diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c | 647 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 647 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c deleted file mode 100644 index bbdf6da493..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,647 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* v3_purp.c */ | ||
2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (shenson@bigfoot.com) for the OpenSSL | ||
3 | * project 2001. | ||
4 | */ | ||
5 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
6 | * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
9 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
10 | * are met: | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
13 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
14 | * | ||
15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
17 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
18 | * distribution. | ||
19 | * | ||
20 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
21 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
22 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
23 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
24 | * | ||
25 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
26 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
27 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
28 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
29 | * | ||
30 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
31 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
32 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
33 | * | ||
34 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
35 | * acknowledgment: | ||
36 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
37 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
38 | * | ||
39 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
40 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
41 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
42 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
43 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
44 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
45 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
46 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
48 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
49 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
50 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
51 | * ==================================================================== | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
54 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
55 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
56 | * | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include "cryptlib.h" | ||
61 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
62 | #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> | ||
63 | |||
64 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); | ||
65 | |||
66 | static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); | ||
67 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
68 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
69 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
70 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
71 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
72 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
73 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
74 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
75 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
76 | |||
77 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, | ||
78 | const X509_PURPOSE * const *b); | ||
79 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); | ||
80 | |||
81 | static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { | ||
82 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, | ||
83 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, | ||
84 | {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, | ||
85 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, | ||
86 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, | ||
87 | {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, | ||
88 | {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, | ||
89 | {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, | ||
90 | }; | ||
91 | |||
92 | #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) | ||
93 | |||
94 | IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) | ||
95 | |||
96 | static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; | ||
97 | |||
98 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, | ||
99 | const X509_PURPOSE * const *b) | ||
100 | { | ||
101 | return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; | ||
102 | } | ||
103 | |||
104 | /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* | ||
105 | * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const | ||
106 | * things. */ | ||
107 | int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) | ||
108 | { | ||
109 | int idx; | ||
110 | const X509_PURPOSE *pt; | ||
111 | if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | ||
112 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
113 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | ||
114 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
115 | } | ||
116 | if(id == -1) return 1; | ||
117 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | ||
118 | if(idx == -1) return -1; | ||
119 | pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
120 | return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); | ||
121 | } | ||
122 | |||
123 | int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) | ||
124 | { | ||
125 | if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { | ||
126 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); | ||
127 | return 0; | ||
128 | } | ||
129 | *p = purpose; | ||
130 | return 1; | ||
131 | } | ||
132 | |||
133 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) | ||
134 | { | ||
135 | if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
136 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
139 | X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) | ||
140 | { | ||
141 | if(idx < 0) return NULL; | ||
142 | if(idx < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx; | ||
143 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); | ||
144 | } | ||
145 | |||
146 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) | ||
147 | { | ||
148 | int i; | ||
149 | X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; | ||
150 | for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { | ||
