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1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124/* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154#include <stdio.h>
155#include "ssl_locl.h"
156#include "kssl_lcl.h"
157#include <openssl/buffer.h>
158#include <openssl/rand.h>
159#include <openssl/objects.h>
160#include <openssl/evp.h>
161#include <openssl/hmac.h>
162#include <openssl/x509.h>
163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164#include <openssl/dh.h>
165#endif
166#include <openssl/bn.h>
167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169#endif
170#include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
183 ssl3_accept,
184 ssl_undefined_function,
185 ssl3_get_server_method)
186
187int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
188 {
189 BUF_MEM *buf;
190 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
191 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
192 int ret= -1;
193 int new_state,state,skip=0;
194
195 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
196 ERR_clear_error();
197 clear_sys_error();
198
199 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
200 cb=s->info_callback;
201 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
202 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
203
204 /* init things to blank */
205 s->in_handshake++;
206 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
207
208 if (s->cert == NULL)
209 {
210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
211 return(-1);
212 }
213
214 for (;;)
215 {
216 state=s->state;
217
218 switch (s->state)
219 {
220 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
221 s->new_session=1;
222 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
223
224 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
225 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
226 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
227 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
228
229 s->server=1;
230 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
231
232 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
233 {
234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
235 return -1;
236 }
237 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
238
239 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
240 {
241 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
242 {
243 ret= -1;
244 goto end;
245 }
246 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
247 {
248 ret= -1;
249 goto end;
250 }
251 s->init_buf=buf;
252 }
253
254 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
255 {
256 ret= -1;
257 goto end;
258 }
259
260 s->init_num=0;
261 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
262
263 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
264 {
265 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
266 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
267 */
268 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
269
270 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
271 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
272 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
273 }
274 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
275 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
276 {
277 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
278 * client that doesn't support secure
279 * renegotiation.
280 */
281 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
282 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
283 ret = -1;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 else
287 {
288 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
289 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
290 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
291 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
292 }
293 break;
294
295 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
296 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
297
298 s->shutdown=0;
299 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
300 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
301 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
302 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
303 s->init_num=0;
304
305 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
306 break;
307
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
309 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
310 break;
311
312 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
313 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
314 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
315
316 s->shutdown=0;
317 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
318 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
319
320 s->new_session = 2;
321 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
322 s->init_num=0;
323 break;
324
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
326 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
327 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
328 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
329#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
330 if (s->hit)
331 {
332 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
333 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
334 else
335 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
336 }
337#else
338 if (s->hit)
339 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
340#endif
341 else
342 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
343 s->init_num=0;
344 break;
345
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
347 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
348 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
349 /* normal PSK or KRB5 */
350 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
351 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
352 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
353 {
354 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
355 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
356#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
357 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
358 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
359 else
360 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
361 }
362 else
363 {
364 skip = 1;
365 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
366 }
367#else
368 }
369 else
370 skip=1;
371
372 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
373#endif
374 s->init_num=0;
375 break;
376
377 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
378 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
379 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
380
381 /* clear this, it may get reset by
382 * send_server_key_exchange */
383 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
384#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
385 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
386#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
387 )
388 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
389 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
390 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
391 * be able to handle this) */
392 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
393 else
394 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
395
396
397 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
398 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
399 *
400 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
401 *
402 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
403 * message only if the cipher suite is either
404 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
405 * server certificate contains the server's
406 * public key for key exchange.
407 */
408 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
409 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
410 * hint if provided */
411#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
412 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
413#endif
414 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
415 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
416 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
417 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
418 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
419 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
420 )
421 )
422 )
423 )
424 {
425 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
426 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
427 }
428 else
429 skip=1;
430
431 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
432 s->init_num=0;
433 break;
434
435 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
436 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
437 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
438 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
439 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
440 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
441 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
442 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
443 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
444 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
445 * and in RFC 2246): */
446 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
447 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
448 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
449 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
450 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
451 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
452 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
453 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
454 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
455 {
456 /* no cert request */
457 skip=1;
458 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
459 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
460 }
461 else
462 {
463 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
464 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
465 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
466#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
467 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
468#else
469 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
470 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
471#endif
472 s->init_num=0;
473 }
474 break;
475
476 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
477 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
478 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
479 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
480 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
481 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
482 s->init_num=0;
483 break;
484
485 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
486
487 /* This code originally checked to see if
488 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
489 * and then flushed. This caused problems
490 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
491 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
492 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
493 * still exist. So instead we just flush
494 * unconditionally.
495 */
496
497 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
498 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
499 {
500 ret= -1;
501 goto end;
502 }
503 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
504
505 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
506 break;
507
508 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
509 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
510 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
511 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
512 if (ret <= 0)
513 goto end;
514 if (ret == 2)
515 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
516 else {
517 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
518 {
519 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
520 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
521 }
522 s->init_num=0;
523 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
524 }
525 break;
526
527 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
528 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
529 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
530 if (ret <= 0)
531 goto end;
532 if (ret == 2)
533 {
534 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
535 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
536 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
537 * message is not sent.
538 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
539 * the client uses its key from the certificate
540 * for key exchange.
