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1/* ssl/s3_srvr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
113 *
114 * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
115 * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
116 *
117 * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
118 * license provided above.
119 *
120 * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
121 * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
122 *
123 */
124/* ====================================================================
125 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
126 *
127 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
128 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
129 * license.
130 *
131 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
132 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
133 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
134 *
135 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
136 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
137 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
138 *
139 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
140 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
141 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
142 * to make use of the Contribution.
143 *
144 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
145 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
146 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
147 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
148 * OTHERWISE.
149 */
150
151#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
152#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
153
154#include <stdio.h>
155#include "ssl_locl.h"
156#include "kssl_lcl.h"
157#include <openssl/buffer.h>
158#include <openssl/rand.h>
159#include <openssl/objects.h>
160#include <openssl/evp.h>
161#include <openssl/hmac.h>
162#include <openssl/x509.h>
163#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
164#include <openssl/dh.h>
165#endif
166#include <openssl/bn.h>
167#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
168#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
169#endif
170#include <openssl/md5.h>
171
172static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver);
173
174static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver)
175 {
176 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION)
177 return(SSLv3_server_method());
178 else
179 return(NULL);
180 }
181
182#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
183static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al)
184 {
185 int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE;
186
187 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
188
189 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) &&
190 (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL))
191 {
192 if(s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
193 {
194 /* RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject,
195 we do so if There is no srp login name */
196 ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL;
197 *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
198 }
199 else
200 {
201 ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s,al);
202 }
203 }
204 return ret;
205 }
206#endif
207
208IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method,
209 ssl3_accept,
210 ssl_undefined_function,
211 ssl3_get_server_method)
212
213int ssl3_accept(SSL *s)
214 {
215 BUF_MEM *buf;
216 unsigned long alg_k,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL);
217 void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL;
218 int ret= -1;
219 int new_state,state,skip=0;
220
221 RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0);
222 ERR_clear_error();
223 clear_sys_error();
224
225 if (s->info_callback != NULL)
226 cb=s->info_callback;
227 else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL)
228 cb=s->ctx->info_callback;
229
230 /* init things to blank */
231 s->in_handshake++;
232 if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s);
233
234 if (s->cert == NULL)
235 {
236 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
237 return(-1);
238 }
239
240#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
241 /* If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we
242 * already got and don't await it anymore, because
243 * Heartbeats don't make sense during handshakes anyway.
244 */
245 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
246 {
247 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
248 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
249 }
250#endif
251
252 for (;;)
253 {
254 state=s->state;
255
256 switch (s->state)
257 {
258 case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
259 s->renegotiate=1;
260 /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */
261
262 case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
263 case SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
264 case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
265 case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT:
266
267 s->server=1;
268 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1);
269
270 if ((s->version>>8) != 3)
271 {
272 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
273 return -1;
274 }
275 s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
276
277 if (s->init_buf == NULL)
278 {
279 if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL)
280 {
281 ret= -1;
282 goto end;
283 }
284 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH))
285 {
286 ret= -1;
287 goto end;
288 }
289 s->init_buf=buf;
290 }
291
292 if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s))
293 {
294 ret= -1;
295 goto end;
296 }
297
298 s->init_num=0;
299 s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
300
301 if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE)
302 {
303 /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that
304 * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-)
305 */
306 if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; }
307
308 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
309 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A;
310 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++;
311 }
312 else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding &&
313 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
314 {
315 /* Server attempting to renegotiate with
316 * client that doesn't support secure
317 * renegotiation.
318 */
319 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
320 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
321 ret = -1;
322 goto end;
323 }
324 else
325 {
326 /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
327 * we will just send a HelloRequest */
328 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++;
329 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A;
330 }
331 break;
332
333 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A:
334 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B:
335
336 s->shutdown=0;
337 ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s);
338 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
339 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C;
340 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
341 s->init_num=0;
342
343 ssl3_init_finished_mac(s);
344 break;
345
346 case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C:
347 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
348 break;
349
350 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A:
351 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B:
352 case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C:
353
354 s->shutdown=0;
355 if (s->rwstate != SSL_X509_LOOKUP)
356 {
357 ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s);
358 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
359 }
360#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
361 {
362 int al;
363 if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s,&al)) < 0)
364 {
365 /* callback indicates firther work to be done */
366 s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
367 goto end;
368 }
369 if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE)
370 {
371 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
372 /* This is not really an error but the only means to
373 for a client to detect whether srp is supported. */
374 if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY)
375 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
376 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
377 ret= -1;
378 goto end;
379 }
380 }
381#endif
382
383 s->renegotiate = 2;
384 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A;
385 s->init_num=0;
386 break;
387
388 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A:
389 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B:
390 ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s);
391 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
393 if (s->hit)
394 {
395 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
396 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
397 else
398 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
399 }
400#else
401 if (s->hit)
402 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
403#endif
404 else
405 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A;
406 s->init_num=0;
407 break;
408
409 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A:
410 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B:
411 /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */
412 /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */
413 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
414 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)
415 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5))
416 {
417 ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s);
418 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
420 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
421 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A;
422 else
423 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
424 }
425 else
426 {
427 skip = 1;
428 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
429 }
430#else
431 }
432 else
433 skip=1;
434
435 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
436#endif
437 s->init_num=0;
438 break;
439
440 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A:
441 case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B:
442 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
443
444 /* clear this, it may get reset by
445 * send_server_key_exchange */
446 if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA)
447#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
448 && !(alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
449#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
450 )
451 /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key
452 * even when forbidden by protocol specs
453 * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to
454 * be able to handle this) */
455 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
456 else
457 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0;
458
459
460 /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or
461 * RSA but we have a sign only certificate
462 *
463 * PSK: may send PSK identity hints
464 *
465 * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange
466 * message only if the cipher suite is either
467 * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the
468 * server certificate contains the server's
469 * public key for key exchange.
470 */
471 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp
472 /* PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity
473 * hint if provided */
474#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
475 || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)
476#endif
477#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
478 /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */
479 || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
480#endif
481 || (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd|SSL_kEDH))
482 || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
483 || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
484 && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL
485 || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
486 && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)
487 )
488 )
489 )
490 )
491 {
492 ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s);
493 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
494 }
495 else
496 skip=1;
497
498 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A;
499 s->init_num=0;
500 break;
501
502 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A:
503 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B:
504 if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */
505 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) ||
506 /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set,
507 * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */
508 ((s->session->peer != NULL) &&
509 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) ||
510 /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites
511 * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts
512 * and in RFC 2246): */
513 ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) &&
514 /* ... except when the application insists on verification
515 * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */
516 !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) ||
517 /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */
518 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5)
519 /* With normal PSK Certificates and
520 * Certificate Requests are omitted */
521 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
522 {
523 /* no cert request */
524 skip=1;
525 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0;
526 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
527 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
528 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
529 return -1;
530 }
531 else
532 {
533 s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1;
534 ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s);
535 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
536#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
537 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A;
538#else
539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
540 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
541#endif
542 s->init_num=0;
543 }
544 break;
545
546 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A:
547 case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B:
548 ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s);
549 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
550 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A;
551 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
552 s->init_num=0;
553 break;
554
555 case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH:
556
557 /* This code originally checked to see if
558 * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO
559 * and then flushed. This caused problems
560 * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed
561 * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue
562 * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING
563 * still exist. So instead we just flush
564 * unconditionally.
