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1/* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <time.h>
61#include <errno.h>
62
63#include "cryptlib.h"
64#include <openssl/crypto.h>
65#include <openssl/lhash.h>
66#include <openssl/buffer.h>
67#include <openssl/evp.h>
68#include <openssl/asn1.h>
69#include <openssl/x509.h>
70#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
71#include <openssl/objects.h>
72
73/* CRL score values */
74
75/* No unhandled critical extensions */
76
77#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
78
79/* certificate is within CRL scope */
80
81#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
82
83/* CRL times valid */
84
85#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
86
87/* Issuer name matches certificate */
88
89#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
90
91/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
92
93#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
94
95/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
96
97#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
98
99/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
100
101#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
102
103/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
104
105#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
106
107/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
108
109#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
110
111static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e);
112static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
113static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
114static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
115static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
116static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
117static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
118static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
119static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120
121static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
122 unsigned int *preasons,
123 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
124static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
125 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
126static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
127 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
128static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
129 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score);
130static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
131 unsigned int *preasons);
132static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
133static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
134 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
135 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
136
137static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
138const char X509_version[]="X.509" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
139
140
141static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
142 {
143 return ok;
144 }
145
146#if 0
147static int x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
148 {
149 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b);
150 }
151#endif
152
153int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
154 {
155 X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL;
156 int bad_chain = 0;
157 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
158 int depth,i,ok=0;
159 int num;
160 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
161 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp=NULL;
162 if (ctx->cert == NULL)
163 {
164 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
165 return -1;
166 }
167
168 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
169
170 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
171 * present and that the first entry is in place */
172 if (ctx->chain == NULL)
173 {
174 if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
175 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,ctx->cert)))
176 {
177 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
178 goto end;
179 }
180 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
181 ctx->last_untrusted=1;
182 }
183
184 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
185 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL
186 && (sktmp=sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL)
187 {
188 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
189 goto end;
190 }
191
192 num=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
193 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
194 depth=param->depth;
195
196
197 for (;;)
198 {
199 /* If we have enough, we break */
200 if (depth < num) break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
201 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
202 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
203 * code later.
204 */
205
206 /* If we are self signed, we break */
207 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x,x)) break;
208
209 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
210 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL)
211 {
212 xtmp=find_issuer(ctx, sktmp,x);
213 if (xtmp != NULL)
214 {
215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,xtmp))
216 {
217 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 goto end;
219 }
220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
221 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp,xtmp);
222 ctx->last_untrusted++;
223 x=xtmp;
224 num++;
225 /* reparse the full chain for
226 * the next one */
227 continue;
228 }
229 }
230 break;
231 }
232
233 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
234 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
235 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
236
237 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
238 * is self signed.
239 */
240
241 i=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
242 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,i-1);
243 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
244 {
245 /* we have a self signed certificate */
246 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1)
247 {
248 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
249 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
250 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
251 */
252 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
253 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp))
254 {
255 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
256 ctx->current_cert=x;
257 ctx->error_depth=i-1;
258 if (ok == 1) X509_free(xtmp);
259 bad_chain = 1;
260 ok=cb(0,ctx);
261 if (!ok) goto end;
262 }
263 else
264 {
265 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
266 * so we get any trust settings.
