diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 704 |
1 files changed, 704 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..c1be91edba --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | |||
@@ -0,0 +1,704 @@ | |||
1 | /* crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <time.h> | ||
61 | #include <errno.h> | ||
62 | #include <sys/types.h> | ||
63 | #include <sys/stat.h> | ||
64 | |||
65 | #include "crypto.h" | ||
66 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
67 | #include "lhash.h" | ||
68 | #include "buffer.h" | ||
69 | #include "evp.h" | ||
70 | #include "asn1.h" | ||
71 | #include "x509.h" | ||
72 | #include "objects.h" | ||
73 | #include "pem.h" | ||
74 | |||
75 | #ifndef NOPROTO | ||
76 | static int null_callback(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *e); | ||
77 | static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); | ||
78 | #else | ||
79 | static int null_callback(); | ||
80 | static int internal_verify(); | ||
81 | #endif | ||
82 | |||
83 | char *X509_version="X509 part of SSLeay 0.9.0b 29-Jun-1998"; | ||
84 | static STACK *x509_store_ctx_method=NULL; | ||
85 | static int x509_store_ctx_num=0; | ||
86 | #if 0 | ||
87 | static int x509_store_num=1; | ||
88 | static STACK *x509_store_method=NULL; | ||
89 | #endif | ||
90 | |||
91 | static int null_callback(ok,e) | ||
92 | int ok; | ||
93 | X509_STORE_CTX *e; | ||
94 | { | ||
95 | return(ok); | ||
96 | } | ||
97 | |||
98 | #if 0 | ||
99 | static int x509_subject_cmp(a,b) | ||
100 | X509 **a,**b; | ||
101 | { | ||
102 | return(X509_subject_name_cmp(*a,*b)); | ||
103 | } | ||
104 | #endif | ||
105 | |||
106 | int X509_verify_cert(ctx) | ||
107 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
108 | { | ||
109 | X509 *x,*xtmp,*chain_ss=NULL; | ||
110 | X509_NAME *xn; | ||
111 | X509_OBJECT obj; | ||
112 | int depth,i,ok=0; | ||
113 | int num; | ||
114 | int (*cb)(); | ||
115 | STACK *sktmp=NULL; | ||
116 | |||
117 | if (ctx->cert == NULL) | ||
118 | { | ||
119 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); | ||
120 | return(-1); | ||
121 | } | ||
122 | |||
123 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
124 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
125 | |||
126 | /* first we make sure the chain we are going to build is | ||
127 | * present and that the first entry is in place */ | ||
128 | if (ctx->chain == NULL) | ||
129 | { | ||
130 | if ( ((ctx->chain=sk_new_null()) == NULL) || | ||
131 | (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)ctx->cert))) | ||
132 | { | ||
133 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
134 | goto end; | ||
135 | } | ||
136 | CRYPTO_add(&ctx->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
137 | ctx->last_untrusted=1; | ||
138 | } | ||
139 | |||
140 | /* We use a temporary so we can chop and hack at it */ | ||
141 | if ((ctx->untrusted != NULL) && (sktmp=sk_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) | ||
142 | { | ||
143 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
144 | goto end; | ||
145 | } | ||
146 | |||
147 | num=sk_num(ctx->chain); | ||
148 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
149 | depth=ctx->depth; | ||
150 | |||
151 | |||
152 | for (;;) | ||
153 | { | ||
154 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
155 | if (depth <= num) break; | ||
156 | |||
157 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
158 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
159 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | ||
160 | break; | ||
161 | |||
162 | /* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */ | ||
163 | if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) | ||
164 | { | ||
165 | xtmp=X509_find_by_subject(sktmp,xn); | ||
166 | if (xtmp != NULL) | ||
167 | { | ||
168 | if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)xtmp)) | ||
169 | { | ||
170 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
171 | goto end; | ||
172 | } | ||
173 | CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
174 | sk_delete_ptr(sktmp,(char *)xtmp); | ||
175 | ctx->last_untrusted++; | ||
176 | x=xtmp; | ||
177 | num++; | ||
178 | /* reparse the full chain for | ||
179 | * the next one */ | ||
180 | continue; | ||
181 | } | ||
