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diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
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1/* v3_purp.c */
2/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
3 * project 2001.
4 */
5/* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 *
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 *
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18 * distribution.
19 *
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24 *
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29 *
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33 *
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35 * acknowledgment:
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38 *
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
52 *
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56 *
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include "cryptlib.h"
61#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
62#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
63
64static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
65
66static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
67static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
68static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
69static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
70static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
71static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
72static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
73static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
74static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
75static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
76
77static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
78 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
79static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
80
81static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
82 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
83 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
84 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
85 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
86 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
87 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
88 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
89 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
90};
91
92#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
93
94IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE)
95
96static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
97
98static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a,
99 const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
100{
101 return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
102}
103
104/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
105 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
106 * things. */
107int X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
108{
109 int idx;
110 const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
111 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
112 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
113 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
114 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
115 }
116 if(id == -1) return 1;
117 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
118 if(idx == -1) return -1;
119 pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
120 return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
121}
122
123int X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
124{
125 if(X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
126 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
127 return 0;
128 }
129 *p = purpose;
130 return 1;
131}
132
133int X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
134{
135 if(!xptable) return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
136 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
137}
138
139X509_PURPOSE * X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
140{
141 if(idx < 0) return NULL;
142 if(idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) return xstandard + idx;
143 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
144}
145
146int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
147{
148 int i;
149 X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
150 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
151 xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
152 if(!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) return i;
153 }
154 return -1;
155}
156
157int X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
158{
159 X509_PURPOSE tmp;
160 int idx;
161 if((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
162 return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
163 tmp.purpose = purpose;
164 if(!xptable) return -1;
165 idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
166 if(idx == -1) return -1;
167 return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
168}
169
170int X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
171 int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int),
172 char *name, char *sname, void *arg)
173{
174 int idx;
175 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
176 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
177 flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
178 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
179 flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
180 /* Get existing entry if any */
181 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
182 /* Need a new entry */
183 if(idx == -1) {
184 if(!(ptmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)))) {
185 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
186 return 0;
187 }
188 ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
189 } else ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
190
191 /* OPENSSL_free existing name if dynamic */
192 if(ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
193 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->name);
194 OPENSSL_free(ptmp->sname);
195 }
196 /* dup supplied name */
197 ptmp->name = BUF_strdup(name);
198 ptmp->sname = BUF_strdup(sname);
199 if(!ptmp->name || !ptmp->sname) {
200 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
201 return 0;
202 }
203 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
204 ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
205 /* Set all other flags */
206 ptmp->flags |= flags;
207
208 ptmp->purpose = id;
209 ptmp->trust = trust;
210 ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
211 ptmp->usr_data = arg;
212
213 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
214 if(idx == -1) {
215 if(!xptable && !(xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp))) {
216 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
217 return 0;
218 }
219 if (!sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp)) {
220 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
221 return 0;
222 }
223 }
224 return 1;
225}
226
227static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
228 {
229 if(!p) return;
230 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC)
231 {
232 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
233 OPENSSL_free(p->name);
234 OPENSSL_free(p->sname);
235 }
236 OPENSSL_free(p);
237 }
238 }
239
240void X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
241{
242 unsigned int i;
243 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
244 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) xptable_free(xstandard + i);
245 xptable = NULL;
246}
247
248int X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
249{
250 return xp->purpose;
251}
252
253char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
254{
255 return xp->name;
256}
257
258char *X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
259{
260 return xp->sname;
261}
262
263int X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
264{
265 return xp->trust;
266}
267
268static int nid_cmp(int *a, int *b)
269 {
270 return *a - *b;
271 }
272
273int X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
274 {
275 /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
276 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
277 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
278 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
279 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
280 * searched using bsearch.
