 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
991 return 0;
992 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
993 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
994 {
995 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
996 return 0;
997 }
998 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
999 {
1000 /* If no new reasons reject */
1001 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1002 return 0;
1003 }
1004 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1005 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1006 return 0;
1007 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1008 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1009 {
1010 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1011 return 0;
1012 }
1013 else
1014 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1015
1016 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1017 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1018
1019 /* Check expiry */
1020 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1021 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1022
1023 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1024 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1025
1026 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1027
1028 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1029 return 0;
1030
1031 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1032
1033 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1034 {
1035 /* If no new reasons reject */
1036 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1037 return 0;
1038 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1039 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1040 }
1041
1042 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1043
1044 return crl_score;
1045
1046 }
1047
1048static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1049 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1050 {
1051 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1052 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1053 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1054 int i;
1055
1056 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1057 cidx++;
1058
1059 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1060
1061 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1062 {
1063 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1064 {
1065 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1066 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1067 return;
1068 }
1069 }
1070
1071 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1072 {
1073 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1074 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1075 continue;
1076 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1077 {
1078 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1079 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1080 return;
1081 }
1082 }
1083
1084 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1085
1086 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1087 return;
1088
1089 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1090 * set of untrusted certificates.
1091 */
1092 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1093 {
1094 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1095 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1096 continue;
1097 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1098 {
1099 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1100 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1101 return;
1102 }
1103 }
1104 }
1105
1106/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1107 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1108 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1109 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1110 * practice.
1111 */
1112
1113static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1114 {
1115 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1116 int ret;
1117 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1118 if (ctx->parent)
1119 return 0;
1120 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1121 return -1;
1122
1123 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1124 /* Copy verify params across */
1125 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1126
1127 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1128 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1129
1130 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1131 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1132
1133 if (ret <= 0)
1134 goto err;
1135
1136 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1137
1138 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1139 err:
1140 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1141 return ret;
1142 }
1143
1144/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1145 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1146 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1147 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1148 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1149 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1150 */
1151
1152static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1153 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1154 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1155 {
1156 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1157 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1158 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1159 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1160 return 1;
1161 return 0;
1162 }
1163
1164/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1165 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1166 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1167 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1168 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1169 */
1170
1171
1172static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1173 {
1174 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1175 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1176 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1177 int i, j;
1178 if (!a || !b)
1179 return 1;
1180 if (a->type == 1)
1181 {
1182 if (!a->dpname)
1183 return 0;
1184 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1185 if (b->type == 1)
1186 {
1187 if (!b->dpname)
1188 return 0;
1189 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1190 return 1;
1191 else
1192 return 0;
1193 }
1194 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1195 nm = a->dpname;
1196 gens = b->name.fullname;
1197 }
1198 else if (b->type == 1)
1199 {
1200 if (!b->dpname)
1201 return 0;
1202 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1203 gens = a->name.fullname;
1204 nm = b->dpname;
1205 }
1206
1207 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1208 if (nm)
1209 {
1210 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1211 {
1212 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1213 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1214 continue;
1215 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1216 return 1;
1217 }
1218 return 0;
1219 }
1220
1221 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1222
1223 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1224 {
1225 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1226 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1227 {
1228 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1229 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1230 return 1;
1231 }
1232 }
1233
1234 return 0;
1235
1236 }
1237
1238static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1239 {
1240 int i;
1241 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1242 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1243 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1244 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1245 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1246 {
1247 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1248 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1249 continue;
1250 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1251 return 1;
1252 }
1253 return 0;
1254 }
1255
1256/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1257
1258static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1259 unsigned int *preasons)
1260 {
1261 int i;
1262 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1263 return 0;
1264 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1265 {
1266 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1267 return 0;
1268 }
1269 else
1270 {
1271 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1272 return 0;
1273 }
1274 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1275 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1276 {
1277 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1278 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1279 {
1280 if (!crl->idp ||
1281 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1282 {
1283 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1284 return 1;
1285 }
1286 }
1287 }
1288 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1289 return 1;
1290 return 0;
1291 }
1292
1293/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1294 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1295 */
1296
1297static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1298 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1299 {
1300 int ok;
1301 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1302 int crl_score = 0;
1303 unsigned int reasons;
1304 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1305 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1306 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1307 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1308 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1309 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1310
1311 if (ok)
1312 goto done;
1313
1314 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1315
1316 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1317
1318 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1319 if (!skcrl && crl)
1320 goto done;
1321
1322 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1323
1324 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1325
1326 done:
1327
1328 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1329 if (crl)
1330 {
1331 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1332 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1333 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1334 *pcrl = crl;
1335 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1336 return 1;
1337 }
1338
1339 return 0;
1340 }
1341
1342/* Check CRL validity */
1343static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1344 {
1345 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1346 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1347 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1348 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1349 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1350 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1351 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1352 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1353
1354 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1355 * is next certificate in chain.