267 */
268 X509_free(x);
269 x = xtmp;
270 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
271 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
272 }
273 }
274 else
275 {
276 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
277 chain_ss=sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
278 ctx->last_untrusted--;
279 num--;
280 x=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,num-1);
281 }
282 }
283
284 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
285 for (;;)
286 {
287 /* If we have enough, we break */
288 if (depth < num) break;
289
290 /* If we are self signed, we break */
291 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x)) break;
292
293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
294
295 if (ok < 0) return ok;
296 if (ok == 0) break;
297
298 x = xtmp;
299 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,x))
300 {
301 X509_free(xtmp);
302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 return 0;
304 }
305 num++;
306 }
307
308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
309
310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx,x,x))
312 {
313 if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss))
314 {
315 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
316 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
317 else
318 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
319 ctx->current_cert=x;
320 }
321 else
322 {
323
324 sk_X509_push(ctx->chain,chain_ss);
325 num++;
326 ctx->last_untrusted=num;
327 ctx->current_cert=chain_ss;
328 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
329 chain_ss=NULL;
330 }
331
332 ctx->error_depth=num-1;
333 bad_chain = 1;
334 ok=cb(0,ctx);
335 if (!ok) goto end;
336 }
337
338 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
339 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
340
341 if (!ok) goto end;
342
343 /* Check name constraints */
344
345 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
346
347 if (!ok) goto end;
348
349 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
350
351 if (param->trust > 0) ok = check_trust(ctx);
352
353 if (!ok) goto end;
354
355 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
356 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
357
358 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
359 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
360 */
361
362 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
363 if(!ok) goto end;
364
365 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
366 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
367 ok=ctx->verify(ctx);
368 else
369 ok=internal_verify(ctx);
370 if(!ok) goto end;
371
372#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
373 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */
374 ok = v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
375 if (!ok) goto end;
376 ok = v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
377 if (!ok) goto end;
378#endif
379
380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
383 if(!ok) goto end;
384 if (0)
385 {
386end:
387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain);
388 }
389 if (sktmp != NULL) sk_X509_free(sktmp);
390 if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss);
391 return ok;
392 }
393
394
395/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
396 */
397
398static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
399{
400 int i;
401 X509 *issuer;
402 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++)
403 {
404 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
405 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer))
406 return issuer;
407 }
408 return NULL;
409}
410
411/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
412
413static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
414{
415 int ret;
416 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
417 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
418 return 1;
419 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
420 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
421 return 0;
422
423 ctx->error = ret;
424 ctx->current_cert = x;
425 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
426 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
427 return 0;
428}
429
430/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
431
432static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
433{
434 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
435 if (*issuer)
436 {
437 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
438 return 1;
439 }
440 else
441 return 0;
442}
443
444
445/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
446 * with the supplied purpose
447 */
448
449static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
450{
451#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
452 return 1;
453#else
454 int i, ok=0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
455 X509 *x;
456 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
457 int proxy_path_length = 0;
458 int purpose;
459 int allow_proxy_certs;
460 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
461
462 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
463 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
464 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
465 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
466 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
467 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
468 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
469 */
470 must_be_ca = -1;
471
472 /* CRL path validation */
473 if (ctx->parent)
474 {
475 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
476 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
477 }
478 else
479 {
480 allow_proxy_certs =
481 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
482 /* A hack to keep people who don't want to modify their
483 software happy */
484 if (getenv("OPENSSL_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS"))
485 allow_proxy_certs = 1;
486 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
487 }
488
489 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
490 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++)
491 {
492 int ret;
493 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
494 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
495 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
496 {
497 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
498 ctx->error_depth = i;
499 ctx->current_cert = x;
500 ok=cb(0,ctx);
501 if (!ok) goto end;
502 }
503 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY))
504 {
505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
506 ctx->error_depth = i;
507 ctx->current_cert = x;
508 ok=cb(0,ctx);
509 if (!ok) goto end;
510 }
511 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
512 switch(must_be_ca)
513 {
514 case -1:
515 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
516 && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0))
517 {
518 ret = 0;
519 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
520 }
521 else
522 ret = 1;
523 break;
524 case 0:
525 if (ret != 0)
526 {
527 ret = 0;
528 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
529 }
530 else
531 ret = 1;
532 break;
533 default:
534 if ((ret == 0)
535 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
536 && (ret != 1)))
537 {
538 ret = 0;
539 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
540 }
541 else
542 ret = 1;
543 break;
544 }
545 if (ret == 0)
546 {
547 ctx->error_depth = i;
548 ctx->current_cert = x;
549 ok=cb(0,ctx);
550 if (!ok) goto end;
551 }
552 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0)
553 {
554 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
555 if ((ret == 0)
556 || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)
557 && (ret != 1)))
558 {
559 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