182 | } | ||
183 | break; | ||
184 | } | ||
185 | |||
186 | /* at this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted | ||
187 | * certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one, | ||
188 | * if possible, otherwise we complain. */ | ||
189 | |||
190 | i=sk_num(ctx->chain); | ||
191 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,i-1); | ||
192 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),X509_get_issuer_name(x)) | ||
193 | == 0) | ||
194 | { | ||
195 | /* we have a self signed certificate */ | ||
196 | if (sk_num(ctx->chain) == 1) | ||
197 | { | ||
198 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT; | ||
199 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
200 | ctx->error_depth=i-1; | ||
201 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
202 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
203 | } | ||
204 | else | ||
205 | { | ||
206 | /* worry more about this one elsewhere */ | ||
207 | chain_ss=(X509 *)sk_pop(ctx->chain); | ||
208 | ctx->last_untrusted--; | ||
209 | num--; | ||
210 | x=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,num-1); | ||
211 | } | ||
212 | } | ||
213 | |||
214 | /* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */ | ||
215 | for (;;) | ||
216 | { | ||
217 | /* If we have enough, we break */ | ||
218 | if (depth <= num) break; | ||
219 | |||
220 | /* If we are self signed, we break */ | ||
221 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
222 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) == 0) | ||
223 | break; | ||
224 | |||
225 | ok=X509_STORE_get_by_subject(ctx,X509_LU_X509,xn,&obj); | ||
226 | if (ok != X509_LU_X509) | ||
227 | { | ||
228 | if (ok == X509_LU_RETRY) | ||
229 | { | ||
230 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
231 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY); | ||
232 | return(ok); | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | else if (ok != X509_LU_FAIL) | ||
235 | { | ||
236 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
237 | /* not good :-(, break anyway */ | ||
238 | return(ok); | ||
239 | } | ||
240 | break; | ||
241 | } | ||
242 | x=obj.data.x509; | ||
243 | if (!sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)obj.data.x509)) | ||
244 | { | ||
245 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); | ||
246 | X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
247 | return(0); | ||
248 | } | ||
249 | num++; | ||
250 | } | ||
251 | |||
252 | /* we now have our chain, lets check it... */ | ||
253 | xn=X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
254 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x),xn) != 0) | ||
255 | { | ||
256 | if ((chain_ss == NULL) || (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(chain_ss),xn) != 0)) | ||
257 | { | ||
258 | if (ctx->last_untrusted >= num) | ||
259 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY; | ||
260 | else | ||
261 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT; | ||
262 | ctx->current_cert=x; | ||
263 | } | ||
264 | else | ||
265 | { | ||
266 | |||
267 | sk_push(ctx->chain,(char *)chain_ss); | ||
268 | num++; | ||
269 | ctx->last_untrusted=num; | ||
270 | ctx->current_cert=chain_ss; | ||
271 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN; | ||
272 | chain_ss=NULL; | ||
273 | } | ||
274 | |||
275 | ctx->error_depth=num-1; | ||
276 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
277 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
278 | } | ||
279 | |||
280 | /* We may as well copy down any DSA parameters that are required */ | ||
281 | X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL,ctx->chain); | ||
282 | |||
283 | /* At this point, we have a chain and just need to verify it */ | ||
284 | if (ctx->ctx->verify != NULL) | ||
285 | ok=ctx->ctx->verify(ctx); | ||
286 | else | ||
287 | ok=internal_verify(ctx); | ||
288 | end: | ||
289 | if (sktmp != NULL) sk_free(sktmp); | ||
290 | if (chain_ss != NULL) X509_free(chain_ss); | ||
291 | return(ok); | ||
292 | } | ||
293 | |||
294 | static int internal_verify(ctx) | ||
295 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
296 | { | ||
297 | int i,ok=0,n; | ||
298 | X509 *xs,*xi; | ||
299 | EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; | ||
