diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c | 861 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 861 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c deleted file mode 100644 index 69a8d05f26..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,861 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: v3_purp.c,v 1.26 2015/02/10 13:28:17 jsing Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL | ||
3 | * project 2001. | ||
4 | */ | ||
5 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
6 | * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
7 | * | ||
8 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
9 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
10 | * are met: | ||
11 | * | ||
12 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
13 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
14 | * | ||
15 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
16 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
17 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
18 | * distribution. | ||
19 | * | ||
20 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
21 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
22 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
23 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
24 | * | ||
25 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
26 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
27 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
28 | * licensing@OpenSSL.org. | ||
29 | * | ||
30 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
31 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
32 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
33 | * | ||
34 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
35 | * acknowledgment: | ||
36 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
37 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" | ||
38 | * | ||
39 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
40 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
41 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
42 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
43 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
44 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
45 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
46 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
47 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
48 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
49 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
50 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
51 | * ==================================================================== | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
54 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
55 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
56 | * | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <string.h> | ||
61 | |||
62 | #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> | ||
63 | |||
64 | #include <openssl/err.h> | ||
65 | #include <openssl/x509v3.h> | ||
66 | #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> | ||
67 | |||
68 | static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x); | ||
69 | |||
70 | static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x); | ||
71 | static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
72 | int ca); | ||
73 | static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
74 | int ca); | ||
75 | static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
76 | int ca); | ||
77 | static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
78 | static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
79 | int ca); | ||
80 | static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
81 | int ca); | ||
82 | static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
83 | int ca); | ||
84 | static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, | ||
85 | int ca); | ||
86 | static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
87 | static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca); | ||
88 | |||
89 | static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, const X509_PURPOSE * const *b); | ||
90 | static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p); | ||
91 | |||
92 | static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = { | ||
93 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL}, | ||
94 | {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL}, | ||
95 | {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL}, | ||
96 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL}, | ||
97 | {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL}, | ||
98 | {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL}, | ||
99 | {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL}, | ||
100 | {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL}, | ||
101 | {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL}, | ||
102 | }; | ||
103 | |||
104 | #define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE)) | ||
105 | |||
106 | static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL; | ||
107 | |||
108 | static int | ||
109 | xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, const X509_PURPOSE * const *b) | ||
110 | { | ||
111 | return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose; | ||
112 | } | ||
113 | |||
114 | /* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509* | ||
115 | * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const | ||
116 | * things. */ | ||
117 | int | ||
118 | X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca) | ||
119 | { | ||
120 | int idx; | ||
121 | const X509_PURPOSE *pt; | ||
122 | |||
123 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | ||
124 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
125 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | ||
126 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
127 | } | ||
128 | if (id == -1) | ||
129 | return 1; | ||
130 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | ||
131 | if (idx == -1) | ||
132 | return -1; | ||
133 | pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
134 | return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca); | ||
135 | } | ||
136 | |||
137 | int | ||
138 | X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose) | ||
139 | { | ||
140 | if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) { | ||
141 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE); | ||
142 | return 0; | ||
143 | } | ||
144 | *p = purpose; | ||
145 | return 1; | ||
146 | } | ||
147 | |||
148 | int | ||
