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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_pkt.c
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1/* $OpenBSD: s3_pkt.c,v 1.54 2014/12/14 21:49:29 bcook Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <errno.h>
113#include <stdio.h>
114
115#include "ssl_locl.h"
116
117#include <openssl/buffer.h>
118#include <openssl/evp.h>
119
120static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
121 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment);
122static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s);
123
124/* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase
125 * packet by another n bytes.
126 * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified
127 * by s->packet and s->packet_length.
128 * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf
129 * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].)
130 */
131int
132ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend)
133{
134 int i, len, left;
135 size_t align;
136 unsigned char *pkt;
137 SSL3_BUFFER *rb;
138
139 if (n <= 0)
140 return n;
141
142 rb = &(s->s3->rbuf);
143 if (rb->buf == NULL)
144 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
145 return -1;
146
147 left = rb->left;
148 align = (size_t)rb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
149 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
150
151 if (!extend) {
152 /* start with empty packet ... */
153 if (left == 0)
154 rb->offset = align;
155 else if (align != 0 && left >= SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
156 /* check if next packet length is large
157 * enough to justify payload alignment... */
158 pkt = rb->buf + rb->offset;
159 if (pkt[0] == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
160 (pkt[3]<<8|pkt[4]) >= 128) {
161 /* Note that even if packet is corrupted
162 * and its length field is insane, we can
163 * only be led to wrong decision about
164 * whether memmove will occur or not.
165 * Header values has no effect on memmove
166 * arguments and therefore no buffer
167 * overrun can be triggered. */
168 memmove(rb->buf + align, pkt, left);
169 rb->offset = align;
170 }
171 }
172 s->packet = rb->buf + rb->offset;
173 s->packet_length = 0;
174 /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */
175 }
176
177 /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets
178 * because the read operation returns the whole packet
179 * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */
180 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
181 if (left > 0 && n > left)
182 n = left;
183 }
184
185 /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */
186 if (left >= n) {
187 s->packet_length += n;
188 rb->left = left - n;
189 rb->offset += n;
190 return (n);
191 }
192
193 /* else we need to read more data */
194
195 len = s->packet_length;
196 pkt = rb->buf + align;
197 /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer:
198 * 'len' bytes already pointed to by 'packet',
199 * 'left' extra ones at the end */
200 if (s->packet != pkt) {
201 /* len > 0 */
202 memmove(pkt, s->packet, len + left);
203 s->packet = pkt;
204 rb->offset = len + align;
205 }
206
207 if (n > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset)) {
208 /* does not happen */
209 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
210 return -1;
211 }
212
213 if (!s->read_ahead) {
214 /* ignore max parameter */
215 max = n;
216 } else {
217 if (max < n)
218 max = n;
219 if (max > (int)(rb->len - rb->offset))
220 max = rb->len - rb->offset;
221 }
222
223 while (left < n) {
224 /* Now we have len+left bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf
225 * and need to read in more until we have len+n (up to
226 * len+max if possible) */
227
228 errno = 0;
229 if (s->rbio != NULL) {
230 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
231 i = BIO_read(s->rbio, pkt + len + left, max - left);
232 } else {
233 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N, SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET);
234 i = -1;
235 }
236
237 if (i <= 0) {
238 rb->left = left;
239 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
240 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
241 if (len + left == 0)
242 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
243 }
244 return (i);
245 }
246 left += i;
247
248 /*
249 * reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because
250 * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as
251 * opposed to byte oriented as in the TLS case.
252 */
253 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
254 if (n > left)
255 n = left; /* makes the while condition false */
256 }
257 }
258
259 /* done reading, now the book-keeping */
260 rb->offset += n;
261 rb->left = left - n;
262 s->packet_length += n;
263 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
264 return (n);
265}
266
267/* Call this to get a new input record.
268 * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error
269 * or non-blocking IO.