281 */
282
283 static int supported_nids[] = {
284 NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
285 NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
286 NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
287 NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
288 NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
289 NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
290#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
291 NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, /* 290 */
292 NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, /* 291 */
293#endif
294 NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
295 NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 661 */
296 NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
297 };
298
299 int ex_nid;
300
301 ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
302
303 if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
304 return 0;
305
306 if (OBJ_bsearch((char *)&ex_nid, (char *)supported_nids,
307 sizeof(supported_nids)/sizeof(int), sizeof(int),
308 (int (*)(const void *, const void *))nid_cmp))
309 return 1;
310 return 0;
311 }
312
313
314static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
315{
316 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
317 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
318 ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
319 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
320 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
321 X509_EXTENSION *ex;
322
323 int i;
324 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) return;
325#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
326 X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
327#endif
328 /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
329 if(!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
330 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
331 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
332 if(!X509_get_version(x)) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
333 /* Handle basic constraints */
334 if((bs=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
335 if(bs->ca) x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
336 if(bs->pathlen) {
337 if((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
338 || !bs->ca) {
339 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
340 x->ex_pathlen = 0;
341 } else x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
342 } else x->ex_pathlen = -1;
343 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
344 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
345 }
346 /* Handle proxy certificates */
347 if((pci=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
348 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA
349 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, 0) >= 0
350 || X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, 0) >= 0) {
351 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
352 }
353 if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
354 x->ex_pcpathlen =
355 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
356 } else x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
357 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
358 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
359 }
360 /* Handle key usage */
361 if((usage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
362 if(usage->length > 0) {
363 x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
364 if(usage->length > 1)
365 x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
366 } else x->ex_kusage = 0;
367 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
368 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
369 }
370 x->ex_xkusage = 0;
371 if((extusage=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
372 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
373 for(i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
374 switch(OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage,i))) {
375 case NID_server_auth:
376 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
377 break;
378
379 case NID_client_auth:
380 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
381 break;
382
383 case NID_email_protect:
384 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
385 break;
386
387 case NID_code_sign:
388 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
389 break;
390
391 case NID_ms_sgc:
392 case NID_ns_sgc:
393 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
394 break;
395
396 case NID_OCSP_sign:
397 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
398 break;
399
400 case NID_time_stamp:
401 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
402 break;
403
404 case NID_dvcs:
405 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
406 break;
407 }
408 }
409 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
410 }
411
412 if((ns=X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
413 if(ns->length > 0) x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
414 else x->ex_nscert = 0;
415 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
416 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
417 }
418 x->skid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
419 x->akid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
420#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
421 x->rfc3779_addr =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, NULL, NULL);
422 x->rfc3779_asid =X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum,
423 NULL, NULL);
424#endif
425 for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++)
426 {
427 ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
428 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
429 continue;
430 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex))
431 {
432 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
433 break;
434 }
435 }
436 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
437}
438
439/* CA checks common to all purposes
440 * return codes:
441 * 0 not a CA
442 * 1 is a CA
443 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
444 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
445 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
446 */
447
448#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
449#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
450 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
451#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
452 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
453#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
454 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
455
456static int check_ca(const X509 *x)
457{
458 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
459 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) return 0;
460 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
461 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) return 1;
462 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
463 else return 0;
464 } else {
465 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
466 if((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) return 3;
467 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
468 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) return 4;
469 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
470 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT
471 && x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) return 5;
472 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
473 return 0;
474 }
475}
476
477int X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
478{
479 if(!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
480 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
481 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
482 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
483 }
484
485 return check_ca(x);
486}
487
488/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
489static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
490{
491 int ca_ret;
492 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
493 if(!ca_ret) return 0;
494 /* check nsCertType if present */
495 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) return ca_ret;
496 else return 0;
497}
498
499
500static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
501{
502 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
503 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
504 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
505 if(ku_reject(x,KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) return 0;
506 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
507 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) return 0;
508 return 1;
509}
510
511static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
512{
513 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) return 0;
514 if(ca) return check_ssl_ca(x);
515
516 if(ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) return 0;
517 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
518 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
519
520 return 1;
521
522}
523
524static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
525{
526 int ret;
527 ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
528 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
529 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
530 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
531 return ret;
532}
533
534/* common S/MIME checks */
535static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
536{
537 if(xku_reject(x,XKU_SMIME)) return 0;
538 if(ca) {
539 int ca_ret;
540 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
541 if(!ca_ret) return 0;
542 /* check nsCertType if present */
543 if(ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) return ca_ret;
544 else return 0;
545 }
546 if(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
547 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) return 1;
548 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
549 if(x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) return 2;
550 return 0;
551 }
552 return 1;
553}
554
555static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
556{
557 int ret;
558 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
559 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
560 if(ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) return 0;
561 return ret;
562}
563
564static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
565{
566 int ret;
567 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
568 if(!ret || ca) return ret;
569 if(ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) return 0;
570 return ret;
571}
572
573static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
574{
575 if(ca) {
576 int ca_ret;
577 if((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) return ca_ret;
578 else return 0;
579 }
580 if(ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) return 0;
581 return 1;
582}
583
584/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
585 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
586 */
587
588static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
589{
590 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
591 value (2)? */
592 if(ca) return check_ca(x);
593 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
594 return 1;
595}
596
597static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
598{
599 return 1;
600}
601
602/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
603 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
604 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
605 * subject name.
606 * These are:
607 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
608 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
609 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
610 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
611 * codes for X509_verify_cert()
612 */
613
614int X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
615{
616 if(X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
617 X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
618 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
619 x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
620 x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
621 if(subject->akid) {
622 /* Check key ids (if present) */
623 if(subject->akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
624 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(subject->akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
625 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
626 /* Check serial number */
627 if(subject->akid->serial &&
628 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer),
629 subject->akid->serial))
630 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
631 /* Check issuer name */
632 if(subject->akid->issuer) {
633 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
634 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
635 * There may be more than one but we only take any
636 * notice of the first.
637 */
638 GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
639 GENERAL_NAME *gen;
640 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
641 int i;
642 gens = subject->akid->issuer;
643 for(i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
644 gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
645 if(gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
646 nm = gen->d.dirn;
647 break;
648 }
649 }
650 if(nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
651 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
652 }
653 }
654 if(subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)
655 {
656 if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
657 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
658 }
659 else if(ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
660 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
661 return X509_V_OK;
662}
663
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-04-03 04:01:09 +0000