565 */
566
567 s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING;
568 if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0)
569 {
570 ret= -1;
571 goto end;
572 }
573 s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING;
574
575 s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state;
576 break;
577
578 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A:
579 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B:
580 /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */
581 ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s);
582 if (ret <= 0)
583 goto end;
584 if (ret == 2)
585 s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C;
586 else {
587 if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
588 {
589 ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s);
590 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
591 }
592 s->init_num=0;
593 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A;
594 }
595 break;
596
597 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A:
598 case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B:
599 ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s);
600 if (ret <= 0)
601 goto end;
602 if (ret == 2)
603 {
604 /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when
605 * the client sends its ECDH pub key in
606 * a certificate, the CertificateVerify
607 * message is not sent.
608 * Also for GOST ciphersuites when
609 * the client uses its key from the certificate
610 * for key exchange.
611 */
612#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
613 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
614#else
615 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
616 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
617 else
618 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
619#endif
620 s->init_num = 0;
621 }
622 else if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
623 {
624 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
625 s->init_num=0;
626 if (!s->session->peer)
627 break;
628 /* For TLS v1.2 freeze the handshake buffer
629 * at this point and digest cached records.
630 */
631 if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer)
632 {
633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
634 return -1;
635 }
636 s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
637 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
638 return -1;
639 }
640 else
641 {
642 int offset=0;
643 int dgst_num;
644
645 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A;
646 s->init_num=0;
647
648 /* We need to get hashes here so if there is
649 * a client cert, it can be verified
650 * FIXME - digest processing for CertificateVerify
651 * should be generalized. But it is next step
652 */
653 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
654 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
655 return -1;
656 for (dgst_num=0; dgst_num<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;dgst_num++)
657 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num])
658 {
659 int dgst_size;
660
661 s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]),&(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[offset]));
662 dgst_size=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]);
663 if (dgst_size < 0)
664 {
665 ret = -1;
666 goto end;
667 }
668 offset+=dgst_size;
669 }
670 }
671 break;
672
673 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A:
674 case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B:
675
676 /* we should decide if we expected this one */
677 ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s);
678 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
679
680#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
681 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
682#else
683 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
684 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
685 else
686 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
687#endif
688 s->init_num=0;
689 break;
690
691#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
692 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A:
693 case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B:
694 ret=ssl3_get_next_proto(s);
695 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
696 s->init_num = 0;
697 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
698 break;
699#endif
700
701 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A:
702 case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B:
703 ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A,
704 SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B);
705 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
706 if (s->hit)
707 s->state=SSL_ST_OK;
708#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
709 else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
710 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A;
711#endif
712 else
713 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
714 s->init_num=0;
715 break;
716
717#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
718 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A:
719 case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B:
720 ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s);
721 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
722 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A;
723 s->init_num=0;
724 break;
725
726 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A:
727 case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B:
728 ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s);
729 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
730 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A;
731 s->init_num=0;
732 break;
733
734#endif
735
736 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A:
737 case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B:
738
739 s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher;
740 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s))
741 { ret= -1; goto end; }
742
743 ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s,
744 SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B);
745
746 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
747 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A;
748 s->init_num=0;
749
750 if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,
751 SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE))
752 {
753 ret= -1;
754 goto end;
755 }
756
757 break;
758
759 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A:
760 case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B:
761 ret=ssl3_send_finished(s,
762 SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B,
763 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label,
764 s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len);
765 if (ret <= 0) goto end;
766 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH;
767 if (s->hit)
768 {
769#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
770 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
771#else
772 if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
773 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A;
774 else
775 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A;
776#endif
777 }
778 else
779 s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK;
780 s->init_num=0;
781 break;
782
783 case SSL_ST_OK:
784 /* clean a few things up */
785 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
786
787 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf);
788 s->init_buf=NULL;
789
790 /* remove buffering on output */
791 ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
792
793 s->init_num=0;
794
795 if (s->renegotiate == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */
796 {
797 s->renegotiate=0;
798 s->new_session=0;
799
800 ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER);
801
802 s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++;
803 /* s->server=1; */
804 s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept;
805
806 if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1);
807 }
808
809 ret = 1;
810 goto end;
811 /* break; */
812
813 default:
814 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
815 ret= -1;
816 goto end;
817 /* break; */
818 }
819
820 if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip)
821 {
822 if (s->debug)
823 {
824 if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0)
825 goto end;
826 }
827
828
829 if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state))
830 {
831 new_state=s->state;
832 s->state=state;
833 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1);
834 s->state=new_state;
835 }
836 }
837 skip=0;
838 }
839end:
840 /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */
841
842 s->in_handshake--;
843 if (cb != NULL)
844 cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret);
845 return(ret);
846 }
847
848int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s)
849 {
850 unsigned char *p;
851
852 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A)
853 {
854 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
855 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST;
856 *(p++)=0;
857 *(p++)=0;
858 *(p++)=0;
859
860 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B;
861 /* number of bytes to write */
862 s->init_num=4;
863 s->init_off=0;
864 }
865
866 /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */
867 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
868 }
869
870int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s)
871 {
872 int ok;
873 long n;
874
875 /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message,
876 * so permit appropriate message length */
877 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
878 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
879 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
880 -1,
881 s->max_cert_list,
882 &ok);
883 if (!ok) return((int)n);
884 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1;
885 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)
886 {
887 /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per
888 * negotiation. */
889 if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE)
890 {
891 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS);
892 return -1;
893 }
894 /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake,
895 * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */
896#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
897 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
898 {
899 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
900 s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL;
901 }
902#endif
903#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
904 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
905 {
906 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
907 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
908 }
909#endif
910 s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE;
911 return 2;
912 }
913 return 1;
914}
915
916int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
917 {
918 int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1;
919 unsigned int cookie_len;
920 long n;
921 unsigned long id;
922 unsigned char *p,*d,*q;
923 SSL_CIPHER *c;
924#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
925 SSL_COMP *comp=NULL;
926#endif
927 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL;
928
929 /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type.
930 * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1,
931 * This down switching should be handled by a different method.
932 * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with
933 * TLSv1.
934 */
935 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A
936 )
937 {
938 s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B;
939 }
940 s->first_packet=1;
941 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
942 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B,
943 SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C,
944 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO,
945 SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,
946 &ok);
947
948 if (!ok) return((int)n);
949 s->first_packet=0;
950 d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
951
952 /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header
953 * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */
954 s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1];
955 p+=2;
956
957 if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) ||
958 (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version))
959 {
960 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
961 if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR &&
962 !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)
963 {
964 /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */
965 s->version = s->client_version;
966 }
967 al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
968 goto f_err;
969 }
970
971 /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't
972 * contain one, just return since we do not want to
973 * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length...
974 */
975 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)
976 {
977 unsigned int session_length, cookie_length;
978
979 session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
980 cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1);
981
982 if (cookie_length == 0)
983 return 1;
984 }
985
986 /* load the client random */
987 memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
988 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
989
990 /* get the session-id */
991 j= *(p++);
992
993 s->hit=0;
994 /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in renegotiation.