270 * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in
271 * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
272 * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data
273 * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes
274 */
275/* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */
276static int
277ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
278{
279 int ssl_major, ssl_minor, al;
280 int enc_err, n, i, ret = -1;
281 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
282 SSL_SESSION *sess;
283 unsigned char *p;
284 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
285 short version;
286 unsigned mac_size, orig_len;
287 size_t extra;
288
289 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
290 sess = s->session;
291
292 if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER)
293 extra = SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA;
294 else
295 extra = 0;
296
297 if (extra && !s->s3->init_extra) {
298 /* An application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
299 * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */
300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
301 return -1;
302 }
303
304again:
305 /* check if we have the header */
306 if ((s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) ||
307 (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) {
308 n = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0);
309 if (n <= 0)
310 return(n); /* error or non-blocking */
311 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_BODY;
312
313 p = s->packet;
314
315 /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */
316 rr->type= *(p++);
317 ssl_major= *(p++);
318 ssl_minor= *(p++);
319 version = (ssl_major << 8)|ssl_minor;
320 n2s(p, rr->length);
321
322 /* Lets check version */
323 if (!s->first_packet) {
324 if (version != s->version) {
325 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
326 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
327 if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) &&
328 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
329 /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */
330 s->version = (unsigned short)version;
331 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
332 goto f_err;
333 }
334 }
335
336 if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
337 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
338 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
339 goto err;
340 }
341
342 if (rr->length > s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
343 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
344 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
345 SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
346 goto f_err;
347 }
348
349 /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */
350 }
351
352 /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */
353
354 if (rr->length > s->packet_length - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) {
355 /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
356 i = rr->length;
357 n = ssl3_read_n(s, i, i, 1);
358 if (n <= 0)
359 return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */
360 /* now n == rr->length,
361 * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */
362 }
363
364 s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */
365
366 /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length,
367 * and we have that many bytes in s->packet
368 */
369 rr->input = &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]);
370
371 /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr'
372 * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which
373 * need to be copied into rr->data by either
374 * the decryption or by the decompression
375 * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer,
376 * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */
377
378 /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ]
379 * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */
380
381 /* check is not needed I believe */
382 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH + extra) {
383 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
384 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
385 goto f_err;
386 }
387
388 /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */
389 rr->data = rr->input;
390
391 enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 0);
392 /* enc_err is:
393 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid.
394 * 1: if the padding is valid
395 * -1: if the padding is invalid */
396 if (enc_err == 0) {
397 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED;
398 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG);
399 goto f_err;
400 }
401
402
403 /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */
404 if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) &&
405 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) {
406 /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */
407 unsigned char *mac = NULL;
408 unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
409
410 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
411 OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
412
413 /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */
414 orig_len = rr->length + ((unsigned int)rr->type >> 8);
415
416 /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was
417 * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use,
418 * therefore we can safely process the record in a different
419 * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC.
420 */
421 if (orig_len < mac_size ||
422 /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */
423 (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
424 orig_len < mac_size + 1)) {
425 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
426 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
427 goto f_err;
428 }
429
430 if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
431 /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes
432 * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract
433 * the MAC in constant time from within the record,
434 * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes.
435 * */
436 mac = mac_tmp;
437 ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len);
438 rr->length -= mac_size;
439 } else {
440 /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len|
441 * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's
442 * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */
443 rr->length -= mac_size;
444 mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
445 }
446
447 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */);
448 if (i < 0 || mac == NULL ||
449 timingsafe_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0)
450 enc_err = -1;
451 if (rr->length >
452 SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + extra + mac_size)
453 enc_err = -1;
454 }
455
456 if (enc_err < 0) {
457 /*
458 * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with
459 * TLS 1.0, SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a
460 * decryption failure is directly visible from the ciphertext
461 * anyway, we should not reveal which kind of error
462 * occurred -- this might become visible to an attacker
463 * (e.g. via a logfile)
464 */
465 al = SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
467 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
468 goto f_err;
469 }
470
471 if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH + extra) {
472 al = SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW;
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
474 goto f_err;
475 }
476
477 rr->off = 0;
478 /*
479 * So at this point the following is true
480 *
481 * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record
482 * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record
483 * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte
484 * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment
485 * after use :-).
486 */
487
488 /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */
489 s->packet_length = 0;
490
491 /* just read a 0 length packet */
492 if (rr->length == 0)
493 goto again;
494
495 return (1);
496
497f_err:
498 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
499err:
500 return (ret);
501}
502
503/* Call this to write data in records of type 'type'
504 * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO.
505 */
506int
507ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len)
508{
509 const unsigned char *buf = buf_;
510 unsigned int tot, n, nw;
511 int i;
512
513 if (len < 0) {
514 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
515 return -1;
516 }
517
518 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
519 tot = s->s3->wnum;
520 s->s3->wnum = 0;
521
522 if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) {
523 i = s->handshake_func(s);
524 if (i < 0)
525 return (i);
526 if (i == 0) {
527 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,
528 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
529 return -1;
530 }
531 }
532
533 if (len < tot)
534 len = tot;
535 n = (len - tot);
536 for (;;) {
537 if (n > s->max_send_fragment)
538 nw = s->max_send_fragment;
539 else
540 nw = n;
541
542 i = do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0);
543 if (i <= 0) {
544 s->s3->wnum = tot;
545 return i;
546 }
547
548 if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
549 (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) {
550 /*
551 * Next chunk of data should get another prepended
552 * empty fragment in ciphersuites with known-IV
553 * weakness.
