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1/* ssl/d1_pkt.c */
2/*
3 * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu
4 * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005.
5 */
6/* ====================================================================
7 * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
8 *
9 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
10 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
11 * are met:
12 *
13 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
14 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
15 *
16 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
17 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
18 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
19 * distribution.
20 *
21 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
22 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
23 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
24 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
25 *
26 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
27 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
28 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
29 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
30 *
31 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
32 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
33 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
34 *
35 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
36 * acknowledgment:
37 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
38 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
39 *
40 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
41 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
42 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
43 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
44 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
45 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
46 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
47 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
49 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
50 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
51 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
52 * ====================================================================
53 *
54 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
55 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
56 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
57 *
58 */
59/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
60 * All rights reserved.
61 *
62 * This package is an SSL implementation written
63 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
64 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
65 *
66 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
67 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
68 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
69 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
70 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
71 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
72 *
73 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
74 * the code are not to be removed.
75 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
76 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
77 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
78 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
79 *
80 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
81 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
82 * are met:
83 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
84 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
85 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
86 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
87 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
88 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
89 * must display the following acknowledgement:
90 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
91 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
92 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
93 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
94 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
95 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
96 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
97 *
98 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
99 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
100 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
101 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
102 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
103 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
104 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
105 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
106 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
107 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
108 * SUCH DAMAGE.
109 *
110 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
111 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
112 * copied and put under another distribution licence
113 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
114 */
115
116#include <stdio.h>
117#include <errno.h>
118#define USE_SOCKETS
119#include "ssl_locl.h"
120#include <openssl/evp.h>
121#include <openssl/buffer.h>
122#include <openssl/pqueue.h>
123#include <openssl/rand.h>
124
125/* mod 128 saturating subtract of two 64-bit values in big-endian order */
126static int satsub64be(const unsigned char *v1,const unsigned char *v2)
127{ int ret,sat,brw,i;
128
129 if (sizeof(long) == 8) do
130 { const union { long one; char little; } is_endian = {1};
131 long l;
132
133 if (is_endian.little) break;
134 /* not reached on little-endians */
135 /* following test is redundant, because input is
136 * always aligned, but I take no chances... */
137 if (((size_t)v1|(size_t)v2)&0x7) break;
138
139 l = *((long *)v1);
140 l -= *((long *)v2);
141 if (l>128) return 128;
142 else if (l<-128) return -128;
143 else return (int)l;
144 } while (0);
145
146 ret = (int)v1[7]-(int)v2[7];
147 sat = 0;
148 brw = ret>>8; /* brw is either 0 or -1 */
149 if (ret & 0x80)
150 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
151 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
152 sat |= ~brw;
153 brw >>= 8;
154 }
155 }
156 else
157 { for (i=6;i>=0;i--)
158 { brw += (int)v1[i]-(int)v2[i];
159 sat |= brw;
160 brw >>= 8;
161 }
162 }
163 brw <<= 8; /* brw is either 0 or -256 */
164
165 if (sat&0xff) return brw | 0x80;
166 else return brw + (ret&0xFF);
167}
168
169static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
170 int len, int peek);
171static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
172static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap);
173static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
174 unsigned int *is_next_epoch);
175#if 0
176static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr,
177 unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset);
178#endif
179static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q,
180 unsigned char *priority);
181static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s);
182
183/* copy buffered record into SSL structure */
184static int
185dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item)
186 {
187 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
188
189 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
190
191 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
192 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
193
194 s->packet = rdata->packet;
195 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
196 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
197 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
198
199 /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */
200 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6);
201
202 return(1);
203 }
204
205
206static int
207dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, unsigned char *priority)
208 {
209 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
210 pitem *item;
211
212 /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */
213 if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100)
214 return 0;
215
216 rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA));
217 item = pitem_new(priority, rdata);
218 if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL)
219 {
220 if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata);
221 if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item);
222
223 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
224 return(0);
225 }
226
227 rdata->packet = s->packet;
228 rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length;
229 memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
230 memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
231
232 item->data = rdata;
233
234#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
235 /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
236 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