560 ctx->error_depth = i;
561 ctx->current_cert = x;
562 ok=cb(0,ctx);
563 if (!ok) goto end;
564 }
565 }
566 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
567 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)
568 && (x->ex_pathlen != -1)
569 && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1)))
570 {
571 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
572 ctx->error_depth = i;
573 ctx->current_cert = x;
574 ok=cb(0,ctx);
575 if (!ok) goto end;
576 }
577 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
578 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
579 plen++;
580 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
581 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
582 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
583 CA certificate. */
584 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
585 {
586 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen)
587 {
588 ctx->error =
589 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
590 ctx->error_depth = i;
591 ctx->current_cert = x;
592 ok=cb(0,ctx);
593 if (!ok) goto end;
594 }
595 proxy_path_length++;
596 must_be_ca = 0;
597 }
598 else
599 must_be_ca = 1;
600 }
601 ok = 1;
602 end:
603 return ok;
604#endif
605}
606
607static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
608 {
609 X509 *x;
610 int i, j, rv;
611 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
612 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--)
613 {
614 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
615 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
616 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
617 continue;
618 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
619 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
620 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
621 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
622 */
623 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--)
624 {
625 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
626 if (nc)
627 {
628 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
629 if (rv != X509_V_OK)
630 {
631 ctx->error = rv;
632 ctx->error_depth = i;
633 ctx->current_cert = x;
634 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0,ctx))
635 return 0;
636 }
637 }
638 }
639 }
640 return 1;
641 }
642
643static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
644{
645#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
646 return 1;
647#else
648 int i, ok;
649 X509 *x;
650 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
651 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
652/* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
653 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
654 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
655 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
656 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
657 return 1;
658 ctx->error_depth = i;
659 ctx->current_cert = x;
660 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
661 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
662 else
663 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
664 ok = cb(0, ctx);
665 return ok;
666#endif
667}
668
669static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
670 {
671 int i, last, ok;
672 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
673 return 1;
674 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
675 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
676 else
677 {
678 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
679 if (ctx->parent)
680 return 1;
681 last = 0;
682 }
683 for(i = 0; i <= last; i++)
684 {
685 ctx->error_depth = i;
686 ok = check_cert(ctx);
687 if (!ok) return ok;
688 }
689 return 1;
690 }
691
692static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
693 {
694 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
695 X509 *x;
696 int ok, cnum;
697 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
698 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
699 ctx->current_cert = x;
700 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
701 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
702 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
703 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS)
704 {
705 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
706 if (ctx->get_crl)
707 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
708 else
709 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
710 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
711 * notify callback
712 */
713 if(!ok)
714 {
715 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
716 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
717 goto err;
718 }
719 ctx->current_crl = crl;
720 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
721 if (!ok)
722 goto err;
723
724 if (dcrl)
725 {
726 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
727 if (!ok)
728 goto err;
729 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
730 if (!ok)
731 goto err;
732 }
733 else
734 ok = 1;
735
736 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
737 if (ok != 2)
738 {
739 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
740 if (!ok)
741 goto err;
742 }
743
744 X509_CRL_free(crl);
745 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
746 crl = NULL;
747 dcrl = NULL;
748 }
749 err:
750 X509_CRL_free(crl);
751 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
752
753 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
754 return ok;
755
756 }
757
758/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
759
760static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
761 {
762 time_t *ptime;
763 int i;
764 if (notify)
765 ctx->current_crl = crl;
766 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
767 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
768 else
769 ptime = NULL;
770
771 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
772 if (i == 0)
773 {
774 if (!notify)
775 return 0;
776 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
777 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
778 return 0;
779 }
780
781 if (i > 0)
782 {
783 if (!notify)
784 return 0;
785 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
786 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
787 return 0;
788 }
789
790 if(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl))
791 {
792 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
793
794 if (i == 0)
795 {
796 if (!notify)
797 return 0;
798 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
799 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
800 return 0;
801 }
802 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
803 if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA))
804 {
805 if (!notify)
806 return 0;
807 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
808 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
809 return 0;
810 }
811 }
812
813 if (notify)
814 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
815
816 return 1;
817 }
818
819static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
820 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
821 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
822 {
823 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
824 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
825 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
826 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
827 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
828
829 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
830 {
831 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
832 reasons = *preasons;
833 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
834
835 if (crl_score > best_score)
836 {
837 best_crl = crl;
838 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
839 best_score = crl_score;
840 best_reasons = reasons;
841 }
842 }