149 | X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void) | ||
150 | { | ||
151 | if (!xptable) | ||
152 | return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
153 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
154 | } | ||
155 | |||
156 | X509_PURPOSE * | ||
157 | X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx) | ||
158 | { | ||
159 | if (idx < 0) | ||
160 | return NULL; | ||
161 | if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT) | ||
162 | return xstandard + idx; | ||
163 | return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT); | ||
164 | } | ||
165 | |||
166 | int | ||
167 | X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname) | ||
168 | { | ||
169 | int i; | ||
170 | X509_PURPOSE *xptmp; | ||
171 | |||
172 | for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) { | ||
173 | xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i); | ||
174 | if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname)) | ||
175 | return i; | ||
176 | } | ||
177 | return -1; | ||
178 | } | ||
179 | |||
180 | int | ||
181 | X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose) | ||
182 | { | ||
183 | X509_PURPOSE tmp; | ||
184 | int idx; | ||
185 | |||
186 | if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX)) | ||
187 | return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN; | ||
188 | tmp.purpose = purpose; | ||
189 | if (!xptable) | ||
190 | return -1; | ||
191 | idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp); | ||
192 | if (idx == -1) | ||
193 | return -1; | ||
194 | return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; | ||
195 | } | ||
196 | |||
197 | int | ||
198 | X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags, | ||
199 | int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), char *name, | ||
200 | char *sname, void *arg) | ||
201 | { | ||
202 | int idx; | ||
203 | X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; | ||
204 | char *name_dup, *sname_dup; | ||
205 | |||
206 | name_dup = sname_dup = NULL; | ||
207 | |||
208 | if (name == NULL || sname == NULL) { | ||
209 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, | ||
210 | X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT); | ||
211 | return 0; | ||
212 | } | ||
213 | |||
214 | /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */ | ||
215 | flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
216 | /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */ | ||
217 | flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME; | ||
218 | /* Get existing entry if any */ | ||
219 | idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id); | ||
220 | /* Need a new entry */ | ||
221 | if (idx == -1) { | ||
222 | if ((ptmp = malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))) == NULL) { | ||
223 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, | ||
224 | ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
225 | return 0; | ||
226 | } | ||
227 | ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
228 | } else | ||
229 | ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); | ||
230 | |||
231 | if ((name_dup = strdup(name)) == NULL) | ||
232 | goto err; | ||
233 | if ((sname_dup = strdup(sname)) == NULL) | ||
234 | goto err; | ||
235 | |||
236 | /* free existing name if dynamic */ | ||
237 | if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | ||
238 | free(ptmp->name); | ||
239 | free(ptmp->sname); | ||
240 | } | ||
241 | /* dup supplied name */ | ||
242 | ptmp->name = name_dup; | ||
243 | ptmp->sname = sname_dup; | ||
244 | /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */ | ||
245 | ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC; | ||
246 | /* Set all other flags */ | ||
247 | ptmp->flags |= flags; | ||
248 | |||
249 | ptmp->purpose = id; | ||
250 | ptmp->trust = trust; | ||
251 | ptmp->check_purpose = ck; | ||
252 | ptmp->usr_data = arg; | ||
253 | |||
254 | /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */ | ||
255 | if (idx == -1) { | ||
256 | if (xptable == NULL && | ||
257 | (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL) | ||
258 | goto err; | ||
259 | if (sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp) == 0) | ||
260 | goto err; | ||
261 | } | ||
262 | return 1; | ||
263 | |||
264 | err: | ||
265 | free(name_dup); | ||
266 | free(sname_dup); | ||
267 | if (idx == -1) | ||
268 | free(ptmp); | ||
269 | X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
270 | return 0; | ||
271 | } | ||
272 | |||
273 | static void | ||
274 | xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p) | ||
275 | { | ||
276 | if (!p) | ||
277 | return; | ||
278 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) { | ||
279 | if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) { | ||
280 | free(p->name); | ||
281 | free(p->sname); | ||
282 | } | ||
283 | free(p); | ||
284 | } | ||
285 | } | ||
286 | |||
287 | void | ||
288 | X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void) | ||
289 | { | ||
290 | unsigned int i; | ||
291 | |||
292 | sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free); | ||
293 | for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++) | ||
294 | xptable_free(xstandard + i); | ||
295 | xptable = NULL; | ||
296 | } | ||
297 | |||
298 | int | ||
299 | X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
300 | { | ||
301 | return xp->purpose; | ||
302 | } | ||
303 | |||
304 | char * | ||
305 | X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
306 | { | ||
307 | return xp->name; | ||
308 | } | ||
309 | |||
310 | char * | ||
311 | X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
312 | { | ||
313 | return xp->sname; | ||
314 | } | ||
315 | |||
316 | int | ||
317 | X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp) | ||
318 | { | ||
319 | return xp->trust; | ||
320 | } | ||
321 | |||
322 | static int | ||
323 | nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b) | ||
324 | { | ||
325 | return *a - *b; | ||
326 | } | ||
327 | |||
328 | DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); | ||
329 | IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid); | ||
330 | |||
331 | int | ||
332 | X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex) | ||
333 | { | ||
334 | /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions: | ||
335 | * that is those which are used by the verify process. If | ||
336 | * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list | ||
337 | * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate. | ||
338 | * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be | ||
339 | * searched using bsearch. | ||
340 | */ | ||
341 | |||
342 | static const int supported_nids[] = { | ||