237 (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A || s->state == SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A)) {
238 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
239 }
240#endif
241
242 /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */
243 if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL)
244 {
245 OPENSSL_free(rdata);
246 pitem_free(item);
247 return(0);
248 }
249
250 s->packet = NULL;
251 s->packet_length = 0;
252 memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
253 memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
254
255 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
256 {
257 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
258 OPENSSL_free(rdata);
259 pitem_free(item);
260 return(0);
261 }
262
263 return(1);
264 }
265
266
267static int
268dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue)
269 {
270 pitem *item;
271
272 item = pqueue_pop(queue->q);
273 if (item)
274 {
275 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
276
277 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
278 pitem_free(item);
279
280 return(1);
281 }
282
283 return(0);
284 }
285
286
287/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed
288 * yet */
289#define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \
290 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
291 &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds))
292
293/* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */
294#define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \
295 dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \
296 &((s)->d1->processed_rcds))
297
298static int
299dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
300 {
301 pitem *item;
302
303 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
304 if (item)
305 {
306 /* Check if epoch is current. */
307 if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
308 return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
309
310 /* Process all the records. */
311 while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
312 {
313 dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
314 if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
315 return(0);
316 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
317 s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
318 }
319 }
320
321 /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
322 * have been processed */
323 s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
324 s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
325
326 return(1);
327 }
328
329
330#if 0
331
332static int
333dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s)
334 {
335 pitem *item;
336 PQ_64BIT priority =
337 (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) |
338 ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off);
339
340 if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating,
341 nothing buffered */
342 return 0;
343
344
345 item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records);
346 if (item && item->priority == priority)
347 {
348 /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be
349 * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without
350 * buffering */
351 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata;
352 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records);
353 rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data;
354
355 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL)
356 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf);
357
358 s->packet = rdata->packet;
359 s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length;
360 memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER));
361 memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD));
362
363 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
364 pitem_free(item);
365
366 /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */
367 return(1);
368 }
369
370 return 0;
371 }
372
373#endif
374
375static int
376dtls1_process_record(SSL *s)
377{
378 int i,al;
379 int enc_err;
380 SSL_SESSION *sess;
381 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
382 unsigned int mac_size, orig_len;
383 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
384
385 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
386 sess = s->session;
387
388 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
389 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
390 */
391 rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
392
393 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
394 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
395 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
396 * the decryption or by the decompression
397 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
398 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
399
400 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
401 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
402
403 /* check is not needed I believe */
404 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
405 {
406 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
407 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
408 goto f_err;
409 }
410
411 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
412 rr->data=rr->input;
413
414 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
415 /* enc_err is:
416 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
417 * 1: if the padding is valid
418 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
419 if (enc_err == 0)
420 {
421 /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */
422 rr->length = 0;
423 s->packet_length = 0;
424 goto err;
425 }
426
427#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
428printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
429{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
430printf("\n");
431#endif
432
433 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
434 if ((sess != NULL) &&
435 (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
436 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL))
437 {
438 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
439 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
440 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
441 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
442 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
443
444 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
445 orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8);
446
447 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
448 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
449 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
450 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
451 */
452 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
453 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
454 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
455 orig_len < mac_size+1))
456 {
457 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
458 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
459 goto f_err;
460 }
461
462 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
463 {
464 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
465 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
466 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
467 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
468 * */
469 mac = mac_tmp;
470 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
471 rr->length -= mac_size;
472 }
473 else
474 {
475 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
476 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
477 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
478 rr->length -= mac_size;
479 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
480 }
481
482 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
483 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
484 enc_err = -1;
485 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size)
486 enc_err = -1;
487 }
488
489 if (enc_err < 0)
490 {
491 /* decryption failed, silently discard message */
492 rr->length = 0;
493 s->packet_length = 0;
494 goto err;
495 }
496
497 /* r->length is now just compressed */
498 if (s->expand != NULL)
499 {
500 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH)
501 {
502 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
503 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504 goto f_err;
505 }
506 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
507 {
508 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
509 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
510 goto f_err;
511 }
512 }
513
514 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
515 {
516 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
517 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
518 goto f_err;
519 }
520
521 rr->off=0;
522 /* So at this point the following is true
523 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
524 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
525 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
526 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
527 * after use :-).
