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-rw-r--r--src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c2694
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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c b/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c992406ca8..0000000000
--- a/src/lib/libssl/s3_srvr.c
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@@ -1,2694 +0,0 @@
1/* $OpenBSD: s3_srvr.c,v 1.124 2016/01/27 02:06:16 beck Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124/* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151#include <stdio.h>
152
153#include "ssl_locl.h"
154
155#include <openssl/bn.h>
156#include <openssl/buffer.h>
157#include <openssl/evp.h>
158#include <openssl/dh.h>
159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
160#include <openssl/gost.h>
161#endif
162#include <openssl/hmac.h>
163#include <openssl/md5.h>
164#include <openssl/objects.h>
165#include <openssl/x509.h>
166
167#include "bytestring.h"
168
169int
170ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
171{
172 unsigned long alg_k;
173 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL;
174 int ret = -1;
175 int new_state, state, skip = 0;
176
177 ERR_clear_error();
178 errno = 0;
179
180 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
181 cb = s->info_callback;
182 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
183 cb = s->ctx->info_callback;
184
185 /* init things to blank */
186 s->in_handshake++;
187 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
188 SSL_clear(s);
189
190 if (s->cert == NULL) {
191 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
192 ret = -1;
193 goto end;
194 }
195
196 for (;;) {
197 state = s->state;
198
199 switch (s->state) {
200 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
201 s->renegotiate = 1;
202 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
203
204 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
205 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
206 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
207 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
208
209 s->server = 1;
210 if (cb != NULL)
211 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
212
213 if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) {
214 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
215 ret = -1;
216 goto end;
217 }
218 s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
219
220 if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
221 ret = -1;
222 goto end;
223 }
224 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
225 ret = -1;
226 goto end;
227 }
228
229 s->init_num = 0;
230
231 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
232 /*
233 * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO
234 * so that the output is sent in a way that
235 * TCP likes :-)
236 */
237 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) {
238 ret = -1;
239 goto end;
240 }
241
242 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
243 ret = -1;
244 goto end;
245 }
246
247 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
248 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
249 } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
250 /*
251 * Server attempting to renegotiate with
252 * client that doesn't support secure
253 * renegotiation.
254 */
255 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
256 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
257 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
258 SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
259 ret = -1;
260 goto end;
261 } else {
262 /*
263 * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
264 * we will just send a HelloRequest
265 */
266 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
267 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
268 }
269 break;
270
271 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
272 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
273
274 s->shutdown = 0;
275 ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
276 if (ret <= 0)
277 goto end;
278 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
279 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
280 s->init_num = 0;
281
282 if (!tls1_init_finished_mac(s)) {
283 ret = -1;
284 goto end;
285 }
286 break;
287
288 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
289 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
290 break;
291
292 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
293 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
294 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
295
296 s->shutdown = 0;
297 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
298 ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
299 if (ret <= 0)
300 goto end;
301 }
302
303 s->renegotiate = 2;
304 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
305 s->init_num = 0;
306 break;
307
308 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
309 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
310 ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
311 if (ret <= 0)
312 goto end;
313 if (s->hit) {
314 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
315 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
316 else
317 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
318 }
319 else
320 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
321 s->init_num = 0;
322 break;
323
324 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
325 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
326 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH. */
327 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
328 SSL_aNULL)) {
329 ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
330 if (ret <= 0)
331 goto end;
332 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
333 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
334 else
335 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
336 } else {
337 skip = 1;
338 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
339 }
340 s->init_num = 0;
341 break;
342
343 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
344 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
345 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
346
347 /*
348 * Only send if using a DH key exchange.
349 *
350 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a ServerKeyExchange
351 * message only if the cipher suite is ECDHE. In other
352 * cases, the server certificate contains the server's
353 * public key for key exchange.
354 */
355 if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
356 ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
357 if (ret <= 0)
358 goto end;
359 } else
360 skip = 1;
361
362 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
363 s->init_num = 0;
364 break;
365
366 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
367 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
368 /*
369 * Determine whether or not we need to request a
370 * certificate.
371 *
372 * Do not request a certificate if:
373 *
374 * - We did not ask for it (SSL_VERIFY_PEER is unset).
375 *
376 * - SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set and we are
377 * renegotiating.
378 *
379 * - We are using an anonymous ciphersuites
380 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
381 * and in RFC 2246) ... except when the application
382 * insists on verification (against the specs, but
383 * s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3).
384 */
385 if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
386 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
387 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
388 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth &
389 SSL_aNULL) && !(s->verify_mode &
390 SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) {
391 /* No cert request */
392 skip = 1;
393 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0;
394 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
395 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
396 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
397 ret = -1;
398 goto end;
399 }
400 }
401 } else {
402 s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1;
403 ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
404 if (ret <= 0)
405 goto end;
406 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
407 s->init_num = 0;
408 }
409 break;
410
411 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
412 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
413 ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s);
414 if (ret <= 0)
415 goto end;
416 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
417 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
418 s->init_num = 0;
419 break;
420
421 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
422
423 /*
424 * This code originally checked to see if
425 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
426 * and then flushed. This caused problems
427 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
428 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
429 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
430 * still exist. So instead we just flush
431 * unconditionally.
432 */
433
434 s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
435 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
436 ret = -1;
437 goto end;
438 }
439 s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
440
441 s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state;
442 break;
443
444 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
445 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
446 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
447 ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
448 if (ret <= 0)
449 goto end;
450 }
451 s->init_num = 0;
452 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
453 break;
454
455 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
456 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
457 ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
458 if (ret <= 0)
459 goto end;
460 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
461 if (ret == 2) {
462 /*
463 * For the ECDH ciphersuites when
464 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
465 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
466 * message is not sent.
