summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c')
-rw-r--r--src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c861
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 861 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 69a8d05f26..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,861 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: v3_purp.c,v 1.26 2015/02/10 13:28:17 jsing Exp $ */
2/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
3 * project 2001.
4 */
5/* ====================================================================
6 * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
7 *
8 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
9 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10 * are met:
11 *
12 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
13 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
14 *
15 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
16 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
17 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
18 * distribution.
19 *
20 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
21 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
22 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
23 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
24 *
25 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
26 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
27 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
28 * licensing@OpenSSL.org.
29 *
30 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
31 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
32 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
33 *
34 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
35 * acknowledgment:
36 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
37 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
38 *
39 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
40 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
41 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
42 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
43 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
44 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
45 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
46 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
47 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
48 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
49 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
50 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
51 * ====================================================================
52 *
53 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
54 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
55 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
56 *
57 */
58
59#include <stdio.h>
60#include <string.h>
61
62#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
63
64#include <openssl/err.h>
65#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
66#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
67
68static void x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x);
69
70static int check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x);
71static int check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
72 int ca);
73static int check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
74 int ca);
75static int check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
76 int ca);
77static int purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca);
78static int check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
79 int ca);
80static int check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
81 int ca);
82static int check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
83 int ca);
84static int check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x,
85 int ca);
86static int no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
87static int ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca);
88
89static int xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, const X509_PURPOSE * const *b);
90static void xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p);
91
92static X509_PURPOSE xstandard[] = {
93 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_CLIENT, X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT, 0, check_purpose_ssl_client, "SSL client", "sslclient", NULL},
94 {X509_PURPOSE_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ssl_server, "SSL server", "sslserver", NULL},
95 {X509_PURPOSE_NS_SSL_SERVER, X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER, 0, check_purpose_ns_ssl_server, "Netscape SSL server", "nssslserver", NULL},
96 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_SIGN, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_sign, "S/MIME signing", "smimesign", NULL},
97 {X509_PURPOSE_SMIME_ENCRYPT, X509_TRUST_EMAIL, 0, check_purpose_smime_encrypt, "S/MIME encryption", "smimeencrypt", NULL},
98 {X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, check_purpose_crl_sign, "CRL signing", "crlsign", NULL},
99 {X509_PURPOSE_ANY, X509_TRUST_DEFAULT, 0, no_check, "Any Purpose", "any", NULL},
100 {X509_PURPOSE_OCSP_HELPER, X509_TRUST_COMPAT, 0, ocsp_helper, "OCSP helper", "ocsphelper", NULL},
101 {X509_PURPOSE_TIMESTAMP_SIGN, X509_TRUST_TSA, 0, check_purpose_timestamp_sign, "Time Stamp signing", "timestampsign", NULL},
102};
103
104#define X509_PURPOSE_COUNT (sizeof(xstandard)/sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))
105
106static STACK_OF(X509_PURPOSE) *xptable = NULL;
107
108static int
109xp_cmp(const X509_PURPOSE * const *a, const X509_PURPOSE * const *b)
110{
111 return (*a)->purpose - (*b)->purpose;
112}
113
114/* As much as I'd like to make X509_check_purpose use a "const" X509*
115 * I really can't because it does recalculate hashes and do other non-const
116 * things. */
117int
118X509_check_purpose(X509 *x, int id, int ca)
119{