528 */
529
530 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
531 s->packet_length=0;
532 dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */
533 return(1);
534
535f_err:
536 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
537err:
538 return(0);
539}
540
541
542/* Call this to get a new input record.
543 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
544 * or non-blocking IO.
545 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
546 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
547 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
548 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
549 */
550/* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */
551int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s)
552 {
553 int ssl_major,ssl_minor;
554 int i,n;
555 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
556 unsigned char *p = NULL;
557 unsigned short version;
558 DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap;
559 unsigned int is_next_epoch;
560
561 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
562
563 /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the
564 * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */
565 dtls1_process_buffered_records(s);
566
567 /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */
568 if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s))
569 return 1;
570
571 /* get something from the wire */
572again:
573 /* check if we have the header */
574 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
575 (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
576 {
577 n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
578 /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */
579 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
580
581 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
582 if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
583 {
584 s->packet_length = 0;
585 goto again;
586 }
587
588 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
589
590 p=s->packet;
591
592 /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */
593 rr->type= *(p++);
594 ssl_major= *(p++);
595 ssl_minor= *(p++);
596 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
597
598 /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */
599 n2s(p,rr->epoch);
600
601 memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6);
602 p+=6;
603
604 n2s(p,rr->length);
605
606 /* Lets check version */
607 if (!s->first_packet)
608 {
609 if (version != s->version)
610 {
611 /* unexpected version, silently discard */
612 rr->length = 0;
613 s->packet_length = 0;
614 goto again;
615 }
616 }
617
618 if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00))
619 {
620 /* wrong version, silently discard record */
621 rr->length = 0;
622 s->packet_length = 0;
623 goto again;
624 }
625
626 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH)
627 {
628 /* record too long, silently discard it */
629 rr->length = 0;
630 s->packet_length = 0;
631 goto again;
632 }
633
634 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
635 }
636
637 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
638
639 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
640 {
641 /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
642 i=rr->length;
643 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
644 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
645
646 /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */
647 if ( n != i)
648 {
649 rr->length = 0;
650 s->packet_length = 0;
651 goto again;
652 }
653
654 /* now n == rr->length,
655 * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
656 }
657 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
658
659 /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */
660 bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch);
661 if ( bitmap == NULL)
662 {
663 rr->length = 0;
664 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
665 goto again; /* get another record */
666 }
667
668#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
669 /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */
670 if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
671 {
672#endif
673 /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record.
674 * Don't check if we're listening and this message is
675 * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed,
676 * since they arrive from different connections and
677 * would be dropped unnecessarily.
678 */
679 if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
680 *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
681 !dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))
682 {
683 rr->length = 0;
684 s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */
685 goto again; /* get another record */
686 }
687#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
688 }
689#endif
690
691 /* just read a 0 length packet */
692 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
693
694 /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT),
695 * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it
696 * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer
697 * anything while listening.
698 */
699 if (is_next_epoch)
700 {
701 if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen)
702 {
703 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), rr->seq_num);
704 }
705 rr->length = 0;
706 s->packet_length = 0;
707 goto again;
708 }
709
710 if (!dtls1_process_record(s))
711 {
712 rr->length = 0;
713 s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */
714 goto again; /* get another record */
715 }
716
717 return(1);
718
719 }
720
721/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
722 * 'type' is one of the following:
723 *
724 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
725 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
726 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
727 *
728 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
729 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
730 *
731 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
732 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
733 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
734 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
735 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
736 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
737 * Change cipher spec protocol
738 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
739 * Alert protocol
740 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
741 * Handshake protocol
742 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
743 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
744 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
745 * Application data protocol
746 * none of our business
747 */
748int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
749 {
750 int al,i,j,ret;
751 unsigned int n;
752 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
753 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
754
755 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
756 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
757 return(-1);
758
759 /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */
760 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
761 (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
762 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
763 {
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 return -1;
766 }
767
768 /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */
769 if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek)))
770 return ret;
771
772 /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
773
774#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
775 /* Continue handshake if it had to be interrupted to read
776 * app data with SCTP.