541 */
542 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
543 s->init_num = 0;
544 }
545 else
546 {
547 int offset=0;
548 int dgst_num;
549
550 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
551 s->init_num=0;
552
553 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
554 * a client cert, it can be verified
555 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
556 * should be generalized. But it is next step
557 */
558 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
559 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
560 return -1;
561 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
562 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
563 {
564 int dgst_size;
565
566 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
567 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
568 if (dgst_size < 0)
569 {
570 ret = -1;
571 goto end;
572 }
573 offset+=dgst_size;
574 }
575 }
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
580
581 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
582 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
583 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
584
585 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
586 s->init_num=0;
587 break;
588
589 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
590 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
591 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
592 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
593 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
594#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
595 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
596 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
597 else if (s->hit)
598 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
599#else
600 if (s->hit)
601 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
602#endif
603 else
604 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
605 s->init_num=0;
606 break;
607
608#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
609 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
610 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
611 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
612 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
614 s->init_num=0;
615 break;
616
617 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
618 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
619 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
620 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
621 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
622 s->init_num=0;
623 break;
624
625#endif
626
627 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
628 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
629
630 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
631 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
632 { ret= -1; goto end; }
633
634 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
635 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
636
637 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
638 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
639 s->init_num=0;
640
641 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
642 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
643 {
644 ret= -1;
645 goto end;
646 }
647
648 break;
649
650 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
651 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
652 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
653 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
654 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
655 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
656 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
657 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
658 if (s->hit)
659 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
660 else
661 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
662 s->init_num=0;
663 break;
664
665 case SSL_ST_OK:
666 /* clean a few things up */
667 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
668
669 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
670 s->init_buf=NULL;
671
672 /* remove buffering on output */
673 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
674
675 s->init_num=0;
676
677 if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
678 {
679 /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless
680 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */
681
682 s->new_session=0;
683
684 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
685
686 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
687 /* s->server=1; */
688 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
689
690 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
691 }
692
693 ret = 1;
694 goto end;
695 /* break; */
696
697 default:
698 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
699 ret= -1;
700 goto end;
701 /* break; */
702 }
703
704 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
705 {
706 if (s->debug)
707 {
708 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
709 goto end;
710 }
711
712
713 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
714 {
715 new_state=s->state;
716 s->state=state;
717 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
718 s->state=new_state;
719 }
720 }
721 skip=0;
722 }
723end:
724 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
725
726 s->in_handshake--;
727 if (cb != NULL)
728 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
729 return(ret);
730 }
731
732int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
733 {
734 unsigned char *p;
735
736 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
737 {
738 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
739 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
740 *(p++)=0;
741 *(p++)=0;
742 *(p++)=0;
743
744 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
745 /* number of bytes to write */
746 s->init_num=4;
747 s->init_off=0;
748 }
749
750 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
751 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
752 }
753
754int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
755 {
756 int ok;
757 long n;
758
759 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
760 * negotiation. */
761 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
762 {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
764 return -1;
765 }
766
767 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
768 * so permit appropriate message length */
769 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
770 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
771 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
772 -1,
773 s->max_cert_list,
774 &ok);
775 if (!ok) return((int)n);
776 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
777 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
778 {
779 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
780 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
781#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
782 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
783 {
784 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
785 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
786 }
787#endif
788#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
789 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
790 {
791 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
792 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
793 }
794#endif
795 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
796 return 2;
797 }
798 return 1;
799}
800
801int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
802 {
803 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
804 unsigned int cookie_len;
805 long n;
806 unsigned long id;
807 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
808 SSL_CIPHER *c;
809#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
810 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
811#endif
812 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
813
814 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
815 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
816 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
817 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
818 * TLSv1.
819 */
820 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A)
821 {
822 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
823 }
824 s->first_packet=1;
825 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
826 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
827 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
828 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
829 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
830 &ok);
831
832 if (!ok) return((int)n);
833 s->first_packet=0;
834 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
835
836 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
837 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
838 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
839 p+=2;
840
841 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
842 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
843 {
844 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
845 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
846 {
847 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
848 s->version = s->client_version;
849 }
850 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
851 goto f_err;
852 }
853
854 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
855 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
856 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
857 */
858 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
859 {
860 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
861
862 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
863 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
864
865 if (cookie_length == 0)
866 return 1;
867 }
868
869 /* load the client random */
870 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
871 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
872
873 /* get the session-id */
874 j= *(p++);
875
876 s->hit=0;
877 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation
878 * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option
879 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7.
880 * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default,
881 * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications
882 * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with
883 * an earlier library version)
884 */
885 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
886 {
887 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
888 goto err;
889 }
890 else
891 {
892 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
893 if (i == 1)
894 { /* previous session */
895 s->hit=1;
896 }
897 else if (i == -1)
898 goto err;
899 else /* i == 0 */
900 {
901 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
902 goto err;
903 }
904 }
905
906 p+=j;
907
908 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
909 {
910 /* cookie stuff */
911 cookie_len = *(p++);
912
913 /*
914 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
915 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
916 * does not cause an overflow.