467 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
468 * the client uses its key from the certificate
469 * for key exchange.
470 */
471 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
472 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
473 else
474 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
475 s->init_num = 0;
476 } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) {
477 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
478 s->init_num = 0;
479 if (!s->session->peer)
480 break;
481 /*
482 * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer
483 * at this point and digest cached records.
484 */
485 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
486 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
487 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
488 ret = -1;
489 goto end;
490 }
491 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
492 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
493 ret = -1;
494 goto end;
495 }
496 } else {
497 int offset = 0;
498 int dgst_num;
499
500 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
501 s->init_num = 0;
502
503 /*
504 * We need to get hashes here so if there is
505 * a client cert, it can be verified
506 * FIXME - digest processing for
507 * CertificateVerify should be generalized.
508 * But it is next step
509 */
510 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
511 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
512 ret = -1;
513 goto end;
514 }
515 }
516 for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST;
517 dgst_num++)
518 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) {
519 int dgst_size;
520
521 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,
522 EVP_MD_CTX_type(
523 s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),
524 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
525 dgst_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(
526 s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
527 if (dgst_size < 0) {
528 ret = -1;
529 goto end;
530 }
531 offset += dgst_size;
532 }
533 }
534 break;
535
536 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
537 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
538 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
539
540 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
541 ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
542 if (ret <= 0)
543 goto end;
544
545 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
546 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
547 else
548 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
549 s->init_num = 0;
550 break;
551
552 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
553 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
554 ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
555 if (ret <= 0)
556 goto end;
557 s->init_num = 0;
558 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
559 break;
560
561 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
562 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
563 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
564 ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
565 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
566 if (ret <= 0)
567 goto end;
568 if (s->hit)
569 s->state = SSL_ST_OK;
570 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
571 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
572 else
573 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
574 s->init_num = 0;
575 break;
576
577 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
578 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
579 ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
580 if (ret <= 0)
581 goto end;
582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
583 s->init_num = 0;
584 break;
585
586 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
587 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
588 ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
589 if (ret <= 0)
590 goto end;
591 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
592 s->init_num = 0;
593 break;
594
595
596 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
597 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
598
599 s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
600 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) {
601 ret = -1;
602 goto end;
603 }
604
605 ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
606 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
607
608 if (ret <= 0)
609 goto end;
610 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
611 s->init_num = 0;
612
613 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(
614 s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) {
615 ret = -1;
616 goto end;
617 }
618
619 break;
620
621 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
622 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
623 ret = ssl3_send_finished(s,
624 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
625 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
626 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
627 if (ret <= 0)
628 goto end;
629 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
630 if (s->hit) {
631 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
632 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
633 s->s3->tmp.next_state =
634 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
635 } else
636 s->s3->tmp.next_state =
637 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
638 } else
639 s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
640 s->init_num = 0;
641 break;
642
643 case SSL_ST_OK:
644 /* clean a few things up */
645 tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
646
647 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
648 s->init_buf = NULL;
649
650 /* remove buffering on output */
651 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
652
653 s->init_num = 0;
654
655 /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
656 if (s->renegotiate == 2) {
657 s->renegotiate = 0;
658 s->new_session = 0;
659
660 ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
661
662 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
663 /* s->server=1; */
664 s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept;
665
666 if (cb != NULL)
667 cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
668 }
669
670 ret = 1;
671 goto end;
672 /* break; */
673
674 default:
675 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,
676 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
677 ret = -1;
678 goto end;
679 /* break; */
680 }
681
682 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) {
683 if (s->debug) {
684 if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
685 goto end;
686 }
687
688
689 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) {
690 new_state = s->state;
691 s->state = state;
692 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1);
693 s->state = new_state;
694 }
695 }
696 skip = 0;
697 }
698end:
699 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
700
701 s->in_handshake--;
702 if (cb != NULL)
703 cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret);
704 return (ret);
705}
706
707int
708ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
709{
710 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) {
711 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST);
712 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
713
714 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
715 }
716
717 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
718 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
719}
720
721int
722ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
723{
724 int i, j, ok, al, ret = -1;
725 unsigned int cookie_len;
726 long n;
727 unsigned long id;
728 unsigned char *p, *d;
729 SSL_CIPHER *c;
730 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL;
731 unsigned long alg_k;
732
733 /*
734 * We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
735 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
736 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
737 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
738 * TLSv1.
739 */
740 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
741 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
742 }
743 s->first_packet = 1;
744 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
745 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
746 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
747
748 if (!ok)
749 return ((int)n);
750 s->first_packet = 0;
751 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
752
753 if (2 > n)
754 goto truncated;
755 /*
756 * Use version from inside client hello, not from record header.
757 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph)
758 */
759 s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8)|(int)p[1];
760 p += 2;
761
762 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
763 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) {
764 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
765 SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
766 if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
767 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) {
768 /*
769 * Similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote
770 * version number
771 */
772 s->version = s->client_version;
773 }
774 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
775 goto f_err;
776 }
777
778 /*
779 * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
780 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
781 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
782 */
783 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) {
784 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
785
786 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
787 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
788
789 if (cookie_length == 0)
790 return (1);
791 }
792
793 if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 - d > n)
794 goto truncated;
795
796 /* load the client random */
797 memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
798 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
799
800 /* get the session-id */
801 j= *(p++);
802 if (p + j - d > n)
803 goto truncated;
804
805 s->hit = 0;
806 /*
807 * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in
808 * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally
809 * ignore resumption requests with flag
810 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag
811 * rather than a change to default behavior so that applications
812 * relying on this for security won't even compile against older
813 * library versions).
814 *
815 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated()
816 * to request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session
817 * remains unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the
818 * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be
819 * ignored.