777 */
778 if ((!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) ||
779 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
780 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK) &&
781 s->s3->in_read_app_data != 2))
782#else
783 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
784#endif
785 {
786 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
787 i=s->handshake_func(s);
788 if (i < 0) return(i);
789 if (i == 0)
790 {
791 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
792 return(-1);
793 }
794 }
795
796start:
797 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
798
799 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
800 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
801 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
802 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
803 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
804
805 /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet,
806 * so process data buffered during the last handshake
807 * in advance, if any.
808 */
809 if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0)
810 {
811 pitem *item;
812 item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q);
813 if (item)
814 {
815#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
816 /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */
817 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
818 {
819 DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *) item->data;
820 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_rbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo);
821 }
822#endif
823
824 dtls1_copy_record(s, item);
825
826 OPENSSL_free(item->data);
827 pitem_free(item);
828 }
829 }
830
831 /* Check for timeout */
832 if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0)
833 goto start;
834
835 /* get new packet if necessary */
836 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
837 {
838 ret=dtls1_get_record(s);
839 if (ret <= 0)
840 {
841 ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret);
842 /* anything other than a timeout is an error */
843 if (ret <= 0)
844 return(ret);
845 else
846 goto start;
847 }
848 }
849
850 if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
851 {
852 rr->length = 0;
853 goto start;
854 }
855
856 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
857
858 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
859 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
860 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
861 {
862 /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished.
863 * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so
864 * buffer the application data for later processing rather
865 * than dropping the connection.
866 */
867 dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), rr->seq_num);
868 rr->length = 0;
869 goto start;
870 }
871
872 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
873 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
874 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
875 {
876 rr->length=0;
877 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
878 return(0);
879 }
880
881
882 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
883 {
884 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
885 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
886 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
887 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
888 {
889 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
890 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
891 goto f_err;
892 }
893
894 if (len <= 0) return(len);
895
896 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
897 n = rr->length;
898 else
899 n = (unsigned int)len;
900
901 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
902 if (!peek)
903 {
904 rr->length-=n;
905 rr->off+=n;
906 if (rr->length == 0)
907 {
908 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
909 rr->off=0;
910 }
911 }
912
913#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
914 /* We were about to renegotiate but had to read
915 * belated application data first, so retry.
916 */
917 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
918 rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
919 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK))
920 {
921 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
922 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
923 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
924 }
925
926 /* We might had to delay a close_notify alert because
927 * of reordered app data. If there was an alert and there
928 * is no message to read anymore, finally set shutdown.
929 */
930 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
931 s->d1->shutdown_received && !BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
932 {
933 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
934 return(0);
935 }
936#endif
937 return(n);
938 }
939
940
941 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
942 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
943
944 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
945 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
946 */
947 {
948 unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0;
949 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
950 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
951
952 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
953 {
954 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment;
955 dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
956 dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len;
957 }
958 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
959 {
960 dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment);
961 dest = s->d1->alert_fragment;
962 dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len;
963 }
964#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
965 else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT)
966 {
967 dtls1_process_heartbeat(s);
968
969 /* Exit and notify application to read again */
970 rr->length = 0;
971 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
972 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
973 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
974 return(-1);
975 }
976#endif
977 /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */
978 else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
979 {
980 /* Application data while renegotiating
981 * is allowed. Try again reading.