917 */
918 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
919 {
920 /* too much data */
921 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
923 goto f_err;
924 }
925
926 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
927 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
928 cookie_len > 0)
929 {
930 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
931
932 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
933 {
934 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
935 cookie_len) == 0)
936 {
937 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
938 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
939 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
940 goto f_err;
941 }
942 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
943 }
944 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
945 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
946 {
947 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
949 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
950 goto f_err;
951 }
952
953 ret = 2;
954 }
955
956 p += cookie_len;
957 }
958
959 n2s(p,i);
960 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
961 {
962 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
963 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
964 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
965 goto f_err;
966 }
967 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
968 {
969 /* not enough data */
970 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
971 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
972 goto f_err;
973 }
974 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
975 == NULL))
976 {
977 goto err;
978 }
979 p+=i;
980
981 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
982 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
983 {
984 j=0;
985 id=s->session->cipher->id;
986
987#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
988 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
989#endif
990 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
991 {
992 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
993#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
994 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
995 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
996#endif
997 if (c->id == id)
998 {
999 j=1;
1000 break;
1001 }
1002 }
1003/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1004 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1005 */
1006#if 0
1007 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1008 {
1009 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1010 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1011 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1012 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1013 * enabled, though. */
1014 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1015 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1016 {
1017 s->session->cipher = c;
1018 j = 1;
1019 }
1020 }
1021#endif
1022 if (j == 0)
1023 {
1024 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1025 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1026 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1027 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1028 goto f_err;
1029 }
1030 }
1031
1032 /* compression */
1033 i= *(p++);
1034 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1035 {
1036 /* not enough data */
1037 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1038 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1039 goto f_err;
1040 }
1041 q=p;
1042 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1043 {
1044 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1045 }
1046
1047 p+=i;
1048 if (j >= i)
1049 {
1050 /* no compress */
1051 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1052 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1053 goto f_err;
1054 }
1055
1056#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1057 /* TLS extensions*/
1058 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1059 {
1060 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1061 {
1062 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1063 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1064 goto f_err;
1065 }
1066 }
1067 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1069 goto err;
1070 }
1071
1072 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1073 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1074 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1075 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1076 {
1077 unsigned long Time;
1078 unsigned char *pos;
1079 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1080 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1081 l2n(Time,pos);
1082 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(pos,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1083 {
1084 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1085 goto f_err;
1086 }
1087 }
1088
1089 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1090 {
1091 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1092
1093 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1094 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1095 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1096 {
1097 s->hit=1;
1098 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1099 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1100
1101 ciphers=NULL;
1102
1103 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1104 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1105 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1106 {
1107 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1109 goto f_err;
1110 }
1111
1112 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1113
1114 if (s->cipher_list)
1115 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1116
1117 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1118 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1119
1120 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1121 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1122 }
1123 }
1124#endif
1125
1126 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1127 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1128 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1129 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1130#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1131 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1132 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1133 {
1134 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1135 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1136 /* Can't disable compression */
1137 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1138 {
1139 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1141 goto f_err;
1142 }
1143 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1144 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1145 {
1146 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1147 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1148 {
1149 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1150 break;
1151 }
1152 }
1153 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1154 {
1155 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1156 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1157 goto f_err;
1158 }
1159 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1160 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1161 {
1162 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1163 break;
1164 }
1165 if (m >= i)
1166 {
1167 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1168 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1169 goto f_err;
1170 }
1171 }
1172 else if (s->hit)
1173 comp = NULL;
1174 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1175 { /* See if we have a match */
1176 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1177
1178 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1179 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1180 {
1181 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1182 v=comp->id;
1183 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1184 {
1185 if (v == q[o])
1186 {
1187 done=1;
1188 break;
1189 }
1190 }
1191 if (done) break;
1192 }
1193 if (done)
1194 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1195 else
1196 comp=NULL;
1197 }
1198#else
1199 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1200 * using compression.
1201 */
1202 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1203 {
1204 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1205 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1206 goto f_err;
1207 }
1208#endif
1209
1210 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1211 * pick a cipher */
1212
1213 if (!s->hit)
1214 {
1215#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1216 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1217#else
1218 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1219#endif
1220 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1221 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1222 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1223 if (ciphers == NULL)
1224 {
1225 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1227 goto f_err;
1228 }
1229 ciphers=NULL;
1230 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1231 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1232
1233 if (c == NULL)
1234 {
1235 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1237 goto f_err;
1238 }
1239 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1240 }
1241 else
1242 {
1243 /* Session-id reuse */
1244#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1245 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1246 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1247 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1248
1249 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1250 {
1251 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1252 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1253 {
1254 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1255 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1256 nc=c;
1257 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1258 ec=c;
1259 }
1260 if (nc != NULL)
1261 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1262 else if (ec != NULL)
1263 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1264 else
1265 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1266 }
1267 else
1268#endif
1269 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1270 }
1271
1272 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1273 goto f_err;
1274
1275 /* we now have the following setup.
1276 * client_random
1277 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1278 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1279 * compression - basically ignored right now
1280 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1281 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1282 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1283 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1284 */
1285
1286 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1287 if (0)
1288 {
1289f_err:
1290 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1291 }
1292err:
1293 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1294 return(ret);
1295 }
1296
1297int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1298 {
1299 unsigned char *buf;
1300 unsigned char *p,*d;
1301 int i,sl;
1302 unsigned long l;
1303#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1304 unsigned long Time;
1305#endif
1306
1307 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1308 {
1309 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1310#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1311 p=s->s3->server_random;
1312 /* Generate server_random if it was not needed previously */
1313 Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */
1314 l2n(Time,p);
1315 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0)
1316 return -1;
1317#endif
1318 /* Do the message type and length last */
1319 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1320
1321 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1322 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1323
1324 /* Random stuff */
1325 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1326 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1327
1328 /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the
1329 * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the
1330 * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send
1331 * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length
1332 * session-id if we want it to be single use.
1333 * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id
1334 * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff.
1335 *
1336 * We also have an additional case where stateless session
1337 * resumption is successful: we always send back the old
1338 * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can
1339 * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful
1340 * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality
1341 * is unaffected.