120 int idx;
121 const X509_PURPOSE *pt;
122
123 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
124 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
125 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
126 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
127 }
128 if (id == -1)
129 return 1;
130 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
131 if (idx == -1)
132 return -1;
133 pt = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
134 return pt->check_purpose(pt, x, ca);
135}
136
137int
138X509_PURPOSE_set(int *p, int purpose)
139{
140 if (X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose) == -1) {
141 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_SET, X509V3_R_INVALID_PURPOSE);
142 return 0;
143 }
144 *p = purpose;
145 return 1;
146}
147
148int
149X509_PURPOSE_get_count(void)
150{
151 if (!xptable)
152 return X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
153 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_num(xptable) + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
154}
155
156X509_PURPOSE *
157X509_PURPOSE_get0(int idx)
158{
159 if (idx < 0)
160 return NULL;
161 if (idx < (int)X509_PURPOSE_COUNT)
162 return xstandard + idx;
163 return sk_X509_PURPOSE_value(xptable, idx - X509_PURPOSE_COUNT);
164}
165
166int
167X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname(char *sname)
168{
169 int i;
170 X509_PURPOSE *xptmp;
171
172 for (i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_get_count(); i++) {
173 xptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(i);
174 if (!strcmp(xptmp->sname, sname))
175 return i;
176 }
177 return -1;
178}
179
180int
181X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(int purpose)
182{
183 X509_PURPOSE tmp;
184 int idx;
185
186 if ((purpose >= X509_PURPOSE_MIN) && (purpose <= X509_PURPOSE_MAX))
187 return purpose - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
188 tmp.purpose = purpose;
189 if (!xptable)
190 return -1;
191 idx = sk_X509_PURPOSE_find(xptable, &tmp);
192 if (idx == -1)
193 return -1;
194 return idx + X509_PURPOSE_COUNT;
195}
196
197int
198X509_PURPOSE_add(int id, int trust, int flags,
199 int (*ck)(const X509_PURPOSE *, const X509 *, int), char *name,
200 char *sname, void *arg)
201{
202 int idx;
203 X509_PURPOSE *ptmp;
204 char *name_dup, *sname_dup;
205
206 name_dup = sname_dup = NULL;
207
208 if (name == NULL || sname == NULL) {
209 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,
210 X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_ARGUMENT);
211 return 0;
212 }
213
214 /* This is set according to what we change: application can't set it */
215 flags &= ~X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
216 /* This will always be set for application modified trust entries */
217 flags |= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME;
218 /* Get existing entry if any */
219 idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(id);
220 /* Need a new entry */
221 if (idx == -1) {
222 if ((ptmp = malloc(sizeof(X509_PURPOSE))) == NULL) {
223 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD,
224 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
225 return 0;
226 }
227 ptmp->flags = X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
228 } else
229 ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx);
230
231 if ((name_dup = strdup(name)) == NULL)
232 goto err;
233 if ((sname_dup = strdup(sname)) == NULL)
234 goto err;
235
236 /* free existing name if dynamic */
237 if (ptmp->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
238 free(ptmp->name);
239 free(ptmp->sname);
240 }
241 /* dup supplied name */
242 ptmp->name = name_dup;
243 ptmp->sname = sname_dup;
244 /* Keep the dynamic flag of existing entry */
245 ptmp->flags &= X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC;
246 /* Set all other flags */
247 ptmp->flags |= flags;
248
249 ptmp->purpose = id;
250 ptmp->trust = trust;
251 ptmp->check_purpose = ck;
252 ptmp->usr_data = arg;
253
254 /* If its a new entry manage the dynamic table */
255 if (idx == -1) {
256 if (xptable == NULL &&
257 (xptable = sk_X509_PURPOSE_new(xp_cmp)) == NULL)
258 goto err;
259 if (sk_X509_PURPOSE_push(xptable, ptmp) == 0)
260 goto err;
261 }
262 return 1;
263
264err:
265 free(name_dup);
266 free(sname_dup);
267 if (idx == -1)
268 free(ptmp);
269 X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509_PURPOSE_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
270 return 0;
271}
272
273static void
274xptable_free(X509_PURPOSE *p)
275{
276 if (!p)
277 return;
278 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC) {
279 if (p->flags & X509_PURPOSE_DYNAMIC_NAME) {
280 free(p->name);
281 free(p->sname);
282 }
283 free(p);
284 }
285}
286
287void
288X509_PURPOSE_cleanup(void)
289{
290 unsigned int i;
291
292 sk_X509_PURPOSE_pop_free(xptable, xptable_free);
293 for(i = 0; i < X509_PURPOSE_COUNT; i++)
294 xptable_free(xstandard + i);
295 xptable = NULL;
296}
297
298int
299X509_PURPOSE_get_id(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
300{
301 return xp->purpose;
302}
303
304char *
305X509_PURPOSE_get0_name(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
306{
307 return xp->name;
308}
309
310char *
311X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
312{
313 return xp->sname;
314}
315
316int
317X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(X509_PURPOSE *xp)
318{
319 return xp->trust;
320}
321
322static int
323nid_cmp(const int *a, const int *b)
324{
325 return *a - *b;
326}
327
328DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
329IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(int, int, nid);
330
331int
332X509_supported_extension(X509_EXTENSION *ex)
333{
334 /* This table is a list of the NIDs of supported extensions:
335 * that is those which are used by the verify process. If
336 * an extension is critical and doesn't appear in this list
337 * then the verify process will normally reject the certificate.