554 */
555 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0;
556
557 return tot + i;
558 }
559
560 n -= i;
561 tot += i;
562 }
563}
564
565static int
566do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
567 unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment)
568{
569 unsigned char *p, *plen;
570 int i, mac_size, clear = 0;
571 int prefix_len = 0;
572 int eivlen;
573 size_t align;
574 SSL3_RECORD *wr;
575 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
576 SSL_SESSION *sess;
577
578 if (wb->buf == NULL)
579 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
580 return -1;
581
582 /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
583 * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */
584 if (wb->left != 0)
585 return (ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len));
586
587 /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */
588 if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) {
589 i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
590 if (i <= 0)
591 return (i);
592 /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
593 /* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
594 if (wb->buf == NULL)
595 if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
596 return -1;
597 }
598
599 if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
600 return 0;
601
602 wr = &(s->s3->wrec);
603 sess = s->session;
604
605 if ((sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) ||
606 (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash) == NULL)) {
607 clear = s->enc_write_ctx ? 0 : 1; /* must be AEAD cipher */
608 mac_size = 0;
609 } else {
610 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
611 if (mac_size < 0)
612 goto err;
613 }
614
615 /*
616 * 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls
617 * itself.
618 */
619 if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) {
620 /*
621 * Countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites
622 * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
623 */
624 if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments &&
625 type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
626 /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set;
627 * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment
628 * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later
629 * together with the actual payload) */
630 prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1);
631 if (prefix_len <= 0)
632 goto err;
633
634 if (prefix_len >
635 (SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_SEND_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD)) {
636 /* insufficient space */
637 SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,
638 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
639 goto err;
640 }
641 }
642
643 s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1;
644 }
645
646 if (create_empty_fragment) {
647 /* extra fragment would be couple of cipher blocks,
648 * which would be multiple of SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD, so
649 * if we want to align the real payload, then we can
650 * just pretent we simply have two headers. */
651 align = (size_t)wb->buf + 2 * SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
652 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
653
654 p = wb->buf + align;
655 wb->offset = align;
656 } else if (prefix_len) {
657 p = wb->buf + wb->offset + prefix_len;
658 } else {
659 align = (size_t)wb->buf + SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
660 align = (-align) & (SSL3_ALIGN_PAYLOAD - 1);
661
662 p = wb->buf + align;
663 wb->offset = align;
664 }
665
666 /* write the header */
667
668 *(p++) = type&0xff;
669 wr->type = type;
670
671 *(p++) = (s->version >> 8);
672 /* Some servers hang if iniatial client hello is larger than 256
673 * bytes and record version number > TLS 1.0
674 */
675 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B && !s->renegotiate &&
676 TLS1_get_version(s) > TLS1_VERSION)
677 *(p++) = 0x1;
678 else
679 *(p++) = s->version&0xff;
680
681 /* field where we are to write out packet length */
682 plen = p;
683 p += 2;
684
685 /* Explicit IV length. */
686 if (s->enc_write_ctx && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) {
687 int mode = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_write_ctx);
688 if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) {
689 eivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(s->enc_write_ctx);
690 if (eivlen <= 1)
691 eivlen = 0;
692 }
693 /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */
694 else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
695 eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
696 else
697 eivlen = 0;
698 } else if (s->aead_write_ctx != NULL &&
699 s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_in_record) {
700 eivlen = s->aead_write_ctx->variable_nonce_len;
701 } else
702 eivlen = 0;
703
704 /* lets setup the record stuff. */
705 wr->data = p + eivlen;
706 wr->length = (int)len;
707 wr->input = (unsigned char *)buf;
708
709 /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into wr->data */
710
711 memcpy(wr->data, wr->input, wr->length);
712 wr->input = wr->data;
713
714 /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input
715 * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length.