1342 */
1343 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1344 && !s->hit)
1345 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1346
1347 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1348 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1349 {
1350 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1351 return -1;
1352 }
1353 *(p++)=sl;
1354 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1355 p+=sl;
1356
1357 /* put the cipher */
1358 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1359 p+=i;
1360
1361 /* put the compression method */
1362#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1363 *(p++)=0;
1364#else
1365 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1366 *(p++)=0;
1367 else
1368 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1369#endif
1370#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1371 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1372 {
1373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1374 return -1;
1375 }
1376 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1377 {
1378 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1379 return -1;
1380 }
1381#endif
1382 /* do the header */
1383 l=(p-d);
1384 d=buf;
1385 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1386 l2n3(l,d);
1387
1388 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1389 /* number of bytes to write */
1390 s->init_num=p-buf;
1391 s->init_off=0;
1392 }
1393
1394 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1395 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1396 }
1397
1398int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1399 {
1400 unsigned char *p;
1401
1402 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1403 {
1404 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1405
1406 /* do the header */
1407 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1408 *(p++)=0;
1409 *(p++)=0;
1410 *(p++)=0;
1411
1412 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1413 /* number of bytes to write */
1414 s->init_num=4;
1415 s->init_off=0;
1416 }
1417
1418 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1419 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1420 }
1421
1422int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1423 {
1424#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1425 unsigned char *q;
1426 int j,num;
1427 RSA *rsa;
1428 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1429 unsigned int u;
1430#endif
1431#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1432 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1433#endif
1434#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1435 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1436 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1437 int encodedlen = 0;
1438 int curve_id = 0;
1439 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1440#endif
1441 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1442 unsigned char *p,*d;
1443 int al,i;
1444 unsigned long type;
1445 int n;
1446 CERT *cert;
1447 BIGNUM *r[4];
1448 int nr[4],kn;
1449 BUF_MEM *buf;
1450 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1451
1452 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1453 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1454 {
1455 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1456 cert=s->cert;
1457
1458 buf=s->init_buf;
1459
1460 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1461 n=0;
1462#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1463 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1464 {
1465 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1466 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1467 {
1468 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1469 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1470 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1471 if(rsa == NULL)
1472 {
1473 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1474 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1475 goto f_err;
1476 }
1477 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1478 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1479 }
1480 if (rsa == NULL)
1481 {
1482 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1483 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1484 goto f_err;
1485 }
1486 r[0]=rsa->n;
1487 r[1]=rsa->e;
1488 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1489 }
1490 else
1491#endif
1492#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1493 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1494 {
1495 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1496 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1497 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1498 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1499 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1500 if (dhp == NULL)
1501 {
1502 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1503 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1504 goto f_err;
1505 }
1506
1507 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1508 {
1509 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1510 goto err;
1511 }
1512
1513 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1514 {
1515 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1516 goto err;
1517 }
1518
1519 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1520 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1521 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1522 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1523 {
1524 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1525 {
1526 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1527 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1528 goto err;
1529 }
1530 }
1531 else
1532 {
1533 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1534 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1535 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1536 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1537 {
1538 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1539 goto err;
1540 }
1541 }
1542 r[0]=dh->p;
1543 r[1]=dh->g;
1544 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1545 }
1546 else
1547#endif
1548#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1549 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1550 {
1551 const EC_GROUP *group;
1552
1553 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1554 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1555 {
1556 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1557 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1558 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1559 }
1560 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1561 {
1562 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1563 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1564 goto f_err;
1565 }
1566
1567 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1568 {
1569 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1570 goto err;
1571 }
1572
1573 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1574 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1575 {
1576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1577 goto err;
1578 }
1579 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1580 {
1581 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1582 goto err;
1583 }
1584
1585 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1586 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1587 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1588 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1589 {
1590 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1591 {
1592 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1593 goto err;
1594 }
1595 }
1596
1597 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1598 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1599 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1600 {
1601 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1602 goto err;
1603 }
1604
1605 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1606 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1607 {
1608 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1609 goto err;
1610 }
1611
1612 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1613 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1614 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1615 */
1616 if ((curve_id =
1617 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1618 == 0)
1619 {
1620 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1621 goto err;
1622 }
1623
1624 /* Encode the public key.
1625 * First check the size of encoding and
1626 * allocate memory accordingly.
1627 */
1628 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1629 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1630 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1631 NULL, 0, NULL);
1632
1633 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1634 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1635 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1636 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1637 {
1638 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1639 goto err;
1640 }
1641
1642
1643 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1644 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1645 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1646 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1647
1648 if (encodedlen == 0)
1649 {
1650 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1651 goto err;
1652 }
1653
1654 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1655
1656 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1657 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1658 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1659 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1660 * structure.