338 * The list must be kept in numerical order because it will be
339 * searched using bsearch.
340 */
341
342 static const int supported_nids[] = {
343 NID_netscape_cert_type, /* 71 */
344 NID_key_usage, /* 83 */
345 NID_subject_alt_name, /* 85 */
346 NID_basic_constraints, /* 87 */
347 NID_certificate_policies, /* 89 */
348 NID_ext_key_usage, /* 126 */
349 NID_policy_constraints, /* 401 */
350 NID_proxyCertInfo, /* 663 */
351 NID_name_constraints, /* 666 */
352 NID_policy_mappings, /* 747 */
353 NID_inhibit_any_policy /* 748 */
354 };
355
356 int ex_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex));
357
358 if (ex_nid == NID_undef)
359 return 0;
360
361 if (OBJ_bsearch_nid(&ex_nid, supported_nids,
362 sizeof(supported_nids) / sizeof(int)))
363 return 1;
364 return 0;
365}
366
367static void
368setup_dp(X509 *x, DIST_POINT *dp)
369{
370 X509_NAME *iname = NULL;
371 int i;
372
373 if (dp->reasons) {
374 if (dp->reasons->length > 0)
375 dp->dp_reasons = dp->reasons->data[0];
376 if (dp->reasons->length > 1)
377 dp->dp_reasons |= (dp->reasons->data[1] << 8);
378 dp->dp_reasons &= CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
379 } else
380 dp->dp_reasons = CRLDP_ALL_REASONS;
381 if (!dp->distpoint || (dp->distpoint->type != 1))
382 return;
383 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
384 GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
385 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
386 iname = gen->d.directoryName;
387 break;
388 }
389 }
390 if (!iname)
391 iname = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
392
393 DIST_POINT_set_dpname(dp->distpoint, iname);
394
395}
396
397static void
398setup_crldp(X509 *x)
399{
400 int i;
401
402 x->crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL);
403 for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++)
404 setup_dp(x, sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i));
405}
406
407static void
408x509v3_cache_extensions(X509 *x)
409{
410 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS *bs;
411 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION *pci;
412 ASN1_BIT_STRING *usage;
413 ASN1_BIT_STRING *ns;
414 EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE *extusage;
415 X509_EXTENSION *ex;
416
417 int i;
418 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
419 return;
420#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
421 X509_digest(x, EVP_sha1(), x->sha1_hash, NULL);
422#endif
423 /* Does subject name match issuer ? */
424 if (!X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(x), X509_get_issuer_name(x)))
425 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SI;
426 /* V1 should mean no extensions ... */
427 if (!X509_get_version(x))
428 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_V1;
429 /* Handle basic constraints */
430 if ((bs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_basic_constraints, NULL, NULL))) {
431 if (bs->ca)
432 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CA;
433 if (bs->pathlen) {
434 if ((bs->pathlen->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER) ||
435 !bs->ca) {
436 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
437 x->ex_pathlen = 0;
438 } else
439 x->ex_pathlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(bs->pathlen);
440 } else
441 x->ex_pathlen = -1;
442 BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free(bs);
443 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_BCONS;
444 }
445 /* Handle proxy certificates */
446 if ((pci = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_proxyCertInfo, NULL, NULL))) {
447 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA ||