820 */
821 if ((s->new_session && (s->options &
822 SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) {
823 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
824 goto err;
825 } else {
826 i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
827 if (i == 1) { /* previous session */
828 s->hit = 1;
829 } else if (i == -1)
830 goto err;
831 else {
832 /* i == 0 */
833 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1))
834 goto err;
835 }
836 }
837
838 p += j;
839
840 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
841 /* cookie stuff */
842 if (p + 1 - d > n)
843 goto truncated;
844 cookie_len = *(p++);
845
846 /*
847 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
848 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
849 * does not cause an overflow.
850 */
851 if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) {
852 /* too much data */
853 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
855 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
856 goto f_err;
857 }
858
859 if (p + cookie_len - d > n)
860 goto truncated;
861
862 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
863 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
864 cookie_len > 0) {
865 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
866
867 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) {
868 if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s,
869 s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) {
870 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
871 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
872 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
873 goto f_err;
874 }
875 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
876 } else if (timingsafe_memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
877 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) {
878 /* default verification */
879 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
880 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
881 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
882 goto f_err;
883 }
884
885 ret = 2;
886 }
887
888 p += cookie_len;
889 }
890
891 if (p + 2 - d > n)
892 goto truncated;
893 n2s(p, i);
894 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) {
895 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
896 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
897 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
898 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
899 goto f_err;
900 }
901 if (p + i - d > n)
902 goto truncated;
903 if (i > 0) {
904 if ((ciphers = ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i)) == NULL)
905 goto err;
906 }
907 p += i;
908
909 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
910 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) {
911 j = 0;
912 id = s->session->cipher->id;
913
914 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) {
915 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i);
916 if (c->id == id) {
917 j = 1;
918 break;
919 }
920 }
921 if (j == 0) {
922 /*
923 * We need to have the cipher in the cipher
924 * list if we are asked to reuse it
925 */
926 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
927 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
928 SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
929 goto f_err;
930 }
931 }
932
933 /* compression */
934 if (p + 1 - d > n)
935 goto truncated;
936 i= *(p++);
937 if (p + i - d > n)
938 goto truncated;
939 for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
940 if (p[j] == 0)
941 break;
942 }
943
944 p += i;
945 if (j >= i) {
946 /* no compress */
947 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
949 SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
950 goto f_err;
951 }
952
953 /* TLS extensions*/
954 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d, n, &al)) {
955 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
956 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
957 goto f_err;
958 }
959 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
961 SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
962 goto err;
963 }
964
965 /*
966 * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
967 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
968 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
969 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation.
970 */
971 arc4random_buf(s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
972
973 if (!s->hit && s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
974 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
975
976 s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
977 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key,
978 &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher,
979 s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
980 s->hit = 1;
981 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
982 s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK;
983
984 ciphers = NULL;
985
986 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
987 pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher :
988 ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
989 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
990 if (pref_cipher == NULL) {
991 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
992 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
993 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
994 goto f_err;
995 }
996
997 s->session->cipher = pref_cipher;
998
999 if (s->cipher_list)
1000 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1001
1002 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1003 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1004
1005 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1006 s->cipher_list_by_id =
1007 sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1008 }
1009 }
1010
1011 /*
1012 * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1013 * pick a cipher
1014 */
1015
1016 if (!s->hit) {
1017 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1018 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1019 s->session->ciphers = ciphers;
1020 if (ciphers == NULL) {
1021 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1022 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1023 SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1024 goto f_err;
1025 }
1026 ciphers = NULL;
1027 c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers,
1028 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1029
1030 if (c == NULL) {
1031 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1032 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1033 SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1034 goto f_err;
1035 }
1036 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c;
1037 } else {
1038 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher;
1039 }
1040
1041 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1042 if (!(SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) ||
1043 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) {
1044 if (!tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
1045 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1046 goto f_err;
1047 }
1048 }
1049
1050 /*
1051 * We now have the following setup.
1052 * client_random
1053 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1054 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1055 * compression - basically ignored right now
1056 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1057 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1058 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1059 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1060 */
1061
1062 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1063 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) {
1064 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1065 goto err;
1066 }
1067
1068 if (ret < 0)
1069 ret = 1;
1070 if (0) {
1071truncated:
1072 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1073 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1074f_err:
1075 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1076 }
1077err:
1078 if (ciphers != NULL)
1079 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1080 return (ret);
1081}
1082
1083int
1084ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1085{
1086 unsigned char *bufend;
1087 unsigned char *p, *d;
1088 int sl;
1089
1090 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
1091 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO);
1092
1093 *(p++) = s->version >> 8;
1094 *(p++) = s->version & 0xff;
1095
1096 /* Random stuff */
1097 memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1098 p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1099
1100 /*
1101 * There are several cases for the session ID to send
1102 * back in the server hello:
1103 *
1104 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1105 * we send back the old session ID.
1106 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1107 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1108 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1109 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1110 * session ID.
1111 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1112 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1113 *
1114 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1115 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1116 * to send back.
