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1/* ssl/s3_pkt.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <errno.h>
114#define USE_SOCKETS
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116#include <openssl/evp.h>
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118
119static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
120 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
121static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
122
123int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
124 {
125 /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
126 * packet by another n bytes.
127 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
128 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
129 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
130 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
131 */
132 int i,len,left;
133 long align=0;
134 unsigned char *pkt;
135 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
136
137 if (n <= 0) return n;
138
139 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
140 if (rb->buf == NULL)
141 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
142 return -1;
143
144 left = rb->left;
145#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
146 align = (long)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
147 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
148#endif
149
150 if (!extend)
151 {
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
153 if (left == 0)
154 rb->offset = align;
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
156 {
157 /* check if next packet length is large
158 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
159 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
160 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
161 && (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128)
162 {
163 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
164 * and its length field is insane, we can
165 * only be led to wrong decision about
166 * whether memmove will occur or not.
167 * Header values has no effect on memmove
168 * arguments and therefore no buffer
169 * overrun can be triggered. */
170 memmove (rb->buf+align,pkt,left);
171 rb->offset = align;
172 }
173 }
174 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
175 s->packet_length = 0;
176 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
177 }
178
179 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
180 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
181 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
182 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
183 {
184 if (left > 0 && n > left)
185 n = left;
186 }
187
188 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
189 if (left >= n)
190 {
191 s->packet_length+=n;
192 rb->left=left-n;
193 rb->offset+=n;
194 return(n);
195 }
196
197 /* else we need to read more data */
198
199 len = s->packet_length;
200 pkt = rb->buf+align;
201 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
202 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
203 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
204 if (s->packet != pkt) /* len > 0 */
205 {
206 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len+left);
207 s->packet = pkt;
208 rb->offset = len + align;
209 }
210
211 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) /* does not happen */
212 {
213 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
214 return -1;
215 }
216
217 if (!s->read_ahead)
218 /* ignore max parameter */
219 max = n;
220 else
221 {
222 if (max < n)
223 max = n;
224 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
225 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
226 }
227
228 while (left < n)
229 {
230 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
231 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
232 * len+max if possible) */
233
234 clear_sys_error();
235 if (s->rbio != NULL)
236 {
237 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
238 i=BIO_read(s->rbio,pkt+len+left, max-left);
239 }
240 else
241 {
242 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
243 i = -1;
244 }
245
246 if (i <= 0)
247 {
248 rb->left = left;
249 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
250 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
251 if (len+left == 0)
252 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
253 return(i);
254 }
255 left+=i;
256 /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
257 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed
258 * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */
259 if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
260 {
261 if (n > left)
262 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
263 }
264 }
265
266 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
267 rb->offset += n;
268 rb->left = left - n;
269 s->packet_length += n;
270 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
271 return(n);
272 }
273
274/* Call this to get a new input record.
275 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
276 * or non-blocking IO.
277 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
278 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
279 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
280 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
281 */
282/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
283static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
284 {
285 int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al;
286 int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1;
287 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
288 SSL_SESSION *sess;
289 unsigned char *p;
290 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
291 short version;
292 int mac_size;
293 int clear=0;
294 size_t extra;
295 int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
296 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
297
298 rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
299 sess=s->session;
300
301 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
302 extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
303 else
304 extra=0;
305 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra)
306 {
307 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
308 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
310 return -1;
311 }
312
313again:
314 /* check if we have the header */
315 if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
316 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH))
317 {
318 n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
319 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
320 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
321
322 p=s->packet;
323
324 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
325 rr->type= *(p++);
326 ssl_major= *(p++);
327 ssl_minor= *(p++);
328 version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor;
329 n2s(p,rr->length);
330#if 0
331fprintf(stderr, "Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
332#endif
333
334 /* Lets check version */
335 if (!s->first_packet)
336 {
337 if (version != s->version)
338 {
339 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
340 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00))
341 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
342 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
343 al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
344 goto f_err;
345 }
346 }
347
348 if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
349 {
350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
351 goto err;
352 }
353
354 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
355 {
356 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
357 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
358 goto f_err;
359 }
360
361 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
362 }
363
364 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
365
366 if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)
367 {
368 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
369 i=rr->length;
370 n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1);
371 if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
372 /* now n == rr->length,
373 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
374 }
375
