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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c
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1/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.49 2016/03/11 07:08:45 mmcc Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58
59#include <errno.h>
60#include <stdio.h>
61#include <string.h>
62#include <time.h>
63#include <unistd.h>
64
65#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
66
67#include <openssl/asn1.h>
68#include <openssl/buffer.h>
69#include <openssl/crypto.h>
70#include <openssl/err.h>
71#include <openssl/evp.h>
72#include <openssl/lhash.h>
73#include <openssl/objects.h>
74#include <openssl/x509.h>
75#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
76#include "x509_lcl.h"
77
78/* CRL score values */
79
80/* No unhandled critical extensions */
81
82#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
83
84/* certificate is within CRL scope */
85
86#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
87
88/* CRL times valid */
89
90#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
91
92/* Issuer name matches certificate */
93
94#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
95
96/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
97
98#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
99
100/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
101
102#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
103
104/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
105
106#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
107
108/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
109
110#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
111
112/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
113
114#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
115
116static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
117static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer);
118static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x);
119static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
120static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
121static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
122static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
123static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
124static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
125
126static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
127 unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
128static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
129 X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
130static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
131 X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
132static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
133 int *pcrl_score);
134static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
135 unsigned int *preasons);
136static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
137static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
138 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
139
140static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
141
142static int
143null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
144{
145 return ok;
146}
147
148#if 0
149static int
150x509_subject_cmp(X509 **a, X509 **b)
151{
152 return X509_subject_name_cmp(*a, *b);
153}
154#endif
155
156int
157X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
158{
159 X509 *x, *xtmp, *chain_ss = NULL;
160 int bad_chain = 0;
161 X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
162 int depth, i, ok = 0;
163 int num;
164 int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
165 STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
166
167 if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
168 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,
169 X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
170 return -1;
171 }
172
173 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
174
175 /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is
176 * present and that the first entry is in place */
177 if (ctx->chain == NULL) {
178 if (((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) ||
179 (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert))) {
180 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
181 goto end;
182 }
183 CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
184 ctx->last_untrusted = 1;
185 }
186
187 /* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
188 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL &&
189 (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
190 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
191 goto end;
192 }
193
194 num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
195 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
196 depth = param->depth;
197
198 for (;;) {
199 /* If we have enough, we break */
200 if (depth < num)
201 break; /* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
202 * note of it and, if appropriate, use the
203 * X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error
204 * code later.
205 */
206
207 /* If we are self signed, we break */
208 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
209 break;
210
211 /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
212 if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
213 xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x);
214 if (xtmp != NULL) {
215 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
216 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,
217 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
218 goto end;
219 }
220 CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1,
221 CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
222 (void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
223 ctx->last_untrusted++;
224 x = xtmp;
225 num++;
226 /* reparse the full chain for
227 * the next one */
228 continue;
229 }
230 }
231 break;
232 }
233 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
234 sktmp = NULL;
235
236 /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
237 * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
238 * if possible, otherwise we complain. */
239
240 /* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it
241 * is self signed.
242 */
243
244 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
245 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
246 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
247 /* we have a self signed certificate */
248 if (sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) {
249 /* We have a single self signed certificate: see if
250 * we can find it in the store. We must have an exact
251 * match to avoid possible impersonation.
252 */
253 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
254 if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
255 ctx->error =
256 X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
257 ctx->current_cert = x;
258 ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
259 if (ok == 1)
260 X509_free(xtmp);
261 bad_chain = 1;
262 ok = cb(0, ctx);
263 if (!ok)
264 goto end;
265 } else {
266 /* We have a match: replace certificate with store version
267 * so we get any trust settings.