343 | NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */ | ||
344 | NID_key_usage, /* 83 */ | ||
345 | NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */ | ||
346 | NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */ | ||
347 | NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */ | ||
348 | NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */ | ||
349 | NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */ | ||
350 | NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */ | ||
351 | NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */ | ||
352 | NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */ | ||
353 | NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */ | ||
354 | }; | ||
355 | |||
356 | int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)); | ||
357 | |||
358 | if (ex_nid == NID_undef) | ||
359 | return 0; | ||
360 | |||
361 | if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids, | ||
362 | sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int))) | ||
363 | return 1; | ||
364 | return 0; | ||
365 | } | ||
366 | |||
367 | static void | ||
368 | setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp) | ||
369 | { | ||
370 | X509_NAME *iname = NULL; | ||
371 | int i; | ||
372 | |||
373 | if (dp->reasons) { | ||
374 | if (dp->reasons->length > 0) | ||
375 | dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0]; | ||
376 | if (dp->reasons->length > 1) | ||
377 | dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8); | ||
378 | dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; | ||
379 | } else | ||
380 | dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS; | ||
381 | if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1)) | ||
382 | return; | ||
383 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { | ||
384 | GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); | ||
385 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { | ||
386 | iname = gen->d.directoryName; | ||
387 | break; | ||
388 | } | ||
389 | } | ||
390 | if (!iname) | ||
391 | iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x); | ||
392 | |||
393 | DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname); | ||
394 | |||
395 | } | ||
396 | |||
397 | static void | ||
398 | setup_crldp(X509 *x) | ||
399 | { | ||
400 | int i; | ||
401 | |||
402 | x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); | ||
403 | for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) | ||
404 | setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i)); | ||
405 | } | ||
406 | |||
407 | static void | ||
408 | x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x) | ||
409 | { | ||
410 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs; | ||
411 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci; | ||
412 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage; | ||
413 | ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns; | ||
414 | EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage; | ||
415 | X509_EXTENSION *ex; | ||
416 | |||
417 | int i; | ||
418 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET) | ||
419 | return; | ||
420 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA | ||
421 | X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL); | ||
422 | #endif | ||
423 | /* Does subject name match issuer ? */ | ||
424 | if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x))) | ||
425 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI; | ||
426 | /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */ | ||
427 | if (!X509_get_version(x)) | ||
428 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1; | ||
429 | /* Handle basic constraints */ | ||
430 | if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
431 | if (bs->ca) | ||
432 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA; | ||
433 | if (bs->pathlen) { | ||
434 | if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) || | ||
435 | !bs->ca) { | ||
436 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | ||
437 | x->ex_pathlen = 0; | ||
438 | } else | ||
439 | x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen); | ||
440 | } else | ||
441 | x->ex_pathlen = -1; | ||
442 | BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs); | ||
443 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS; | ||
444 | } | ||
445 | /* Handle proxy certificates */ | ||
446 | if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
447 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA || | ||
448 | X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 || | ||
449 | X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) { | ||
450 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | ||
451 | } | ||
452 | if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) { | ||
453 | x->ex_pcpathlen = | ||
454 | ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint); | ||
455 | } else | ||
456 | x->ex_pcpathlen = -1; | ||
457 | PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci); | ||
458 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY; | ||
459 | } | ||
460 | /* Handle key usage */ | ||
461 | if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
462 | if (usage->length > 0) { | ||
463 | x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0]; | ||
464 | if (usage->length > 1) | ||
465 | x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8; | ||
466 | } else | ||
467 | x->ex_kusage = 0; | ||
468 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE; | ||
469 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage); | ||
470 | } | ||
471 | x->ex_xkusage = 0; | ||
472 | if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
473 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE; | ||
474 | for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) { | ||
475 | switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) { | ||
476 | case NID_server_auth: | ||
477 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER; | ||
478 | break; | ||
479 | |||
480 | case NID_client_auth: | ||
481 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT; | ||
482 | break; | ||
483 | |||
484 | case NID_email_protect: | ||
485 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME; | ||
486 | break; | ||
487 | |||
488 | case NID_code_sign: | ||
489 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN; | ||
490 | break; | ||
491 | |||
492 | case NID_ms_sgc: | ||
493 | case NID_ns_sgc: | ||
494 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC; | ||
495 | break; | ||
496 | |||
497 | case NID_OCSP_sign: | ||
498 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN; | ||
499 | break; | ||
500 | |||
501 | case NID_time_stamp: | ||