716 * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */
717
718 if (mac_size != 0) {
719 if (s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,
720 &(p[wr->length + eivlen]), 1) < 0)
721 goto err;
722 wr->length += mac_size;
723 }
724
725 wr->input = p;
726 wr->data = p;
727
728 if (eivlen) {
729 /* if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, eivlen) <= 0)
730 goto err;
731 */
732 wr->length += eivlen;
733 }
734
735 /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */
736 s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, 1);
737
738 /* record length after mac and block padding */
739 s2n(wr->length, plen);
740
741 /* we should now have
742 * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is
743 * wr->length long */
744 wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */
745 wr->length += SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH;
746
747 if (create_empty_fragment) {
748 /* we are in a recursive call;
749 * just return the length, don't write out anything here
750 */
751 return wr->length;
752 }
753
754 /* now let's set up wb */
755 wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length;
756
757 /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect
758 * bad write retries later */
759 s->s3->wpend_tot = len;
760 s->s3->wpend_buf = buf;
761 s->s3->wpend_type = type;
762 s->s3->wpend_ret = len;
763
764 /* we now just need to write the buffer */
765 return ssl3_write_pending(s, type, buf, len);
766err:
767 return -1;
768}
769
770/* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */
771int
772ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
773{
774 int i;
775 SSL3_BUFFER *wb = &(s->s3->wbuf);
776
777 /* XXXX */
778 if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) &&
779 !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) ||
780 (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) {
781 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY);
782 return (-1);
783 }
784
785 for (;;) {
786 errno = 0;
787 if (s->wbio != NULL) {
788 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
789 i = BIO_write(s->wbio,
790 (char *)&(wb->buf[wb->offset]),
791 (unsigned int)wb->left);
792 } else {
793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING, SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET);
794 i = -1;
795 }
796 if (i == wb->left) {
797 wb->left = 0;
798 wb->offset += i;
799 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
800 !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
801 ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
802 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
803 return (s->s3->wpend_ret);
804 } else if (i <= 0) {
805 /*
806 * For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the
807 * whole point in using a datagram service.
808 */
809 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
810 wb->left = 0;
811 return (i);
812 }
813 wb->offset += i;
814 wb->left -= i;
815 }
816}
817
818/* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records.
819 * 'type' is one of the following:
820 *
821 * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us)
822 * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us)
823 * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned)
824 *
825 * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first
826 * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return).
827 *
828 * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as
829 * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really
830 * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests.
831 * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store
832 * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol
833 * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving):
834 * Change cipher spec protocol
835 * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored
836 * Alert protocol
837 * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription)
838 * Handshake protocol
839 * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have
840 * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages
841 * here, anything else is handled by higher layers
842 * Application data protocol
843 * none of our business
844 */
845int
846ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
847{
848 int al, i, j, ret;
849 unsigned int n;
850 SSL3_RECORD *rr;
851 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL;
852
853 if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */
854 if (!ssl3_setup_read_buffer(s))
855 return (-1);
856
857 if (len < 0) {
858 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
859 return -1;
860 }
861
862 if ((type && type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA &&
863 type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) ||
864 (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) {
865 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
866 return -1;
867 }
868
869 if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) &&
870 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
871 /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */
872 unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
873 unsigned char *dst = buf;
874 unsigned int k;
875
876 /* peek == 0 */
877 n = 0;
878 while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) {
879 *dst++ = *src++;
880 len--;
881 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--;
882 n++;
883 }
884 /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */
885 for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++)
886 s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++;
887 return n;
888 }
889
890 /*
891 * Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if
892 * type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE.
893 */
894 if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) {
895 /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */
896 i = s->handshake_func(s);
897 if (i < 0)
898 return (i);
899 if (i == 0) {
900 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
901 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
902 return (-1);
903 }
904 }
905start:
906 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
907
908 /*
909 * s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record
910 * s->s3->rrec.data, - data
911 * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read
912 * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes.
913 */
914 rr = &(s->s3->rrec);
915
916 /* get new packet if necessary */
917 if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) {
918 ret = ssl3_get_record(s);
919 if (ret <= 0)
920 return (ret);
921 }
922
923 /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */
924
925 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec,
926 * reset by ssl3_get_finished */
927 && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) {
928 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
929 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
930 SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED);
931 goto f_err;
932 }
933
934 /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away
935 * (even in 'peek' mode) */
936 if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) {
937 rr->length = 0;
938 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
939 return (0);
940 }
941
942
943 /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */
944 if (type == rr->type) {
945 /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we
946 * are doing a handshake for the first time */
947 if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) &&
948 (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) {
949 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
950 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
951 SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE);
952 goto f_err;
953 }
954
955 if (len <= 0)
956 return (len);
957
958 if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length)
959 n = rr->length;
960 else
961 n = (unsigned int)len;
962
963 memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n);
964 if (!peek) {
965 rr->length -= n;
966 rr->off += n;
967 if (rr->length == 0) {
968 s->rstate = SSL_ST_READ_HEADER;
969 rr->off = 0;
970 if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS &&
971 s->s3->rbuf.left == 0)
972 ssl3_release_read_buffer(s);
973 }
974 }
975 return (n);
976 }
977
978
979 /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake
980 * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */
981
982 {
983 /*
984 * In case of record types for which we have 'fragment'
985 * storage, * fill that so that we can process the data
986 * at a fixed place.