376 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
377
378 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
379 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
380 */
381 rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
382
383 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
384 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
385 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
386 * the decryption or by the decompression
387 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
388 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
389
390 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
391 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
392
393 /* check is not needed I believe */
394 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra)
395 {
396 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
398 goto f_err;
399 }
400
401 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
402 rr->data=rr->input;
403
404 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0);
405 if (enc_err <= 0)
406 {
407 if (enc_err == 0)
408 /* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
409 goto err;
410
411 /* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
412 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
413 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
414 * the MAC computation anyway. */
415 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
416 }
417
418#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
419printf("dec %d\n",rr->length);
420{ unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
421printf("\n");
422#endif
423
424 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
425 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
426 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) ||
427 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) == NULL))
428 clear=1;
429
430 if (!clear)
431 {
432 /* !clear => s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
433 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
434 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size >= 0);
435
436 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size)
437 {
438#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers (then rr->length is visible from ciphertext anyway) */
439 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
440 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
441 goto f_err;
442#else
443 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
444#endif
445 }
446 /* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
447 if (rr->length >= (unsigned int)mac_size)
448 {
449 rr->length -= mac_size;
450 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
451 }
452 else
453 {
454 /* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
455#if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
456 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
457 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
458 goto f_err;
459#else
460 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
461 rr->length = 0;
462#endif
463 }
464 i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
465 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
466 {
467 decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
468 }
469 }
470
471 if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
472 {
473 /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
474 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption
475 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
476 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
477 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
478 al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
479 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
480 goto f_err;
481 }
482
483 /* r->length is now just compressed */
484 if (s->expand != NULL)
485 {
486 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra)
487 {
488 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
489 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
490 goto f_err;
491 }
492 if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s))
493 {
494 al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE;
495 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION);
496 goto f_err;
497 }
498 }
499
500 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra)
501 {
502 al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
504 goto f_err;
505 }
506
507 rr->off=0;
508 /* So at this point the following is true
509 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
510 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
511 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
512 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
513 * after use :-).
514 */
515
516 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
517 s->packet_length=0;
518
519 /* just read a 0 length packet */
520 if (rr->length == 0) goto again;
521
522#if 0
523fprintf(stderr, "Ultimate Record type=%d, Length=%d\n", rr->type, rr->length);
524#endif
525
526 return(1);
527
528f_err:
529 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
530err:
531 return(ret);
532 }
533
534int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl)
535 {
536#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
537 int i;
538 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
539
540 rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
541 i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp,
542 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length);
543 if (i < 0)
544 return(0);
545 else
546 rr->length=i;
547 rr->data=rr->comp;
548#endif
549 return(1);
550 }
551
552int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl)
553 {
554#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
555 int i;
556 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
557
558 wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
559 i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data,
560 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH,
561 wr->input,(int)wr->length);
562 if (i < 0)
563 return(0);
564 else
565 wr->length=i;
566
567 wr->input=wr->data;
568#endif
569 return(1);
570 }
571
572/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
573 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
574 */
575int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
576 {
577 const unsigned char *buf=buf_;
578 unsigned int tot,n,nw;
579 int i;
580
581 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
582 tot=s->s3->wnum;
583 s->s3->wnum=0;
584
585 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake)
586 {
587 i=s->handshake_func(s);
588 if (i < 0) return(i);
589 if (i == 0)
590 {
591 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
592 return -1;
593 }
594 }
595
596 n=(len-tot);
597 for (;;)
598 {
599 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
600 nw=s->max_send_fragment;
601 else
602 nw=n;
603
604 i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
605 if (i <= 0)
606 {
607 s->s3->wnum=tot;
608 return i;
609 }
610
611 if ((i == (int)n) ||
612 (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
613 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE)))
614 {
615 /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment
616 * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */
617 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
618
619 return tot+i;
620 }
621
622 n-=i;
623 tot+=i;
624 }
625 }
626
627static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
628 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
629 {
630 unsigned char *p,*plen;
631 int i,mac_size,clear=0;
632 int prefix_len=0;
633 long align=0;
634 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
635 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
636 SSL_SESSION *sess;
637
638 if (wb->buf == NULL)
639 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
640 return -1;
641
642 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
643 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
644 if (wb->left != 0)
645 return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len));
646
647 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
648 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch)
649 {
650 i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
651 if (i <= 0)
652 return(i);