268 */
269 X509_free(x);
270 x = xtmp;
271 (void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
272 ctx->last_untrusted = 0;
273 }
274 } else {
275 /* extract and save self signed certificate for later use */
276 chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
277 ctx->last_untrusted--;
278 num--;
279 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
280 }
281 }
282
283 /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
284 for (;;) {
285 /* If we have enough, we break */
286 if (depth < num)
287 break;
288
289 /* If we are self signed, we break */
290 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x))
291 break;
292
293 ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
294 if (ok < 0)
295 return ok;
296 if (ok == 0)
297 break;
298
299 x = xtmp;
300 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
301 X509_free(xtmp);
302 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
303 return 0;
304 }
305 num++;
306 }
307
308 /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
309
310 /* Is last certificate looked up self signed? */
311 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, x)) {
312 if ((chain_ss == NULL) ||
313 !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
314 if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num)
315 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
316 else
317 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
318 ctx->current_cert = x;
319 } else {
320
321 if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
322 X509_free(chain_ss);
323 X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
324 return 0;
325 }
326 num++;
327 ctx->last_untrusted = num;
328 ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
329 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
330 chain_ss = NULL;
331 }
332
333 ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
334 bad_chain = 1;
335 ok = cb(0, ctx);
336 if (!ok)
337 goto end;
338 }
339
340 /* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
341 ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx);
342
343 if (!ok)
344 goto end;
345
346 /* Check name constraints */
347
348 ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
349
350 if (!ok)
351 goto end;
352
353 /* The chain extensions are OK: check trust */
354
355 if (param->trust > 0)
356 ok = check_trust(ctx);
357
358 if (!ok)
359 goto end;
360
361 /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */
362 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
363
364 /* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters
365 * because they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
366 */
367
368 ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx);
369 if (!ok)
370 goto end;
371
372 /* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
373 if (ctx->verify != NULL)
374 ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
375 else
376 ok = internal_verify(ctx);
377 if (!ok)
378 goto end;
379
380 /* If we get this far evaluate policies */
381 if (!bad_chain && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK))
382 ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx);
383 if (!ok)
384 goto end;
385 if (0) {
386end:
387 X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain);
388 }
389 if (sktmp != NULL)
390 sk_X509_free(sktmp);
391 X509_free(chain_ss);
392 return ok;
393}
394
395
396/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
397 */
398
399static X509 *
400find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x)
401{
402 int i;
403 X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
404
405 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
406 issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
407 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
408 rv = issuer;
409 if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, 1))
410 break;
411 }
412 }
413 return rv;
414}
415
416/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
417
418static int
419check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer)
420{
421 int ret;
422
423 ret = X509_check_issued(issuer, x);
424 if (ret == X509_V_OK)
425 return 1;
426 /* If we haven't asked for issuer errors don't set ctx */
427 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CB_ISSUER_CHECK))
428 return 0;
429
430 ctx->error = ret;
431 ctx->current_cert = x;
432 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
433 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
434}
435
436/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */
437
438static int
439get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
440{
441 *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x);
442 if (*issuer) {
443 CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
444 return 1;
445 } else
446 return 0;
447}
448
449/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
450 * with the supplied purpose
451 */
452
453static int
454check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
455{
456#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
457 return 1;
458#else
459 int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
460 X509 *x;
461 int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
462 int proxy_path_length = 0;
463 int purpose;
464 int allow_proxy_certs;
465
466 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
467
468 /* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
469 -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
470 use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
471 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
472 used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
473 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
474 all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
475 */
476 must_be_ca = -1;
477
478 /* CRL path validation */
479 if (ctx->parent) {
480 allow_proxy_certs = 0;
481 purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
482 } else {
483 allow_proxy_certs =
484 !!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS);
485 purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
486 }
487
488 /* Check all untrusted certificates */
489 for (i = 0; i < ctx->last_untrusted; i++) {
490 int ret;
491 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
492 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
493 (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
494 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
495 ctx->error_depth = i;
496 ctx->current_cert = x;
497 ok = cb(0, ctx);
498 if (!ok)
499 goto end;
500 }
501 if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) {
502 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED;
503 ctx->error_depth = i;
504 ctx->current_cert = x;
505 ok = cb(0, ctx);
506 if (!ok)
507 goto end;
508 }
509 ret = X509_check_ca(x);
510 switch (must_be_ca) {
511 case -1:
512 if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
513 (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
514 ret = 0;
515 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
516 } else
517 ret = 1;
518 break;
519 case 0:
520 if (ret != 0) {
521 ret = 0;
522 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA;
523 } else
524 ret = 1;
525 break;
526 default:
527 if ((ret == 0) ||
528 ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
529 (ret != 1))) {
530 ret = 0;
531 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
532 } else
533 ret = 1;
534 break;
535 }
536 if (ret == 0) {
537 ctx->error_depth = i;
538 ctx->current_cert = x;
539 ok = cb(0, ctx);
540 if (!ok)
541 goto end;
542 }
543 if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
544 ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
545 if ((ret == 0) ||
546 ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
547 (ret != 1))) {
548 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
549 ctx->error_depth = i;
550 ctx->current_cert = x;
551 ok = cb(0, ctx);
552 if (!ok)
553 goto end;
554 }
555 }
556 /* Check pathlen if not self issued */
557 if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) &&
558 (x->ex_pathlen != -1) &&
559 (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
560 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
561 ctx->error_depth = i;
562 ctx->current_cert = x;
563 ok = cb(0, ctx);
564 if (!ok)
565 goto end;
566 }
567 /* Increment path length if not self issued */
568 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
569 plen++;
570 /* If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next
571 certificate must be another proxy certificate or a EE
572 certificate. If not, the next certificate must be a
573 CA certificate. */
574 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
575 if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1 && i > x->ex_pcpathlen) {
576 ctx->error =
577 X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
578 ctx->error_depth = i;
579 ctx->current_cert = x;
580 ok = cb(0, ctx);
581 if (!ok)
582 goto end;
583 }
584 proxy_path_length++;
585 must_be_ca = 0;
586 } else
587 must_be_ca = 1;
588 }
589 ok = 1;
590
591end:
592 return ok;
593#endif
594}
595
596static int
597check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
598{
599 X509 *x;
600 int i, j, rv;
601
602 /* Check name constraints for all certificates */
603 for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
604 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
605 /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */
606 if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
607 continue;
608 /* Check against constraints for all certificates higher in
609 * chain including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly
610 * speaking needed but if it includes constraints it is to be
611 * assumed it expects them to be obeyed.
