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1/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
2/*
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 * distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * acknowledgment:
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 *
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 *
58 */
59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
61 *
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 *
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 *
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 *
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 * are met:
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 *
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 *
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 */
115
116#include <stdio.h>
117#include <errno.h>
118#define USE_SOCKETS
119#include "ssl_locl.h"
120#include <openssl/evp.h>
121#include <openssl/buffer.h>
122#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123#include <openssl/rand.h>
124
125/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
127{ int ret,sat,brw,i;
128
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
131 long l;
132
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
138
139 l = *((long *)v1);
140 l -= *((long *)v2);
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
143 else return (int)l;
144 } while (0);
145
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
147 sat = 0;
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
149 if (ret & 0x80)
150 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
152 sat |= ~brw;
153 brw >>= 8;
154 }
155 }
156 else
157 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
159 sat |= brw;
160 brw >>= 8;
161 }
162 }
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
164
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
167}
168
169static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
170 int len, int peek);
171static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
175#if 0
176static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
178#endif
179static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182static void dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s);
183
184/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
185static int
186dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
187 {
188 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
189
190 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
191
192 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
193 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
194
195 s->packet = rdata->packet;
196 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
198 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
199
200 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
201 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
202
203 return(1);
204 }
205
206
207static int
208dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
209 {
210 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
211 pitem *item;
212
213 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
214 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
215 return 0;
216
217 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
218 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
219 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
220 {
221 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
222 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
223
224 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
225 return(0);
226 }
227
228 rdata->packet = s->packet;
229 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
231 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
232
233 item->data = rdata;
234
235 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
236 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
237 {
238 OPENSSL_free(rdata);
239 pitem_free(item);
240 return(0);
241 }
242
243 s->packet = NULL;
244 s->packet_length = 0;
245 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
246 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
247
248 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
249 {
250 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
251 OPENSSL_free(rdata);
252 pitem_free(item);
253 return(0);
254 }
255
256 return(1);
257 }
258
259
260static int
261dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
262 {
263 pitem *item;
264
265 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
266 if (item)
267 {
268 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
269
270 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
271 pitem_free(item);
272
273 return(1);
274 }
275
276 return(0);
277 }
278
279
280/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
281 * yet */
282#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
283 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
284 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
285
286/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
287#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
288 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
289 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
290
291static int
292dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
293 {
294 pitem *item;
295
296 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
297 if (item)
298 {
299 /* Check if epoch is current. */
300 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
301 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
302
303 /* Process all the records. */
304 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
305 {
306 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
307 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
308 return(0);
309 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
310 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
311 }
312 }
313
314 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
315 * have been processed */
316 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
317 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
318
319 return(1);
320 }
321
322
323#if 0
324
325static int
326dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
327 {
328 pitem *item;
329 PQ_64BIT priority =
330 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
331 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
332
333 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
334 nothing buffered */
335 return 0;
336
337
338 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
339 if (item && item->priority == priority)
340 {
341 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
342 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
343 * buffering */
344 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
345 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
346 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
347
348 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
349 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
350
351 s->packet = rdata->packet;
352 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
353 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
354 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
355
356 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
357 pitem_free(item);
358
359 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
360 return(1);
361 }
362
363 return 0;
364 }
365
366#endif
367
368static int
369dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
370{
371 int i,al;
372 int clear=0;
373 int enc_err;
374 SSL_SESSION *sess;
375 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
376 unsigned int mac_size;
377 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
378 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
379
380
381 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
382 sess = s->session;
383
384 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
385 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
386 */
387 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
388
389 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
390 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
391 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
392 * the decryption or by the decompression
393 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
394 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
395
396 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
397 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
398
399 /* check is not needed I believe */
400 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
401 {
402 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
403 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
404 goto f_err;
405 }
406
407 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
408 rr->data=rr->input;
409
410 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
411 if (enc_err <= 0)
412 {
413 /* To minimize information leaked via timing, we will always
414 * perform all computations before discarding the message.