987 */
988 unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0;
989 unsigned char *dest = NULL;
990 unsigned int *dest_len = NULL;
991
992 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
993 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment;
994 dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment;
995 dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len;
996 } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
997 dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment;
998 dest = s->s3->alert_fragment;
999 dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len;
1000 }
1001 if (dest_maxlen > 0) {
1002 /* available space in 'dest' */
1003 n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len;
1004 if (rr->length < n)
1005 n = rr->length; /* available bytes */
1006
1007 /* now move 'n' bytes: */
1008 while (n-- > 0) {
1009 dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++];
1010 rr->length--;
1011 }
1012
1013 if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen)
1014 goto start; /* fragment was too small */
1015 }
1016 }
1017
1018 /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE;
1019 * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT.
1020 * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */
1021
1022 /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */
1023 if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1024 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) &&
1025 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1026 s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;
1027
1028 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) ||
1029 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) ||
1030 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST);
1033 goto f_err;
1034 }
1035
1036 if (s->msg_callback)
1037 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
1038 s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s,
1039 s->msg_callback_arg);
1040
1041 if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1042 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) &&
1043 !s->s3->renegotiate) {
1044 ssl3_renegotiate(s);
1045 if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) {
1046 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1047 if (i < 0)
1048 return (i);
1049 if (i == 0) {
1050 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1051 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1052 return (-1);
1053 }
1054
1055 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1056 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) {
1057 /* no read-ahead left? */
1058 BIO *bio;
1059 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1060 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1061 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1062 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1063 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1064 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1065 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1066 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1067 return (-1);
1068 }
1069 }
1070 }
1071 }
1072 /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request,
1073 * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */
1074 goto start;
1075 }
1076 /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't
1077 * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on.
1078 * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve)
1079 */
1080 if (s->server &&
1081 SSL_is_init_finished(s) &&
1082 !s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
1083 (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) &&
1084 (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) &&
1085 (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&
1086 (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) {
1087 /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/
1088 rr->length = 0;
1089 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1090 goto start;
1091 }
1092 if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) {
1093 int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0];
1094 int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1];
1095
1096 s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0;
1097
1098 if (s->msg_callback)
1099 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1100 s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1101
1102 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1103 cb = s->info_callback;
1104 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1105 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1106
1107 if (cb != NULL) {
1108 j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr;
1109 cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j);
1110 }
1111
1112 if (alert_level == 1) {
1113 /* warning */
1114 s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr;
1115 if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) {
1116 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1117 return (0);
1118 }
1119 /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested
1120 * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with
1121 * a fatal alert because if application tried to
1122 * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and
1123 * expects it to succeed.
1124 *
1125 * In future we might have a renegotiation where we
1126 * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on.