300 | int (*cb)(); | ||
301 | |||
302 | cb=ctx->ctx->verify_cb; | ||
303 | if (cb == NULL) cb=null_callback; | ||
304 | |||
305 | n=sk_num(ctx->chain); | ||
306 | ctx->error_depth=n-1; | ||
307 | n--; | ||
308 | xi=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
309 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(xi), | ||
310 | X509_get_issuer_name(xi)) == 0) | ||
311 | xs=xi; | ||
312 | else | ||
313 | { | ||
314 | if (n <= 0) | ||
315 | { | ||
316 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE; | ||
317 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
318 | ok=cb(0,ctx); | ||
319 | goto end; | ||
320 | } | ||
321 | else | ||
322 | { | ||
323 | n--; | ||
324 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
325 | xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
326 | } | ||
327 | } | ||
328 | |||
329 | /* ctx->error=0; not needed */ | ||
330 | while (n >= 0) | ||
331 | { | ||
332 | ctx->error_depth=n; | ||
333 | if (!xs->valid) | ||
334 | { | ||
335 | if ((pkey=X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) | ||
336 | { | ||
337 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; | ||
338 | ctx->current_cert=xi; | ||
339 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
340 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
341 | } | ||
342 | if (X509_verify(xs,pkey) <= 0) | ||
343 | { | ||
344 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; | ||
345 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
346 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
347 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
348 | } | ||
349 | pkey=NULL; | ||
350 | |||
351 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notBefore(xs)); | ||
352 | if (i == 0) | ||
353 | { | ||
354 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD; | ||
355 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
356 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
357 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
358 | } | ||
359 | if (i > 0) | ||
360 | { | ||
361 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID; | ||
362 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
363 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
364 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
365 | } | ||
366 | xs->valid=1; | ||
367 | } | ||
368 | |||
369 | i=X509_cmp_current_time(X509_get_notAfter(xs)); | ||
370 | if (i == 0) | ||
371 | { | ||
372 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD; | ||
373 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
374 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
375 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
376 | } | ||
377 | |||
378 | if (i < 0) | ||
379 | { | ||
380 | ctx->error=X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED; | ||
381 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
382 | ok=(*cb)(0,ctx); | ||
383 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
384 | } | ||
385 | |||
386 | /* CRL CHECK */ | ||
387 | |||
388 | /* The last error (if any) is still in the error value */ | ||
389 | ctx->current_cert=xs; | ||
390 | ok=(*cb)(1,ctx); | ||
391 | if (!ok) goto end; | ||
392 | |||
393 | n--; | ||
394 | if (n >= 0) | ||
395 | { | ||
396 | xi=xs; | ||
397 | xs=(X509 *)sk_value(ctx->chain,n); | ||
398 | } | ||
399 | } | ||
400 | ok=1; | ||
401 | end: | ||
402 | return(ok); | ||
403 | } | ||
404 | |||
405 | int X509_cmp_current_time(ctm) | ||
406 | ASN1_UTCTIME *ctm; | ||
407 | { | ||
408 | char *str; | ||
409 | ASN1_UTCTIME atm; | ||
410 | time_t offset; | ||
411 | char buff1[24],buff2[24],*p; | ||
412 | int i,j; | ||
413 | |||
414 | p=buff1; | ||
415 | i=ctm->length; | ||
416 | str=(char *)ctm->data; | ||
417 | if ((i < 11) || (i > 17)) return(0); | ||
418 | memcpy(p,str,10); | ||
419 | p+=10; | ||
420 | str+=10; | ||
421 | |||
422 | if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) | ||
423 | { *(p++)='0'; *(p++)='0'; } | ||
424 | else { *(p++)= *(str++); *(p++)= *(str++); } | ||
425 | *(p++)='Z'; | ||
426 | *(p++)='\0'; | ||
427 | |||
428 | if (*str == 'Z') | ||
429 | offset=0; | ||
430 | else | ||
431 | { | ||
432 | if ((*str != '+') && (str[5] != '-')) | ||
433 | return(0); | ||
434 | offset=((str[1]-'0')*10+(str[2]-'0'))*60; | ||