415 */
416 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
417 }
418
419#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
420printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
421{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
422printf("\n");
423#endif
424
425 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
426 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
427 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
428 (s->read_hash == NULL))
429 clear=1;
430
431 if (!clear)
432 {
433 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
434 int t;
435 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
436 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
437 mac_size=t;
438
439 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
440 {
441#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
442 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
443 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
444 goto f_err;
445#else
446 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
447#endif
448 }
449 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
450 if (rr->length < mac_size)
451 {
452#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
453 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
454 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
455 goto f_err;
456#else
457 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
458#endif
459 }
460 rr->length-=mac_size;
461 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
462 if (i < 0 || memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
463 {
464 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
465 }
466 }
467
468 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
469 {
470 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
471 rr->length = 0;
472 s->packet_length = 0;
473 goto err;
474 }
475
476 /* r->length is now just compressed */
477 if (s->expand != NULL)
478 {
479 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
480 {
481 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
483 goto f_err;
484 }
485 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
486 {
487 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
488 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
489 goto f_err;
490 }
491 }
492
493 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
494 {
495 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
496 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
497 goto f_err;
498 }
499
500 rr->off=0;
501 /* So at this point the following is true
502 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
503 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
504 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
505 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
506 * after use :-).
507 */
508
509 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
510 s->packet_length=0;
511 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
512 return(1);
513
514f_err:
515 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
516err:
517 return(0);
518}
519
520
521/* Call this to get a new input record.
522 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
523 * or non-blocking IO.
524 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
525 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
526 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
527 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
528 */
529/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
530int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
531 {
532 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
533 int i,n;
534 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
535 unsigned char *p = NULL;
536 unsigned short version;
537 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
538 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
539
540 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
541
542 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
543 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
544 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
545
546 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
547 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
548 return 1;
549
550 /* get something from the wire */
551again:
552 /* check if we have the header */
553 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
554 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
555 {
556 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
557 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
558 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
559
560 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
561 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
562 {
563 s->packet_length = 0;
564 goto again;
565 }
566
567 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
568
569 p=s->packet;
570
571 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
572 rr->type= *(p++);
573 ssl_major= *(p++);
574 ssl_minor= *(p++);
575 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
576
577 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
578 n2s(p,rr->epoch);
579
580 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
581 p+=6;
582
583 n2s(p,rr->length);
584
585 /* Lets check version */
586 if (!s->first_packet)
587 {
588 if (version != s->version)
589 {
590 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
591 rr->length = 0;
592 s->packet_length = 0;
593 goto again;
594 }
595 }
596
597 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
598 {
599 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
600 rr->length = 0;
601 s->packet_length = 0;
602 goto again;
603 }
604
605 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
606 {
607 /* record too long, silently discard it */
608 rr->length = 0;
609 s->packet_length = 0;
610 goto again;
611 }
612
613 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
614 }
615
616 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
617
618 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
619 {
620 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
621 i=rr->length;
622 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
623 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
624
625 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
626 if ( n != i)
627 {
628 rr->length = 0;
629 s->packet_length = 0;
630 goto again;
631 }
632
633 /* now n == rr->length,
634 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
635 }
636 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
637
638 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
639 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
640 if ( bitmap == NULL)
641 {
642 rr->length = 0;
643 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
644 goto again; /* get another record */
645 }
646
647 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
648 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
649 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
650 * since they arrive from different connections and
651 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
652 */
653 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
654 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
655 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
656 {
657 rr->length = 0;
658 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
659 goto again; /* get another record */
660 }
661
662 /* just read a 0 length packet */
663 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
664
665 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
666 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
667 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
668 * anything while listening.
669 */
670 if (is_next_epoch)
671 {
672 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
673 {
674 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
675 }
676 rr->length = 0;
677 s->packet_length = 0;
678 goto again;
679 }
680
681 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
682 {
683 rr->length = 0;
684 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
685 goto again; /* get another record */
686 }
687
688 dtls1_clear_timeouts(s); /* done waiting */
689 return(1);
690
691 }
692
693/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
694 * 'type' is one of the following:
695 *
696 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
697 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
698 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
699 *
700 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
701 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
702 *
703 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
704 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
705 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
706 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
707 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
708 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
709 * Change cipher spec protocol
710 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
711 * Alert protocol
712 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
713 * Handshake protocol
714 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
715 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
716 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
717 * Application data protocol
718 * none of our business
719 */
720int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
721 {
722 int al,i,j,ret;
723 unsigned int n;
724 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
725 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
726
727 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
728 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
729 return(-1);
730
731 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
732 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
733 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
734 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
735 {
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
737 return -1;
738 }
739
740 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
741 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
742 return ret;
743
744 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
745
746 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
747 {
748 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
749 i=s->handshake_func(s);
750 if (i < 0) return(i);
751 if (i == 0)
752 {
753 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
754 return(-1);
755 }
756 }
757
758start:
759 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
760
761 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
762 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
763 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
764 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
765 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
766
767 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
768 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
769 * in advance, if any.