1661 */
1662 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1663
1664 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1665 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1666 */
1667 r[0]=NULL;
1668 r[1]=NULL;
1669 r[2]=NULL;
1670 r[3]=NULL;
1671 }
1672 else
1673#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1674#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1675 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1676 {
1677 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1678 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1679 }
1680 else
1681#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1682 {
1683 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1684 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1685 goto f_err;
1686 }
1687 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1688 {
1689 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1690 n+=2+nr[i];
1691 }
1692
1693 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1694 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1695 {
1696 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher))
1697 == NULL)
1698 {
1699 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1700 goto f_err;
1701 }
1702 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1703 }
1704 else
1705 {
1706 pkey=NULL;
1707 kn=0;
1708 }
1709
1710 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1711 {
1712 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1713 goto err;
1714 }
1715 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1716 p= &(d[4]);
1717
1718 for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++)
1719 {
1720 s2n(nr[i],p);
1721 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1722 p+=nr[i];
1723 }
1724
1725#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1726 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1727 {
1728 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1729 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1730 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1731 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1732 * the actual encoded point itself
1733 */
1734 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1735 p += 1;
1736 *p = 0;
1737 p += 1;
1738 *p = curve_id;
1739 p += 1;
1740 *p = encodedlen;
1741 p += 1;
1742 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1743 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1744 encodedlen);
1745 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1746 encodedPoint = NULL;
1747 p += encodedlen;
1748 }
1749#endif
1750
1751#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1752 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1753 {
1754 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1755 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1756 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1757 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1758 }
1759#endif
1760
1761 /* not anonymous */
1762 if (pkey != NULL)
1763 {
1764 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1765 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1766#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1767 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
1768 {
1769 q=md_buf;
1770 j=0;
1771 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1772 {
1773 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1774 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1775 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1776 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1777 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1778 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1779 (unsigned int *)&i);
1780 q+=i;
1781 j+=i;
1782 }
1783 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1784 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1785 {
1786 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1787 goto err;
1788 }
1789 s2n(u,p);
1790 n+=u+2;
1791 }
1792 else
1793#endif
1794#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA)
1795 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
1796 {
1797 /* lets do DSS */
1798 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL);
1799 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1800 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1801 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1802 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1803 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1804 {
1805 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA);
1806 goto err;
1807 }
1808 s2n(i,p);
1809 n+=i+2;
1810 }
1811 else
1812#endif
1813#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA)
1814 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
1815 {
1816 /* let's do ECDSA */
1817 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL);
1818 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1819 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1820 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1821 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1822 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1823 {
1824 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA);
1825 goto err;
1826 }
1827 s2n(i,p);
1828 n+=i+2;
1829 }
1830 else
1831#endif
1832 {
1833 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1834 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1835 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1836 goto f_err;
1837 }
1838 }
1839
1840 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
1841 l2n3(n,d);
1842
1843 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1844 * it off */
1845 s->init_num=n+4;
1846 s->init_off=0;
1847 }
1848
1849 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1850 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1851 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1852f_err:
1853 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1854err:
1855#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1856 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1857 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1858#endif
1859 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1860 return(-1);
1861 }
1862
1863int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1864 {
1865 unsigned char *p,*d;
1866 int i,j,nl,off,n;
1867 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
1868 X509_NAME *name;
1869 BUF_MEM *buf;
1870
1871 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
1872 {
1873 buf=s->init_buf;
1874
1875 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
1876
1877 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1878 p++;
1879 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
1880 d[0]=n;
1881 p+=n;
1882 n++;
1883
1884 off=n;
1885 p+=2;
1886 n+=2;
1887
1888 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1889 nl=0;
1890 if (sk != NULL)
1891 {
1892 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
1893 {
1894 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
1895 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
1896 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
1897 {
1898 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1899 goto err;
1900 }
1901 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
1902 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
1903 {
1904 s2n(j,p);
1905 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1906 n+=2+j;
1907 nl+=2+j;
1908 }
1909 else
1910 {
1911 d=p;
1912 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
1913 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
1914 n+=j;
1915 nl+=j;
1916 }
1917 }
1918 }
1919 /* else no CA names */
1920 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
1921 s2n(nl,p);
1922
1923 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
1924 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
1925 l2n3(n,d);
1926
1927 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
1928 * it off */
1929
1930 s->init_num=n+4;
1931 s->init_off=0;
1932#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
1933 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
1934
1935 /* do the header */
1936 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1937 *(p++)=0;
1938 *(p++)=0;
1939 *(p++)=0;
1940 s->init_num += 4;
1941#endif
1942
1943 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1944 }
1945
1946 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1947 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1948err:
1949 return(-1);
1950 }
1951
1952int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1953 {
1954 int i,al,ok;
1955 long n;
1956 unsigned long alg_k;
1957 unsigned char *p;
1958#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1959 RSA *rsa=NULL;
1960 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
1961#endif
1962#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1963 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
1964 DH *dh_srvr;
1965#endif
1966#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
1967 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
1968#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
1969
1970#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1971 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1972 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1973 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1974 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1975#endif
1976
1977 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
1978 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1979 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
1980 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1981 2048, /* ??? */
1982 &ok);
1983
1984 if (!ok) return((int)n);
1985 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1986
1987 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1988
1989#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1990 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
1991 {
1992 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
1993 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
1994 {
1995 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
1996 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
1997 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
1998 * be sent already */
1999 if (rsa == NULL)
2000 {
2001 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2002 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2003 goto f_err;
2004
2005 }
2006 }
2007 else
2008 {
2009 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2010 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2011 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2012 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2013 {
2014 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2015 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2016 goto f_err;
2017 }
2018 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2019 }
2020
2021 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2022 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2023 {
2024 n2s(p,i);
2025 if (n != i+2)
2026 {
2027 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2028 {
2029 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2030 goto err;
2031 }
2032 else
2033 p-=2;
2034 }
2035 else
2036 n=i;
2037 }
2038
2039 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2040
2041 al = -1;
2042
2043 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2044 {
2045 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2046 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2047 }
2048
2049 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2050 {
2051 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2052 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2053 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2054 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2055 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2056 * protocol version.