1117 */
1118 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1119 && !s->hit)
1120 s->session->session_id_length = 0;
1121
1122 sl = s->session->session_id_length;
1123 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
1124 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
1125 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1126 return (-1);
1127 }
1128 *(p++) = sl;
1129 memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl);
1130 p += sl;
1131
1132 /* put the cipher */
1133 s2n(ssl3_cipher_get_value(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), p);
1134
1135 /* put the compression method */
1136 *(p++) = 0;
1137
1138 bufend = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data +
1139 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH;
1140 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, bufend)) == NULL) {
1141 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,
1142 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1143 return (-1);
1144 }
1145
1146 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, p - d);
1147 }
1148
1149 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1150 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1151}
1152
1153int
1154ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1155{
1156 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) {
1157 ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE);
1158 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, 0);
1159
1160 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1161 }
1162
1163 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1164 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1165}
1166
1167int
1168ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1169{
1170 unsigned char *q;
1171 int j, num;
1172 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1173 unsigned int u;
1174 DH *dh = NULL, *dhp;
1175 EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp;
1176 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1177 int encodedlen = 0;
1178 int curve_id = 0;
1179 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1180
1181 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1182 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1183 unsigned char *p, *d;
1184 int al, i;
1185 unsigned long type;
1186 int n;
1187 CERT *cert;
1188 BIGNUM *r[4];
1189 int nr[4], kn;
1190 BUF_MEM *buf;
1191 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1192
1193 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1194 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
1195 type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1196 cert = s->cert;
1197
1198 buf = s->init_buf;
1199
1200 r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL;
1201 n = 0;
1202 if (type & SSL_kDHE) {
1203 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1204 if ((dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s)) == NULL) {
1205 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1206 SSLerr(
1207 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1208 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1209 goto f_err;
1210 }
1211 } else
1212 dhp = cert->dh_tmp;
1213
1214 if (dhp == NULL && s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)
1215 dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1216 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1217
1218 if (dhp == NULL) {
1219 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1220 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1221 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1222 goto f_err;
1223 }
1224
1225 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) {
1226 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1227 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1228 goto err;
1229 }
1230
1231 if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1232 dh = dhp;
1233 } else if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) {
1234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1235 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1236 goto err;
1237 }
1238 s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
1239 if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
1240 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1241 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1242 goto err;
1243 }
1244 r[0] = dh->p;
1245 r[1] = dh->g;
1246 r[2] = dh->pub_key;
1247 } else if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1248 const EC_GROUP *group;
1249
1250 ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp;
1251 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1252 int nid = tls1_get_shared_curve(s);
1253 if (nid != NID_undef)
1254 ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1255 } else if (ecdhp == NULL &&
1256 s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL) {
1257 ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, 0,
1258 SSL_C_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1259 }
1260 if (ecdhp == NULL) {
1261 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1262 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1263 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1264 goto f_err;
1265 }
1266
1267 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) {
1268 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1269 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1270 goto err;
1271 }
1272
1273 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1274 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
1275 ecdh = ecdhp;
1276 } else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) {
1277 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1278 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1279 goto err;
1280 }
1281 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh;
1282
1283 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1284 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1285 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) {
1286 if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) {
1287 SSLerr(
1288 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1289 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1290 goto err;
1291 }
1292 }
1293
1294 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1295 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1296 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) {
1297 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1298 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1299 goto err;
1300 }
1301
1302 /*
1303 * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1304 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1305 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1306 */
1307 if ((curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(
1308 EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) {
1309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1310 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1311 goto err;
1312 }
1313
1314 /*
1315 * Encode the public key.
1316 * First check the size of encoding and
1317 * allocate memory accordingly.
1318 */
1319 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1320 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1321 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1322 NULL, 0, NULL);
1323
1324 encodedPoint = malloc(encodedlen);
1325
1326 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1327 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) {
1328 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1329 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1330 goto err;
1331 }
1332
1333
1334 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1335 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1336 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1337 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1338
1339 if (encodedlen == 0) {
1340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1341 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1342 goto err;
1343 }
1344
1345 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1346 bn_ctx = NULL;
1347
1348 /*
1349 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1350 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1351 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1352 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1353 * structure.
1354 */
1355 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1356
1357 /*
1358 * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1359 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1360 */
1361 r[0] = NULL;
1362 r[1] = NULL;
1363 r[2] = NULL;
1364 r[3] = NULL;
1365 } else
1366 {
1367 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1368 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1369 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1370 goto f_err;
1371 }
1372 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1373 nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1374 n += 2 + nr[i];
1375 }
1376
1377 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)) {
1378 if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(
1379 s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) {
1380 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1381 goto f_err;
1382 }
1383 kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1384 } else {
1385 pkey = NULL;
1386 kn = 0;
1387 }
1388
1389 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
1390 n + kn)) {
1391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1392 ERR_LIB_BUF);
1393 goto err;
1394 }
1395
1396 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1397 SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE);
1398
1399 for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) {
1400 s2n(nr[i], p);
1401 BN_bn2bin(r[i], p);
1402 p += nr[i];
1403 }
1404
1405 if (type & SSL_kECDHE) {
1406 /*
1407 * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic)
1408 * curves.
1409 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1410 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1411 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1412 * the actual encoded point itself
1413 */
1414 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1415 p += 1;
1416 *p = 0;
1417 p += 1;
1418 *p = curve_id;
1419 p += 1;
1420 *p = encodedlen;
1421 p += 1;
1422 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1423 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen);
1424 free(encodedPoint);
1425 encodedPoint = NULL;
1426 p += encodedlen;
1427 }
1428
1429
1430 /* not anonymous */
1431 if (pkey != NULL) {
1432 /*
1433 * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1434 * and p points to the space at the end.