770 */
771 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
772 {
773 pitem *item;
774 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
775 if (item)
776 {
777 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
778
779 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
780 pitem_free(item);
781 }
782 }
783
784 /* Check for timeout */
785 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
786 goto start;
787
788 /* get new packet if necessary */
789 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
790 {
791 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
792 if (ret <= 0)
793 {
794 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
795 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
796 if (ret <= 0)
797 return(ret);
798 else
799 goto start;
800 }
801 }
802
803 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
804
805 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
806 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
807 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
808 {
809 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
810 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
811 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
812 * than dropping the connection.
813 */
814 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
815 rr->length = 0;
816 goto start;
817 }
818
819 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
820 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
821 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
822 {
823 rr->length=0;
824 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
825 return(0);
826 }
827
828
829 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
830 {
831 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
832 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
833 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
834 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
835 {
836 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
837 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
838 goto f_err;
839 }
840
841 if (len <= 0) return(len);
842
843 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
844 n = rr->length;
845 else
846 n = (unsigned int)len;
847
848 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
849 if (!peek)
850 {
851 rr->length-=n;
852 rr->off+=n;
853 if (rr->length == 0)
854 {
855 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
856 rr->off=0;
857 }
858 }
859 return(n);
860 }
861
862
863 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
864 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
865
866 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
867 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
868 */
869 {
870 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
871 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
872 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
873
874 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
875 {
876 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
877 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
878 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
879 }
880 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
881 {
882 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
883 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
884 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
885 }
886 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
887 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
888 {
889 /* Application data while renegotiating
890 * is allowed. Try again reading.
891 */
892 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
893 {
894 BIO *bio;
895 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
896 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
897 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
898 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
899 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
900 return(-1);
901 }
902
903 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
904 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
905 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
906 goto f_err;
907 }
908
909 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
910 {
911 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
912 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
913 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
914 {
915#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
916 /*
917 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
918 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
919 * non-existing alert...
920 */
921 FIX ME
922#endif
923 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
924 rr->length = 0;
925 goto start;
926 }
927
928 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
929 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
930 {
931 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
932 rr->length--;
933 }
934 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
935 }
936 }
937
938 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
939 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
940 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
941
942 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
943 if ((!s->server) &&
944 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
945 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
946 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
947 {
948 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
949
950 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
951 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
952 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
953 {
954 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
955 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
956 goto err;
957 }
958
959 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
960
961 if (s->msg_callback)
962 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
963 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
964
965 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
966 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
967 !s->s3->renegotiate)
968 {
969 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
970 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
971 {
972 i=s->handshake_func(s);
973 if (i < 0) return(i);
974 if (i == 0)
975 {
976 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
977 return(-1);
978 }
979
980 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
981 {
982 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
983 {
984 BIO *bio;
985 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
986 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
987 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
988 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
989 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
990 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
991 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
992 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
993 return(-1);
994 }
995 }
996 }
997 }
998 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
999 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1000 goto start;
1001 }
1002
1003 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1004 {
1005 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1006 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1007
1008 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1009
1010 if (s->msg_callback)
1011 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1012 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1013
1014 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1015 cb=s->info_callback;
1016 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1017 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1018
1019 if (cb != NULL)
1020 {
1021 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1022 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1023 }
1024
1025 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1026 {
1027 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1028 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1029 {
1030 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1031 return(0);
1032 }
1033#if 0
1034 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1035 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1036 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1037 {
1038 unsigned short seq;
1039 unsigned int frag_off;
1040 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1041
1042 n2s(p, seq);
1043 n2l3(p, frag_off);
1044
1045 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1046 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1047 frag_off, &found);
1048 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1049 {
1050 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1051 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1052 send an alert ourselves */
1053 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1054 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1055 }
1056 }
1057#endif
1058 }
1059 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1060 {
1061 char tmp[16];
1062
1063 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1064 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1065 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1066 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1067 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1068 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1069 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1070 return(0);
1071 }
1072 else
1073 {
1074 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1075 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1076 goto f_err;
1077 }
1078
1079 goto start;
1080 }
1081
1082 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1083 {
1084 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1085 rr->length=0;
1086 return(0);
1087 }
1088
1089 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1090 {
1091 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1092 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1093
1094 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1095
1096 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1097 ccs_hdr_len = 3;
1098