502 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP; | ||
503 | break; | ||
504 | |||
505 | case NID_dvcs: | ||
506 | x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS; | ||
507 | break; | ||
508 | } | ||
509 | } | ||
510 | sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free); | ||
511 | } | ||
512 | |||
513 | if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) { | ||
514 | if (ns->length > 0) | ||
515 | x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0]; | ||
516 | else | ||
517 | x->ex_nscert = 0; | ||
518 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT; | ||
519 | ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns); | ||
520 | } | ||
521 | |||
522 | x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | ||
523 | x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL); | ||
524 | x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); | ||
525 | x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL); | ||
526 | if (!x->nc && (i != -1)) | ||
527 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID; | ||
528 | setup_crldp(x); | ||
529 | |||
530 | for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) { | ||
531 | ex = X509_get_ext(x, i); | ||
532 | if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) == | ||
533 | NID_freshest_crl) | ||
534 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST; | ||
535 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex)) | ||
536 | continue; | ||
537 | if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) { | ||
538 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL; | ||
539 | break; | ||
540 | } | ||
541 | } | ||
542 | x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET; | ||
543 | } | ||
544 | |||
545 | /* CA checks common to all purposes | ||
546 | * return codes: | ||
547 | * 0 not a CA | ||
548 | * 1 is a CA | ||
549 | * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA | ||
550 | * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1. | ||
551 | * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted. | ||
552 | */ | ||
553 | |||
554 | #define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS) | ||
555 | #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
556 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) | ||
557 | #define xku_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
558 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage))) | ||
559 | #define ns_reject(x, usage) \ | ||
560 | (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage))) | ||
561 | |||
562 | static int | ||
563 | check_ca(const X509 *x) | ||
564 | { | ||
565 | /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */ | ||
566 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) | ||
567 | return 0; | ||
568 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) { | ||
569 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) | ||
570 | return 1; | ||
571 | /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */ | ||
572 | else | ||
573 | return 0; | ||
574 | } else { | ||
575 | /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */ | ||
576 | if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT) | ||
577 | return 3; | ||
578 | /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */ | ||
579 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) | ||
580 | return 4; | ||
581 | /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */ | ||
582 | else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT && | ||
583 | x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA) | ||
584 | return 5; | ||
585 | /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */ | ||
586 | return 0; | ||
587 | } | ||
588 | } | ||
589 | |||
590 | int | ||
591 | X509_check_ca(X509 *x) | ||
592 | { | ||
593 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) { | ||
594 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
595 | x509v3_cache_extensions(x); | ||
596 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); | ||
597 | } | ||
598 | |||
599 | return check_ca(x); | ||
600 | } | ||
601 | |||
602 | /* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */ | ||
603 | static int | ||
604 | check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x) | ||
605 | { | ||
606 | int ca_ret; | ||
607 | |||
608 | ca_ret = check_ca(x); | ||
609 | if (!ca_ret) | ||
610 | return 0; | ||
611 | /* check nsCertType if present */ | ||
612 | if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA) | ||
613 | return ca_ret; | ||
614 | else | ||
615 | return 0; | ||
616 | } | ||
617 | |||
618 | static int | ||
619 | check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
620 | { | ||
621 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT)) | ||
622 | return 0; | ||
623 | if (ca) | ||
624 | return check_ssl_ca(x); | ||
625 | /* We need to do digital signatures with it */ | ||
626 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) | ||
627 | return 0; | ||
628 | /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */ | ||
629 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT)) | ||
630 | return 0; | ||
631 | return 1; | ||
632 | } | ||
633 | |||
634 | static int | ||
635 | check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
636 | { | ||
637 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC)) | ||
638 | return 0; | ||
639 | if (ca) | ||
640 | return check_ssl_ca(x); | ||
641 | |||
642 | if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER)) | ||
643 | return 0; | ||
644 | /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */ | ||
645 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) | ||
646 | return 0; | ||
647 | |||
648 | return 1; | ||
649 | } | ||
650 | |||
651 | static int | ||
652 | check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
653 | { | ||
654 | int ret; | ||
655 | |||
656 | ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca); | ||
657 | if (!ret || ca) | ||
658 | return ret; | ||
659 | /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */ | ||
660 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) | ||
661 | return 0; | ||
662 | return ret; | ||
663 | } | ||
664 | |||
665 | /* common S/MIME checks */ | ||
666 | static int | ||
667 | purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
668 | { | ||
669 | if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME)) | ||
670 | return 0; | ||
671 | if (ca) { | ||
672 | int ca_ret; | ||
673 | ca_ret = check_ca(x); | ||
674 | if (!ca_ret) | ||
675 | return 0; | ||
676 | /* check nsCertType if present */ | ||
677 | if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA) | ||
678 | return ca_ret; | ||
679 | else | ||
680 | return 0; | ||
681 | } | ||