151 | xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); | ||
152 | if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i; | ||
153 | } | ||
154 | return -1; | ||
155 | } | ||
156 | |||
157 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) | ||
158 | { | ||
159 | X509_PURPOSE tmp; | ||
160 | int idx; | ||
161 | if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) | ||
162 | return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; | ||
163 | tmp.purpose = purpose; | ||
164 | if(!xptable) return -1; | ||
165 | idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); | ||
166 | if(idx == -1) return -1; | ||
167 | return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
168 | } | ||
169 | |||
170 | int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, | ||
171 | int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), | ||
172 | char *name, char *sname, void *arg) | ||
173 | { | ||
174 | int idx; | ||
175 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
176 | /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ | ||
177 | flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
178 | /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ | ||
179 | flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; | ||
180 | /* Get existing entry if any */ | ||
181 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | ||
182 | /* Need a new entry */ | ||
183 | if(idx == -1) { | ||
184 | if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) { | ||
185 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
186 | return 0; | ||
187 | } | ||
188 | ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
189 | } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
190 | |||
191 | /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */ | ||
192 | if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | ||
193 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name); | ||
194 | OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname); | ||
195 | } | ||
196 | /* dup supplied name */ | ||
197 | ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name); | ||
198 | ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname); | ||
199 | if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) { | ||
200 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
201 | return 0; | ||
202 | } | ||
203 | /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ | ||
204 | ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
205 | /* Set all other flags */ | ||
206 | ptmp->flags |= flags; | ||
207 | |||
208 | ptmp->purpose = id; | ||
209 | ptmp->trust = trust; | ||
210 | ptmp->check_purpose = ck; | ||
211 | ptmp->usr_data = arg; | ||
212 | |||
213 | /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ | ||
214 | if(idx == -1) { | ||
215 | if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) { | ||
216 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
217 | return 0; | ||
218 | } | ||
219 | if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) { | ||
220 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
221 | return 0; | ||
222 | } | ||
223 | } | ||
224 | return 1; | ||
225 | } | ||
226 | |||
227 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) | ||
228 | { | ||
229 | if(!p) return; | ||
230 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) | ||
231 | { | ||
232 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | ||
233 | OPENSSL_free(p->name); | ||
234 | OPENSSL_free(p->sname); | ||
235 | } | ||
236 | OPENSSL_free(p); | ||
237 | } | ||
238 | } | ||
239 | |||
240 | void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) | ||
241 | { | ||
242 | int i; | ||
243 | sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); | ||
244 | for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i); | ||
245 | xptable = NULL; | ||
246 | } | ||
247 | |||
248 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
249 | { | ||
250 | return xp->purpose; | ||
251 | } | ||
252 | |||
253 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
254 | { | ||
255 | return xp->name; | ||
256 | } | ||
257 | |||
258 | char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
259 | { | ||
260 | return xp->sname; | ||
261 | } | ||
262 | |||
263 | int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
264 | { | ||
265 | return xp->trust; | ||
266 | } | ||
267 | |||
268 | static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b) | ||
269 | { | ||
270 | return *a - *b; | ||
271 | } | ||
272 | |||
273 | int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) | ||
274 | { | ||
275 | /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: | ||
276 | * that is those which are used by the verify process. If | ||
277 | * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list | ||
278 | * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate. | ||
279 | * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be | ||
280 | * searched using bsearch. | ||
281 | */ | ||
282 | |||
283 | static int supported_nids[] = { | ||
284 | NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ | ||
285 | NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ | ||
286 | NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ | ||
287 | NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ | ||
288 | NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ | ||
289 | NID_proxyCertInfo /* 661 */ | ||
290 | }; | ||
291 | |||
292 | int ex_nid; | ||
293 | |||
294 | ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); | ||
295 | |||
296 | if (ex_nid == NID_undef) | ||
297 | return 0; | ||
298 | |||
299 | if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids, | ||
300 | sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int), | ||
301 | (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp)) | ||
302 | return 1; | ||
303 | return 0; | ||
304 | } | ||
305 | |||
306 | |||
307 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) | ||
308 | { | ||
309 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; | ||
310 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; | ||
311 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; | ||
312 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; | ||
313 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; | ||
314 | X509_EXTENSION *ex; | ||
315 | |||
316 | int i; | ||
317 | if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return; | ||
318 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
319 | X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); | ||
320 | #endif | ||
321 | /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ | ||
322 | if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) | ||
323 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SS; | ||