2057 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2058 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2059 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2060 {
2061 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2062 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2063
2064 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2065 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2066 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2067 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2068 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2069 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2070 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2071 }
2072 }
2073
2074 if (al != -1)
2075 {
2076 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2077 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2078 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2079 ERR_clear_error();
2080 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2081 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2082 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2083 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2084 goto err;
2085 }
2086
2087 s->session->master_key_length=
2088 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2089 s->session->master_key,
2090 p,i);
2091 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2092 }
2093 else
2094#endif
2095#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2096 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2097 {
2098 n2s(p,i);
2099 if (n != i+2)
2100 {
2101 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2102 {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2104 goto err;
2105 }
2106 else
2107 {
2108 p-=2;
2109 i=(int)n;
2110 }
2111 }
2112
2113 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2114 {
2115 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2116 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2117 goto f_err;
2118 }
2119 else
2120 {
2121 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2122 {
2123 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2125 goto f_err;
2126 }
2127 else
2128 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2129 }
2130
2131 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2132 if (pub == NULL)
2133 {
2134 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2135 goto err;
2136 }
2137
2138 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2139
2140 if (i <= 0)
2141 {
2142 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2143 BN_clear_free(pub);
2144 goto err;
2145 }
2146
2147 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2148 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2149
2150 BN_clear_free(pub);
2151 pub=NULL;
2152 s->session->master_key_length=
2153 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2154 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2155 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2156 }
2157 else
2158#endif
2159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2160 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2161 {
2162 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2163 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2164 krb5_data authenticator;
2165 krb5_data enc_pms;
2166 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2167 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2168 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2169 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2170 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2171 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2172 int padl, outl;
2173 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2174 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2175
2176 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2177
2178 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2179
2180 n2s(p,i);
2181 enc_ticket.length = i;
2182
2183 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2184 {
2185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2186 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2187 goto err;
2188 }
2189
2190 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2191 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2192
2193 n2s(p,i);
2194 authenticator.length = i;
2195
2196 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2197 {
2198 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2199 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2200 goto err;
2201 }
2202
2203 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2204 p+=authenticator.length;
2205
2206 n2s(p,i);
2207 enc_pms.length = i;
2208 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2209 p+=enc_pms.length;
2210
2211 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2212 ** after decryption
2213 */
2214 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2215 {
2216 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2217 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2218 goto err;
2219 }
2220
2221 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2222 enc_pms.length + 6))
2223 {
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2225 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2226 goto err;
2227 }
2228
2229 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2230 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2231 {
2232#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2233 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2234 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2235 if (kssl_err.text)
2236 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2237#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2238 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2239 kssl_err.reason);
2240 goto err;
2241 }
2242
2243 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2244 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2245 */
2246 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2247 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2248 {
2249#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2250 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2251 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2252 if (kssl_err.text)
2253 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2254#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2256 kssl_err.reason);
2257 goto err;
2258 }
2259
2260 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2261 {
2262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2263 goto err;
2264 }
2265
2266#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2267 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2268#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2269
2270 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2271 if (enc == NULL)
2272 goto err;
2273
2274 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2275
2276 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2277 {
2278 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2279 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2280 goto err;
2281 }
2282 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2283 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2284 {
2285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2286 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2287 goto err;
2288 }
2289 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2290 {
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2292 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2293 goto err;
2294 }
2295 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2296 {
2297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2298 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2299 goto err;
2300 }
2301 outl += padl;
2302 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2303 {
2304 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2305 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2306 goto err;
2307 }
2308 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2309 {
2310 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2311 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2312 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2313 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2314 * the protocol version.
2315 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2316 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2317 */
2318 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2319 {
2320 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2321 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2322 goto err;
2323 }
2324 }
2325
2326 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2327
2328 s->session->master_key_length=
2329 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2330 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2331
2332 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2333 {
2334 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2335 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2336 {
2337 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2338 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2339 }
2340 }
2341
2342
2343 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2344 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2345 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2346 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2347 */
2348 }
2349 else
2350#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2351
2352#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2353 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2354 {
2355 int ret = 1;
2356 int field_size = 0;
2357 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2358 const EC_GROUP *group;
2359 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2360
2361 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2362 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2363 {
2364 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2365 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2366 goto err;
2367 }
2368
2369 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2370 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2371 {
2372 /* use the certificate */
2373 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2374 }
2375 else
2376 {
2377 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2378 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2379 */
2380 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2381 }
2382
2383 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2384 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2385
2386 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2387 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2388 {
2389 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2390 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2391 goto err;
2392 }
2393
2394 /* Let's get client's public key */
2395 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2396 {
2397 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2398 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2399 goto err;
2400 }
2401
2402 if (n == 0L)
2403 {
2404 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2405
2406 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2407 {
2408 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2409 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2410 goto f_err;
2411 }
2412 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2413 == NULL) ||
2414 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2415 {
2416 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2417 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2418 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2419 * never executed. When that support is
2420 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2421 * received in the certificate is
2422 * authorized for key agreement.
2423 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2424 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2425 * group.