682 | if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) { | ||
683 | if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME) | ||
684 | return 1; | ||
685 | /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */ | ||
686 | if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT) | ||
687 | return 2; | ||
688 | return 0; | ||
689 | } | ||
690 | return 1; | ||
691 | } | ||
692 | |||
693 | static int | ||
694 | check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
695 | { | ||
696 | int ret; | ||
697 | |||
698 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | ||
699 | if (!ret || ca) | ||
700 | return ret; | ||
701 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION)) | ||
702 | return 0; | ||
703 | return ret; | ||
704 | } | ||
705 | |||
706 | static int | ||
707 | check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
708 | { | ||
709 | int ret; | ||
710 | |||
711 | ret = purpose_smime(x, ca); | ||
712 | if (!ret || ca) | ||
713 | return ret; | ||
714 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT)) | ||
715 | return 0; | ||
716 | return ret; | ||
717 | } | ||
718 | |||
719 | static int | ||
720 | check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
721 | { | ||
722 | if (ca) { | ||
723 | int ca_ret; | ||
724 | if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2) | ||
725 | return ca_ret; | ||
726 | else | ||
727 | return 0; | ||
728 | } | ||
729 | if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN)) | ||
730 | return 0; | ||
731 | return 1; | ||
732 | } | ||
733 | |||
734 | /* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that | ||
735 | * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain. | ||
736 | */ | ||
737 | static int | ||
738 | ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
739 | { | ||
740 | /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know" | ||
741 | value (2)? */ | ||
742 | if (ca) | ||
743 | return check_ca(x); | ||
744 | /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */ | ||
745 | return 1; | ||
746 | } | ||
747 | |||
748 | static int | ||
749 | check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
750 | { | ||
751 | int i_ext; | ||
752 | |||
753 | /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */ | ||
754 | if (ca) | ||
755 | return check_ca(x); | ||
756 | |||
757 | /* | ||
758 | * Check the optional key usage field: | ||
759 | * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature | ||
760 | * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall | ||
761 | * be rejected). | ||
762 | */ | ||
763 | if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && | ||
764 | ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) || | ||
765 | !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)))) | ||
766 | return 0; | ||
767 | |||
768 | /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */ | ||
769 | if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP) | ||
770 | return 0; | ||
771 | |||
772 | /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */ | ||
773 | i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1); | ||
774 | if (i_ext >= 0) { | ||
775 | X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext); | ||
776 | if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)) | ||
777 | return 0; | ||
778 | } | ||
779 | |||
780 | return 1; | ||
781 | } | ||
782 | |||
783 | static int | ||
784 | no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca) | ||
785 | { | ||
786 | return 1; | ||
787 | } | ||
788 | |||
789 | /* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second. | ||
790 | * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates | ||
791 | * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by | ||
792 | * subject name. | ||
793 | * These are: | ||
794 | * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer) | ||
795 | * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer | ||
796 | * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing | ||
797 | * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match | ||
798 | * codes for X509_verify_cert() | ||
799 | */ | ||
800 | |||
801 | int | ||
802 | X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject) | ||
803 | { | ||
804 | if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer), | ||
805 | X509_get_issuer_name(subject))) | ||
806 | return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH; | ||
807 | x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer); | ||
808 | x509v3_cache_extensions(subject); | ||
809 | |||
810 | if (subject->akid) { | ||
811 | int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid); | ||
812 | if (ret != X509_V_OK) | ||
813 | return ret; | ||
814 | } | ||
815 | |||
816 | if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { | ||
817 | if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) | ||
818 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; | ||
819 | } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN)) | ||
820 | return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN; | ||
821 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
822 | } | ||
823 | |||
824 | int | ||
825 | X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid) | ||
826 | { | ||
827 | if (!akid) | ||
828 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
829 | |||
830 | /* Check key ids (if present) */ | ||
831 | if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid && | ||
832 | ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) ) | ||
833 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH; | ||
834 | /* Check serial number */ | ||
835 | if (akid->serial && | ||
836 | ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial)) | ||
837 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | ||
838 | /* Check issuer name */ | ||
839 | if (akid->issuer) { | ||
840 | /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes | ||
841 | * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName. | ||
842 | * There may be more than one but we only take any | ||
843 | * notice of the first. | ||
844 | */ | ||
845 | GENERAL_NAMES *gens; | ||
846 | GENERAL_NAME *gen; | ||
847 | X509_NAME *nm = NULL; | ||
848 | int i; | ||
849 | gens = akid->issuer; | ||
850 | for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { | ||
851 | gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); | ||
852 | if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) { | ||
853 | nm = gen->d.dirn; | ||
854 | break; | ||
855 | } | ||
856 | } | ||
857 | if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer))) | ||
858 | return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH; | ||
859 | } | ||
860 | return X509_V_OK; | ||
861 | } | ||