653 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
654 }
655
656 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
657 return 0;
658
659 wr= &(s->s3->wrec);
660 sess=s->session;
661
662 if ( (sess == NULL) ||
663 (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
664 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL))
665 clear=1;
666
667 if (clear)
668 mac_size=0;
669 else
670 {
671 mac_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
672 if (mac_size < 0)
673 goto err;
674 }
675
676 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */
677 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done)
678 {
679 /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
680 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */
681
682 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)
683 {
684 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
685 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
686 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
687 * together with the actual payload) */
688 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
689 if (prefix_len <= 0)
690 goto err;
691
692 if (prefix_len >
693 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD))
694 {
695 /* insufficient space */
696 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
697 goto err;
698 }
699 }
700
701 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
702 }
703
704 if (create_empty_fragment)
705 {
706#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
707 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
708 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
709 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
710 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
711 align = (long)wb->buf + 2*SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
712 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
713#endif
714 p = wb->buf + align;
715 wb->offset = align;
716 }
717 else if (prefix_len)
718 {
719 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
720 }
721 else
722 {
723#if defined(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD) && SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD!=0
724 align = (long)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
725 align = (-align)&(SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD-1);
726#endif
727 p = wb->buf + align;
728 wb->offset = align;
729 }
730
731 /* write the header */
732
733 *(p++)=type&0xff;
734 wr->type=type;
735
736 *(p++)=(s->version>>8);
737 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
738
739 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
740 plen=p;
741 p+=2;
742
743 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
744 wr->data=p;
745 wr->length=(int)len;
746 wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf;
747
748 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into
749 * wr->data */
750
751 /* first we compress */
752 if (s->compress != NULL)
753 {
754 if (!ssl3_do_compress(s))
755 {
756 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE);
757 goto err;
758 }
759 }
760 else
761 {
762 memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length);
763 wr->input=wr->data;
764 }
765
766 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
767 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
768 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
769
770 if (mac_size != 0)
771 {
772 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1) < 0)
773 goto err;
774 wr->length+=mac_size;
775 wr->input=p;
776 wr->data=p;
777 }
778
779 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
780 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1);
781
782 /* record length after mac and block padding */
783 s2n(wr->length,plen);
784
785 /* we should now have
786 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
787 * wr->length long */
788 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
789 wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
790
791 if (create_empty_fragment)
792 {
793 /* we are in a recursive call;
794 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
795 */
796 return wr->length;
797 }
798
799 /* now let's set up wb */
800 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
801
802 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */
803 s->s3->wpend_tot=len;
804 s->s3->wpend_buf=buf;
805 s->s3->wpend_type=type;
806 s->s3->wpend_ret=len;
807
808 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
809 return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len);
810err:
811 return -1;
812 }
813
814/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
815int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
816 unsigned int len)
817 {
818 int i;
819 SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
820
821/* XXXX */
822 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len)
823 || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
824 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER))
825 || (s->s3->wpend_type != type))
826 {
827 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
828 return(-1);
829 }
830
831 for (;;)
832 {
833 clear_sys_error();
834 if (s->wbio != NULL)
835 {
836 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
837 i=BIO_write(s->wbio,
838 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
839 (unsigned int)wb->left);
840 }
841 else
842 {
843 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
844 i= -1;
845 }
846 if (i == wb->left)
847 {
848 wb->left=0;
849 wb->offset+=i;
850 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
851 SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
852 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
853 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
854 return(s->s3->wpend_ret);
855 }
856 else if (i <= 0) {
857 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION ||
858 s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) {
859 /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole
860 point in using a datagram service */
861 wb->left = 0;
862 }
863 return(i);
864 }
865 wb->offset+=i;
866 wb->left-=i;
867 }
868 }
869
870/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
871 * 'type' is one of the following:
872 *
873 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
874 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
875 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
876 *
877 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
878 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
879 *
880 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
881 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
882 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
883 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
884 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
885 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
886 * Change cipher spec protocol
887 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
888 * Alert protocol
889 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
890 * Handshake protocol
891 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
892 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
893 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
894 * Application data protocol
895 * none of our business
896 */
897int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
898 {
899 int al,i,j,ret;
900 unsigned int n;
901 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
902 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL;
903
904 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
905 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
906 return(-1);
907
908 if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) ||
909 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA)))
910 {
911 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
912 return -1;
913 }
914
915 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
916 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
917 {
918 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
919 unsigned char *dst = buf;
920 unsigned int k;
921
922 /* peek == 0 */
923 n = 0;
924 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0))
925 {
926 *dst++ = *src++;
927 len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
928 n++;
929 }