612 */
613 for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) {
614 NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc;
615 if (nc) {
616 rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc);
617 if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
618 ctx->error = rv;
619 ctx->error_depth = i;
620 ctx->current_cert = x;
621 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
622 return 0;
623 }
624 }
625 }
626 }
627 return 1;
628}
629
630static int
631check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
632{
633#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
634 return 1;
635#else
636 int i, ok;
637 X509 *x;
638 int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
639
640 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
641 /* For now just check the last certificate in the chain */
642 i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
643 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
644 ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
645 if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
646 return 1;
647 ctx->error_depth = i;
648 ctx->current_cert = x;
649 if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED)
650 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
651 else
652 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED;
653 ok = cb(0, ctx);
654 return ok;
655#endif
656}
657
658static int
659check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
660{
661 int i, last, ok;
662
663 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
664 return 1;
665 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
666 last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
667 else {
668 /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
669 if (ctx->parent)
670 return 1;
671 last = 0;
672 }
673 for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
674 ctx->error_depth = i;
675 ok = check_cert(ctx);
676 if (!ok)
677 return ok;
678 }
679 return 1;
680}
681
682static int
683check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
684{
685 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
686 X509 *x;
687 int ok = 0, cnum;
688 unsigned int last_reasons;
689
690 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
691 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum);
692 ctx->current_cert = x;
693 ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
694 ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
695 ctx->current_reasons = 0;
696 while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
697 last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
698 /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
699 if (ctx->get_crl)
700 ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x);
701 else
702 ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
703 /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except
704 * notify callback
705 */
706 if (!ok) {
707 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
708 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
709 goto err;
710 }
711 ctx->current_crl = crl;
712 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl);
713 if (!ok)
714 goto err;
715
716 if (dcrl) {
717 ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
718 if (!ok)
719 goto err;
720 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
721 if (!ok)
722 goto err;
723 } else
724 ok = 1;
725
726 /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
727 if (ok != 2) {
728 ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
729 if (!ok)
730 goto err;
731 }
732
733 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
734 X509_CRL_free(crl);
735 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
736 crl = NULL;
737 dcrl = NULL;
738 /* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
739 * another iteration, so exit loop.
740 */
741 if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
742 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
743 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
744 goto err;
745 }
746 }
747
748err:
749 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
750 X509_CRL_free(crl);
751 X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
752 return ok;
753}
754
755/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
756
757static int
758check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
759{
760 time_t *ptime = NULL;
761 int i;
762
763 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
764 return (1);
765
766 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
767 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
768
769 if (notify)
770 ctx->current_crl = crl;
771
772 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
773 if (i == 0) {
774 if (!notify)
775 return 0;
776 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
777 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
778 return 0;
779 }
780
781 if (i > 0) {
782 if (!notify)
783 return 0;
784 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
785 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
786 return 0;
787 }
788
789 if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
790 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
791
792 if (i == 0) {
793 if (!notify)
794 return 0;
795 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
796 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
797 return 0;
798 }
799 /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
800 if ((i < 0) &&
801 !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
802 if (!notify)
803 return 0;
804 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
805 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
806 return 0;
807 }
808 }
809
810 if (notify)
811 ctx->current_crl = NULL;
812
813 return 1;
814}
815
816static int
817get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
818 X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
819 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
820{
821 int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
822 unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
823 X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
824 X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
825 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
826
827 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
828 crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
829 reasons = *preasons;
830 crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
831
832 if (crl_score > best_score) {
833 best_crl = crl;
834 best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
835 best_score = crl_score;
836 best_reasons = reasons;
837 }
838 }
839
840 if (best_crl) {
841 if (*pcrl)
842 X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
843 *pcrl = best_crl;
844 *pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
845 *pscore = best_score;
846 *preasons = best_reasons;
847 CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
848 if (*pdcrl) {
849 X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
850 *pdcrl = NULL;
851 }
852 get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
853 }
854
855 if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
856 return 1;
857
858 return 0;
859}
860
861/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
862 * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
863 */
864
865static int
866crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
867{
868 ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
869 int i;
870
871 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
872 if (i >= 0) {
873 /* Can't have multiple occurrences */
874 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
875 return 0;
876 exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
877 } else
878 exta = NULL;
879
880 i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
881
882 if (i >= 0) {
883 if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
884 return 0;
885 extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
886 } else
887 extb = NULL;
888
889 if (!exta && !extb)
890 return 1;
891
892 if (!exta || !extb)
893 return 0;
894
895 if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
896 return 0;
897
898 return 1;
899}
900
901/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
902
903static int
904check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
905{
906 /* Delta CRL must be a delta */
907 if (!delta->base_crl_number)
908 return 0;
909 /* Base must have a CRL number */
910 if (!base->crl_number)
911 return 0;
912 /* Issuer names must match */
913 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
914 X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
915 return 0;
916 /* AKID and IDP must match */
917 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
918 return 0;
919 if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
920 return 0;
921 /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
922 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
923 return 0;
924 /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
925 if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
926 return 1;
927 return 0;
928}
929
930/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
931 * or retrieve a chain of deltas...