1435 */
1436 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1437 q = md_buf;
1438 j = 0;
1439 for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) {
1440 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,
1441 (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 :
1442 s->ctx->sha1, NULL))
1443 goto err;
1444 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
1445 s->s3->client_random,
1446 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1447 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,
1448 s->s3->server_random,
1449 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1450 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1451 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q,
1452 (unsigned int *)&i);
1453 q += i;
1454 j += i;
1455 }
1456 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1457 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) {
1458 SSLerr(
1459 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1460 ERR_LIB_RSA);
1461 goto err;
1462 }
1463 s2n(u, p);
1464 n += u + 2;
1465 } else if (md) {
1466 /* Send signature algorithm. */
1467 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1468 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) {
1469 /* Should never happen */
1470 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1471 SSLerr(
1472 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1473 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1474 goto f_err;
1475 }
1476 p += 2;
1477 }
1478 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1479 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1480 s->s3->client_random,
1481 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1482 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,
1483 s->s3->server_random,
1484 SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1485 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n);
1486 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &p[2],
1487 (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) {
1488 SSLerr(
1489 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1490 ERR_LIB_EVP);
1491 goto err;
1492 }
1493 s2n(i, p);
1494 n += i + 2;
1495 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
1496 n += 2;
1497 } else {
1498 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1499 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1501 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1502 goto f_err;
1503 }
1504 }
1505
1506 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
1507 }
1508
1509 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
1510 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1511
1512 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1513
1514f_err:
1515 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1516err:
1517 free(encodedPoint);
1518 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1519 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
1520 return (-1);
1521}
1522
1523int
1524ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
1525{
1526 unsigned char *p, *d;
1527 int i, j, nl, off, n;
1528 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL;
1529 X509_NAME *name;
1530 BUF_MEM *buf;
1531
1532 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) {
1533 buf = s->init_buf;
1534
1535 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1536 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST);
1537
1538 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
1539 p++;
1540 n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p);
1541 d[0] = n;
1542 p += n;
1543 n++;
1544
1545 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
1546 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
1547 s2n(nl, p);
1548 p += nl + 2;
1549 n += nl + 2;
1550 }
1551
1552 off = n;
1553 p += 2;
1554 n += 2;
1555
1556 sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
1557 nl = 0;
1558 if (sk != NULL) {
1559 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) {
1560 name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i);
1561 j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL);
1562 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,
1563 ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) + n + j
1564 + 2)) {
1565 SSLerr(
1566 SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
1567 ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
1568 goto err;
1569 }
1570 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1571 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + n;
1572 s2n(j, p);
1573 i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p);
1574 n += 2 + j;
1575 nl += 2 + j;
1576 }
1577 }
1578 /* else no CA names */
1579 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s,
1580 SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) + off;
1581 s2n(nl, p);
1582
1583 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, n);
1584
1585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
1586 }
1587
1588 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
1589 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
1590err:
1591 return (-1);
1592}
1593
1594int
1595ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1596{
1597 int i, al, ok;
1598 long n;
1599 unsigned long alg_k;
1600 unsigned char *d, *p;
1601 RSA *rsa = NULL;
1602 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1603 BIGNUM *pub = NULL;
1604 DH *dh_srvr;
1605
1606 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
1607 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
1608 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
1609 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1610
1611 /* 2048 maxlen is a guess. How long a key does that permit? */
1612 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
1613 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok);
1614 if (!ok)
1615 return ((int)n);
1616 d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
1617
1618 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1619
1620 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
1621 char fakekey[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1622
1623 arc4random_buf(fakekey, sizeof(fakekey));
1624 fakekey[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
1625 fakekey[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
1626
1627 pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
1628 if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
1629 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) {
1630 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1632 SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
1633 goto f_err;
1634 }
1635 rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
1636
1637 if (2 > n)
1638 goto truncated;
1639 n2s(p, i);
1640 if (n != i + 2) {
1641 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1642 SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1643 goto err;
1644 } else
1645 n = i;
1646
1647 i = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
1648
1649 ERR_clear_error();
1650
1651 al = -1;
1652
1653 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) {
1654 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1655 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
1656 }
1657
1658 if (p + 2 - d > n) /* needed in the SSL3 case */
1659 goto truncated;
1660 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) &&
1661 (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) {
1662 /*
1663 * The premaster secret must contain the same version
1664 * number as the ClientHello to detect version rollback
1665 * attacks (strangely, the protocol does not offer such
1666 * protection for DH ciphersuites).
1667 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated
1668 * protocol version instead if the server does not
1669 * support the requested protocol version.
1670 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such
1671 * clients.
1672 */
1673 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
1674 (p[0] == (s->version >> 8)) &&
1675 (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) {
1676 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1677 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
1678
1679 /*
1680 * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of
1681 * Bleichenbacher's attack
1682 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits
1683 * the version number check as a "bad version
1684 * oracle" -- an alert would reveal that the
1685 * plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
1686 * made up by the adversary is properly
1687 * formatted except that the version number is
1688 * wrong.
1689 * To avoid such attacks, we should treat this
1690 * just like any other decryption error.
1691 */
1692 }
1693 }
1694
1695 if (al != -1) {
1696 /*
1697 * Some decryption failure -- use random value instead
1698 * as countermeasure against Bleichenbacher's attack
1699 * on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246,
1700 * section 7.4.7.1).