982 */
983 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
984 {
985 BIO *bio;
986 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
987 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
988 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
989 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
990 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
991 return(-1);
992 }
993
994 /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */
995 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
996 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
997 goto f_err;
998 }
999
1000 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1001 {
1002 /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello
1003 * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */
1004 if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen)
1005 {
1006#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1007 /*
1008 * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while
1009 * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this
1010 * non-existing alert...
1011 */
1012 FIX ME
1013#endif
1014 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1015 rr->length = 0;
1016 goto start;
1017 }
1018
1019 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1020 for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++)
1021 {
1022 dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1023 rr->length--;
1024 }
1025 *dest_len = dest_maxlen;
1026 }
1027 }
1028
1029 /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1030 * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1031 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1032
1033 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1034 if ((!s->server) &&
1035 (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1036 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1037 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1038 {
1039 s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1040
1041 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1042 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1043 (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1044 {
1045 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1046 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1047 goto err;
1048 }
1049
1050 /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */
1051
1052 if (s->msg_callback)
1053 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1054 s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1055
1056 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1057 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1058 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1059 {
1060 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1061 s->new_session = 1;
1062 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1063 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1064 {
1065 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1066 if (i < 0) return(i);
1067 if (i == 0)
1068 {
1069 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1070 return(-1);
1071 }
1072
1073 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1074 {
1075 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1076 {
1077 BIO *bio;
1078 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1079 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1080 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1081 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1082 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1083 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1084 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1085 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1086 return(-1);
1087 }
1088 }
1089 }
1090 }
1091 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1092 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1093 goto start;
1094 }
1095
1096 if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH)
1097 {
1098 int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0];
1099 int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1];
1100
1101 s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1102
1103 if (s->msg_callback)
1104 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1105 s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1106
1107 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1108 cb=s->info_callback;
1109 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1110 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1111
1112 if (cb != NULL)
1113 {
1114 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1115 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1116 }
1117
1118 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1119 {
1120 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1121 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1122 {
1123#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1124 /* With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data
1125 * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this
1126 * first so that nothing gets discarded.
1127 */
1128 if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) &&
1129 BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
1130 {
1131 s->d1->shutdown_received = 1;
1132 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1133 BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1134 BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
1135 return -1;
1136 }
1137#endif
1138 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1139 return(0);
1140 }
1141#if 0
1142 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */
1143 /* now check if it's a missing record */
1144 if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1145 {
1146 unsigned short seq;
1147 unsigned int frag_off;
1148 unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]);
1149
1150 n2s(p, seq);
1151 n2l3(p, frag_off);
1152
1153 dtls1_retransmit_message(s,
1154 dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0),
1155 frag_off, &found);
1156 if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s))
1157 {
1158 /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */
1159 /* requested a message not yet sent,
1160 send an alert ourselves */
1161 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,
1162 DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1163 }
1164 }
1165#endif
1166 }
1167 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1168 {
1169 char tmp[16];
1170
1171 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1172 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1173 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1174 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1175 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1176 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1177 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1178 return(0);
1179 }
1180 else
1181 {
1182 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1184 goto f_err;
1185 }
1186
1187 goto start;
1188 }
1189
1190 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1191 {
1192 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1193 rr->length=0;
1194 return(0);
1195 }
1196
1197 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1198 {
1199 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1200 unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH;
1201
1202 dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr);
1203
1204 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1205 ccs_hdr_len = 3;
1206
1207 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1208 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1209 /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */
1210 if ( (rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) ||
1211 (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1212 {
1213 i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1214 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1215 goto err;
1216 }
1217
1218 rr->length=0;
1219
1220 if (s->msg_callback)
1221 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1222 rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1223
1224 /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake
1225 * messages are still missing, so just drop it.