448 X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_subject_alt_name, -1) >= 0 ||
449 X509_get_ext_by_NID(x, NID_issuer_alt_name, -1) >= 0) {
450 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
451 }
452 if (pci->pcPathLengthConstraint) {
453 x->ex_pcpathlen =
454 ASN1_INTEGER_get(pci->pcPathLengthConstraint);
455 } else
456 x->ex_pcpathlen = -1;
457 PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free(pci);
458 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_PROXY;
459 }
460 /* Handle key usage */
461 if ((usage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
462 if (usage->length > 0) {
463 x->ex_kusage = usage->data[0];
464 if (usage->length > 1)
465 x->ex_kusage |= usage->data[1] << 8;
466 } else
467 x->ex_kusage = 0;
468 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_KUSAGE;
469 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(usage);
470 }
471 x->ex_xkusage = 0;
472 if ((extusage = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_ext_key_usage, NULL, NULL))) {
473 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_XKUSAGE;
474 for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(extusage); i++) {
475 switch (OBJ_obj2nid(sk_ASN1_OBJECT_value(extusage, i))) {
476 case NID_server_auth:
477 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_SERVER;
478 break;
479
480 case NID_client_auth:
481 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SSL_CLIENT;
482 break;
483
484 case NID_email_protect:
485 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SMIME;
486 break;
487
488 case NID_code_sign:
489 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_CODE_SIGN;
490 break;
491
492 case NID_ms_sgc:
493 case NID_ns_sgc:
494 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_SGC;
495 break;
496
497 case NID_OCSP_sign:
498 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_OCSP_SIGN;
499 break;
500
501 case NID_time_stamp:
502 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_TIMESTAMP;
503 break;
504
505 case NID_dvcs:
506 x->ex_xkusage |= XKU_DVCS;
507 break;
508 }
509 }
510 sk_ASN1_OBJECT_pop_free(extusage, ASN1_OBJECT_free);
511 }
512
513 if ((ns = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_netscape_cert_type, NULL, NULL))) {
514 if (ns->length > 0)
515 x->ex_nscert = ns->data[0];
516 else
517 x->ex_nscert = 0;
518 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_NSCERT;
519 ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ns);
520 }
521
522 x->skid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
523 x->akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
524 x->altname = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
525 x->nc = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_name_constraints, &i, NULL);
526 if (!x->nc && (i != -1))
527 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_INVALID;
528 setup_crldp(x);
529
530 for (i = 0; i < X509_get_ext_count(x); i++) {
531 ex = X509_get_ext(x, i);
532 if (OBJ_obj2nid(X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ex)) ==
533 NID_freshest_crl)
534 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_FRESHEST;
535 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ex))
536 continue;
537 if (!X509_supported_extension(ex)) {
538 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_CRITICAL;
539 break;
540 }
541 }
542 x->ex_flags |= EXFLAG_SET;
543}
544
545/* CA checks common to all purposes
546 * return codes:
547 * 0 not a CA
548 * 1 is a CA
549 * 2 basicConstraints absent so "maybe" a CA
550 * 3 basicConstraints absent but self signed V1.
551 * 4 basicConstraints absent but keyUsage present and keyCertSign asserted.