995 * 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally ignore resumption requests
996 * with flag SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather
997 * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this for security
998 * won't even compile against older library versions).
999 *
1000 * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to request
1001 * renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains unset): for servers,
1002 * this essentially just means that the SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1003 * setting will be ignored.
1004 */
1005 if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION)))
1006 {
1007 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1008 goto err;
1009 }
1010 else
1011 {
1012 i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n);
1013 if (i == 1)
1014 { /* previous session */
1015 s->hit=1;
1016 }
1017 else if (i == -1)
1018 goto err;
1019 else /* i == 0 */
1020 {
1021 if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1))
1022 goto err;
1023 }
1024 }
1025
1026 p+=j;
1027
1028 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1029 {
1030 /* cookie stuff */
1031 cookie_len = *(p++);
1032
1033 /*
1034 * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the
1035 * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it
1036 * does not cause an overflow.
1037 */
1038 if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie))
1039 {
1040 /* too much data */
1041 al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1042 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1043 goto f_err;
1044 }
1045
1046 /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */
1047 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) &&
1048 cookie_len > 0)
1049 {
1050 memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len);
1051
1052 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL)
1053 {
1054 if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie,
1055 cookie_len) == 0)
1056 {
1057 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1058 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1059 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1060 goto f_err;
1061 }
1062 /* else cookie verification succeeded */
1063 }
1064 else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie,
1065 s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */
1066 {
1067 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1068 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,
1069 SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH);
1070 goto f_err;
1071 }
1072
1073 ret = 2;
1074 }
1075
1076 p += cookie_len;
1077 }
1078
1079 n2s(p,i);
1080 if ((i == 0) && (j != 0))
1081 {
1082 /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */
1083 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1084 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED);
1085 goto f_err;
1086 }
1087 if ((p+i) >= (d+n))
1088 {
1089 /* not enough data */
1090 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1091 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1092 goto f_err;
1093 }
1094 if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers))
1095 == NULL))
1096 {
1097 goto err;
1098 }
1099 p+=i;
1100
1101 /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */
1102 if ((s->hit) && (i > 0))
1103 {
1104 j=0;
1105 id=s->session->cipher->id;
1106
1107#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1108 printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers));
1109#endif
1110 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++)
1111 {
1112 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers,i);
1113#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG
1114 printf("client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n",
1115 i,sk_num(ciphers),SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
1116#endif
1117 if (c->id == id)
1118 {
1119 j=1;
1120 break;
1121 }
1122 }
1123/* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade
1124 * attack: CVE-2010-4180.
1125 */
1126#if 0
1127 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1))
1128 {
1129 /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may
1130 * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to
1131 * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server
1132 * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not
1133 * enabled, though. */
1134 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0);
1135 if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0)
1136 {
1137 s->session->cipher = c;
1138 j = 1;
1139 }
1140 }
1141#endif
1142 if (j == 0)
1143 {
1144 /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher
1145 * list if we are asked to reuse it */
1146 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1147 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING);
1148 goto f_err;
1149 }
1150 }
1151
1152 /* compression */
1153 i= *(p++);
1154 if ((p+i) > (d+n))
1155 {
1156 /* not enough data */
1157 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1158 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
1159 goto f_err;
1160 }
1161 q=p;
1162 for (j=0; j<i; j++)
1163 {
1164 if (p[j] == 0) break;
1165 }
1166
1167 p+=i;
1168 if (j >= i)
1169 {
1170 /* no compress */
1171 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1172 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED);
1173 goto f_err;
1174 }
1175
1176#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1177 /* TLS extensions*/
1178 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1179 {
1180 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al))
1181 {
1182 /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */
1183 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
1184 goto f_err;
1185 }
1186 }
1187 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) {
1188 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1189 goto err;
1190 }
1191
1192 /* Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this
1193 * handshake for not reused session only. We need to generate
1194 * server_random before calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow
1195 * SessionTicket processing to use it in key derivation. */
1196 {
1197 unsigned char *pos;
1198 pos=s->s3->server_random;
1199 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1200 {
1201 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1202 goto f_err;
1203 }
1204 }
1205
1206 if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb)
1207 {
1208 SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher=NULL;
1209
1210 s->session->master_key_length=sizeof(s->session->master_key);
1211 if(s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length,
1212 ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg))
1213 {
1214 s->hit=1;
1215 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1216 s->session->verify_result=X509_V_OK;
1217
1218 ciphers=NULL;
1219
1220 /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */
1221 pref_cipher=pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1222 if (pref_cipher == NULL)
1223 {
1224 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1225 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1226 goto f_err;
1227 }
1228
1229 s->session->cipher=pref_cipher;
1230
1231 if (s->cipher_list)
1232 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list);
1233
1234 if (s->cipher_list_by_id)
1235 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id);
1236
1237 s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1238 s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers);
1239 }
1240 }
1241#endif
1242
1243 /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other
1244 * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression
1245 * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */
1246 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL;
1247#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1248 /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */
1249 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1250 {
1251 int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth;
1252 /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */
1253 /* Can't disable compression */
1254 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION)
1255 {
1256 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1257 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1258 goto f_err;
1259 }
1260 /* Look for resumed compression method */
1261 for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++)
1262 {
1263 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1264 if (comp_id == comp->id)
1265 {
1266 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1267 break;
1268 }
1269 }
1270 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1271 {
1272 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1273 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
1274 goto f_err;
1275 }
1276 /* Look for resumed method in compression list */
1277 for (m = 0; m < i; m++)
1278 {
1279 if (q[m] == comp_id)
1280 break;
1281 }
1282 if (m >= i)
1283 {
1284 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1285 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING);
1286 goto f_err;
1287 }
1288 }
1289 else if (s->hit)
1290 comp = NULL;
1291 else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods)
1292 { /* See if we have a match */
1293 int m,nn,o,v,done=0;
1294
1295 nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods);
1296 for (m=0; m<nn; m++)
1297 {
1298 comp=sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods,m);
1299 v=comp->id;
1300 for (o=0; o<i; o++)
1301 {
1302 if (v == q[o])
1303 {
1304 done=1;
1305 break;
1306 }
1307 }
1308 if (done) break;
1309 }
1310 if (done)
1311 s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp;
1312 else
1313 comp=NULL;
1314 }
1315#else
1316 /* If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session
1317 * using compression.