930 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
931 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
932 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
933 return n;
934 }
935
936 /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */
937
938 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s))
939 {
940 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
941 i=s->handshake_func(s);
942 if (i < 0) return(i);
943 if (i == 0)
944 {
945 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
946 return(-1);
947 }
948 }
949start:
950 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
951
952 /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
953 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
954 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
955 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */
956 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
957
958 /* get new packet if necessary */
959 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY))
960 {
961 ret=ssl3_get_record(s);
962 if (ret <= 0) return(ret);
963 }
964
965 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
966
967 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
968 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
969 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE))
970 {
971 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
972 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
973 goto f_err;
974 }
975
976 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
977 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
978 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)
979 {
980 rr->length=0;
981 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
982 return(0);
983 }
984
985
986 if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
987 {
988 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
989 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
990 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
991 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL))
992 {
993 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
995 goto f_err;
996 }
997
998 if (len <= 0) return(len);
999
1000 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
1001 n = rr->length;
1002 else
1003 n = (unsigned int)len;
1004
1005 memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n);
1006 if (!peek)
1007 {
1008 rr->length-=n;
1009 rr->off+=n;
1010 if (rr->length == 0)
1011 {
1012 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
1013 rr->off=0;
1014 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS)
1015 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
1016 }
1017 }
1018 return(n);
1019 }
1020
1021
1022 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
1023 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
1024
1025 /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage,
1026 * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place.
1027 */
1028 {
1029 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
1030 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
1031 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
1032
1033 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
1034 {
1035 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1036 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
1037 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
1038 }
1039 else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)
1040 {
1041 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
1042 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
1043 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1044 }
1045
1046 if (dest_maxlen > 0)
1047 {
1048 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */
1049 if (rr->length < n)
1050 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1051
1052 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1053 while (n-- > 0)
1054 {
1055 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1056 rr->length--;
1057 }
1058
1059 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1060 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1061 }
1062 }
1063
1064 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1065 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1066 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1067
1068 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1069 if ((!s->server) &&
1070 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1071 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1072 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL))
1073 {
1074 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1075
1076 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1077 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1078 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0))
1079 {
1080 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1081 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1082 goto f_err;
1083 }
1084
1085 if (s->msg_callback)
1086 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1087
1088 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1089 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1090 !s->s3->renegotiate)
1091 {
1092 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1093 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s))
1094 {
1095 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1096 if (i < 0) return(i);
1097 if (i == 0)
1098 {
1099 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1100 return(-1);
1101 }
1102
1103 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1104 {
1105 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1106 {
1107 BIO *bio;
1108 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1109 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1110 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1111 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1112 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1113 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1114 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1115 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1116 return(-1);
1117 }
1118 }
1119 }
1120 }
1121 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1122 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1123 goto start;
1124 }
1125 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1126 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1127 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1128 */
1129 if (s->server &&
1130 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1131 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1132 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1133 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1134 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1135 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) &&
1136 !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1137
1138 {
1139 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1140 rr->length = 0;
1141 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1142 goto start;
1143 }
1144 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2)
1145 {
1146 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1147 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1148
1149 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1150
1151 if (s->msg_callback)
1152 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1153
1154 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1155 cb=s->info_callback;
1156 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1157 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1158
1159 if (cb != NULL)
1160 {
1161 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1162 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1163 }
1164
1165 if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */
1166 {
1167 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1168 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
1169 {
1170 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1171 return(0);
1172 }
1173 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1174 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1175 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1176 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1177 * expects it to succeed.