552 */
553
554#define V1_ROOT (EXFLAG_V1|EXFLAG_SS)
555#define ku_reject(x, usage) \
556 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage)))
557#define xku_reject(x, usage) \
558 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_xkusage & (usage)))
559#define ns_reject(x, usage) \
560 (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) && !((x)->ex_nscert & (usage)))
561
562static int
563check_ca(const X509 *x)
564{
565 /* keyUsage if present should allow cert signing */
566 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
567 return 0;
568 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) {
569 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)
570 return 1;
571 /* If basicConstraints says not a CA then say so */
572 else
573 return 0;
574 } else {
575 /* we support V1 roots for... uh, I don't really know why. */
576 if ((x->ex_flags & V1_ROOT) == V1_ROOT)
577 return 3;
578 /* If key usage present it must have certSign so tolerate it */
579 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE)
580 return 4;
581 /* Older certificates could have Netscape-specific CA types */
582 else if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT &&
583 x->ex_nscert & NS_ANY_CA)
584 return 5;
585 /* can this still be regarded a CA certificate? I doubt it */
586 return 0;
587 }
588}
589
590int
591X509_check_ca(X509 *x)
592{
593 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)) {
594 CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
595 x509v3_cache_extensions(x);
596 CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
597 }
598
599 return check_ca(x);
600}
601
602/* Check SSL CA: common checks for SSL client and server */
603static int
604check_ssl_ca(const X509 *x)
605{
606 int ca_ret;
607
608 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
609 if (!ca_ret)
610 return 0;
611 /* check nsCertType if present */
612 if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CA)
613 return ca_ret;
614 else
615 return 0;
616}
617
618static int
619check_purpose_ssl_client(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
620{
621 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_CLIENT))
622 return 0;
623 if (ca)
624 return check_ssl_ca(x);
625 /* We need to do digital signatures with it */
626 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
627 return 0;
628 /* nsCertType if present should allow SSL client use */
629 if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_CLIENT))
630 return 0;
631 return 1;
632}
633
634static int
635check_purpose_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
636{
637 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SSL_SERVER|XKU_SGC))
638 return 0;
639 if (ca)
640 return check_ssl_ca(x);
641
642 if (ns_reject(x, NS_SSL_SERVER))
643 return 0;
644 /* Now as for keyUsage: we'll at least need to sign OR encipher */
645 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
646 return 0;
647
648 return 1;
649}
650
651static int
652check_purpose_ns_ssl_server(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
653{
654 int ret;
655
656 ret = check_purpose_ssl_server(xp, x, ca);
657 if (!ret || ca)
658 return ret;
659 /* We need to encipher or Netscape complains */
660 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
661 return 0;
662 return ret;
663}
664
665/* common S/MIME checks */
666static int
667purpose_smime(const X509 *x, int ca)
668{
669 if (xku_reject(x, XKU_SMIME))
670 return 0;
671 if (ca) {
672 int ca_ret;
673 ca_ret = check_ca(x);
674 if (!ca_ret)
675 return 0;
676 /* check nsCertType if present */
677 if (ca_ret != 5 || x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME_CA)
678 return ca_ret;
679 else
680 return 0;
681 }
682 if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_NSCERT) {
683 if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SMIME)
684 return 1;
685 /* Workaround for some buggy certificates */
686 if (x->ex_nscert & NS_SSL_CLIENT)
687 return 2;
688 return 0;
689 }
690 return 1;
691}
692
693static int
694check_purpose_smime_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
695{
696 int ret;
697
698 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
699 if (!ret || ca)
700 return ret;
701 if (ku_reject(x, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE|KU_NON_REPUDIATION))
702 return 0;
703 return ret;
704}
705
706static int
707check_purpose_smime_encrypt(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
708{
709 int ret;
710
711 ret = purpose_smime(x, ca);
712 if (!ret || ca)
713 return ret;
714 if (ku_reject(x, KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT))
715 return 0;
716 return ret;
717}
718
719static int
720check_purpose_crl_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
721{
722 if (ca) {
723 int ca_ret;
724 if ((ca_ret = check_ca(x)) != 2)
725 return ca_ret;
726 else
727 return 0;
728 }
729 if (ku_reject(x, KU_CRL_SIGN))
730 return 0;
731 return 1;
732}
733
734/* OCSP helper: this is *not* a full OCSP check. It just checks that
735 * each CA is valid. Additional checks must be made on the chain.