324 | /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ | ||
325 | if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; | ||
326 | /* Handle basic constraints */ | ||
327 | if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
328 | if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; | ||
329 | if(bs->pathlen) { | ||
330 | if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) | ||
331 | || !bs->ca) { | ||
332 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | ||
333 | x->ex_pathlen = 0; | ||
334 | } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); | ||
335 | } else x->ex_pathlen = -1; | ||
336 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); | ||
337 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; | ||
338 | } | ||
339 | /* Handle proxy certificates */ | ||
340 | if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
341 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA | ||
342 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0 | ||
343 | || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) { | ||
344 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | ||
345 | } | ||
346 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); | ||
347 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; | ||
348 | } | ||
349 | /* Handle key usage */ | ||
350 | if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
351 | if(usage->length > 0) { | ||
352 | x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; | ||
353 | if(usage->length > 1) | ||
354 | x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; | ||
355 | } else x->ex_kusage = 0; | ||
356 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; | ||
357 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); | ||
358 | } | ||
359 | x->ex_xkusage = 0; | ||
360 | if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
361 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; | ||
362 | for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { | ||
363 | switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) { | ||
364 | case NID_server_auth: | ||
365 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; | ||
366 | break; | ||
367 | |||
368 | case NID_client_auth: | ||
369 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; | ||
370 | break; | ||
371 | |||
372 | case NID_email_protect: | ||
373 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; | ||
374 | break; | ||
375 | |||
376 | case NID_code_sign: | ||
377 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; | ||
378 | break; | ||
379 | |||
380 | case NID_ms_sgc: | ||
381 | case NID_ns_sgc: | ||
382 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; | ||
383 | break; | ||
384 | |||
385 | case NID_OCSP_sign: | ||
386 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; | ||
387 | break; | ||
388 | |||
389 | case NID_time_stamp: | ||
390 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; | ||
391 | break; | ||
392 | |||
393 | case NID_dvcs: | ||
394 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; | ||
395 | break; | ||
396 | } | ||
397 | } | ||
398 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | ||
399 | } | ||
400 | |||
401 | if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
402 | if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; | ||
403 | else x->ex_nscert = 0; | ||
404 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; | ||
405 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); | ||
406 | } | ||
407 | x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | ||
408 | x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | ||
409 | for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) | ||
410 | { | ||
411 | ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); | ||
412 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) | ||
413 | continue; | ||
414 | if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) | ||
415 | { | ||
416 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | ||
417 | break; | ||
418 | } | ||
419 | } | ||
420 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; | ||
421 | } | ||
422 | |||
423 | /* CA checks common to all purposes | ||
424 | * return codes: | ||
425 | * 0 not a CA | ||
426 | * 1 is a CA | ||
427 | * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA | ||
428 | * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. | ||
429 | * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. | ||
430 | */ | ||
431 | |||
432 | #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) | ||
433 | #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
434 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) | ||
435 | #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
436 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) | ||
437 | #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
438 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) | ||
439 | |||
440 | static int check_ca(const X509 *x) | ||
441 | { | ||
442 | /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ | ||
443 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0; | ||
444 | if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { | ||
445 | if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1; | ||
446 | /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ | ||
447 | else return 0; | ||
448 | } else { | ||
449 | /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ | ||
450 | if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3; | ||
451 | /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ | ||
452 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4; | ||
453 | /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ | ||
454 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT | ||
455 | && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5; | ||
456 | /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ | ||
457 | return 0; | ||
458 | } | ||
459 | } | ||
460 | |||
461 | int X509_check_ca(X509 *x) | ||
462 | { | ||
463 | if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | ||
464 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
465 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | ||
466 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
467 | } | ||
468 | |||
469 | return check_ca(x); | ||
470 | } | ||
471 | |||
472 | /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ | ||
473 | static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) | ||
474 | { | ||
475 | int ca_ret; | ||
476 | ca_ret = check_ca(x); | ||
477 | if(!ca_ret) return 0; | ||
478 | /* check nsCertType if present */ | ||
479 | if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret; | ||