932 */
933
934static void
935get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base,
936 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
937{
938 X509_CRL *delta;
939 int i;
940
941 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
942 return;
943 if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
944 return;
945 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
946 delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
947 if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
948 if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
949 *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
950 CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
951 *dcrl = delta;
952 return;
953 }
954 }
955 *dcrl = NULL;
956}
957
958/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
959 * The return value is a mask of several criteria.
960 * If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
961 * The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
962 * no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
963 */
964
965static int
966get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons,
967 X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
968{
969 int crl_score = 0;
970 unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
971
972 /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
973
974 /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
975 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
976 return 0;
977 /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
978 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
979 if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
980 return 0;
981 } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
982 /* If no new reasons reject */
983 if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
984 return 0;
985 }
986 /* Don't process deltas at this stage */
987 else if (crl->base_crl_number)
988 return 0;
989 /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
990 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
991 if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
992 return 0;
993 } else
994 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
995
996 if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
997 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
998
999 /* Check expiry */
1000 if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
1001 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
1002
1003 /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
1004 crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
1005
1006 /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
1007
1008 if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
1009 return 0;
1010
1011 /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
1012
1013 if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
1014 /* If no new reasons reject */
1015 if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
1016 return 0;
1017 tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
1018 crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
1019 }
1020
1021 *preasons = tmp_reasons;
1022
1023 return crl_score;
1024}
1025
1026static void
1027crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
1028 int *pcrl_score)
1029{
1030 X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
1031 X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1032 int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
1033 int i;
1034
1035 if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
1036 cidx++;
1037
1038 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1039
1040 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1041 if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
1042 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
1043 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1044 return;
1045 }
1046 }
1047
1048 for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
1049 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
1050 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1051 continue;
1052 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1053 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
1054 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1055 return;
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
1060
1061 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
1062 return;
1063
1064 /* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
1065 * set of untrusted certificates.
1066 */
1067 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
1068 crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
1069 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
1070 continue;
1071 if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
1072 *pissuer = crl_issuer;
1073 *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
1074 return;
1075 }
1076 }
1077}
1078
1079/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
1080 * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
1081 * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
1082 * will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
1083 * practice.