843
844 if (best_crl)
845 {
846 if (*pcrl)
847 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
848 *pcrl = best_crl;
849 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
850 *pscore = best_score;
851 *preasons = best_reasons;
852 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
853 if (*pdcrl)
854 {
855 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
856 *pdcrl = NULL;
857 }
858 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
859 }
860
861 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
862 return 1;
863
864 return 0;
865 }
866
867/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
868 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
869 */
870
871static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
872 {
873 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
874 int i;
875 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, 0);
876 if (i >= 0)
877 {
878 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
879 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
880 return 0;
881 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
882 }
883 else
884 exta = NULL;
885
886 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, 0);
887
888 if (i >= 0)
889 {
890
891 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
892 return 0;
893 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
894 }
895 else
896 extb = NULL;
897
898 if (!exta && !extb)
899 return 1;
900
901 if (!exta || !extb)
902 return 0;
903
904
905 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
906 return 0;
907
908 return 1;
909 }
910
911/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
912
913static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
914 {
915 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
916 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
917 return 0;
918 /* Base must have a CRL number */
919 if (!base->crl_number)
920 return 0;
921 /* Issuer names must match */
922 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
923 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
924 return 0;
925 /* AKID and IDP must match */
926 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
927 return 0;
928 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
929 return 0;
930 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
931 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
932 return 0;
933 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
934 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
935 return 1;
936 return 0;
937 }
938
939/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
940 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
941 */
942
943static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore,
944 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
945 {
946 X509_CRL *delta;
947 int i;
948 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
949 return;
950 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
951 return;
952 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++)
953 {
954 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
955 if (check_delta_base(delta, base))
956 {
957 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
958 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
959 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
960 *dcrl = delta;
961 return;
962 }
963 }
964 *dcrl = NULL;
965 }
966
967/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
968 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
969 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
970 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
971 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
972 */
973
974static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
975 unsigned int *preasons,
976 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
977 {
978
979 int crl_score = 0;
980 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
981
982 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
983
984 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
985 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
986 return 0;
987 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
988 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
989 {
990 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
991 return 0;
992 }
993 else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS)
994 {
995 /* If no new reasons reject */
996 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
997 return 0;
998 }
999 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
1000 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
1001 return 0;
1002 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
1003 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl)))
1004 {
1005 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
1006 return 0;
1007 }
1008 else
1009 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
1010
1011 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
1012 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
1013
1014 /* Check expiry */
1015 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1016 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1017
1018 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1019 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1020
1021 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1022
1023 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1024 return 0;
1025
1026 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1027
1028 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons))
1029 {
1030 /* If no new reasons reject */
1031 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1032 return 0;
1033 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1034 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1035 }
1036
1037 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1038
1039 return crl_score;
1040
1041 }
1042
1043static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl,
1044 X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score)
1045 {
1046 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1047 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1048 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1049 int i;
1050
1051 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1052 cidx++;
1053
1054 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1055
1056 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1057 {
1058 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)
1059 {
1060 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1061 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1062 return;
1063 }
1064 }
1065
1066 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++)
1067 {
1068 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1070 continue;
1071 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1072 {
1073 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1074 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1075 return;
1076 }
1077 }
1078
1079 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1080
1081 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1082 return;
1083
1084 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1085 * set of untrusted certificates.
1086 */
1087 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++)
1088 {
1089 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1090 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1091 continue;
1092 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK)
1093 {
1094 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1095 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1096 return;
1097 }
1098 }
1099 }
1100
1101/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1102 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1103 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1104 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1105 * practice.