480 | else return 0; | ||
481 | } | ||
482 | |||
483 | |||
484 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
485 | { | ||
486 | if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; | ||
487 | if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); | ||
488 | /* We need to do digital signatures with it */ | ||
489 | if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0; | ||
490 | /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ | ||
491 | if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0; | ||
492 | return 1; | ||
493 | } | ||
494 | |||
495 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
496 | { | ||
497 | if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0; | ||
498 | if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x); | ||
499 | |||
500 | if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0; | ||
501 | /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */ | ||
502 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | ||
503 | |||
504 | return 1; | ||
505 | |||
506 | } | ||
507 | |||
508 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
509 | { | ||
510 | int ret; | ||
511 | ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); | ||
512 | if(!ret || ca) return ret; | ||
513 | /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ | ||
514 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | ||
515 | return ret; | ||
516 | } | ||
517 | |||
518 | /* common S/MIME checks */ | ||
519 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
520 | { | ||
521 | if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0; | ||
522 | if(ca) { | ||
523 | int ca_ret; | ||
524 | ca_ret = check_ca(x); | ||
525 | if(!ca_ret) return 0; | ||
526 | /* check nsCertType if present */ | ||
527 | if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret; | ||
528 | else return 0; | ||
529 | } | ||
530 | if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { | ||
531 | if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1; | ||
532 | /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ | ||
533 | if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2; | ||
534 | return 0; | ||
535 | } | ||
536 | return 1; | ||
537 | } | ||
538 | |||
539 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
540 | { | ||
541 | int ret; | ||
542 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | ||
543 | if(!ret || ca) return ret; | ||
544 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0; | ||
545 | return ret; | ||
546 | } | ||
547 | |||
548 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
549 | { | ||
550 | int ret; | ||
551 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | ||
552 | if(!ret || ca) return ret; | ||
553 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0; | ||
554 | return ret; | ||
555 | } | ||
556 | |||
557 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
558 | { | ||
559 | if(ca) { | ||
560 | int ca_ret; | ||
561 | if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret; | ||
562 | else return 0; | ||
563 | } | ||
564 | if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; | ||
565 | return 1; | ||
566 | } | ||
567 | |||
568 | /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that | ||
569 | * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. | ||
570 | */ | ||
571 | |||
572 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
573 | { | ||
574 | /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" | ||
575 | value (2)? */ | ||
576 | if(ca) return check_ca(x); | ||
577 | /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ | ||
578 | return 1; | ||
579 | } | ||
580 | |||
581 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
582 | { | ||
583 | return 1; | ||
584 | } | ||
585 | |||
586 | /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. | ||
587 | * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates | ||
588 | * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by | ||
589 | * subject name. | ||
590 | * These are: | ||
591 | * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) | ||
592 | * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer | ||
593 | * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing | ||
594 | * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match | ||
595 | * codes for X509_verify_cert() | ||
596 | */ | ||
597 | |||
598 | int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) | ||
599 | { | ||
600 | if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), | ||
601 | X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) | ||
602 | return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; | ||
603 | x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); | ||
604 | x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); | ||
605 | if(subject->akid) { | ||
606 | /* Check key ids (if present) */ | ||
607 | if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid && | ||
608 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) ) | ||
609 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; | ||
610 | /* Check serial number */ | ||
611 | if(subject->akid->serial && | ||
612 | ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), | ||
613 | subject->akid->serial)) | ||
614 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | ||
615 | /* Check issuer name */ | ||
616 | if(subject->akid->issuer) { | ||
617 | /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes | ||
618 | * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName. | ||
619 | * There may be more than one but we only take any | ||
620 | * notice of the first. | ||
621 | */ | ||
622 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | ||
623 | GENERAL_NAME *gen; | ||
624 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | ||
625 | int i; | ||
626 | gens = subject->akid->issuer; | ||
627 | for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | ||
628 | gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | ||
629 | if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { | ||
630 | nm = gen->d.dirn; | ||
631 | break; | ||
632 | } | ||
633 | } | ||
634 | if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) | ||
635 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | ||
636 | } | ||
637 | } | ||
638 | if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) | ||
639 | { | ||
640 | if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) | ||
641 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; | ||
642 | } | ||
643 | else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) | ||
644 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; | ||
645 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
646 | } | ||
647 | |||