1084 */
1085
1086static int
1087check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1088{
1089 X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
1090 int ret;
1091
1092 /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
1093 if (ctx->parent)
1094 return 0;
1095 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) {
1096 ret = -1;
1097 goto err;
1098 }
1099
1100 crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
1101 /* Copy verify params across */
1102 X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
1103
1104 crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
1105 crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1106
1107 /* Verify CRL issuer */
1108 ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
1109
1110 if (ret <= 0)
1111 goto err;
1112
1113 /* Check chain is acceptable */
1114 ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
1115
1116err:
1117 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
1118 return ret;
1119}
1120
1121/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
1122 * and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
1123 * certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
1124 * to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
1125 * end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
1126 * until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
1127 */
1128
1129static int
1130check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
1131 STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
1132{
1133 X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
1134
1135 cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
1136 crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
1137 if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
1138 return 1;
1139 return 0;
1140}
1141
1142/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
1143 * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
1144 * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
1145 * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
1146 * 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
1147 */
1148
1149static int
1150idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
1151{
1152 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
1153 GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
1154 GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
1155 int i, j;
1156
1157 if (!a || !b)
1158 return 1;
1159 if (a->type == 1) {
1160 if (!a->dpname)
1161 return 0;
1162 /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
1163 if (b->type == 1) {
1164 if (!b->dpname)
1165 return 0;
1166 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
1167 return 1;
1168 else
1169 return 0;
1170 }
1171 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1172 nm = a->dpname;
1173 gens = b->name.fullname;
1174 } else if (b->type == 1) {
1175 if (!b->dpname)
1176 return 0;
1177 /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
1178 gens = a->name.fullname;
1179 nm = b->dpname;
1180 }
1181
1182 /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
1183 if (nm) {
1184 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
1185 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
1186 if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1187 continue;
1188 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
1189 return 1;
1190 }
1191 return 0;
1192 }
1193
1194 /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
1195
1196 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
1197 gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
1198 for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
1199 genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
1200 if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
1201 return 1;
1202 }
1203 }
1204
1205 return 0;
1206}
1207
1208static int
1209crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
1210{
1211 int i;
1212 X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
1213
1214 /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
1215 if (!dp->CRLissuer)
1216 return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
1217 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
1218 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
1219 if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
1220 continue;
1221 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
1222 return 1;
1223 }
1224 return 0;
1225}
1226
1227/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
1228
1229static int
1230crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons)
1231{
1232 int i;
1233
1234 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
1235 return 0;
1236 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
1237 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
1238 return 0;
1239 } else {
1240 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
1241 return 0;
1242 }
1243 *preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
1244 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
1245 DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
1246 if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
1247 if (!crl->idp ||
1248 idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
1249 *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
1250 return 1;
1251 }
1252 }
1253 }
1254 if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) &&
1255 (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
1256 return 1;
1257 return 0;
1258}
1259
1260/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
1261 * If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
1262 */
1263
1264static int
1265get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
1266{
1267 int ok;
1268 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1269 int crl_score = 0;
1270 unsigned int reasons;
1271 X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
1272 STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
1273 X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
1274
1275 reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
1276 ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons,
1277 ctx->crls);
1278 if (ok)
1279 goto done;
1280
1281 /* Lookup CRLs from store */
1282 skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm);
1283
1284 /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
1285 if (!skcrl && crl)
1286 goto done;
1287
1288 get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
1289
1290 sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
1291
1292done:
1293
1294 /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
1295 if (crl) {
1296 ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
1297 ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
1298 ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
1299 *pcrl = crl;
1300 *pdcrl = dcrl;
1301 return 1;
1302 }
1303
1304 return 0;
1305}
1306
1307/* Check CRL validity */
1308static int
1309check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
1310{
1311 X509 *issuer = NULL;
1312 EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
1313 int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
1314
1315 cnum = ctx->error_depth;
1316 chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
1317 /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
1318 if (ctx->current_issuer) {
1319 issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
1320 } else if (cnum < chnum) {
1321 /* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
1322 * is next certificate in chain.
1323 */
1324 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
1325 } else {
1326 issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
1327 /* If not self signed, can't check signature */
1328 if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
1329 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
1330 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1331 if (!ok)
1332 goto err;
1333 }
1334 }
1335
1336 if (issuer) {
1337 /* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
1338 * been done
1339 */
1340 if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
1341 /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
1342 if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
1343 !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
1344 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
1345 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1346 if (!ok)
1347 goto err;
1348 }
1349
1350 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
1351 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
1352 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1353 if (!ok)
1354 goto err;
1355 }
1356
1357 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
1358 if (check_crl_path(ctx,
1359 ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
1360 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
1361 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1362 if (!ok)
1363 goto err;
1364 }
1365 }
1366
1367 if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
1368 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
1369 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1370 if (!ok)
1371 goto err;
1372 }
1373
1374
1375 }
1376
1377 if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
1378 ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
1379 if (!ok)
1380 goto err;
1381 }
1382
1383 /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
1384 ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
1385
1386 if (!ikey) {
1387 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1388 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1389 if (!ok)
1390 goto err;
1391 } else {
1392 /* Verify CRL signature */
1393 if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
1394 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1395 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1396 if (!ok)
1397 goto err;
1398 }
1399 }
1400 }
1401
1402 ok = 1;
1403
1404err:
1405 EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
1406 return ok;
1407}
1408
1409/* Check certificate against CRL */
1410static int
1411cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
1412{
1413 int ok;
1414 X509_REVOKED *rev;
1415
1416 /* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
1417 * unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
1418 * a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
1419 * critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
1420 */
1421 if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
1422 (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
1423 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
1424 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1425 if (!ok)
1426 return 0;
1427 }
1428 /* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
1429 * If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
1430 */
1431 if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
1432 if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
1433 return 2;
1434 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
1435 ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1436 if (!ok)
1437 return 0;
1438 }
1439
1440 return 1;
1441}
1442
1443static int
1444check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1445{
1446 int ret;
1447
1448 if (ctx->parent)
1449 return 1;
1450 ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain,
1451 ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags);
1452 if (ret == 0) {
1453 X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1454 return 0;
1455 }
1456 /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */
1457 if (ret == -1) {
1458 /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify
1459 * callback.