1106 */
1107
1108static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1109 {
1110 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1111 int ret;
1112 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1113 if (ctx->parent)
1114 return 0;
1115 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted))
1116 return -1;
1117
1118 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1119 /* Copy verify params across */
1120 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1121
1122 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1123 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1124
1125 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1126 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1127
1128 if (ret <= 0)
1129 goto err;
1130
1131 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1132
1133 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1134 err:
1135 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1136 return ret;
1137 }
1138
1139/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1140 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1141 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1142 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1143 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1144 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1145 */
1146
1147static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1148 STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1149 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1150 {
1151 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1152 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1153 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1154 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1155 return 1;
1156 return 0;
1157 }
1158
1159/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1160 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1161 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1162 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1163 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1164 */
1165
1166
1167static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1168 {
1169 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1170 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1171 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1172 int i, j;
1173 if (!a || !b)
1174 return 1;
1175 if (a->type == 1)
1176 {
1177 if (!a->dpname)
1178 return 0;
1179 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1180 if (b->type == 1)
1181 {
1182 if (!b->dpname)
1183 return 0;
1184 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1185 return 1;
1186 else
1187 return 0;
1188 }
1189 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1190 nm = a->dpname;
1191 gens = b->name.fullname;
1192 }
1193 else if (b->type == 1)
1194 {
1195 if (!b->dpname)
1196 return 0;
1197 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1198 gens = a->name.fullname;
1199 nm = b->dpname;
1200 }
1201
1202 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1203 if (nm)
1204 {
1205 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++)
1206 {
1207 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1208 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1209 continue;
1210 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1211 return 1;
1212 }
1213 return 0;
1214 }
1215
1216 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1217
1218 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++)
1219 {
1220 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1221 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++)
1222 {
1223 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1224 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1225 return 1;
1226 }
1227 }
1228
1229 return 0;
1230
1231 }
1232
1233static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1234 {
1235 int i;
1236 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1237 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1238 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1239 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1240 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++)
1241 {
1242 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1243 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1244 continue;
1245 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1246 return 1;
1247 }
1248 return 0;
1249 }
1250
1251/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1252
1253static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
1254 unsigned int *preasons)
1255 {
1256 int i;
1257 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1258 return 0;
1259 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
1260 {
1261 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 else
1265 {
1266 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1267 return 0;
1268 }
1269 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1270 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
1271 {
1272 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1273 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score))
1274 {
1275 if (!crl->idp ||
1276 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint))
1277 {
1278 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1279 return 1;
1280 }
1281 }
1282 }
1283 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1284 return 1;
1285 return 0;
1286 }
1287
1288/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1289 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1290 */
1291
1292static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
1293 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1294 {
1295 int ok;
1296 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1297 int crl_score = 0;
1298 unsigned int reasons;
1299 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1300 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1301 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1302 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1303 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl,
1304 &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls);
1305
1306 if (ok)
1307 goto done;
1308
1309 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1310
1311 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1312
1313 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1314 if (!skcrl && crl)
1315 goto done;
1316
1317 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1318
1319 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1320
1321 done:
1322
1323 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1324 if (crl)
1325 {
1326 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1327 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1328 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1329 *pcrl = crl;
1330 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1331 return 1;
1332 }
1333
1334 return 0;
1335 }
1336
1337/* Check CRL validity */
1338static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1339 {
1340 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1341 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1342 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1343 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1344 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1345 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1346 if (ctx->current_issuer)
1347 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1348
1349 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1350 * is next certificate in chain.
1351 */
1352 else if (cnum < chnum)
1353 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1354 else
1355 {
1356 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1357 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1358 if(!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer))
1359 {
1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1362 if(!ok) goto err;
1363 }
1364 }
1365
1366 if(issuer)
1367 {
1368 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1369 * been done
1370 */
1371 if (!crl->base_crl_number)
1372 {
1373 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1374 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1375 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN))
1376 {
1377 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1378 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1379 if(!ok) goto err;
1380 }
1381
1382 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE))
1383 {
1384 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1385 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1386 if(!ok) goto err;
1387 }
1388
1389 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH))
1390 {
1391 if (check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0)
1392 {
1393 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1394 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1395 if(!ok) goto err;
1396 }
1397 }
1398
1399 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
1400 {
1401 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1402 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1403 if(!ok) goto err;
1404 }
1405
1406
1407 }
1408
1409 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME))
1410 {
1411 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1412 if (!ok)
1413 goto err;
1414 }
1415
1416 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1417 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1418
1419 if(!ikey)
1420 {
1421 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1422 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1423 if (!ok) goto err;
1424 }
1425 else
1426 {
1427 /* Verify CRL signature */
1428 if(X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0)
1429 {
1430 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1431 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1432 if (!ok) goto err;
1433 }
1434 }
1435 }
1436
1437 ok = 1;
1438
1439 err:
1440 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1441 return ok;
1442 }
1443
1444/* Check certificate against CRL */
1445static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1446 {
1447 int ok;
1448 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1449 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1450 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1451 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1452 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1453 */
1454 if (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)
1455 {
1456 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL)
1457 return 1;
1458 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1459 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1460 if(!ok)
1461 return 0;
1462 }
1463 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1464 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1465 */
1466 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x))
1467 {
1468 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1469 return 2;
1470 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1471 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1472 if (!ok)
1473 return 0;
1474 }
1475
1476 return 1;
1477 }
1478
1479static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1480 {
1481 int ret;
1482 if (ctx->parent)
1483 return 1;
1484 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1485 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1486 if (ret == 0)
1487 {
1488 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1489 return 0;
1490 }
1491 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1492 if (ret == -1)
1493 {
1494 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1495 * callback.