1226 */
1227 if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok)
1228 {
1229 goto start;
1230 }
1231
1232 s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0;
1233
1234 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1235 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1236 goto err;
1237
1238 /* do this whenever CCS is processed */
1239 dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
1240
1241 if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1242 s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
1243
1244#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1245 /* Remember that a CCS has been received,
1246 * so that an old key of SCTP-Auth can be
1247 * deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored
1248 * if no SCTP is used
1249 */
1250 BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
1251#endif
1252
1253 goto start;
1254 }
1255
1256 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1257 if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) &&
1258 !s->in_handshake)
1259 {
1260 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1261
1262 /* this may just be a stale retransmit */
1263 dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr);
1264 if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
1265 {
1266 rr->length = 0;
1267 goto start;
1268 }
1269
1270 /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the
1271 * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED.
1272 */
1273 if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED)
1274 {
1275 if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0)
1276 return -1;
1277
1278 dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s);
1279 rr->length = 0;
1280 goto start;
1281 }
1282
1283 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1284 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1285 {
1286#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1287 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1288 * protocol violations): */
1289 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1290 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1291 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1292#else
1293 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1294#endif
1295 s->renegotiate=1;
1296 s->new_session=1;
1297 }
1298 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1299 if (i < 0) return(i);
1300 if (i == 0)
1301 {
1302 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1303 return(-1);
1304 }
1305
1306 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1307 {
1308 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1309 {
1310 BIO *bio;
1311 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1312 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1313 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1314 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1315 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1316 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1317 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1318 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1319 return(-1);
1320 }
1321 }
1322 goto start;
1323 }
1324
1325 switch (rr->type)
1326 {
1327 default:
1328#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1329 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1330 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1331 {
1332 rr->length = 0;
1333 goto start;
1334 }
1335#endif
1336 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1337 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1338 goto f_err;
1339 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1340 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1341 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1342 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1343 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1344 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1345 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1346 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1347 goto f_err;
1348 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1349 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1350 * but have application data. If the library was
1351 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1352 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1353 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1354 * we will indulge it.
1355 */
1356 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1357 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1358 ((
1359 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1360 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1361 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1362 ) || (
1363 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1364 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1365 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1366 )
1367 ))
1368 {
1369 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1370 return(-1);
1371 }
1372 else
1373 {
1374 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1375 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1376 goto f_err;
1377 }
1378 }
1379 /* not reached */
1380
1381f_err:
1382 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1383err:
1384 return(-1);
1385 }
1386
1387int
1388dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
1389 {
1390 int i;
1391
1392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
1393 /* Check if we have to continue an interrupted handshake
1394 * for reading belated app data with SCTP.
1395 */
1396 if ((SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) ||
1397 (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) &&
1398 (s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK || s->state == DTLS1_SCTP_ST_CR_READ_SOCK)))
1399#else
1400 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
1401#endif
1402 {
1403 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1404 if (i < 0) return(i);
1405 if (i == 0)
1406 {
1407 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1408 return -1;
1409 }
1410 }
1411
1412 if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)
1413 {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG);
1415 return -1;
1416 }
1417
1418 i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len);
1419 return i;
1420 }
1421
1422
1423 /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake
1424 * is started. */
1425static int
1426have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf,
1427 int len, int peek)
1428 {
1429
1430 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1431 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
1432 {
1433 unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment;
1434 unsigned char *dst = buf;
1435 unsigned int k,n;
1436
1437 /* peek == 0 */
1438 n = 0;
1439 while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
1440 {
1441 *dst++ = *src++;
1442 len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--;
1443 n++;