1318 */
1319 if (s->session->compress_meth != 0)
1320 {
1321 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1322 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION);
1323 goto f_err;
1324 }
1325#endif
1326
1327 /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must
1328 * pick a cipher */
1329
1330 if (!s->hit)
1331 {
1332#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1333 s->session->compress_meth=0;
1334#else
1335 s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id;
1336#endif
1337 if (s->session->ciphers != NULL)
1338 sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers);
1339 s->session->ciphers=ciphers;
1340 if (ciphers == NULL)
1341 {
1342 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1343 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED);
1344 goto f_err;
1345 }
1346 ciphers=NULL;
1347 c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers,
1348 SSL_get_ciphers(s));
1349
1350 if (c == NULL)
1351 {
1352 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1353 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER);
1354 goto f_err;
1355 }
1356 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c;
1357 }
1358 else
1359 {
1360 /* Session-id reuse */
1361#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG
1362 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk;
1363 SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL;
1364 SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL;
1365
1366 if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)
1367 {
1368 sk=s->session->ciphers;
1369 for (i=0; i<sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++)
1370 {
1371 c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,i);
1372 if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL)
1373 nc=c;
1374 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c))
1375 ec=c;
1376 }
1377 if (nc != NULL)
1378 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc;
1379 else if (ec != NULL)
1380 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec;
1381 else
1382 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1383 }
1384 else
1385#endif
1386 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher;
1387 }
1388
1389 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER))
1390 {
1391 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
1392 {
1393 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1394 goto f_err;
1395 }
1396 }
1397
1398 /* we now have the following setup.
1399 * client_random
1400 * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers
1401 * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers
1402 * compression - basically ignored right now
1403 * ssl version is set - sslv3
1404 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup.
1405 * s->hit - session reuse flag
1406 * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use.
1407 */
1408
1409 /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */
1410 if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION)
1411 {
1412 if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0)
1413 {
1414 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT);
1415 goto err;
1416 }
1417 }
1418
1419 if (ret < 0) ret=1;
1420 if (0)
1421 {
1422f_err:
1423 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1424 }
1425err:
1426 if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
1427 return(ret);
1428 }
1429
1430int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s)
1431 {
1432 unsigned char *buf;
1433 unsigned char *p,*d;
1434 int i,sl;
1435 unsigned long l;
1436
1437 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A)
1438 {
1439 buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1440#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1441 p=s->s3->server_random;
1442 if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0)
1443 return -1;
1444#endif
1445 /* Do the message type and length last */
1446 d=p= &(buf[4]);
1447
1448 *(p++)=s->version>>8;
1449 *(p++)=s->version&0xff;
1450
1451 /* Random stuff */
1452 memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1453 p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1454
1455 /* There are several cases for the session ID to send
1456 * back in the server hello:
1457 * - For session reuse from the session cache,
1458 * we send back the old session ID.
1459 * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket)
1460 * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID"
1461 * (which doesn't actually identify the session).
1462 * - If it is a new session, we send back the new
1463 * session ID.
1464 * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use,
1465 * we send back a 0-length session ID.
1466 * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse,
1467 * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed
1468 * to send back.
1469 */
1470 if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)
1471 && !s->hit)
1472 s->session->session_id_length=0;
1473
1474 sl=s->session->session_id_length;
1475 if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id))
1476 {
1477 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1478 return -1;
1479 }
1480 *(p++)=sl;
1481 memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl);
1482 p+=sl;
1483
1484 /* put the cipher */
1485 i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p);
1486 p+=i;
1487
1488 /* put the compression method */
1489#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
1490 *(p++)=0;
1491#else
1492 if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL)
1493 *(p++)=0;
1494 else
1495 *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id;
1496#endif
1497#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
1498 if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0)
1499 {
1500 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
1501 return -1;
1502 }
1503 if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL)
1504 {
1505 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1506 return -1;
1507 }
1508#endif
1509 /* do the header */
1510 l=(p-d);
1511 d=buf;
1512 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO;
1513 l2n3(l,d);
1514
1515 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B;
1516 /* number of bytes to write */
1517 s->init_num=p-buf;
1518 s->init_off=0;
1519 }
1520
1521 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */
1522 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1523 }
1524
1525int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s)
1526 {
1527 unsigned char *p;
1528
1529 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A)
1530 {
1531 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1532
1533 /* do the header */
1534 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
1535 *(p++)=0;
1536 *(p++)=0;
1537 *(p++)=0;
1538
1539 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B;
1540 /* number of bytes to write */
1541 s->init_num=4;
1542 s->init_off=0;
1543 }
1544
1545 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */
1546 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
1547 }
1548
1549int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
1550 {
1551#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1552 unsigned char *q;
1553 int j,num;
1554 RSA *rsa;
1555 unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
1556 unsigned int u;
1557#endif
1558#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1559 DH *dh=NULL,*dhp;
1560#endif
1561#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1562 EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp;
1563 unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL;
1564 int encodedlen = 0;
1565 int curve_id = 0;
1566 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
1567#endif
1568 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
1569 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
1570 unsigned char *p,*d;
1571 int al,i;
1572 unsigned long type;
1573 int n;
1574 CERT *cert;
1575 BIGNUM *r[4];
1576 int nr[4],kn;
1577 BUF_MEM *buf;
1578 EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
1579
1580 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
1581 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A)
1582 {
1583 type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1584 cert=s->cert;
1585
1586 buf=s->init_buf;
1587
1588 r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL;
1589 n=0;
1590#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1591 if (type & SSL_kRSA)
1592 {
1593 rsa=cert->rsa_tmp;
1594 if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL))
1595 {
1596 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s,
1597 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1598 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1599 if(rsa == NULL)
1600 {
1601 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1602 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1603 goto f_err;
1604 }
1605 RSA_up_ref(rsa);
1606 cert->rsa_tmp=rsa;
1607 }
1608 if (rsa == NULL)
1609 {
1610 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1611 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY);
1612 goto f_err;
1613 }
1614 r[0]=rsa->n;
1615 r[1]=rsa->e;
1616 s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1;
1617 }
1618 else
1619#endif
1620#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
1621 if (type & SSL_kEDH)
1622 {
1623 dhp=cert->dh_tmp;
1624 if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1625 dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s,
1626 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1627 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1628 if (dhp == NULL)
1629 {
1630 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1631 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
1632 goto f_err;
1633 }
1634
1635 if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL)
1636 {
1637 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1638 goto err;
1639 }
1640
1641 if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL)
1642 {
1643 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1644 goto err;
1645 }
1646
1647 s->s3->tmp.dh=dh;
1648 if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
1649 dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
1650 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)))
1651 {
1652 if(!DH_generate_key(dh))
1653 {
1654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
1655 ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1656 goto err;
1657 }
1658 }
1659 else
1660 {
1661 dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
1662 dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
1663 if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) ||
1664 (dh->priv_key == NULL))
1665 {
1666 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
1667 goto err;
1668 }
1669 }
1670 r[0]=dh->p;
1671 r[1]=dh->g;
1672 r[2]=dh->pub_key;
1673 }
1674 else
1675#endif
1676#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1677 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1678 {
1679 const EC_GROUP *group;
1680
1681 ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp;
1682 if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL))
1683 {
1684 ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s,
1685 SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher),
1686 SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher));
1687 }
1688 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1689 {
1690 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1691 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
1692 goto f_err;
1693 }
1694
1695 if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL)
1696 {
1697 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1698 goto err;
1699 }
1700
1701 /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */
1702 if (ecdhp == NULL)
1703 {
1704 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1705 goto err;
1706 }
1707 if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL)
1708 {
1709 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1710 goto err;
1711 }
1712
1713 s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh;
1714 if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1715 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1716 (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE))
1717 {
1718 if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh))
1719 {
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1721 goto err;
1722 }
1723 }
1724
1725 if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) ||
1726 (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) ||
1727 (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL))
1728 {
1729 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1730 goto err;
1731 }
1732
1733 if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) &&
1734 (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163))
1735 {
1736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER);
1737 goto err;
1738 }
1739
1740 /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH
1741 * keys over named (not generic) curves. For
1742 * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero.