1460 */
1461 X509 *x;
1462 int i;
1463 for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
1464 x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
1465 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY))
1466 continue;
1467 ctx->current_cert = x;
1468 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION;
1469 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1470 return 0;
1471 }
1472 return 1;
1473 }
1474 if (ret == -2) {
1475 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1476 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
1477 return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
1478 }
1479
1480 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
1481 ctx->current_cert = NULL;
1482 ctx->error = X509_V_OK;
1483 if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
1484 return 0;
1485 }
1486
1487 return 1;
1488}
1489
1490int
1491x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int quiet)
1492{
1493 time_t *ptime = NULL;
1494 int i;
1495
1496 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
1497 return (1);
1498
1499 if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
1500 ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
1501
1502 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), ptime);
1503 if (i == 0) {
1504 if (quiet)
1505 return 0;
1506 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD;
1507 ctx->current_cert = x;
1508 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1509 return 0;
1510 }
1511
1512 if (i > 0) {
1513 if (quiet)
1514 return 0;
1515 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID;
1516 ctx->current_cert = x;
1517 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1518 return 0;
1519 }
1520
1521 i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(x), ptime);
1522 if (i == 0) {
1523 if (quiet)
1524 return 0;
1525 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD;
1526 ctx->current_cert = x;
1527 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1528 return 0;
1529 }
1530
1531 if (i < 0) {
1532 if (quiet)
1533 return 0;
1534 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED;
1535 ctx->current_cert = x;
1536 if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
1537 return 0;
1538 }
1539
1540 return 1;
1541}
1542
1543static int
1544internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1545{
1546 int ok = 0, n;
1547 X509 *xs, *xi;
1548 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1549 int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
1550
1551 cb = ctx->verify_cb;
1552
1553 n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
1554 ctx->error_depth = n - 1;
1555 n--;
1556 xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1557
1558 if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
1559 xs = xi;
1560 else {
1561 if (n <= 0) {
1562 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE;
1563 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1564 ok = cb(0, ctx);
1565 goto end;
1566 } else {
1567 n--;
1568 ctx->error_depth = n;
1569 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1570 }
1571 }
1572
1573/* ctx->error=0; not needed */
1574 while (n >= 0) {
1575 ctx->error_depth = n;
1576
1577 /* Skip signature check for self signed certificates unless
1578 * explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any security and
1579 * just wastes time.
1580 */
1581 if (!xs->valid && (xs != xi ||
1582 (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
1583 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
1584 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
1585 ctx->current_cert = xi;
1586 ok = (*cb)(0, ctx);
1587 if (!ok)
1588 goto end;
1589 } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
1590 ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
1591 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1592 ok = (*cb)(0, ctx);
1593 if (!ok) {
1594 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1595 goto end;
1596 }
1597 }
1598 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
1599 pkey = NULL;
1600 }
1601
1602 xs->valid = 1;
1603
1604 ok = x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, 0);
1605 if (!ok)
1606 goto end;
1607
1608 /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */
1609 ctx->current_issuer = xi;
1610 ctx->current_cert = xs;
1611 ok = (*cb)(1, ctx);
1612 if (!ok)
1613 goto end;
1614
1615 n--;
1616 if (n >= 0) {
1617 xi = xs;
1618 xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
1619 }
1620 }
1621 ok = 1;
1622
1623end:
1624 return ok;
1625}
1626
1627int
1628X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
1629{
1630 return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
1631}
1632
1633/*
1634 * Compare a possibly unvalidated ASN1_TIME string against a time_t
1635 * using RFC 5280 rules for the time string. If *cmp_time is NULL
1636 * the current system time is used.
1637 *
1638 * XXX NOTE that unlike what you expect a "cmp" function to do in C,
1639 * XXX this one is "special", and returns 0 for error.
1640 *
1641 * Returns:
1642 * -1 if the ASN1_time is earlier than OR the same as *cmp_time.
1643 * 1 if the ASN1_time is later than *cmp_time.
1644 * 0 on error.