2426 */
2427 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2428 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2429 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2430 goto f_err;
2431 }
2432
2433 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2434 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2435 {
2436 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2437 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2438 goto err;
2439 }
2440 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2441 }
2442 else
2443 {
2444 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2445 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2446 */
2447 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2448 {
2449 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2450 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2451 goto err;
2452 }
2453
2454 /* Get encoded point length */
2455 i = *p;
2456 p += 1;
2457 if (n != 1 + i)
2458 {
2459 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2460 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2461 goto err;
2462 }
2463 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2464 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2465 {
2466 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2467 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2468 goto err;
2469 }
2470 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2471 * currently, so set it to the start
2472 */
2473 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2474 }
2475
2476 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2477 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2478 if (field_size <= 0)
2479 {
2480 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2481 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2482 goto err;
2483 }
2484 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2485 if (i <= 0)
2486 {
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2489 goto err;
2490 }
2491
2492 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2493 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2494 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2495 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2496 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2497 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2498
2499 /* Compute the master secret */
2500 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2501 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2502
2503 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2504 return (ret);
2505 }
2506 else
2507#endif
2508#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2509 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2510 {
2511 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2512 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2513 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2514 int psk_err = 1;
2515 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2516
2517 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2518
2519 n2s(p,i);
2520 if (n != i+2)
2521 {
2522 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2523 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2524 goto psk_err;
2525 }
2526 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2527 {
2528 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2529 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2530 goto psk_err;
2531 }
2532 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2533 {
2534 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2535 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2536 goto psk_err;
2537 }
2538
2539 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2540 * string for the callback */
2541 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2542 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2543 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2544 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2545 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2546
2547 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2548 {
2549 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2550 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2551 goto psk_err;
2552 }
2553 else if (psk_len == 0)
2554 {
2555 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2558 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2559 goto psk_err;
2560 }
2561
2562 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2563 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2564 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2565 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2566 s2n(psk_len, t);
2567 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2568 t+=psk_len;
2569 s2n(psk_len, t);
2570
2571 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2572 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2573 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2574 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2575 {
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2577 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2578 goto psk_err;
2579 }
2580
2581 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2582 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2583 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2584 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2585 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2586 {
2587 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2588 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2589 goto psk_err;
2590 }
2591
2592 s->session->master_key_length=
2593 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2594 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2595 psk_err = 0;
2596 psk_err:
2597 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2598 if (psk_err != 0)
2599 goto f_err;
2600 }
2601 else
2602#endif
2603 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2604 {
2605 int ret = 0;
2606 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2607 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2608 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2609 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2610 unsigned long alg_a;
2611
2612 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2613 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2614 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2615 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2616 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2617 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2618
2619 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2620 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2621 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2622 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2623 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2624 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2625 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2626 if (client_pub_pkey)
2627 {
2628 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2629 ERR_clear_error();
2630 }
2631 /* Decrypt session key */
2632 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2633 {
2634 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2635 goto gerr;
2636 }
2637 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2638 {
2639 start = p+3;
2640 inlen = p[2];
2641 }
2642 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2643 {
2644 start = p+2;
2645 inlen = p[1];
2646 }
2647 else
2648 {
2649 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2650 goto gerr;
2651 }
2652 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2653
2654 {
2655 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2656 goto gerr;
2657 }
2658 /* Generate master secret */
2659 s->session->master_key_length=
2660 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2661 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2662 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2663 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2664 ret = 2;
2665 else
2666 ret = 1;
2667 gerr:
2668 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2669 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2670 if (ret)
2671 return ret;
2672 else
2673 goto err;
2674 }
2675 else
2676 {
2677 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2678 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2679 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2680 goto f_err;
2681 }
2682
2683 return(1);
2684f_err:
2685 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2686#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH)
2687err:
2688#endif
2689#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2690 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2691 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2692 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2693 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2694 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2695#endif
2696 return(-1);
2697 }
2698
2699int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2700 {
2701 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2702 unsigned char *p;
2703 int al,ok,ret=0;
2704 long n;
2705 int type=0,i,j;
2706 X509 *peer;
2707
2708 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2709 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2710 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2711 -1,
2712 514, /* 514? */
2713 &ok);
2714
2715 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2716
2717 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2718 {
2719 peer=s->session->peer;
2720 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2721 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2722 }
2723 else
2724 {
2725 peer=NULL;
2726 pkey=NULL;
2727 }
2728
2729 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2730 {
2731 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2732 if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2733 {
2734 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2735 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2736 goto f_err;
2737 }
2738 ret=1;
2739 goto end;
2740 }
2741
2742 if (peer == NULL)
2743 {
2744 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2745 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2746 goto f_err;
2747 }
2748
2749 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2750 {
2751 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2752 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2753 goto f_err;
2754 }
2755
2756 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2757 {
2758 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2759 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2760 goto f_err;
2761 }
2762
2763 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2764 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2765 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2766 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2767 * signature without length field */
2768 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2769 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2770 {
2771 i=64;
2772 }
2773 else
2774 {
2775 n2s(p,i);
2776 n-=2;
2777 if (i > n)
2778 {
2779 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2780 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2781 goto f_err;
2782 }
2783 }
2784 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2785 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
2786 {
2787 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2788 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2789 goto f_err;
2790 }
2791
2792#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2793 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
2794 {
2795 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2796 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2797 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2798 if (i < 0)
2799 {
2800 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2801 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2802 goto f_err;
2803 }
2804 if (i == 0)
2805 {
2806 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2807 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2808 goto f_err;
2809 }
2810 }
2811 else
2812#endif
2813#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2814 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
2815 {
2816 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2817 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2818 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
2819 if (j <= 0)
2820 {
2821 /* bad signature */