1444 }
1445 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
1446 for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
1447 s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
1448 return n;
1449 }
1450
1451 return 0;
1452 }
1453
1454
1455
1456
1457/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
1458 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
1459 */
1460int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len)
1461 {
1462 int i;
1463
1464 OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH);
1465 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1466 i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0);
1467 return i;
1468 }
1469
1470int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
1471 {
1472 unsigned char *p,*pseq;
1473 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
1474 int prefix_len = 0;
1475 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
1476 SSL3_BUFFER *wb;
1477 SSL_SESSION *sess;
1478 int bs;
1479
1480 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
1481 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
1482 if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0)
1483 {
1484 OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */
1485 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
1486 }
1487
1488 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
1489 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
1490 {
1491 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1492 if (i <= 0)
1493 return(i);
1494 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
1495 }
1496
1497 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
1498 return 0;
1499
1500 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
1501 wb= &(s->s3->wbuf);
1502 sess=s->session;
1503
1504 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
1505 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
1506 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
1507 clear=1;
1508
1509 if (clear)
1510 mac_size=0;
1511 else
1512 {
1513 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
1514 if (mac_size < 0)
1515 goto err;
1516 }
1517
1518 /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */
1519#if 0
1520 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
1521 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done
1522 && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1523 {
1524 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
1525 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
1526 */
1527
1528 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
1529 {
1530 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
1531 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
1532 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
1533 * together with the actual payload) */
1534 prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
1535 if (prefix_len <= 0)
1536 goto err;
1537
1538 if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE)
1539 {
1540 /* insufficient space */
1541 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1542 goto err;
1543 }
1544 }
1545
1546 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
1547 }
1548#endif
1549 p = wb->buf + prefix_len;
1550
1551 /* write the header */
1552
1553 *(p++)=type&0xff;
1554 wr->type=type;
1555
1556 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
1557 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1558
1559 /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */
1560 pseq=p;
1561 p+=10;
1562
1563 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
1564
1565 /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC.
1566 * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck).
1567 */
1568 if ( s->enc_write_ctx &&
1569 (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE))
1570 bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher);
1571 else
1572 bs = 0;
1573
1574 wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */
1575 wr->length=(int)len;
1576 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
1577
1578 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
1579 * wr->data */
1580
1581 /* first we compress */
1582 if (s->compress != NULL)
1583 {
1584 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
1585 {
1586 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1587 goto err;
1588 }
1589 }
1590 else
1591 {
1592 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
1593 wr->input=wr->data;
1594 }
1595
1596 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
1597 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
1598 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
1599
1600 if (mac_size != 0)
1601 {
1602 if(s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1) < 0)
1603 goto err;
1604 wr->length+=mac_size;
1605 }
1606
1607 /* this is true regardless of mac size */
1608 wr->input=p;
1609 wr->data=p;
1610
1611
1612 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
1613 if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */
1614 {
1615 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs);
1616 /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for
1617 * the rest of randomness */
1618 wr->length += bs;
1619 }
1620
1621 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
1622
1623 /* record length after mac and block padding */
1624/* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1625 (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */
1626
1627 /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */
1628
1629 s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq);
1630
1631 /* XDTLS: ?? */
1632/* else
1633 s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */
1634
1635 memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6);
1636 pseq+=6;
1637 s2n(wr->length,pseq);
1638
1639 /* we should now have
1640 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
1641 * wr->length long */
1642 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
1643 wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
1644
1645#if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */
1646 /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */
1647 if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1648 dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length,
1649 *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])));
1650#endif
1651
1652 ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]));
1653
1654 if (create_empty_fragment)
1655 {
1656 /* we are in a recursive call;
1657 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
1658 */
1659 return wr->length;
1660 }
1661
1662 /* now let's set up wb */
1663 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
1664 wb->offset = 0;
1665
1666 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
1667 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
1668 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
1669 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
1670 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
1671