1645 */
1646int
1647X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
1648{
1649 time_t time1, time2;
1650 struct tm tm1, tm2;
1651 int ret = 0;
1652 int type;
1653
1654 if (cmp_time == NULL)
1655 time2 = time(NULL);
1656 else
1657 time2 = *cmp_time;
1658
1659 memset(&tm1, 0, sizeof(tm1));
1660
1661 if ((type = asn1_time_parse(ctm->data, ctm->length, &tm1, 0)) == -1)
1662 goto out; /* invalid time */
1663
1664 /* RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.5 */
1665 if (tm1.tm_year < 150 && type != V_ASN1_UTCTIME)
1666 goto out;
1667 if (tm1.tm_year >= 150 && type != V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
1668 goto out;
1669
1670 /*
1671 * Defensively fail if the time string is not representable as
1672 * a time_t. A time_t must be sane if you care about times after
1673 * Jan 19 2038.
1674 */
1675 if ((time1 = timegm(&tm1)) == -1)
1676 goto out;
1677
1678 if (gmtime_r(&time2, &tm2) == NULL)
1679 goto out;
1680
1681 ret = asn1_tm_cmp(&tm1, &tm2);
1682 if (ret == 0)
1683 ret = -1; /* 0 is used for error, so map same to less than */
1684 out:
1685 return (ret);
1686}
1687
1688ASN1_TIME *
1689X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
1690{
1691 return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
1692}
1693
1694ASN1_TIME *
1695X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
1696{
1697 return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_time);
1698}
1699
1700ASN1_TIME *
1701X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
1702{
1703 time_t t;
1704 if (in_time == NULL)
1705 t = time(NULL);
1706 else
1707 t = *in_time;
1708
1709 return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
1710}
1711
1712int
1713X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1714{
1715 EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
1716 int i, j;
1717
1718 if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
1719 return 1;
1720
1721 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1722 ktmp = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
1723 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1724 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1725 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
1726 return 0;
1727 }
1728 if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
1729 break;
1730 else {
1731 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1732 ktmp = NULL;
1733 }
1734 }
1735 if (ktmp == NULL) {
1736 X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,
1737 X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
1738 return 0;
1739 }
1740
1741 /* first, populate the other certs */
1742 for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
1743 ktmp2 = X509_get_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j));
1744 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp);
1745 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp2);
1746 }
1747
1748 if (pkey != NULL)
1749 EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp);
1750 EVP_PKEY_free(ktmp);
1751 return 1;
1752}
1753
1754int
1755X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
1756 CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
1757{
1758 /* This function is (usually) called only once, by
1759 * SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
1760 return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
1761 argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
1762}
1763
1764int
1765X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
1766{
1767 return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
1768}
1769
1770void *
1771X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
1772{
1773 return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
1774}
1775
1776int
1777X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1778{
1779 return ctx->error;
1780}
1781
1782void
1783X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
1784{
1785 ctx->error = err;
1786}
1787
1788int
1789X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1790{
1791 return ctx->error_depth;
1792}
1793
1794X509 *
1795X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1796{
1797 return ctx->current_cert;
1798}
1799
1800STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1801{
1802 return ctx->chain;
1803}
1804
1805STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1806{
1807 int i;
1808 X509 *x;
1809 STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
1810
1811 if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
1812 return NULL;
1813 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
1814 x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
1815 CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
1816 }
1817 return chain;
1818}
1819
1820X509 *
1821X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1822{
1823 return ctx->current_issuer;
1824}
1825
1826X509_CRL *
1827X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1828{
1829 return ctx->current_crl;
1830}
1831
1832X509_STORE_CTX *
1833X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1834{
1835 return ctx->parent;
1836}
1837
1838void
1839X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
1840{
1841 ctx->cert = x;
1842}
1843
1844void
1845X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
1846{
1847 ctx->untrusted = sk;
1848}
1849
1850void
1851X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
1852{
1853 ctx->crls = sk;
1854}
1855
1856int
1857X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose)
1858{
1859 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0);
1860}
1861
1862int
1863X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust)
1864{
1865 return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust);
1866}
1867
1868/* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
1869 * values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
1870 * own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
1871 * the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
1872 * purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
1873 * An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
1874 * purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
1875 * aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
1876 */
1877
1878int
1879X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose,
1880 int purpose, int trust)
1881{
1882 int idx;
1883
1884 /* If purpose not set use default */
1885 if (!purpose)
1886 purpose = def_purpose;
1887 /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */
1888 if (purpose) {
1889 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
1890 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose);
1891 if (idx == -1) {
1892 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1893 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1894 return 0;
1895 }
1896 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1897 if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) {
1898 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose);
1899 if (idx == -1) {
1900 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1901 X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
1902 return 0;
1903 }
1904 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
1905 }
1906 /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */
1907 if (!trust)
1908 trust = ptmp->trust;
1909 }
1910 if (trust) {
1911 idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust);
1912 if (idx == -1) {
1913 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT,
1914 X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
1915 return 0;
1916 }
1917 }
1918
1919 if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose)
1920 ctx->param->purpose = purpose;
1921 if (trust && !ctx->param->trust)
1922 ctx->param->trust = trust;
1923 return 1;
1924}
1925
1926X509_STORE_CTX *
1927X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
1928{
1929 X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
1930
1931 ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
1932 if (!ctx) {
1933 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1934 return NULL;
1935 }
1936 return ctx;
1937}
1938
1939void
1940X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1941{
1942 if (ctx == NULL)
1943 return;
1944
1945 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
1946 free(ctx);
1947}
1948
1949int
1950X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509,
1951 STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
1952{
1953 int param_ret = 1;
1954
1955 /*
1956 * Make sure everything is initialized properly even in case of an
1957 * early return due to an error.