2822 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2823 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2824 goto f_err;
2825 }
2826 }
2827 else
2828#endif
2829#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2830 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
2831 {
2832 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2833 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2834 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
2835 if (j <= 0)
2836 {
2837 /* bad signature */
2838 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2840 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2841 goto f_err;
2842 }
2843 }
2844 else
2845#endif
2846 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
2847 { unsigned char signature[64];
2848 int idx;
2849 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
2850 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
2851 if (i!=64) {
2852 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
2853 }
2854 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
2855 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
2856 }
2857 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
2858 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2859 if (j<=0)
2860 {
2861 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2862 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2863 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2864 goto f_err;
2865 }
2866 }
2867 else
2868 {
2869 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2870 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2871 goto f_err;
2872 }
2873
2874
2875 ret=1;
2876 if (0)
2877 {
2878f_err:
2879 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2880 }
2881end:
2882 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2883 return(ret);
2884 }
2885
2886int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2887 {
2888 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
2889 X509 *x=NULL;
2890 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
2891 const unsigned char *p,*q;
2892 unsigned char *d;
2893 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
2894
2895 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2896 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
2897 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2898 -1,
2899 s->max_cert_list,
2900 &ok);
2901
2902 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2903
2904 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
2905 {
2906 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2907 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2908 {
2909 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2910 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2911 goto f_err;
2912 }
2913 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
2914 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
2915 {
2916 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
2917 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2918 goto f_err;
2919 }
2920 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2921 return(1);
2922 }
2923
2924 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
2925 {
2926 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2928 goto f_err;
2929 }
2930 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2931
2932 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
2933 {
2934 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2935 goto err;
2936 }
2937
2938 n2l3(p,llen);
2939 if (llen+3 != n)
2940 {
2941 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2942 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2943 goto f_err;
2944 }
2945 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
2946 {
2947 n2l3(p,l);
2948 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
2949 {
2950 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2951 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2952 goto f_err;
2953 }
2954
2955 q=p;
2956 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
2957 if (x == NULL)
2958 {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2960 goto err;
2961 }
2962 if (p != (q+l))
2963 {
2964 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2965 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2966 goto f_err;
2967 }
2968 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
2969 {
2970 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2971 goto err;
2972 }
2973 x=NULL;
2974 nc+=l+3;
2975 }
2976
2977 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
2978 {
2979 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
2980 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
2981 {
2982 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
2984 goto f_err;
2985 }
2986 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
2987 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2988 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
2989 {
2990 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2991 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2992 goto f_err;
2993 }
2994 }
2995 else
2996 {
2997 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
2998 if (i <= 0)
2999 {
3000 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3001 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3002 goto f_err;
3003 }
3004 }
3005
3006 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3007 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3008 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3009 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3010
3011 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3012 * when we arrive here. */
3013 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3014 {
3015 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3016 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3017 {
3018 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3019 goto err;
3020 }
3021 }
3022 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3023 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3024 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3025 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3026 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3027
3028 sk=NULL;
3029
3030 ret=1;
3031 if (0)
3032 {
3033f_err:
3034 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3035 }
3036err:
3037 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3038 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3039 return(ret);
3040 }
3041
3042int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3043 {
3044 unsigned long l;
3045 X509 *x;
3046
3047 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3048 {
3049 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3050 if (x == NULL)
3051 {
3052 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3053 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3054 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3055 {
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3057 return(0);
3058 }
3059 }
3060
3061 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3062 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3063 s->init_num=(int)l;
3064 s->init_off=0;
3065 }
3066
3067 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3068 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3069 }
3070#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3071int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3072 {
3073 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3074 {
3075 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3076 int len, slen;
3077 unsigned int hlen;
3078 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3079 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3080 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3081 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3082 unsigned char key_name[16];
3083
3084 /* get session encoding length */
3085 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3086 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3087 * too long
3088 */
3089 if (slen > 0xFF00)
3090 return -1;
3091 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3092 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3093 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3094 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3095 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3096 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3097 */
3098 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3099 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3100 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3101 return -1;
3102 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen);
3103 if (!senc)
3104 return -1;
3105 p = senc;
3106 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3107
3108 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3109 /* do the header */
3110 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3111 /* Skip message length for now */
3112 p += 3;
3113 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3114 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3115 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3116 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3117 * from parent ctx.
3118 */
3119 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3120 {
3121 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3122 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3123 {
3124 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3125 return -1;
3126 }
3127 }
3128 else
3129 {
3130 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3131 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3132 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3133 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3134 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3135 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3136 }
3137 l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p);
3138 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3139 p += 2;
3140 /* Output key name */
3141 macstart = p;
3142 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3143 p += 16;
3144 /* output IV */
3145 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3146 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3147 /* Encrypt session data */
3148 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3149 p += len;
3150 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3151 p += len;
3152 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3153
3154 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3155 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3156 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3157
3158 p += hlen;
3159 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3160 /* Total length */
3161 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3162 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3163 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3164 p += 4;
3165 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3166
3167 /* number of bytes to write */
3168 s->init_num= len;
3169 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3170 s->init_off=0;
3171 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3172 }
3173
3174 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3175 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3176 }
3177
3178int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3179 {
3180 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3181 {
3182 unsigned char *p;
3183 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3184 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3185 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3186 * + (ocsp response)
3187 */
3188 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3189 return -1;
3190
3191 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3192
3193 /* do the header */
3194 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3195 /* message length */
3196 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3197 /* status type */
3198 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3199 /* length of OCSP response */
3200 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3201 /* actual response */
3202 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3203 /* number of bytes to write */
3204 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3205 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3206 s->init_off = 0;
3207 }
3208
3209 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3210 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3211 }
3212#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-19 22:06:24 +0000