1743 */
1744 if ((curve_id =
1745 tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group)))
1746 == 0)
1747 {
1748 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
1749 goto err;
1750 }
1751
1752 /* Encode the public key.
1753 * First check the size of encoding and
1754 * allocate memory accordingly.
1755 */
1756 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1757 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1758 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1759 NULL, 0, NULL);
1760
1761 encodedPoint = (unsigned char *)
1762 OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char));
1763 bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
1764 if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
1765 {
1766 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1767 goto err;
1768 }
1769
1770
1771 encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
1772 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh),
1773 POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
1774 encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx);
1775
1776 if (encodedlen == 0)
1777 {
1778 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
1779 goto err;
1780 }
1781
1782 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL;
1783
1784 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not
1785 * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges.
1786 * In this situation, we need four additional bytes
1787 * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams
1788 * structure.
1789 */
1790 n = 4 + encodedlen;
1791
1792 /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message
1793 * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs
1794 */
1795 r[0]=NULL;
1796 r[1]=NULL;
1797 r[2]=NULL;
1798 r[3]=NULL;
1799 }
1800 else
1801#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */
1802#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1803 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1804 {
1805 /* reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint*/
1806 n+=2+strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1807 }
1808 else
1809#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
1810#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1811 if (type & SSL_kSRP)
1812 {
1813 if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) ||
1814 (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) ||
1815 (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) ||
1816 (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL))
1817 {
1818 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM);
1819 goto err;
1820 }
1821 r[0]=s->srp_ctx.N;
1822 r[1]=s->srp_ctx.g;
1823 r[2]=s->srp_ctx.s;
1824 r[3]=s->srp_ctx.B;
1825 }
1826 else
1827#endif
1828 {
1829 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1830 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
1831 goto f_err;
1832 }
1833 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1834 {
1835 nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]);
1836#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1837 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1838 n+=1+nr[i];
1839 else
1840#endif
1841 n+=2+nr[i];
1842 }
1843
1844 if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
1845 && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK))
1846 {
1847 if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,&md))
1848 == NULL)
1849 {
1850 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1851 goto f_err;
1852 }
1853 kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
1854 }
1855 else
1856 {
1857 pkey=NULL;
1858 kn=0;
1859 }
1860
1861 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn))
1862 {
1863 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF);
1864 goto err;
1865 }
1866 d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
1867 p= &(d[4]);
1868
1869 for (i=0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++)
1870 {
1871#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1872 if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP))
1873 {
1874 *p = nr[i];
1875 p++;
1876 }
1877 else
1878#endif
1879 s2n(nr[i],p);
1880 BN_bn2bin(r[i],p);
1881 p+=nr[i];
1882 }
1883
1884#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1885 if (type & SSL_kEECDH)
1886 {
1887 /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves.
1888 * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has:
1889 * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName]
1890 * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by
1891 * the actual encoded point itself
1892 */
1893 *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE;
1894 p += 1;
1895 *p = 0;
1896 p += 1;
1897 *p = curve_id;
1898 p += 1;
1899 *p = encodedlen;
1900 p += 1;
1901 memcpy((unsigned char*)p,
1902 (unsigned char *)encodedPoint,
1903 encodedlen);
1904 OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
1905 encodedPoint = NULL;
1906 p += encodedlen;
1907 }
1908#endif
1909
1910#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
1911 if (type & SSL_kPSK)
1912 {
1913 /* copy PSK identity hint */
1914 s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p);
1915 strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint));
1916 p+=strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
1917 }
1918#endif
1919
1920 /* not anonymous */
1921 if (pkey != NULL)
1922 {
1923 /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4])
1924 * and p points to the space at the end. */
1925#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
1926 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA
1927 && TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
1928 {
1929 q=md_buf;
1930 j=0;
1931 for (num=2; num > 0; num--)
1932 {
1933 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx,
1934 EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
1935 EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2)
1936 ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL);
1937 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1938 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1939 EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1940 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,
1941 (unsigned int *)&i);
1942 q+=i;
1943 j+=i;
1944 }
1945 if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j,
1946 &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0)
1947 {
1948 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA);
1949 goto err;
1950 }
1951 s2n(u,p);
1952 n+=u+2;
1953 }
1954 else
1955#endif
1956 if (md)
1957 {
1958 /* For TLS1.2 and later send signature
1959 * algorithm */
1960 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1961 {
1962 if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md))
1963 {
1964 /* Should never happen */
1965 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1967 goto f_err;
1968 }
1969 p+=2;
1970 }
1971#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1972 fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n",
1973 EVP_MD_name(md));
1974#endif
1975 EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
1976 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1977 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1978 EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n);
1979 if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]),
1980 (unsigned int *)&i,pkey))
1981 {
1982 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_EVP);
1983 goto err;
1984 }
1985 s2n(i,p);
1986 n+=i+2;
1987 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
1988 n+= 2;
1989 }
1990 else
1991 {
1992 /* Is this error check actually needed? */
1993 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1994 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE);
1995 goto f_err;
1996 }
1997 }
1998
1999 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE;
2000 l2n3(n,d);
2001
2002 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2003 * it off */
2004 s->init_num=n+4;
2005 s->init_off=0;
2006 }
2007
2008 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B;
2009 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2010 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2011f_err:
2012 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2013err:
2014#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2015 if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint);
2016 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2017#endif
2018 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
2019 return(-1);
2020 }
2021
2022int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s)
2023 {
2024 unsigned char *p,*d;
2025 int i,j,nl,off,n;
2026 STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL;
2027 X509_NAME *name;
2028 BUF_MEM *buf;
2029
2030 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A)
2031 {
2032 buf=s->init_buf;
2033
2034 d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]);
2035
2036 /* get the list of acceptable cert types */
2037 p++;
2038 n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p);
2039 d[0]=n;
2040 p+=n;
2041 n++;
2042
2043 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2044 {
2045 nl = tls12_get_req_sig_algs(s, p + 2);
2046 s2n(nl, p);
2047 p += nl + 2;
2048 n += nl + 2;
2049 }
2050
2051 off=n;
2052 p+=2;
2053 n+=2;
2054
2055 sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s);
2056 nl=0;
2057 if (sk != NULL)
2058 {
2059 for (i=0; i<sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++)
2060 {
2061 name=sk_X509_NAME_value(sk,i);
2062 j=i2d_X509_NAME(name,NULL);
2063 if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,4+n+j+2))
2064 {
2065 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
2066 goto err;
2067 }
2068 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+n]);
2069 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG))
2070 {
2071 s2n(j,p);
2072 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2073 n+=2+j;
2074 nl+=2+j;
2075 }
2076 else
2077 {
2078 d=p;
2079 i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p);
2080 j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2;
2081 n+=j;
2082 nl+=j;
2083 }
2084 }
2085 }
2086 /* else no CA names */
2087 p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]);
2088 s2n(nl,p);
2089
2090 d=(unsigned char *)buf->data;
2091 *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST;
2092 l2n3(n,d);
2093
2094 /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send
2095 * it off */
2096
2097 s->init_num=n+4;
2098 s->init_off=0;
2099#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG
2100 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num;
2101
2102 /* do the header */
2103 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE;
2104 *(p++)=0;
2105 *(p++)=0;
2106 *(p++)=0;
2107 s->init_num += 4;
2108#endif
2109
2110 s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B;
2111 }
2112
2113 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */
2114 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
2115err:
2116 return(-1);
2117 }
2118
2119int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
2120 {
2121 int i,al,ok;
2122 long n;
2123 unsigned long alg_k;
2124 unsigned char *p;
2125#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2126 RSA *rsa=NULL;
2127 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2128#endif
2129#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2130 BIGNUM *pub=NULL;
2131 DH *dh_srvr;
2132#endif
2133#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2134 KSSL_ERR kssl_err;
2135#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2136
2137#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2138 EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL;
2139 EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL;
2140 EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL;
2141 BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
2142#endif
2143
2144 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2145 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A,