736 */
737static int
738ocsp_helper(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
739{
740 /* Must be a valid CA. Should we really support the "I don't know"
741 value (2)? */
742 if (ca)
743 return check_ca(x);
744 /* leaf certificate is checked in OCSP_verify() */
745 return 1;
746}
747
748static int
749check_purpose_timestamp_sign(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
750{
751 int i_ext;
752
753 /* If ca is true we must return if this is a valid CA certificate. */
754 if (ca)
755 return check_ca(x);
756
757 /*
758 * Check the optional key usage field:
759 * if Key Usage is present, it must be one of digitalSignature
760 * and/or nonRepudiation (other values are not consistent and shall
761 * be rejected).
762 */
763 if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
764 ((x->ex_kusage & ~(KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) ||
765 !(x->ex_kusage & (KU_NON_REPUDIATION | KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))))
766 return 0;
767
768 /* Only time stamp key usage is permitted and it's required. */
769 if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_XKUSAGE) || x->ex_xkusage != XKU_TIMESTAMP)
770 return 0;
771
772 /* Extended Key Usage MUST be critical */
773 i_ext = X509_get_ext_by_NID((X509 *) x, NID_ext_key_usage, -1);
774 if (i_ext >= 0) {
775 X509_EXTENSION *ext = X509_get_ext((X509 *) x, i_ext);
776 if (!X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext))
777 return 0;
778 }
779
780 return 1;
781}
782
783static int
784no_check(const X509_PURPOSE *xp, const X509 *x, int ca)
785{
786 return 1;
787}
788
789/* Various checks to see if one certificate issued the second.
790 * This can be used to prune a set of possible issuer certificates
791 * which have been looked up using some simple method such as by
792 * subject name.
793 * These are:
794 * 1. Check issuer_name(subject) == subject_name(issuer)
795 * 2. If akid(subject) exists check it matches issuer
796 * 3. If key_usage(issuer) exists check it supports certificate signing
797 * returns 0 for OK, positive for reason for mismatch, reasons match
798 * codes for X509_verify_cert()
799 */
800
801int
802X509_check_issued(X509 *issuer, X509 *subject)
803{
804 if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(issuer),
805 X509_get_issuer_name(subject)))
806 return X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH;
807 x509v3_cache_extensions(issuer);
808 x509v3_cache_extensions(subject);
809
810 if (subject->akid) {
811 int ret = X509_check_akid(issuer, subject->akid);
812 if (ret != X509_V_OK)
813 return ret;
814 }
815
816 if (subject->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) {
817 if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE))
818 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE;
819 } else if (ku_reject(issuer, KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN))
820 return X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN;
821 return X509_V_OK;
822}
823
824int
825X509_check_akid(X509 *issuer, AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid)
826{
827 if (!akid)
828 return X509_V_OK;
829
830 /* Check key ids (if present) */
831 if (akid->keyid && issuer->skid &&
832 ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(akid->keyid, issuer->skid) )
833 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH;
834 /* Check serial number */
835 if (akid->serial &&
836 ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(X509_get_serialNumber(issuer), akid->serial))
837 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
838 /* Check issuer name */
839 if (akid->issuer) {
840 /* Ugh, for some peculiar reason AKID includes
841 * SEQUENCE OF GeneralName. So look for a DirName.
842 * There may be more than one but we only take any
843 * notice of the first.
844 */
845 GENERAL_NAMES *gens;
846 GENERAL_NAME *gen;
847 X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
848 int i;
849 gens = akid->issuer;
850 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
851 gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
852 if (gen->type == GEN_DIRNAME) {
853 nm = gen->d.dirn;
854 break;
855 }
856 }
857 if (nm && X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_issuer_name(issuer)))
858 return X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH;
859 }
860 return X509_V_OK;
861}