1672 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
1673 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
1674err:
1675 return -1;
1676 }
1677
1678
1679
1680static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1681 {
1682 int cmp;
1683 unsigned int shift;
1684 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1685
1686 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1687 if (cmp > 0)
1688 {
1689 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1690 return 1; /* this record in new */
1691 }
1692 shift = -cmp;
1693 if (shift >= sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1694 return 0; /* stale, outside the window */
1695 else if (bitmap->map & (1UL<<shift))
1696 return 0; /* record previously received */
1697
1698 memcpy (s->s3->rrec.seq_num,seq,8);
1699 return 1;
1700 }
1701
1702
1703static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap)
1704 {
1705 int cmp;
1706 unsigned int shift;
1707 const unsigned char *seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1708
1709 cmp = satsub64be(seq,bitmap->max_seq_num);
1710 if (cmp > 0)
1711 {
1712 shift = cmp;
1713 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1714 bitmap->map <<= shift, bitmap->map |= 1UL;
1715 else
1716 bitmap->map = 1UL;
1717 memcpy(bitmap->max_seq_num,seq,8);
1718 }
1719 else {
1720 shift = -cmp;
1721 if (shift < sizeof(bitmap->map)*8)
1722 bitmap->map |= 1UL<<shift;
1723 }
1724 }
1725
1726
1727int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1728 {
1729 int i,j;
1730 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1731 unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH];
1732 unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0];
1733
1734 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1735
1736 memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf));
1737 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0];
1738 *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1];
1739
1740#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1741 if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE)
1742 {
1743 s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr);
1744#if 0
1745 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */
1746
1747 else
1748 s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */
1749#endif
1750
1751#if 0
1752 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq);
1753#endif
1754 l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr);
1755 }
1756#endif
1757
1758 i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0);
1759 if (i <= 0)
1760 {
1761 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1762 /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */
1763 }
1764 else
1765 {
1766 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL
1767#ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1768 || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE
1769#endif
1770 )
1771 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1772
1773 if (s->msg_callback)
1774 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert,
1775 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1776
1777 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1778 cb=s->info_callback;
1779 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1780 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1781
1782 if (cb != NULL)
1783 {
1784 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1785 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1786 }
1787 }
1788 return(i);
1789 }
1790
1791
1792static DTLS1_BITMAP *
1793dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch)
1794 {
1795
1796 *is_next_epoch = 0;
1797
1798 /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */
1799 if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch)
1800 return &s->d1->bitmap;
1801
1802 /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */
1803 else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) &&
1804 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1805 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT))
1806 {
1807 *is_next_epoch = 1;
1808 return &s->d1->next_bitmap;
1809 }
1810
1811 return NULL;
1812 }
1813
1814#if 0
1815static int
1816dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority,
1817 unsigned long *offset)
1818 {
1819
1820 /* alerts are passed up immediately */
1821 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ||
1822 rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1823 return 0;
1824
1825 /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway.
1826 * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up
1827 * immediately) */
1828 if ( SSL_in_init(s))
1829 {
1830 unsigned char *data = rr->data;
1831 /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */
1832 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ||
1833 rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1834 {
1835 unsigned short seq_num;
1836 struct hm_header_st msg_hdr;
1837 struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr;
1838
1839 if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1840 {
1841 dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr);
1842 seq_num = msg_hdr.seq;
1843 *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off;
1844 }
1845 else
1846 {
1847 dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr);
1848 seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq;
1849 *offset = 0;
1850 }
1851
1852 /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a
1853 * retransmit of something we happened to previously
1854 * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */
1855 if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq)
1856 return 0;
1857 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&
1858 seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1859 msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)
1860 return 0;
1861 else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq &&
1862 (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ||
1863 msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off))
1864 return 0;
1865 else
1866 {
1867 *priority = seq_num;
1868 return 1;
1869 }
1870 }
1871 else /* unknown record type */
1872 return 0;
1873 }
1874
1875 return 0;
1876 }
1877#endif
1878
1879void
1880dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw)
1881 {
1882 unsigned char *seq;
1883 unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence);
1884
1885 if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ)
1886 {
1887 seq = s->s3->read_sequence;
1888 s->d1->r_epoch++;
1889 memcpy(&(s->d1->bitmap), &(s->d1->next_bitmap), sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1890 memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP));
1891 }
1892 else
1893 {
1894 seq = s->s3->write_sequence;
1895 memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence));
1896 s->d1->w_epoch++;
1897 }
1898
1899 memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes);
1900 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2026-02-09 05:12:50 +0000