1178 *
1179 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1180 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1181 */
1182 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
1183 {
1184 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1186 goto f_err;
1187 }
1188 }
1189 else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */
1190 {
1191 char tmp[16];
1192
1193 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1194 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1196 BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr);
1197 ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp);
1198 s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1199 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1200 return(0);
1201 }
1202 else
1203 {
1204 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1206 goto f_err;
1207 }
1208
1209 goto start;
1210 }
1211
1212 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1213 {
1214 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
1215 rr->length=0;
1216 return(0);
1217 }
1218
1219 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC)
1220 {
1221 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1222 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1223 if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1224 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS))
1225 {
1226 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1228 goto f_err;
1229 }
1230
1231 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1232 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL)
1233 {
1234 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1236 goto f_err;
1237 }
1238
1239 rr->length=0;
1240
1241 if (s->msg_callback)
1242 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1243
1244 s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1;
1245 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1246 goto err;
1247 else
1248 goto start;
1249 }
1250
1251 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1252 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake)
1253 {
1254 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1255 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS))
1256 {
1257#if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and
1258 * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting
1259 * protocol violations): */
1260 s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server)
1261 ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT
1262 :SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1263#else
1264 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1265#endif
1266 s->new_session=1;
1267 }
1268 i=s->handshake_func(s);
1269 if (i < 0) return(i);
1270 if (i == 0)
1271 {
1272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1273 return(-1);
1274 }
1275
1276 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY))
1277 {
1278 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */
1279 {
1280 BIO *bio;
1281 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1282 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1283 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1284 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1285 s->rwstate=SSL_READING;
1286 bio=SSL_get_rbio(s);
1287 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1288 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1289 return(-1);
1290 }
1291 }
1292 goto start;
1293 }
1294
1295 switch (rr->type)
1296 {
1297 default:
1298#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS
1299 /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */
1300 if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION)
1301 {
1302 rr->length = 0;
1303 goto start;
1304 }
1305#endif
1306 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1307 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1308 goto f_err;
1309 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1310 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1311 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1312 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1313 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1314 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1315 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1316 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1317 goto f_err;
1318 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1319 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1320 * but have application data. If the library was
1321 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1322 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1323 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1324 * we will indulge it.
1325 */
1326 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1327 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1328 ((
1329 (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1330 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1331 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1332 ) || (
1333 (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1334 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1335 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
1336 )
1337 ))
1338 {
1339 s->s3->in_read_app_data=2;
1340 return(-1);
1341 }
1342 else
1343 {
1344 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1346 goto f_err;
1347 }
1348 }
1349 /* not reached */
1350
1351f_err:
1352 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1353err:
1354 return(-1);
1355 }
1356
1357int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1358 {
1359 int i;
1360 const char *sender;
1361 int slen;
1362
1363 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1364 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1365 else
1366 i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1367
1368 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL)
1369 {
1370 if (s->session == NULL)
1371 {
1372 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1374 return (0);
1375 }
1376
1377 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1378 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0);
1379 }
1380
1381 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i))
1382 return(0);
1383
1384 /* we have to record the message digest at
1385 * this point so we can get it before we read
1386 * the finished message */
1387 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
1388 {
1389 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1390 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1391 }
1392 else
1393 {
1394 sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1395 slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1396 }
1397
1398 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s,
1399 sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1400
1401 return(1);
1402 }
1403
1404int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1405 {
1406 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1407 desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1408 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION)
1409 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1410 if (desc < 0) return -1;
1411 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1412 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1413 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session);
1414
1415 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1416 s->s3->send_alert[0]=level;
1417 s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc;
1418 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1419 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1420 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1421 * some time in the future */
1422 return -1;
1423 }
1424
1425int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1426 {
1427 int i,j;
1428 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
1429
1430 s->s3->alert_dispatch=0;
1431 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1432 if (i <= 0)
1433 {
1434 s->s3->alert_dispatch=1;
1435 }
1436 else
1437 {
1438 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1439 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1440 * we will not worry too much. */
1441 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1442 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1443
1444 if (s->msg_callback)
1445 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1446
1447 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1448 cb=s->info_callback;
1449 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1450 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
1451
1452 if (cb != NULL)
1453 {
1454 j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1455 cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j);
1456 }
1457 }
1458 return(i);
1459 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-19 19:11:43 +0000