1099 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1100 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1101 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1102 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1103 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1104 {
1105 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1106 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1107 goto err;
1108 }
1109
1110 rr->length=0;
1111
1112 if (s->msg_callback)
1113 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1114 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1115
1116 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1117 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1118 */
1119 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1120 {
1121 goto start;
1122 }
1123
1124 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1125
1126 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1127 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1128 goto err;
1129
1130 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1131 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1132
1133 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1134 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1135
1136 goto start;
1137 }
1138
1139 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1140 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1141 !s->in_handshake)
1142 {
1143 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1144
1145 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1146 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1147 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1148 {
1149 rr->length = 0;
1150 goto start;
1151 }
1152
1153 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1154 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1155 */
1156 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1157 {
1158 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1159 rr->length = 0;
1160 goto start;
1161 }
1162
1163 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1164 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1165 {
1166#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1167 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1168 * protocol violations): */
1169 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1170 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1171 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1172#else
1173 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1174#endif
1175 s->new_session=1;
1176 }
1177 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1178 if (i < 0) return(i);
1179 if (i == 0)
1180 {
1181 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1182 return(-1);
1183 }
1184
1185 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1186 {
1187 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1188 {
1189 BIO *bio;
1190 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1191 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1192 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1193 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1194 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1195 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1196 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1197 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1198 return(-1);
1199 }
1200 }
1201 goto start;
1202 }
1203
1204 switch (rr->type)
1205 {
1206 default:
1207#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1208 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1209 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1210 {
1211 rr->length = 0;
1212 goto start;
1213 }
1214#endif
1215 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1217 goto f_err;
1218 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1219 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1220 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1221 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1222 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1223 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1224 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1226 goto f_err;
1227 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1228 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1229 * but have application data. If the library was
1230 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1231 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1232 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1233 * we will indulge it.
1234 */
1235 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1236 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1237 ((
1238 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1239 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1240 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1241 ) || (
1242 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1243 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1244 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1245 )
1246 ))
1247 {
1248 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1249 return(-1);
1250 }
1251 else
1252 {
1253 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1254 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1255 goto f_err;
1256 }
1257 }
1258 /* not reached */
1259
1260f_err:
1261 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1262err:
1263 return(-1);
1264 }
1265
1266int
1267dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1268 {
1269 int i;
1270
1271 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1272 {
1273 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1274 if (i < 0) return(i);
1275 if (i == 0)
1276 {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1278 return -1;
1279 }
1280 }
1281
1282 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1283 {
1284 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1285 return -1;
1286 }
1287
1288 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1289 return i;
1290 }
1291
1292
1293 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1294 * is started. */
1295static int
1296have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1297 int len, int peek)
1298 {
1299
1300 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1301 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1302 {
1303 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1304 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1305 unsigned int k,n;
1306
1307 /* peek == 0 */
1308 n = 0;
1309 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1310 {
1311 *dst++ = *src++;
1312 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1313 n++;
1314 }
1315 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1316 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1317 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1318 return n;
1319 }
1320
1321 return 0;
1322 }
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1328 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1329 */
1330int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1331 {
1332 int i;
1333
1334 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1335 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1336 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1337 return i;
1338 }
1339
1340int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1341 {
1342 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1343 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1344 int prefix_len = 0;
1345 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1346 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1347 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1348 int bs;
1349
1350 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1351 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1352 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1353 {
1354 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1355 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1356 }
1357
1358 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1359 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1360 {
1361 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1362 if (i <= 0)
1363 return(i);
1364 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1365 }
1366
1367 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1368 return 0;
1369
1370 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
1371 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
1372 sess=s->session;
1373
1374 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1375 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1376 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1377 clear=1;
1378
1379 if (clear)
1380 mac_size=0;
1381 else
1382 {
1383 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1384 if (mac_size < 0)
1385 goto err;
1386 }
1387
1388 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1389#if 0
1390 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1391 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1392 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1393 {
1394 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1395 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1396 */
1397
1398 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1399 {
1400 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1401 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1402 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1403 * together with the actual payload) */
1404 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1405 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1406 goto err;
1407
1408 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1409 {
1410 /* insufficient space */
1411 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1412 goto err;
1413 }
1414 }
1415
1416 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1417 }
1418#endif
1419 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1420
1421 /* write the header */
1422
1423 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1424 wr->type=type;
1425
1426 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1427 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1428
1429 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1430 pseq=p;
1431 p+=10;
1432
1433 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1434
1435 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1436 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1437 */