1356 */
1357 else if (cnum < chnum)
1358 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1359 else
1360 {
1361 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1362 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1363 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1364 {
1365 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1366 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1367 if(!ok) goto err;
1368 }
1369 }
1370
1371 if(issuer)
1372 {
1373 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1374 * been done
1375 */
1376 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1377 {
1378 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1379 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1380 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1381 {
1382 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1383 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1384 if(!ok) goto err;
1385 }
1386
1387 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1388 {
1389 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1390 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1391 if(!ok) goto err;
1392 }
1393
1394 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1395 {
1396 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1397 {
1398 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1399 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1400 if(!ok) goto err;
1401 }
1402 }
1403
1404 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1405 {
1406 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1407 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1408 if(!ok) goto err;
1409 }
1410
1411
1412 }
1413
1414 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1415 {
1416 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1417 if (!ok)
1418 goto err;
1419 }
1420
1421 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1422 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1423
1424 if(!ikey)
1425 {
1426 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1427 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1428 if (!ok) goto err;
1429 }
1430 else
1431 {
1432 /* Verify CRL signature */
1433 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1434 {
1435 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1436 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1437 if (!ok) goto err;
1438 }
1439 }
1440 }
1441
1442 ok = 1;
1443
1444 err:
1445 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1446 return ok;
1447 }
1448
1449/* Check certificate against CRL */
1450static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1451 {
1452 int ok;
1453 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1454 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1455 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1456 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1457 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1458 */
1459 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1460 {
1461 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1462 return 1;
1463 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1464 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1465 if(!ok)
1466 return 0;
1467 }
1468 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1469 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1470 */
1471 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1472 {
1473 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1474 return 2;
1475 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1476 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1477 if (!ok)
1478 return 0;
1479 }
1480
1481 return 1;
1482 }
1483
1484static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1485 {
1486 int ret;
1487 if (ctx->parent)
1488 return 1;
1489 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1490 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1491 if (ret == 0)
1492 {
1493 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1494 return 0;
1495 }
1496 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1497 if (ret == -1)
1498 {
1499 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1500 * callback.
1501 */
1502 X509 *x;
1503 int i;
1504 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1505 {
1506 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1507 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1508 continue;
1509 ctx->current_cert = x;
1510 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1511 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1512 return 0;
1513 }
1514 return 1;
1515 }
1516 if (ret == -2)
1517 {
1518 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1520 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1521 }
1522
1523 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1524 {
1525 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1526 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1527 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530
1531 return 1;
1532 }
1533
1534static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1535 {
1536 time_t *ptime;
1537 int i;
1538
1539 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1540 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1541 else
1542 ptime = NULL;
1543
1544 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1545 if (i == 0)
1546 {
1547 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1548 ctx->current_cert=x;
1549 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552
1553 if (i > 0)
1554 {
1555 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1556 ctx->current_cert=x;
1557 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1558 return 0;
1559 }
1560
1561 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1562 if (i == 0)
1563 {
1564 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1565 ctx->current_cert=x;
1566 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1567 return 0;
1568 }
1569
1570 if (i < 0)
1571 {
1572 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1573 ctx->current_cert=x;
1574 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1575 return 0;
1576 }
1577
1578 return 1;
1579 }
1580
1581static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1582 {
1583 int ok=0,n;
1584 X509 *xs,*xi;
1585 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1586 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1587
1588 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1589
1590 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1591 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1592 n--;
1593 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1594
1595 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1596 xs=xi;
1597 else
1598 {
1599 if (n <= 0)
1600 {
1601 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1602 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1603 ok=cb(0,ctx);
1604 goto end;
1605 }
1606 else
1607 {
1608 n--;
1609 ctx->error_depth=n;
1610 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1611 }
1612 }
1613
1614/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1615 while (n >= 0)
1616 {
1617 ctx->error_depth=n;
1618
1619 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1620 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1621 * just wastes time.