2146 SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B,
2147 SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2148 2048, /* ??? */
2149 &ok);
2150
2151 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2152 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2153
2154 alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2155
2156#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2157 if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA)
2158 {
2159 /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */
2160 if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp)
2161 {
2162 if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL))
2163 rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp;
2164 /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should
2165 * be sent already */
2166 if (rsa == NULL)
2167 {
2168 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2169 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY);
2170 goto f_err;
2171
2172 }
2173 }
2174 else
2175 {
2176 pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey;
2177 if ( (pkey == NULL) ||
2178 (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) ||
2179 (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL))
2180 {
2181 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2182 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE);
2183 goto f_err;
2184 }
2185 rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa;
2186 }
2187
2188 /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */
2189 if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2190 {
2191 n2s(p,i);
2192 if (n != i+2)
2193 {
2194 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG))
2195 {
2196 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2197 goto err;
2198 }
2199 else
2200 p-=2;
2201 }
2202 else
2203 n=i;
2204 }
2205
2206 i=RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
2207
2208 al = -1;
2209
2210 if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2211 {
2212 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2213 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
2214 }
2215
2216 if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2217 {
2218 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2219 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2220 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2221 * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol
2222 * version instead if the server does not support the requested
2223 * protocol version.
2224 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */
2225 if (!((s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) &&
2226 (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
2227 {
2228 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2229 /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
2230
2231 /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
2232 * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
2233 * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
2234 * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
2235 * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
2236 * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
2237 * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
2238 }
2239 }
2240
2241 if (al != -1)
2242 {
2243 /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
2244 * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
2245 * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
2246 ERR_clear_error();
2247 i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
2248 p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
2249 p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
2250 if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2) <= 0) /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
2251 goto err;
2252 }
2253
2254 s->session->master_key_length=
2255 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2256 s->session->master_key,
2257 p,i);
2258 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2259 }
2260 else
2261#endif
2262#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
2263 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
2264 {
2265 n2s(p,i);
2266 if (n != i+2)
2267 {
2268 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG))
2269 {
2270 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG);
2271 goto err;
2272 }
2273 else
2274 {
2275 p-=2;
2276 i=(int)n;
2277 }
2278 }
2279
2280 if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */
2281 {
2282 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS);
2284 goto f_err;
2285 }
2286 else
2287 {
2288 if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL)
2289 {
2290 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2291 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY);
2292 goto f_err;
2293 }
2294 else
2295 dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh;
2296 }
2297
2298 pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL);
2299 if (pub == NULL)
2300 {
2301 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB);
2302 goto err;
2303 }
2304
2305 i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr);
2306
2307 if (i <= 0)
2308 {
2309 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB);
2310 BN_clear_free(pub);
2311 goto err;
2312 }
2313
2314 DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh);
2315 s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL;
2316
2317 BN_clear_free(pub);
2318 pub=NULL;
2319 s->session->master_key_length=
2320 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2321 s->session->master_key,p,i);
2322 OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i);
2323 }
2324 else
2325#endif
2326#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
2327 if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5)
2328 {
2329 krb5_error_code krb5rc;
2330 krb5_data enc_ticket;
2331 krb5_data authenticator;
2332 krb5_data enc_pms;
2333 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
2334 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx;
2335 const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL;
2336 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
2337 unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH
2338 + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
2339 int padl, outl;
2340 krb5_timestamp authtime = 0;
2341 krb5_ticket_times ttimes;
2342
2343 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx);
2344
2345 if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
2346
2347 n2s(p,i);
2348 enc_ticket.length = i;
2349
2350 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6))
2351 {
2352 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2353 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2354 goto err;
2355 }
2356
2357 enc_ticket.data = (char *)p;
2358 p+=enc_ticket.length;
2359
2360 n2s(p,i);
2361 authenticator.length = i;
2362
2363 if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6))
2364 {
2365 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2366 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2367 goto err;
2368 }
2369
2370 authenticator.data = (char *)p;
2371 p+=authenticator.length;
2372
2373 n2s(p,i);
2374 enc_pms.length = i;
2375 enc_pms.data = (char *)p;
2376 p+=enc_pms.length;
2377
2378 /* Note that the length is checked again below,
2379 ** after decryption
2380 */
2381 if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms)
2382 {
2383 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2384 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2385 goto err;
2386 }
2387
2388 if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
2389 enc_pms.length + 6))
2390 {
2391 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2392 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2393 goto err;
2394 }
2395
2396 if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
2397 &kssl_err)) != 0)
2398 {
2399#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2400 printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
2401 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2402 if (kssl_err.text)
2403 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2404#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2405 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2406 kssl_err.reason);
2407 goto err;
2408 }
2409
2410 /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
2411 ** but will return authtime == 0.
2412 */
2413 if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
2414 &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
2415 {
2416#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2417 printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
2418 krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
2419 if (kssl_err.text)
2420 printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
2421#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2422 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2423 kssl_err.reason);
2424 goto err;
2425 }
2426
2427 if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
2428 {
2429 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
2430 goto err;
2431 }
2432
2433#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
2434 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
2435#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
2436
2437 enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
2438 if (enc == NULL)
2439 goto err;
2440
2441 memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */
2442
2443 if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv))
2444 {
2445 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2446 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2447 goto err;
2448 }
2449 if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
2450 (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length))
2451 {
2452 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2453 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2454 goto err;
2455 }
2456 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2457 {
2458 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2459 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2460 goto err;
2461 }
2462 if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl))
2463 {
2464 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2465 SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2466 goto err;
2467 }
2468 outl += padl;
2469 if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
2470 {
2471 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2472 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2473 goto err;
2474 }
2475 if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
2476 {
2477 /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the
2478 * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the
2479 * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites).
2480 * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of
2481 * the protocol version.
2482 * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients.
2483 * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher)
2484 */
2485 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG))
2486 {
2487 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2488 SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
2489 goto err;
2490 }
2491 }
2492
2493 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
2494
2495 s->session->master_key_length=
2496 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2497 s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
2498
2499 if (kssl_ctx->client_princ)
2500 {
2501 size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
2502 if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH )
2503 {
2504 s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len;
2505 memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len);
2506 }
2507 }
2508
2509
2510 /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
2511 ** but it caused problems for apache.