435 | offset+=(str[3]-'0')*10+(str[4]-'0'); | ||
436 | if (*str == '-') | ||
437 | offset=-offset; | ||
438 | } | ||
439 | atm.type=V_ASN1_UTCTIME; | ||
440 | atm.length=sizeof(buff2); | ||
441 | atm.data=(unsigned char *)buff2; | ||
442 | |||
443 | X509_gmtime_adj(&atm,-offset); | ||
444 | |||
445 | i=(buff1[0]-'0')*10+(buff1[1]-'0'); | ||
446 | if (i < 70) i+=100; | ||
447 | j=(buff2[0]-'0')*10+(buff2[1]-'0'); | ||
448 | if (j < 70) j+=100; | ||
449 | |||
450 | if (i < j) return (-1); | ||
451 | if (i > j) return (1); | ||
452 | i=strcmp(buff1,buff2); | ||
453 | if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */ | ||
454 | return(-1); | ||
455 | else | ||
456 | return(i); | ||
457 | } | ||
458 | |||
459 | ASN1_UTCTIME *X509_gmtime_adj(s, adj) | ||
460 | ASN1_UTCTIME *s; | ||
461 | long adj; | ||
462 | { | ||
463 | time_t t; | ||
464 | |||
465 | time(&t); | ||
466 | t+=adj; | ||
467 | return(ASN1_UTCTIME_set(s,t)); | ||
468 | } | ||
469 | |||
470 | int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(pkey,chain) | ||
471 | EVP_PKEY *pkey; | ||
472 | STACK *chain; | ||
473 | { | ||
474 | EVP_PKEY *ktmp=NULL,*ktmp2; | ||
475 | int i,j; | ||
476 | |||
477 | if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return(1); | ||
478 | |||
479 | for (i=0; i<sk_num(chain); i++) | ||
480 | { | ||
481 | ktmp=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,i)); | ||
482 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
483 | { | ||
484 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); | ||
485 | return(0); | ||
486 | } | ||
487 | if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) | ||
488 | break; | ||
489 | else | ||
490 | { | ||
491 | ktmp=NULL; | ||
492 | } | ||
493 | } | ||
494 | if (ktmp == NULL) | ||
495 | { | ||
496 | X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS,X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); | ||
497 | return(0); | ||
498 | } | ||
499 | |||
500 | /* first, populate the other certs */ | ||
501 | for (j=i-1; j >= 0; j--) | ||
502 | { | ||
503 | ktmp2=X509_get_pubkey((X509 *)sk_value(chain,j)); | ||
504 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2,ktmp); | ||
505 | } | ||
506 | |||
507 | if (pkey != NULL) | ||
508 | EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey,ktmp); | ||
509 | return(1); | ||
510 | } | ||
511 | |||
512 | EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(x) | ||
513 | X509 *x; | ||
514 | { | ||
515 | if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL)) | ||
516 | return(NULL); | ||
517 | return(X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key)); | ||
518 | } | ||
519 | |||
520 | int X509_check_private_key(x,k) | ||
521 | X509 *x; | ||
522 | EVP_PKEY *k; | ||
523 | { | ||
524 | EVP_PKEY *xk=NULL; | ||
525 | int ok=0; | ||
526 | |||
527 | xk=X509_get_pubkey(x); | ||
528 | if (xk->type != k->type) goto err; | ||
529 | switch (k->type) | ||
530 | { | ||
531 | #ifndef NO_RSA | ||
532 | case EVP_PKEY_RSA: | ||
533 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->n,k->pkey.rsa->n) != 0) goto err; | ||
534 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.rsa->e,k->pkey.rsa->e) != 0) goto err; | ||
535 | break; | ||
536 | #endif | ||
537 | #ifndef NO_DSA | ||
538 | case EVP_PKEY_DSA: | ||
539 | if (BN_cmp(xk->pkey.dsa->pub_key,k->pkey.dsa->pub_key) != 0) | ||
540 | goto err; | ||
541 | break; | ||
542 | #endif | ||
543 | #ifndef NO_DH | ||
544 | case EVP_PKEY_DH: | ||
545 | /* No idea */ | ||
546 | goto err; | ||
547 | #endif | ||
548 | default: | ||
549 | goto err; | ||
550 | } | ||
551 | |||
552 | ok=1; | ||
553 | err: | ||
554 | return(ok); | ||
555 | } | ||
556 | |||
557 | int X509_STORE_add_cert(ctx,x) | ||
558 | X509_STORE *ctx; | ||
559 | X509 *x; | ||
560 | { | ||
561 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | ||
562 | int ret=1; | ||
563 | |||
564 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | ||
565 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | ||
566 | if (obj == NULL) | ||
567 | { | ||
568 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
569 | return(0); | ||
570 | } | ||
571 | obj->type=X509_LU_X509; | ||
572 | obj->data.x509=x; | ||
573 | |||
574 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
575 | |||