1701 */
1702 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
1703 p = fakekey;
1704 }
1705
1706 s->session->master_key_length =
1707 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
1708 s->session->master_key,
1709 p, i);
1710 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1711 } else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
1712 if (2 > n)
1713 goto truncated;
1714 n2s(p, i);
1715 if (n != i + 2) {
1716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1717 SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
1718 goto err;
1719 }
1720
1721 if (n == 0L) {
1722 /* the parameters are in the cert */
1723 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1724 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1725 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
1726 goto f_err;
1727 } else {
1728 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) {
1729 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1730 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1731 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1732 goto f_err;
1733 } else
1734 dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh;
1735 }
1736
1737 pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL);
1738 if (pub == NULL) {
1739 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1740 SSL_R_BN_LIB);
1741 goto err;
1742 }
1743
1744 i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr);
1745
1746 if (i <= 0) {
1747 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1748 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1749 BN_clear_free(pub);
1750 goto err;
1751 }
1752
1753 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
1754 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
1755
1756 BN_clear_free(pub);
1757 pub = NULL;
1758 s->session->master_key_length =
1759 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
1760 s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
1761 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1762 } else
1763
1764 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
1765 int ret = 1;
1766 int key_size;
1767 const EC_KEY *tkey;
1768 const EC_GROUP *group;
1769 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
1770
1771 /* Initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair. */
1772 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) {
1773 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1774 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1775 goto err;
1776 }
1777
1778 /* Let's get server private key and group information. */
1779 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) {
1780 /* Use the certificate */
1781 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
1782 } else {
1783 /*
1784 * Use the ephermeral values we saved when
1785 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
1786 */
1787 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
1788 }
1789
1790 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
1791 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
1792
1793 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
1794 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) {
1795 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1796 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1797 goto err;
1798 }
1799
1800 /* Let's get client's public key */
1801 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
1802 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1803 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1804 goto err;
1805 }
1806
1807 if (n == 0L) {
1808 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
1809
1810 if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
1811 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1812 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1813 SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1814 goto f_err;
1815 }
1816 if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(
1817 s->session->peer)) == NULL) ||
1818 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) {
1819 /*
1820 * XXX: For now, we do not support client
1821 * authentication using ECDH certificates
1822 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
1823 * never executed. When that support is
1824 * added, we ought to ensure the key
1825 * received in the certificate is
1826 * authorized for key agreement.
1827 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
1828 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
1829 * group.
1830 */
1831 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1832 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1833 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
1834 goto f_err;
1835 }
1836
1837 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
1838 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec))
1839 == 0) {
1840 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1841 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1842 goto err;
1843 }
1844 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
1845 } else {
1846 /*
1847 * Get client's public key from encoded point
1848 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
1849 */
1850 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
1851 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1852 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1853 goto err;
1854 }
1855
1856 /* Get encoded point length */
1857 i = *p;
1858
1859 p += 1;
1860 if (n != 1 + i) {
1861 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1862 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1863 goto err;
1864 }
1865 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
1866 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) {
1867 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1868 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
1869 goto err;
1870 }
1871 /*
1872 * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
1873 * currently, so set it to the start.
1874 */
1875 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1876 }
1877
1878 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
1879 key_size = ECDH_size(srvr_ecdh);
1880 if (key_size <= 0) {
1881 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1882 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1883 goto err;
1884 }
1885 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, key_size, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh,
1886 NULL);
1887 if (i <= 0) {
1888 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1889 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1890 goto err;
1891 }
1892
1893 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1894 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1895 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1896 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1897 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
1898 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
1899
1900
1901 /* Compute the master secret */
1902 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
1903 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
1904
1905 explicit_bzero(p, i);
1906 return (ret);
1907 } else
1908 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) {
1909 int ret = 0;
1910 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
1911 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
1912 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
1913 size_t outlen = 32, inlen;
1914 unsigned long alg_a;
1915 int Ttag, Tclass;
1916 long Tlen;
1917
1918 /* Get our certificate private key*/
1919 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1920 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
1921 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
1922
1923 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL);
1924 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
1925 /*
1926 * If client certificate is present and is of the same type,
1927 * maybe use it for key exchange.
1928 * Don't mind errors from EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because
1929 * it is completely valid to use a client certificate for
1930 * authorization only.
1931 */
1932 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
1933 if (client_pub_pkey) {
1934 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx,
1935 client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
1936 ERR_clear_error();
1937 }
1938 if (2 > n)
1939 goto truncated;
1940 /* Decrypt session key */
1941 if (ASN1_get_object((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag,
1942 &Tclass, n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED ||
1943 Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) {
1944 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1945 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1946 goto gerr;
1947 }
1948 start = p;
1949 inlen = Tlen;
1950 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen,
1951 start, inlen) <=0) {
1952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1953 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1954 goto gerr;
1955 }
1956 /* Generate master secret */
1957 s->session->master_key_length =
1958 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(
1959 s, s->session->master_key, premaster_secret, 32);
1960 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
1961 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1,
1962 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
1963 ret = 2;
1964 else
1965 ret = 1;
1966gerr:
1967 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
1968 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
1969 if (ret)
1970 return (ret);
1971 else
1972 goto err;
1973 } else {
1974 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1975 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1976 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
1977 goto f_err;
1978 }
1979
1980 return (1);
1981truncated:
1982 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1983 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
1984f_err:
1985 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1986err:
1987 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
1988 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
1989 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
1990 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
1991 return (-1);
1992}
1993
1994int
1995ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
1996{
1997 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
1998 unsigned char *p;
1999 int al, ok, ret = 0;
2000 long n;
2001 int type = 0, i, j;
2002 X509 *peer;
2003 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2004 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2005 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2006
2007 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2008 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok);
2009 if (!ok)
2010 return ((int)n);
2011
2012 if (s->session->peer != NULL) {
2013 peer = s->session->peer;
2014 pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2015 type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey);
2016 } else {
2017 peer = NULL;
2018 pkey = NULL;
2019 }
2020
2021 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) {
2022 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2023 if (peer != NULL) {
2024 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2026 SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2027 goto f_err;
2028 }
2029 ret = 1;
2030 goto end;
2031 }
2032
2033 if (peer == NULL) {
2034 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2035 SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2036 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2037 goto f_err;
2038 }
2039
2040 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
2041 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2042 SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2043 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2044 goto f_err;
2045 }
2046
2047 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2049 SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2050 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2051 goto f_err;
2052 }
2053
2054 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2055 p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2056 /*
2057 * Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites.
2058 *
2059 * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is a bare
2060 * signature without length field.