1496 */
1497 X509 *x;
1498 int i;
1499 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++)
1500 {
1501 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1502 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1503 continue;
1504 ctx->current_cert = x;
1505 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1506 if(!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1507 return 0;
1508 }
1509 return 1;
1510 }
1511 if (ret == -2)
1512 {
1513 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1514 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1515 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1516 }
1517
1518 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY)
1519 {
1520 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1521 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1522 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1523 return 0;
1524 }
1525
1526 return 1;
1527 }
1528
1529static int check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1530 {
1531 time_t *ptime;
1532 int i;
1533
1534 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1535 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1536 else
1537 ptime = NULL;
1538
1539 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1540 if (i == 0)
1541 {
1542 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1543 ctx->current_cert=x;
1544 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1545 return 0;
1546 }
1547
1548 if (i > 0)
1549 {
1550 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1551 ctx->current_cert=x;
1552 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1553 return 0;
1554 }
1555
1556 i=X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1557 if (i == 0)
1558 {
1559 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1560 ctx->current_cert=x;
1561 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1562 return 0;
1563 }
1564
1565 if (i < 0)
1566 {
1567 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1568 ctx->current_cert=x;
1569 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1570 return 0;
1571 }
1572
1573 return 1;
1574 }
1575
1576static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1577 {
1578 int ok=0,n;
1579 X509 *xs,*xi;
1580 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1581 int (*cb)(int xok,X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1582
1583 cb=ctx->verify_cb;
1584
1585 n=sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1586 ctx->error_depth=n-1;
1587 n--;
1588 xi=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1589
1590 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1591 xs=xi;
1592 else
1593 {
1594 if (n <= 0)
1595 {
1596 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1597 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1598 ok=cb(0,ctx);
1599 goto end;
1600 }
1601 else
1602 {
1603 n--;
1604 ctx->error_depth=n;
1605 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1606 }
1607 }
1608
1609/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1610 while (n >= 0)
1611 {
1612 ctx->error_depth=n;
1613
1614 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1615 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1616 * just wastes time.
1617 */
1618 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE)))
1619 {
1620 if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL)
1621 {
1622 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1623 ctx->current_cert=xi;
1624 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1625 if (!ok) goto end;
1626 }
1627 else if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0)
1628 {
1629 ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1630 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1631 ok=(*cb)(0,ctx);
1632 if (!ok)
1633 {
1634 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1635 goto end;
1636 }
1637 }
1638 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1639 pkey=NULL;
1640 }
1641
1642 xs->valid = 1;
1643
1644 ok = check_cert_time(ctx, xs);
1645 if (!ok)
1646 goto end;
1647
1648 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1649 ctx->current_issuer=xi;
1650 ctx->current_cert=xs;
1651 ok=(*cb)(1,ctx);
1652 if (!ok) goto end;
1653
1654 n--;
1655 if (n >= 0)
1656 {
1657 xi=xs;
1658 xs=sk_X509_value(ctx->chain,n);
1659 }
1660 }
1661 ok=1;
1662end:
1663 return ok;
1664 }
1665
1666int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1667{
1668 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1669}
1670
1671int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1672 {
1673 char *str;
1674 ASN1_TIME atm;
1675 long offset;
1676 char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p;
1677 int i,j;
1678
1679 p=buff1;
1680 i=ctm->length;
1681 str=(char *)ctm->data;
1682 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1683 {
1684 if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return 0;
1685 memcpy(p,str,10);
1686 p+=10;
1687 str+=10;
1688 }
1689 else
1690 {
1691 if (i < 13) return 0;
1692 memcpy(p,str,12);
1693 p+=12;
1694 str+=12;
1695 }
1696
1697 if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+'))
1698 { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; }
1699 else
1700 {
1701 *(p++)= *(str++);
1702 *(p++)= *(str++);
1703 /* Skip any fractional seconds... */
1704 if (*str == '.')