1438 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1439 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1440 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1441 else
1442 bs = 0;
1443
1444 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1445 wr->length=(int)len;
1446 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1447
1448 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1449 * wr->data */
1450
1451 /* first we compress */
1452 if (s->compress != NULL)
1453 {
1454 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1455 {
1456 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1457 goto err;
1458 }
1459 }
1460 else
1461 {
1462 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1463 wr->input=wr->data;
1464 }
1465
1466 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1467 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1468 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1469
1470 if (mac_size != 0)
1471 {
1472 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1473 goto err;
1474 wr->length+=mac_size;
1475 }
1476
1477 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1478 wr->input=p;
1479 wr->data=p;
1480
1481
1482 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1483 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1484 {
1485 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1486 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1487 * the rest of randomness */
1488 wr->length += bs;
1489 }
1490
1491 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1492
1493 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1494/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1495 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1496
1497 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1498
1499 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1500
1501 /* XDTLS: ?? */
1502/* else
1503 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1504
1505 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1506 pseq+=6;
1507 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1508
1509 /* we should now have
1510 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1511 * wr->length long */
1512 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1513 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1514
1515#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1516 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1517 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1518 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1519 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1520#endif
1521
1522 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1523
1524 if (create_empty_fragment)
1525 {
1526 /* we are in a recursive call;
1527 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1528 */
1529 return wr->length;
1530 }
1531
1532 /* now let's set up wb */
1533 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1534 wb->offset = 0;
1535
1536 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1537 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1538 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1539 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1540 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1541
1542 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1543 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1544err:
1545 return -1;
1546 }
1547
1548
1549
1550static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1551 {
1552 int cmp;
1553 unsigned int shift;
1554 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1555
1556 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1557 if (cmp > 0)
1558 {
1559 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1560 return 1; /* this record in new */
1561 }
1562 shift = -cmp;
1563 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1564 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1565 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1566 return 0; /* record previously received */
1567
1568 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1569 return 1;
1570 }
1571
1572
1573static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1574 {
1575 int cmp;
1576 unsigned int shift;
1577 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1578
1579 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1580 if (cmp > 0)
1581 {
1582 shift = cmp;
1583 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1584 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1585 else
1586 bitmap->map = 1UL;
1587 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1588 }
1589 else {
1590 shift = -cmp;
1591 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1592 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1593 }
1594 }
1595
1596
1597int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1598 {
1599 int i,j;
1600 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1601 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1602 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1603
1604 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1605
1606 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1607 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1608 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1609
1610#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1611 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1612 {
1613 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1614#if 0
1615 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1616
1617 else
1618 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1619#endif
1620
1621#if 0
1622 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1623#endif
1624 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1625 }
1626#endif
1627
1628 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1629 if (i <= 0)
1630 {
1631 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1632 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1633 }
1634 else
1635 {
1636 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1637#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1638 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1639#endif
1640 )
1641 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1642
1643 if (s->msg_callback)
1644 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1645 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1646
1647 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1648 cb=s->info_callback;
1649 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1650 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1651
1652 if (cb != NULL)
1653 {
1654 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1655 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1656 }
1657 }
1658 return(i);
1659 }
1660
1661
1662static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1663dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1664 {
1665
1666 *is_next_epoch = 0;
1667
1668 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1669 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1670 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1671
1672 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1673 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1674 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1675 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1676 {
1677 *is_next_epoch = 1;
1678 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1679 }
1680
1681 return NULL;
1682 }
1683
1684#if 0
1685static int
1686dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1687 unsigned long *offset)
1688 {
1689
1690 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1691 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1692 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1693 return 0;
1694
1695 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1696 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1697 * immediately) */
1698 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1699 {
1700 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1701 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1702 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1703 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1704 {
1705 unsigned short seq_num;
1706 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1707 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1708
1709 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1710 {
1711 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1712 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1713 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1714 }
1715 else
1716 {
1717 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1718 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1719 *offset = 0;
1720 }
1721
1722 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1723 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1724 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1725 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1726 return 0;
1727 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1728 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1729 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1730 return 0;
1731 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1732 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1733 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1734 return 0;
1735 else
1736 {
1737 *priority = seq_num;
1738 return 1;
1739 }
1740 }
1741 else /* unknown record type */
1742 return 0;
1743 }
1744
1745 return 0;
1746 }
1747#endif
1748
1749void
1750dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1751 {
1752 unsigned char *seq;
1753 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1754
1755 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1756 {
1757 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1758 s->d1->r_epoch++;
1759 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1760 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1761 }
1762 else
1763 {
1764 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1765 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1766 s->d1->w_epoch++;
1767 }
1768
1769 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1770 }
1771
1772
1773static void
1774dtls1_clear_timeouts(SSL *s)
1775 {
1776 memset(&(s->d1->timeout), 0x00, sizeof(struct dtls1_timeout_st));
1777 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-19 19:11:39 +0000