2061 */
2062 if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2063 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) ) {
2064 i = 64;
2065 } else {
2066 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2067 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2068 /* Should never happen */
2069 if (sigalg == -1) {
2070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2071 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2072 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2073 goto f_err;
2074 }
2075 if (2 > n)
2076 goto truncated;
2077 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2078 if (sigalg != (int)p[1]) {
2079 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2080 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2081 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2082 goto f_err;
2083 }
2084 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
2085 if (md == NULL) {
2086 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2087 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
2088 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2089 goto f_err;
2090 }
2091 p += 2;
2092 n -= 2;
2093 }
2094 if (2 > n)
2095 goto truncated;
2096 n2s(p, i);
2097 n -= 2;
2098 if (i > n)
2099 goto truncated;
2100 }
2101 j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
2102 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) {
2103 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2104 SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
2105 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2106 goto f_err;
2107 }
2108
2109 if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
2110 long hdatalen = 0;
2111 void *hdata;
2112 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2113 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2114 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2115 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2116 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2117 goto f_err;
2118 }
2119 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2120 !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) {
2121 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2122 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2123 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2124 goto f_err;
2125 }
2126
2127 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) {
2128 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2129 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2130 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2131 goto f_err;
2132 }
2133 } else
2134 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
2135 i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
2136 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
2137 pkey->pkey.rsa);
2138 if (i < 0) {
2139 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2140 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2141 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
2142 goto f_err;
2143 }
2144 if (i == 0) {
2145 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2146 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2147 SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
2148 goto f_err;
2149 }
2150 } else
2151 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
2152 j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2153 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2154 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa);
2155 if (j <= 0) {
2156 /* bad signature */
2157 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2159 SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
2160 goto f_err;
2161 }
2162 } else
2163 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
2164 j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
2165 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
2166 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec);
2167 if (j <= 0) {
2168 /* bad signature */
2169 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2170 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2171 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
2172 goto f_err;
2173 }
2174 } else
2175#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2176 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2177 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) {
2178 long hdatalen = 0;
2179 void *hdata;
2180 unsigned char signature[128];
2181 unsigned int siglen = sizeof(signature);
2182 int nid;
2183 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
2184
2185 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
2186 if (hdatalen <= 0) {
2187 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2188 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2189 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2190 goto f_err;
2191 }
2192 if (!EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &nid) ||
2193 !(md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid))) {
2194 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2195 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2196 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2197 goto f_err;
2198 }
2199 pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
2200 if (!pctx) {
2201 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2202 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2203 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2204 goto f_err;
2205 }
2206 if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) ||
2207 !EVP_DigestUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen) ||
2208 !EVP_DigestFinal(&mctx, signature, &siglen) ||
2209 (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) ||
2210 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pctx, md) <= 0) ||
2211 (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY,
2212 EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GOST_SIG_FORMAT,
2213 GOST_SIG_FORMAT_RS_LE,
2214 NULL) <= 0)) {
2215 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2216 ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
2217 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2218 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2219 goto f_err;
2220 }
2221
2222 if (EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, p, i, signature, siglen) <= 0) {
2223 al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
2224 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2225 SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
2226 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2227 goto f_err;
2228 }
2229
2230 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
2231 } else
2232#endif
2233 {
2234 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
2235 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2236 al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
2237 goto f_err;
2238 }
2239
2240
2241 ret = 1;
2242 if (0) {
2243truncated:
2244 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2245 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2246f_err:
2247 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2248 }
2249end:
2250 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) {
2251 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
2252 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
2253 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
2254 }
2255 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
2256 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
2257 return (ret);
2258}
2259
2260int
2261ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
2262{
2263 CBS cbs, client_certs;
2264 int i, ok, al, ret = -1;
2265 X509 *x = NULL;
2266 long n;
2267 const unsigned char *q;
2268 STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL;
2269
2270 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
2271 -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok);
2272
2273 if (!ok)
2274 return ((int)n);
2275
2276 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
2277 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2278 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2279 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2280 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2281 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2282 goto f_err;
2283 }
2284 /*
2285 * If tls asked for a client cert,
2286 * the client must return a 0 list.
2287 */
2288 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) {
2289 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2290 SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST
2291 );
2292 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2293 goto f_err;
2294 }
2295 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
2296 return (1);
2297 }
2298
2299 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
2300 al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2302 SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
2303 goto f_err;
2304 }
2305
2306 if (n < 0)
2307 goto truncated;
2308
2309 CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, n);
2310
2311 if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
2312 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2313 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2314 goto err;
2315 }
2316
2317 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &client_certs) ||
2318 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
2319 goto truncated;
2320
2321 while (CBS_len(&client_certs) > 0) {
2322 CBS cert;
2323
2324 if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&client_certs, &cert)) {
2325 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2326 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2327 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2328 goto f_err;
2329 }
2330
2331 q = CBS_data(&cert);
2332 x = d2i_X509(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&cert));
2333 if (x == NULL) {
2334 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2335 ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
2336 goto err;
2337 }
2338 if (q != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
2339 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2340 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2341 SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2342 goto f_err;
2343 }
2344 if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) {
2345 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2346 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2347 goto err;
2348 }
2349 x = NULL;
2350 }
2351
2352 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) {
2353 /*
2354 * TLS does not mind 0 certs returned.
2355 * Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate.