2512 ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
2513 ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
2514 */
2515 }
2516 else
2517#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
2518
2519#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2520 if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2521 {
2522 int ret = 1;
2523 int field_size = 0;
2524 const EC_KEY *tkey;
2525 const EC_GROUP *group;
2526 const BIGNUM *priv_key;
2527
2528 /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */
2529 if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL)
2530 {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2532 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2533 goto err;
2534 }
2535
2536 /* Let's get server private key and group information */
2537 if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe))
2538 {
2539 /* use the certificate */
2540 tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec;
2541 }
2542 else
2543 {
2544 /* use the ephermeral values we saved when
2545 * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg.
2546 */
2547 tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh;
2548 }
2549
2550 group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey);
2551 priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey);
2552
2553 if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) ||
2554 !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key))
2555 {
2556 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2557 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2558 goto err;
2559 }
2560
2561 /* Let's get client's public key */
2562 if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL)
2563 {
2564 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2565 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2566 goto err;
2567 }
2568
2569 if (n == 0L)
2570 {
2571 /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */
2572
2573 if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH)
2574 {
2575 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2576 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY);
2577 goto f_err;
2578 }
2579 if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer))
2580 == NULL) ||
2581 (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC))
2582 {
2583 /* XXX: For now, we do not support client
2584 * authentication using ECDH certificates
2585 * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is
2586 * never executed. When that support is
2587 * added, we ought to ensure the key
2588 * received in the certificate is
2589 * authorized for key agreement.
2590 * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that
2591 * the two ECDH shares are for the same
2592 * group.
2593 */
2594 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2595 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2596 SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS);
2597 goto f_err;
2598 }
2599
2600 if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint,
2601 EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0)
2602 {
2603 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2604 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2605 goto err;
2606 }
2607 ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */
2608 }
2609 else
2610 {
2611 /* Get client's public key from encoded point
2612 * in the ClientKeyExchange message.
2613 */
2614 if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
2615 {
2616 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2617 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2618 goto err;
2619 }
2620
2621 /* Get encoded point length */
2622 i = *p;
2623 p += 1;
2624 if (n != 1 + i)
2625 {
2626 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2627 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2628 goto err;
2629 }
2630 if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group,
2631 clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0)
2632 {
2633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2634 ERR_R_EC_LIB);
2635 goto err;
2636 }
2637 /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer
2638 * currently, so set it to the start
2639 */
2640 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
2641 }
2642
2643 /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */
2644 field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group);
2645 if (field_size <= 0)
2646 {
2647 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2648 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2649 goto err;
2650 }
2651 i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL);
2652 if (i <= 0)
2653 {
2654 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2655 ERR_R_ECDH_LIB);
2656 goto err;
2657 }
2658
2659 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2660 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2661 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2662 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2663 EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh);
2664 s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL;
2665
2666 /* Compute the master secret */
2667 s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \
2668 generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i);
2669
2670 OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i);
2671 return (ret);
2672 }
2673 else
2674#endif
2675#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
2676 if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK)
2677 {
2678 unsigned char *t = NULL;
2679 unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN*2+4];
2680 unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0;
2681 int psk_err = 1;
2682 char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1];
2683
2684 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2685
2686 n2s(p,i);
2687 if (n != i+2)
2688 {
2689 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2690 SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
2691 goto psk_err;
2692 }
2693 if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN)
2694 {
2695 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2696 SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
2697 goto psk_err;
2698 }
2699 if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL)
2700 {
2701 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2702 SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB);
2703 goto psk_err;
2704 }
2705
2706 /* Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity
2707 * string for the callback */
2708 memcpy(tmp_id, p, i);
2709 memset(tmp_id+i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1-i);
2710 psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id,
2711 psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2712 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN+1);
2713
2714 if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN)
2715 {
2716 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2717 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2718 goto psk_err;
2719 }
2720 else if (psk_len == 0)
2721 {
2722 /* PSK related to the given identity not found */
2723 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2724 SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND);
2725 al=SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY;
2726 goto psk_err;
2727 }
2728
2729 /* create PSK pre_master_secret */
2730 pre_ms_len=2+psk_len+2+psk_len;
2731 t = psk_or_pre_ms;
2732 memmove(psk_or_pre_ms+psk_len+4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len);
2733 s2n(psk_len, t);
2734 memset(t, 0, psk_len);
2735 t+=psk_len;
2736 s2n(psk_len, t);
2737
2738 if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL)
2739 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity);
2740 s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strdup((char *)p);
2741 if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL)
2742 {
2743 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2744 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2745 goto psk_err;
2746 }
2747
2748 if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL)
2749 OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint);
2750 s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint);
2751 if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL &&
2752 s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
2753 {
2754 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2755 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2756 goto psk_err;
2757 }
2758
2759 s->session->master_key_length=
2760 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2761 s->session->master_key, psk_or_pre_ms, pre_ms_len);
2762 psk_err = 0;
2763 psk_err:
2764 OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms));
2765 if (psk_err != 0)
2766 goto f_err;
2767 }
2768 else
2769#endif
2770#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
2771 if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP)
2772 {
2773 int param_len;
2774
2775 n2s(p,i);
2776 param_len=i+2;
2777 if (param_len > n)
2778 {
2779 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2780 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH);
2781 goto f_err;
2782 }
2783 if (!(s->srp_ctx.A=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL)))
2784 {
2785 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB);
2786 goto err;
2787 }
2788 if (s->session->srp_username != NULL)
2789 OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username);
2790 s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login);
2791 if (s->session->srp_username == NULL)
2792 {
2793 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2794 ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
2795 goto err;
2796 }
2797
2798 if ((s->session->master_key_length = SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s,s->session->master_key))<0)
2799 {
2800 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2801 goto err;
2802 }
2803
2804 p+=i;
2805 }
2806 else
2807#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */
2808 if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)
2809 {
2810 int ret = 0;
2811 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx;
2812 EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL;
2813 unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start;
2814 size_t outlen=32, inlen;
2815 unsigned long alg_a;
2816
2817 /* Get our certificate private key*/
2818 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2819 if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94)
2820 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey;
2821 else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01)
2822 pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey;
2823
2824 pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk,NULL);
2825 EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx);
2826 /* If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe
2827 * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from
2828 * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use
2829 * a client certificate for authorization only. */
2830 client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer);
2831 if (client_pub_pkey)
2832 {
2833 if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0)
2834 ERR_clear_error();
2835 }
2836 /* Decrypt session key */
2837 if ((*p!=( V_ASN1_SEQUENCE| V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)))
2838 {
2839 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2840 goto gerr;
2841 }
2842 if (p[1] == 0x81)
2843 {
2844 start = p+3;
2845 inlen = p[2];
2846 }
2847 else if (p[1] < 0x80)
2848 {
2849 start = p+2;
2850 inlen = p[1];
2851 }
2852 else
2853 {
2854 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2855 goto gerr;
2856 }
2857 if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkey_ctx,premaster_secret,&outlen,start,inlen) <=0)
2858
2859 {
2860 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
2861 goto gerr;