1127 */
1128 else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) {
1129 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1130 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1131 SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1132 goto f_err;
1133 }
1134 } else if (alert_level == 2) {
1135 /* fatal */
1136 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1137 s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr;
1138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1139 SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr);
1140 ERR_asprintf_error_data("SSL alert number %d",
1141 alert_descr);
1142 s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN;
1143 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1144 return (0);
1145 } else {
1146 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE);
1148 goto f_err;
1149 }
1150
1151 goto start;
1152 }
1153
1154 if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) {
1155 /* but we have not received a shutdown */
1156 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
1157 rr->length = 0;
1158 return (0);
1159 }
1160
1161 if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
1162 /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know
1163 * exactly what the record payload has to look like */
1164 if ((rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) ||
1165 (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) {
1166 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1167 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1168 SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
1169 goto f_err;
1170 }
1171
1172 /* Check we have a cipher to change to */
1173 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
1174 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1175 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1176 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1177 goto f_err;
1178 }
1179
1180 /* Check that we should be receiving a Change Cipher Spec. */
1181 if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) {
1182 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1184 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1185 goto f_err;
1186 }
1187 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
1188
1189 rr->length = 0;
1190
1191 if (s->msg_callback) {
1192 s->msg_callback(0, s->version,
1193 SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s,
1194 s->msg_callback_arg);
1195 }
1196
1197 s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
1198 if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s))
1199 goto err;
1200 else
1201 goto start;
1202 }
1203
1204 /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */
1205 if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) {
1206 if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) &&
1207 !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) {
1208 s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT;
1209 s->renegotiate = 1;
1210 s->new_session = 1;
1211 }
1212 i = s->handshake_func(s);
1213 if (i < 0)
1214 return (i);
1215 if (i == 0) {
1216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,
1217 SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1218 return (-1);
1219 }
1220
1221 if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) {
1222 if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) { /* no read-ahead left? */
1223 BIO *bio;
1224 /* In the case where we try to read application data,
1225 * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with
1226 * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may
1227 * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */
1228 s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
1229 bio = SSL_get_rbio(s);
1230 BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio);
1231 BIO_set_retry_read(bio);
1232 return (-1);
1233 }
1234 }
1235 goto start;
1236 }
1237
1238 switch (rr->type) {
1239 default:
1240 /*
1241 * TLS up to v1.1 just ignores unknown message types:
1242 * TLS v1.2 give an unexpected message alert.
1243 */
1244 if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION &&
1245 s->version <= TLS1_1_VERSION) {
1246 rr->length = 0;
1247 goto start;
1248 }
1249 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1250 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1251 goto f_err;
1252 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
1253 case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
1254 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
1255 /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception
1256 * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that
1257 * should not happen when type != rr->type */
1258 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1260 goto f_err;
1261 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
1262 /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data,
1263 * but have application data. If the library was
1264 * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data
1265 * is set) and it makes sense to read application data
1266 * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started),
1267 * we will indulge it.
1268 */
1269 if (s->s3->in_read_app_data &&
1270 (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) &&
1271 (((s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) &&
1272 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) &&
1273 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A)) ||
1274 ((s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) &&
1275 (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) &&
1276 (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)))) {
1277 s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2;
1278 return (-1);
1279 } else {
1280 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
1281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD);
1282 goto f_err;
1283 }
1284 }
1285 /* not reached */
1286
1287f_err:
1288 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1289err:
1290 return (-1);
1291}
1292
1293int
1294ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
1295{
1296 int i;
1297 const char *sender;
1298 int slen;
1299
1300 if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
1301 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ;
1302 else
1303 i = SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ;
1304
1305 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) {
1306 if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) {
1307 /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */
1308 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
1309 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
1310 return (0);
1311 }
1312
1313 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
1314 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
1315 return (0);
1316 }
1317
1318 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, i))
1319 return (0);
1320
1321 /* we have to record the message digest at
1322 * this point so we can get it before we read
1323 * the finished message */
1324 if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) {
1325 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label;
1326 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len;
1327 } else {
1328 sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label;
1329 slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len;
1330 }
1331
1332 i = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen,
1333 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md);
1334 if (i == 0) {
1335 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1336 return 0;
1337 }
1338 s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = i;
1339
1340 return (1);
1341}
1342
1343int
1344ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc)
1345{
1346 /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */
1347 desc = s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc);
1348 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) {
1349 /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */
1350 desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1351 }
1352 if (desc < 0)
1353 return -1;
1354 /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */
1355 if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL))
1356 SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx, s->session);
1357
1358 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1359 s->s3->send_alert[0] = level;
1360 s->s3->send_alert[1] = desc;
1361 if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */
1362 return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s);
1363
1364 /* else data is still being written out, we will get written
1365 * some time in the future */
1366 return -1;
1367}
1368
1369int
1370ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s)
1371{
1372 int i, j;
1373 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
1374
1375 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 0;
1376 i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0);
1377 if (i <= 0) {
1378 s->s3->alert_dispatch = 1;
1379 } else {
1380 /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now.
1381 * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO,
1382 * we will not worry too much. */
1383 if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL)
1384 (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio);
1385
1386 if (s->msg_callback)
1387 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT,
1388 s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
1389
1390 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
1391 cb = s->info_callback;
1392 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
1393 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
1394
1395 if (cb != NULL) {
1396 j = (s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1];
1397 cb(s, SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT, j);
1398 }
1399 }
1400 return (i);
1401}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-25 01:27:54 +0000