2356 */
2357 if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
2358 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) {
2359 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2360 SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
2361 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2362 goto f_err;
2363 }
2364 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
2365 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !tls1_digest_cached_records(s)) {
2366 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2367 goto f_err;
2368 }
2369 } else {
2370 i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk);
2371 if (i <= 0) {
2372 al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
2373 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2374 SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
2375 goto f_err;
2376 }
2377 }
2378
2379 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
2380 X509_free(s->session->peer);
2381 s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk);
2382 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
2383
2384 /*
2385 * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
2386 * when we arrive here
2387 */
2388 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2389 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
2390 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2392 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395 }
2396 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
2397 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
2398 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk;
2399
2400 /*
2401 * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
2402 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c
2403 */
2404
2405 sk = NULL;
2406
2407 ret = 1;
2408 if (0) {
2409truncated:
2410 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2411 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
2412 SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
2413f_err:
2414 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2415 }
2416err:
2417 if (x != NULL)
2418 X509_free(x);
2419 if (sk != NULL)
2420 sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free);
2421 return (ret);
2422}
2423
2424int
2425ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
2426{
2427 unsigned long l;
2428 X509 *x;
2429
2430 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) {
2431 x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
2432 if (x == NULL) {
2433 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
2434 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2435 return (0);
2436 }
2437
2438 l = ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, x);
2439 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
2440 s->init_num = (int)l;
2441 s->init_off = 0;
2442 }
2443
2444 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
2445 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2446}
2447
2448/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
2449int
2450ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
2451{
2452 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) {
2453 unsigned char *d, *p, *senc, *macstart;
2454 const unsigned char *const_p;
2455 int len, slen_full, slen;
2456 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2457 unsigned int hlen;
2458 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2459 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2460 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2461 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2462 unsigned char key_name[16];
2463
2464 /* get session encoding length */
2465 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
2466 /*
2467 * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
2468 * too long
2469 */
2470 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
2471 return (-1);
2472 senc = malloc(slen_full);
2473 if (!senc)
2474 return (-1);
2475 p = senc;
2476 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
2477
2478 /*
2479 * Create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to
2480 * clean up
2481 */
2482 const_p = senc;
2483 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
2484 if (sess == NULL) {
2485 free(senc);
2486 return (-1);
2487 }
2488
2489 /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
2490 sess->session_id_length = 0;
2491
2492 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
2493 if (slen > slen_full) {
2494 /* shouldn't ever happen */
2495 free(senc);
2496 return (-1);
2497 }
2498 p = senc;
2499 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
2500 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
2501
2502 /*
2503 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2504 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
2505 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
2506 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
2507 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
2508 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
2509 */
2510 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, ssl3_handshake_msg_hdr_len(s) +
2511 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
2512 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) {
2513 free(senc);
2514 return (-1);
2515 }
2516
2517 d = p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET);
2518
2519 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2520 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2521
2522 /*
2523 * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
2524 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
2525 * from parent ctx.
2526 */
2527 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2528 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
2529 &hctx, 1) < 0) {
2530 free(senc);
2531 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2532 return (-1);
2533 }
2534 } else {
2535 arc4random_buf(iv, 16);
2536 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2537 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
2538 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2539 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2540 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
2541 }
2542
2543 /*
2544 * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
2545 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session
2546 * (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for new
2547 * sessions will live as long as their sessions.
2548 */
2549 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
2550
2551 /* Skip ticket length for now */
2552 p += 2;
2553 /* Output key name */
2554 macstart = p;
2555 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
2556 p += 16;
2557 /* output IV */
2558 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
2559 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2560 /* Encrypt session data */
2561 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
2562 p += len;
2563 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
2564 p += len;
2565 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2566
2567 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
2568 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
2569 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2570 p += hlen;
2571
2572 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
2573 /* Total length */
2574 len = p - d;
2575
2576 /* Skip ticket lifetime hint. */
2577 p = d + 4;
2578 s2n(len - 6, p); /* Message length */
2579
2580 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, len);
2581
2582 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
2583
2584 free(senc);
2585 }
2586
2587 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
2588 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2589}
2590
2591int
2592ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
2593{
2594 unsigned char *p;
2595
2596 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) {
2597 /*
2598 * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
2599 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
2600 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
2601 * + (ocsp response)
2602 */
2603 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 4 +
2604 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
2605 return (-1);
2606
2607 p = ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS);
2608
2609 *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type;
2610 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
2611 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
2612
2613 ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4);
2614
2615 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
2616 }
2617
2618 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
2619 return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
2620}
2621
2622/*
2623 * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message.
2624 * It sets the next_proto member in s if found
2625 */
2626int
2627ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
2628{
2629 CBS cbs, proto, padding;
2630 int ok;
2631 long n;
2632 size_t len;
2633
2634 /*
2635 * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
2636 * extension in their ClientHello
2637 */
2638 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) {
2639 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2640 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
2641 return (-1);
2642 }
2643
2644 /* 514 maxlen is enough for the payload format below */
2645 n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
2646 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok);
2647 if (!ok)
2648 return ((int)n);
2649
2650 /*
2651 * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
2652 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
2653 * by ssl3_get_finished).
2654 */
2655 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
2656 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2657 SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
2658 return (-1);
2659 }
2660
2661 if (n < 2)
2662 return (0);
2663 /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
2664
2665 CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
2666
2667 /*
2668 * The payload looks like:
2669 * uint8 proto_len;
2670 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
2671 * uint8 padding_len;
2672 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
2673 */
2674 if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &proto) ||
2675 !CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &padding) ||
2676 CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
2677 return 0;
2678
2679 /*
2680 * XXX We should not NULL it, but this matches old behavior of not
2681 * freeing before malloc.
2682 */
2683 s->next_proto_negotiated = NULL;
2684 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0;
2685
2686 if (!CBS_stow(&proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &len)) {
2687 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,
2688 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2689 return (0);
2690 }
2691 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (uint8_t)len;
2692
2693 return (1);
2694}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-24 19:07:18 +0000