1958 *
1959 * While this 'ctx' can be reused, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() will have
1960 * freed everything and memset ex_data anyway. This also allows us
1961 * to safely use X509_STORE_CTX variables from the stack which will
1962 * have uninitialized data.
1963 */
1964 memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
1965
1966 /*
1967 * Set values other than 0. Keep this in the same order as
1968 * X509_STORE_CTX except for values that may fail. All fields that
1969 * may fail should go last to make sure 'ctx' is as consistent as
1970 * possible even on early exits.
1971 */
1972 ctx->ctx = store;
1973 ctx->cert = x509;
1974 ctx->untrusted = chain;
1975
1976 if (store && store->verify)
1977 ctx->verify = store->verify;
1978 else
1979 ctx->verify = internal_verify;
1980
1981 if (store && store->verify_cb)
1982 ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
1983 else
1984 ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
1985
1986 if (store && store->get_issuer)
1987 ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer;
1988 else
1989 ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
1990
1991 if (store && store->check_issued)
1992 ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued;
1993 else
1994 ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
1995
1996 if (store && store->check_revocation)
1997 ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation;
1998 else
1999 ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation;
2000
2001 if (store && store->get_crl)
2002 ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl;
2003 else
2004 ctx->get_crl = NULL;
2005
2006 if (store && store->check_crl)
2007 ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl;
2008 else
2009 ctx->check_crl = check_crl;
2010
2011 if (store && store->cert_crl)
2012 ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl;
2013 else
2014 ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl;
2015
2016 ctx->check_policy = check_policy;
2017
2018 if (store && store->lookup_certs)
2019 ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs;
2020 else
2021 ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_get1_certs;
2022
2023 if (store && store->lookup_crls)
2024 ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls;
2025 else
2026 ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_get1_crls;
2027
2028 if (store && store->cleanup)
2029 ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup;
2030 else
2031 ctx->cleanup = NULL;
2032
2033 ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
2034 if (!ctx->param) {
2035 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2036 return 0;
2037 }
2038
2039 /* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
2040 * use defaults.
2041 */
2042 if (store)
2043 param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
2044 else
2045 ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
2046
2047 if (param_ret)
2048 param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
2049 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
2050
2051 if (param_ret == 0) {
2052 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2053 return 0;
2054 }
2055
2056 if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
2057 &(ctx->ex_data)) == 0) {
2058 X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2059 return 0;
2060 }
2061 return 1;
2062}
2063
2064/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
2065 * This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
2066 */
2067
2068void
2069X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
2070{
2071 ctx->other_ctx = sk;
2072 ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk;
2073}
2074
2075void
2076X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2077{
2078 if (ctx->cleanup)
2079 ctx->cleanup(ctx);
2080 if (ctx->param != NULL) {
2081 if (ctx->parent == NULL)
2082 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2083 ctx->param = NULL;
2084 }
2085 if (ctx->tree != NULL) {
2086 X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree);
2087 ctx->tree = NULL;
2088 }
2089 if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
2090 sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
2091 ctx->chain = NULL;
2092 }
2093 CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
2094 ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
2095 memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
2096}
2097
2098void
2099X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
2100{
2101 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
2102}
2103
2104void
2105X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
2106{
2107 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
2108}
2109
2110void
2111X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
2112{
2113 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
2114}
2115
2116void
2117X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
2118 int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
2119{
2120 ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
2121}
2122
2123X509_POLICY_TREE *
2124X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2125{
2126 return ctx->tree;
2127}
2128
2129int
2130X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2131{
2132 return ctx->explicit_policy;
2133}
2134
2135int
2136X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
2137{
2138 const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
2139 param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
2140 if (!param)
2141 return 0;
2142 return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
2143}
2144
2145X509_VERIFY_PARAM *
2146X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
2147{
2148 return ctx->param;
2149}
2150
2151void
2152X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
2153{
2154 if (ctx->param)
2155 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
2156 ctx->param = param;
2157}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-05-07 21:12:54 +0000