1622 */
1623 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1624 {
1625 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1626 {
1627 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1628 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1629 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1630 if (!ok) goto end;
1631 }
1632 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1633 {
1634 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1635 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1636 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1637 if (!ok)
1638 {
1639 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1640 goto end;
1641 }
1642 }
1643 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1644 pkey=NULL;
1645 }
1646
1647 xs->valid = 1;
1648
1649 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1650 if (!ok)
1651 goto end;
1652
1653 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1654 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1655 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1656 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1657 if (!ok) goto end;
1658
1659 n--;
1660 if (n >= 0)
1661 {
1662 xi=xs;
1663 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1664 }
1665 }
1666 ok=1;
1667end:
1668 return ok;
1669 }
1670
1671int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1672{
1673 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1674}
1675
1676int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1677 {
1678 char *str;
1679 ASN1_TIME atm;
1680 long offset;
1681 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1682 int i,j;
1683
1684 p=buff1;
1685 i=ctm->length;
1686 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1687 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1688 {
1689 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1690 memcpy(p,str,10);
1691 p+=10;
1692 str+=10;
1693 }
1694 else
1695 {
1696 if (i < 13) return 0;
1697 memcpy(p,str,12);
1698 p+=12;
1699 str+=12;
1700 }
1701
1702 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1703 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1704 else
1705 {
1706 *(p++)= *(str++);
1707 *(p++)= *(str++);
1708 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1709 if (*str == '.')
1710 {
1711 str++;
1712 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1713 }
1714
1715 }
1716 *(p++)='Z';
1717 *(p++)='\0';
1718
1719 if (*str == 'Z')
1720 offset=0;
1721 else
1722 {
1723 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1724 return 0;
1725 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1726 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1727 if (*str == '-')
1728 offset= -offset;
1729 }
1730 atm.type=ctm->type;
1731 atm.flags = 0;
1732 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1733 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1734
1735 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1736 return 0;
1737
1738 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1739 {
1740 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1741 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1742 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1743 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1744
1745 if (i < j) return -1;
1746 if (i > j) return 1;
1747 }
1748 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1749 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1750 return -1;
1751 else
1752 return i;
1753 }
1754
1755ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1756{
1757 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1758}
1759
1760ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1761 {
1762 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1763 }
1764
1765ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1766 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1767 {
1768 time_t t;
1769
1770 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1771 else time(&t);
1772
1773 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1774 {
1775 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1776 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1777 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1778 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1779 offset_sec);
1780 }
1781 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1782 }
1783
1784int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1785 {
1786 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1787 int i,j;
1788
1789 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1790
1791 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1792 {
1793 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1794 if (ktmp == NULL)
1795 {
1796 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1797 return 0;
1798 }
1799 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1800 break;
1801 else
1802 {
1803 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1804 ktmp=NULL;
1805 }
1806 }
1807 if (ktmp == NULL)
1808 {
1809 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1810 return 0;
1811 }
1812
1813 /* first, populate the other certs */
1814 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1815 {
1816 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1817 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1818 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1819 }
1820
1821 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1822 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1823 return 1;
1824 }
1825
1826int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1827 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1828 {
1829 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1830 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1831 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1832 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1833 }
1834
1835int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1836 {
1837 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1838 }
1839
1840void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1841 {
1842 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1843 }
1844
1845int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1846 {
1847 return ctx->error;
1848 }
1849
1850void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1851 {
1852 ctx->error=err;
1853 }
1854
1855int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1856 {
1857 return ctx->error_depth;
1858 }
1859
1860X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861 {
1862 return ctx->current_cert;
1863 }
1864
1865STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866 {
1867 return ctx->chain;
1868 }
1869
1870STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1871 {
1872 int i;
1873 X509 *x;
1874 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1875 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1876 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1877 {
1878 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1879 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1880 }
1881 return chain;
1882 }
1883
1884X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1885 {
1886 return ctx->current_issuer;
1887 }
1888
1889X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890 {
1891 return ctx->current_crl;
1892 }
1893
1894X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1895 {
1896 return ctx->parent;
1897 }
1898
1899void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1900 {
1901 ctx->cert=x;
1902 }
1903
1904void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1905 {
1906 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1907 }
1908
1909void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1910 {
1911 ctx->crls=sk;
1912 }
1913
1914int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1915 {
1916 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1917 }
1918
1919int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1920 {
1921 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1922 }
1923
1924/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1925 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1926 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1927 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1928 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1929 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1930 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1931 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1932 */
1933
1934int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1935 int purpose, int trust)
1936{
1937 int idx;
1938 /* If purpose not set use default */
1939 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1940 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1941 if (purpose)