1705 {
1706 str++;
1707 while ((*str >= '0') && (*str <= '9')) str++;
1708 }
1709
1710 }
1711 *(p++)='Z';
1712 *(p++)='\0';
1713
1714 if (*str == 'Z')
1715 offset=0;
1716 else
1717 {
1718 if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
1719 return 0;
1720 offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60;
1721 offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0');
1722 if (*str == '-')
1723 offset= -offset;
1724 }
1725 atm.type=ctm->type;
1726 atm.flags = 0;
1727 atm.length=sizeof(buff2);
1728 atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2;
1729
1730 if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset*60, cmp_time) == NULL)
1731 return 0;
1732
1733 if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1734 {
1735 i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0');
1736 if (i < 50) i+=100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
1737 j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0');
1738 if (j < 50) j+=100;
1739
1740 if (i < j) return -1;
1741 if (i > j) return 1;
1742 }
1743 i=strcmp(buff1,buff2);
1744 if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
1745 return -1;
1746 else
1747 return i;
1748 }
1749
1750ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1751{
1752 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1753}
1754
1755ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1756 {
1757 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm);
1758 }
1759
1760ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s,
1761 int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm)
1762 {
1763 time_t t;
1764
1765 if (in_tm) t = *in_tm;
1766 else time(&t);
1767
1768 if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING))
1769 {
1770 if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1771 return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s,t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1772 if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1773 return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day,
1774 offset_sec);
1775 }
1776 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1777 }
1778
1779int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1780 {
1781 EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2;
1782 int i,j;
1783
1784 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1;
1785
1786 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1787 {
1788 ktmp=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,i));
1789 if (ktmp == NULL)
1790 {
1791 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1792 return 0;
1793 }
1794 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1795 break;
1796 else
1797 {
1798 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1799 ktmp=NULL;
1800 }
1801 }
1802 if (ktmp == NULL)
1803 {
1804 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1805 return 0;
1806 }
1807
1808 /* first, populate the other certs */
1809 for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--)
1810 {
1811 ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain,j));
1812 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp);
1813 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1814 }
1815
1816 if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp);
1817 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1818 return 1;
1819 }
1820
1821int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1822 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1823 {
1824 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1825 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1826 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, argl, argp,
1827 new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1828 }
1829
1830int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1831 {
1832 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data);
1833 }
1834
1835void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1836 {
1837 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx);
1838 }
1839
1840int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1841 {
1842 return ctx->error;
1843 }
1844
1845void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1846 {
1847 ctx->error=err;
1848 }
1849
1850int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1851 {
1852 return ctx->error_depth;
1853 }
1854
1855X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1856 {
1857 return ctx->current_cert;
1858 }
1859
1860STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1861 {
1862 return ctx->chain;
1863 }
1864
1865STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1866 {
1867 int i;
1868 X509 *x;
1869 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1870 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain))) return NULL;
1871 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++)
1872 {
1873 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1874 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1875 }
1876 return chain;
1877 }
1878
1879X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1880 {
1881 return ctx->current_issuer;
1882 }
1883
1884X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1885 {
1886 return ctx->current_crl;
1887 }
1888
1889X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1890 {
1891 return ctx->parent;
1892 }
1893
1894void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1895 {
1896 ctx->cert=x;
1897 }
1898
1899void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1900 {
1901 ctx->untrusted=sk;
1902 }
1903
1904void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1905 {
1906 ctx->crls=sk;
1907 }
1908
1909int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1910 {
1911 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1912 }
1913
1914int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1915 {
1916 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1917 }
1918
1919/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1920 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1921 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1922 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1923 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1924 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1925 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1926 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1927 */
1928
1929int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1930 int purpose, int trust)
1931{
1932 int idx;
1933 /* If purpose not set use default */
1934 if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose;
1935 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1936 if (purpose)
1937 {
1938 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1939 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1940 if (idx == -1)
1941 {
1942 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1943 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1944 return 0;
1945 }
1946 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1947 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT)
1948 {
1949 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1950 if (idx == -1)
1951 {
1952 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1953 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1954 return 0;
1955 }
1956 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1957 }
1958 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1959 if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust;
1960 }
1961 if (trust)
1962 {
1963 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1964 if (idx == -1)
1965 {
1966 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1967 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1968 return 0;
1969 }
1970 }
1971
1972 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1973 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust;
1974 return 1;
1975}
1976
1977X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1978{
1979 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1980 ctx = (X509_STORE_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1981 if (!ctx)
1982 {
1983 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1984 return NULL;
1985 }
1986 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1987 return ctx;
1988}
1989
1990void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1991{
1992 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1993 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
1994}
1995
1996int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1997 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1998 {
1999 int ret = 1;
2000 ctx->ctx=store;
2001 ctx->current_method=0;
2002 ctx->cert=x509;
2003 ctx->untrusted=chain;
2004 ctx->crls = NULL;
2005 ctx->last_untrusted=0;
2006 ctx->other_ctx=NULL;
2007 ctx->valid=0;
2008 ctx->chain=NULL;
2009 ctx->error=0;
2010 ctx->explicit_policy=0;
2011 ctx->error_depth=0;
2012 ctx->current_cert=NULL;
2013 ctx->current_issuer=NULL;
2014 ctx->current_crl=NULL;
2015 ctx->current_crl_score=0;
2016 ctx->current_reasons=0;
2017 ctx->tree = NULL;
2018 ctx->parent = NULL;
2019
2020 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2021
2022 if (!ctx->param)
2023 {
2024 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2025 return 0;
2026 }
2027
2028 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2029 * use defaults.