576 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | ||
577 | |||
578 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
579 | if (r != NULL) | ||
580 | { /* oops, put it back */ | ||
581 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
582 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
583 | Free(obj); | ||
584 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r); | ||
585 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
586 | ret=0; | ||
587 | } | ||
588 | |||
589 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
590 | |||
591 | return(ret); | ||
592 | } | ||
593 | |||
594 | int X509_STORE_add_crl(ctx,x) | ||
595 | X509_STORE *ctx; | ||
596 | X509_CRL *x; | ||
597 | { | ||
598 | X509_OBJECT *obj,*r; | ||
599 | int ret=1; | ||
600 | |||
601 | if (x == NULL) return(0); | ||
602 | obj=(X509_OBJECT *)Malloc(sizeof(X509_OBJECT)); | ||
603 | if (obj == NULL) | ||
604 | { | ||
605 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
606 | return(0); | ||
607 | } | ||
608 | obj->type=X509_LU_CRL; | ||
609 | obj->data.crl=x; | ||
610 | |||
611 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
612 | |||
613 | X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count(obj); | ||
614 | |||
615 | r=(X509_OBJECT *)lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
616 | if (r != NULL) | ||
617 | { /* oops, put it back */ | ||
618 | lh_delete(ctx->certs,(char *)obj); | ||
619 | X509_OBJECT_free_contents(obj); | ||
620 | Free(obj); | ||
621 | lh_insert(ctx->certs,(char *)r); | ||
622 | X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL,X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE); | ||
623 | ret=0; | ||
624 | } | ||
625 | |||
626 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_STORE); | ||
627 | |||
628 | return(ret); | ||
629 | } | ||
630 | |||
631 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func) | ||
632 | long argl; | ||
633 | char *argp; | ||
634 | int (*new_func)(); | ||
635 | int (*dup_func)(); | ||
636 | void (*free_func)(); | ||
637 | { | ||
638 | x509_store_ctx_num++; | ||
639 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(x509_store_ctx_num-1, | ||
640 | &x509_store_ctx_method, | ||
641 | argl,argp,new_func,dup_func,free_func)); | ||
642 | } | ||
643 | |||
644 | int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,idx,data) | ||
645 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
646 | int idx; | ||
647 | char *data; | ||
648 | { | ||
649 | return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx,data)); | ||
650 | } | ||
651 | |||
652 | char *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,idx) | ||
653 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
654 | int idx; | ||
655 | { | ||
656 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data,idx)); | ||
657 | } | ||
658 | |||
659 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx) | ||
660 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
661 | { | ||
662 | return(ctx->error); | ||
663 | } | ||
664 | |||
665 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx,err) | ||
666 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
667 | int err; | ||
668 | { | ||
669 | ctx->error=err; | ||
670 | } | ||
671 | |||
672 | int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx) | ||
673 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
674 | { | ||
675 | return(ctx->error_depth); | ||
676 | } | ||
677 | |||
678 | X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx) | ||
679 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
680 | { | ||
681 | return(ctx->current_cert); | ||
682 | } | ||
683 | |||
684 | STACK *X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(ctx) | ||
685 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
686 | { | ||
687 | return(ctx->chain); | ||
688 | } | ||
689 | |||
690 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(ctx,x) | ||
691 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
692 | X509 *x; | ||
693 | { | ||
694 | ctx->cert=x; | ||
695 | } | ||
696 | |||
697 | void X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(ctx,sk) | ||
698 | X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; | ||
699 | STACK *sk; | ||
700 | { | ||
701 | ctx->untrusted=sk; | ||
702 | } | ||
703 | |||
704 | |||