1942 {
1943 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1944 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1945 if (idx == -1)
1946 {
1947 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1948 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1949 return 0;
1950 }
1951 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1952 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1953 {
1954 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1955 if (idx == -1)
1956 {
1957 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1958 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1959 return 0;
1960 }
1961 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1962 }
1963 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1964 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1965 }
1966 if (trust)
1967 {
1968 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1969 if (idx == -1)
1970 {
1971 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1972 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1973 return 0;
1974 }
1975 }
1976
1977 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1978 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1979 return 1;
1980}
1981
1982X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1983{
1984 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1985 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1986 if (!ctx)
1987 {
1988 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1989 return NULL;
1990 }
1991 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1992 return ctx;
1993}
1994
1995void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1996{
1997 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1998 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1999}
2000
2001int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
2002 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
2003 {
2004 int ret = 1;
2005 ctx->ctx=store;
2006 ctx->current_method=0;
2007 ctx->cert=x509;
2008 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2009 ctx->crls = NULL;
2010 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2011 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2012 ctx->valid=0;
2013 ctx->chain=NULL;
2014 ctx->error=0;
2015 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2016 ctx->error_depth=0;
2017 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2018 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2019 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2020 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2021 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2022 ctx->tree = NULL;
2023 ctx->parent = NULL;
2024
2025 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2026
2027 if (!ctx->param)
2028 {
2029 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2030 return 0;
2031 }
2032
2033 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2034 * use defaults.
2035 */
2036
2037
2038 if (store)
2039 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2040 else
2041 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2042
2043 if (store)
2044 {
2045 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2046 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2047 }
2048 else
2049 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2050
2051 if (ret)
2052 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2053 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2054
2055 if (ret == 0)
2056 {
2057 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2058 return 0;
2059 }
2060
2061 if (store && store->check_issued)
2062 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2063 else
2064 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2065
2066 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2067 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2068 else
2069 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2070
2071 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2072 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2073 else
2074 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2075
2076 if (store && store->verify)
2077 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2078 else
2079 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2080
2081 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2082 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2083 else
2084 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2085
2086 if (store && store->get_crl)
2087 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2088 else
2089 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2090
2091 if (store && store->check_crl)
2092 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2093 else
2094 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2095
2096 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2097 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2098 else
2099 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2100
2101 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2102 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2103 else
2104 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2105
2106 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2107 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2108 else
2109 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2110
2111 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2112
2113
2114 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2115 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2116 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2117 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2118 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2119 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2120 {
2121 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2122 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2123 return 0;
2124 }
2125 return 1;
2126 }
2127
2128/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2129 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2130 */
2131
2132void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2133{
2134 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2135 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2136}
2137
2138void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2139 {
2140 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2141 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2142 {
2143 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2144 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2145 ctx->param=NULL;
2146 }
2147 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2148 {
2149 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2150 ctx->tree=NULL;
2151 }
2152 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2153 {
2154 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2155 ctx->chain=NULL;
2156 }
2157 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2158 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2159 }
2160
2161void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2162 {
2163 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2164 }
2165
2166void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2167 {
2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2169 }
2170
2171void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2172 {
2173 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2174 }
2175
2176void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2177 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2178 {
2179 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2180 }
2181
2182X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183 {
2184 return ctx->tree;
2185 }
2186
2187int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2188 {
2189 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2190 }
2191
2192int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2193 {
2194 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2195 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2196 if (!param)
2197 return 0;
2198 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2199 }
2200
2201X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2202 {
2203 return ctx->param;
2204 }
2205
2206void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2207 {
2208 if (ctx->param)
2209 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2210 ctx->param = param;
2211 }
2212
2213IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2214IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2215
2216IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2217
2218IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2219IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-22 18:21:45 +0000