2030 */
2031
2032
2033 if (store)
2034 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2035 else
2036 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2037
2038 if (store)
2039 {
2040 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2041 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2042 }
2043 else
2044 ctx->cleanup = 0;
2045
2046 if (ret)
2047 ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2048 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2049
2050 if (ret == 0)
2051 {
2052 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055
2056 if (store && store->check_issued)
2057 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
2058 else
2059 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
2060
2061 if (store && store->get_issuer)
2062 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
2063 else
2064 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
2065
2066 if (store && store->verify_cb)
2067 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
2068 else
2069 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
2070
2071 if (store && store->verify)
2072 ctx->verify = store->verify;
2073 else
2074 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
2075
2076 if (store && store->check_revocation)
2077 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
2078 else
2079 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2080
2081 if (store && store->get_crl)
2082 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2083 else
2084 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2085
2086 if (store && store->check_crl)
2087 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2088 else
2089 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2090
2091 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2092 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2093 else
2094 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2095
2096 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2097 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2098 else
2099 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2100
2101 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2102 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2103 else
2104 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2105
2106 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2107
2108
2109 /* This memset() can't make any sense anyway, so it's removed. As
2110 * X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup does a proper "free" on the ex_data, we put a
2111 * corresponding "new" here and remove this bogus initialisation. */
2112 /* memset(&(ctx->ex_data),0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA)); */
2113 if(!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2114 &(ctx->ex_data)))
2115 {
2116 OPENSSL_free(ctx);
2117 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2118 return 0;
2119 }
2120 return 1;
2121 }
2122
2123/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2124 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2125 */
2126
2127void X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2128{
2129 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2130 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2131}
2132
2133void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2134 {
2135 if (ctx->cleanup) ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2136 if (ctx->param != NULL)
2137 {
2138 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2139 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2140 ctx->param=NULL;
2141 }
2142 if (ctx->tree != NULL)
2143 {
2144 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2145 ctx->tree=NULL;
2146 }
2147 if (ctx->chain != NULL)
2148 {
2149 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain,X509_free);
2150 ctx->chain=NULL;
2151 }
2152 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2153 memset(&ctx->ex_data,0,sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2154 }
2155
2156void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2157 {
2158 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2159 }
2160
2161void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2162 {
2163 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2164 }
2165
2166void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2167 {
2168 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2169 }
2170
2171void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2172 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2173 {
2174 ctx->verify_cb=verify_cb;
2175 }
2176
2177X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2178 {
2179 return ctx->tree;
2180 }
2181
2182int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2183 {
2184 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2185 }
2186
2187int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2188 {
2189 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2190 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2191 if (!param)
2192 return 0;
2193 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2194 }
2195
2196X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2197 {
2198 return ctx->param;
2199 }
2200
2201void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2202 {
2203 if (ctx->param)
2204 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2205 ctx->param = param;
2206 }
2207
2208IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509)
2209IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509)
2210
2211IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_NAME)
2212
2213IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
2214IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE)
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-22 13:44:16 +0000