2862 }
2863 /* Generate master secret */
2864 s->session->master_key_length=
2865 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
2866 s->session->master_key,premaster_secret,32);
2867 /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */
2868 if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0)
2869 ret = 2;
2870 else
2871 ret = 1;
2872 gerr:
2873 EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey);
2874 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx);
2875 if (ret)
2876 return ret;
2877 else
2878 goto err;
2879 }
2880 else
2881 {
2882 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
2883 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
2884 SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
2885 goto f_err;
2886 }
2887
2888 return(1);
2889f_err:
2890 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
2891#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP)
2892err:
2893#endif
2894#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
2895 EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey);
2896 EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint);
2897 if (srvr_ecdh != NULL)
2898 EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh);
2899 BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
2900#endif
2901 return(-1);
2902 }
2903
2904int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s)
2905 {
2906 EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL;
2907 unsigned char *p;
2908 int al,ok,ret=0;
2909 long n;
2910 int type=0,i,j;
2911 X509 *peer;
2912 const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
2913 EVP_MD_CTX mctx;
2914 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx);
2915
2916 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
2917 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A,
2918 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B,
2919 -1,
2920 516, /* Enough for 4096 bit RSA key with TLS v1.2 */
2921 &ok);
2922
2923 if (!ok) return((int)n);
2924
2925 if (s->session->peer != NULL)
2926 {
2927 peer=s->session->peer;
2928 pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer);
2929 type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey);
2930 }
2931 else
2932 {
2933 peer=NULL;
2934 pkey=NULL;
2935 }
2936
2937 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY)
2938 {
2939 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
2940 if ((peer != NULL) && (type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2941 {
2942 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2943 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE);
2944 goto f_err;
2945 }
2946 ret=1;
2947 goto end;
2948 }
2949
2950 if (peer == NULL)
2951 {
2952 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED);
2953 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2954 goto f_err;
2955 }
2956
2957 if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN))
2958 {
2959 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE);
2960 al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
2961 goto f_err;
2962 }
2963
2964 if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
2965 {
2966 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
2967 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
2968 goto f_err;
2969 }
2970
2971 /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */
2972 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
2973 /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
2974 /* If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare
2975 * signature without length field */
2976 if (n==64 && (pkey->type==NID_id_GostR3410_94 ||
2977 pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) )
2978 {
2979 i=64;
2980 }
2981 else
2982 {
2983 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
2984 {
2985 int sigalg = tls12_get_sigid(pkey);
2986 /* Should never happen */
2987 if (sigalg == -1)
2988 {
2989 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
2990 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2991 goto f_err;
2992 }
2993 /* Check key type is consistent with signature */
2994 if (sigalg != (int)p[1])
2995 {
2996 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
2997 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
2998 goto f_err;
2999 }
3000 md = tls12_get_hash(p[0]);
3001 if (md == NULL)
3002 {
3003 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
3004 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3005 goto f_err;
3006 }
3007#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3008fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
3009#endif
3010 p += 2;
3011 n -= 2;
3012 }
3013 n2s(p,i);
3014 n-=2;
3015 if (i > n)
3016 {
3017 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3018 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3019 goto f_err;
3020 }
3021 }
3022 j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
3023 if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0))
3024 {
3025 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
3026 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3027 goto f_err;
3028 }
3029
3030 if (TLS1_get_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
3031 {
3032 long hdatalen = 0;
3033 void *hdata;
3034 hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
3035 if (hdatalen <= 0)
3036 {
3037 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3038 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3039 goto f_err;
3040 }
3041#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
3042 fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n",
3043 EVP_MD_name(md));
3044#endif
3045 if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL)
3046 || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen))
3047 {
3048 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
3049 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3050 goto f_err;
3051 }
3052
3053 if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p , i, pkey) <= 0)
3054 {
3055 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3056 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
3057 goto f_err;
3058 }
3059 }
3060 else
3061#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
3062 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
3063 {
3064 i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,
3065 MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i,
3066 pkey->pkey.rsa);
3067 if (i < 0)
3068 {
3069 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3070 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
3071 goto f_err;
3072 }
3073 if (i == 0)
3074 {
3075 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3076 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE);
3077 goto f_err;
3078 }
3079 }
3080 else
3081#endif
3082#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
3083 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA)
3084 {
3085 j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3086 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3087 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa);
3088 if (j <= 0)
3089 {
3090 /* bad signature */
3091 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3092 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE);
3093 goto f_err;
3094 }
3095 }
3096 else
3097#endif
3098#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
3099 if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
3100 {
3101 j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type,
3102 &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]),
3103 SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec);
3104 if (j <= 0)
3105 {
3106 /* bad signature */
3107 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3108 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3109 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3110 goto f_err;
3111 }
3112 }
3113 else
3114#endif
3115 if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)
3116 { unsigned char signature[64];
3117 int idx;
3118 EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey,NULL);
3119 EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx);
3120 if (i!=64) {
3121 fprintf(stderr,"GOST signature length is %d",i);
3122 }
3123 for (idx=0;idx<64;idx++) {
3124 signature[63-idx]=p[idx];
3125 }
3126 j=EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx,signature,64,s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md,32);
3127 EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx);
3128 if (j<=0)
3129 {
3130 al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
3131 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,
3132 SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE);
3133 goto f_err;
3134 }
3135 }
3136 else
3137 {
3138 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3139 al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE;
3140 goto f_err;
3141 }
3142
3143
3144 ret=1;
3145 if (0)
3146 {
3147f_err:
3148 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3149 }
3150end:
3151 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
3152 {
3153 BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer);
3154 s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL;
3155 s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE;
3156 }
3157 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx);
3158 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
3159 return(ret);
3160 }
3161
3162int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s)
3163 {
3164 int i,ok,al,ret= -1;
3165 X509 *x=NULL;
3166 unsigned long l,nc,llen,n;
3167 const unsigned char *p,*q;
3168 unsigned char *d;
3169 STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL;
3170
3171 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3172 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A,
3173 SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B,
3174 -1,
3175 s->max_cert_list,
3176 &ok);
3177
3178 if (!ok) return((int)n);
3179
3180 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE)
3181 {
3182 if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3183 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3184 {
3185 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3186 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3187 goto f_err;
3188 }
3189 /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */
3190 if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request)
3191 {
3192 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST);
3193 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3194 goto f_err;
3195 }
3196 s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1;
3197 return(1);
3198 }
3199
3200 if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE)
3201 {
3202 al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
3203 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
3204 goto f_err;
3205 }
3206 p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3207
3208 if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
3209 {
3210 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3211 goto err;
3212 }
3213
3214 n2l3(p,llen);
3215 if (llen+3 != n)
3216 {
3217 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3218 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3219 goto f_err;
3220 }
3221 for (nc=0; nc<llen; )
3222 {
3223 n2l3(p,l);
3224 if ((l+nc+3) > llen)
3225 {
3226 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3227 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3228 goto f_err;
3229 }
3230
3231 q=p;
3232 x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l);
3233 if (x == NULL)
3234 {
3235 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
3236 goto err;
3237 }
3238 if (p != (q+l))
3239 {
3240 al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
3241 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
3242 goto f_err;
3243 }
3244 if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x))
3245 {
3246 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3247 goto err;
3248 }
3249 x=NULL;
3250 nc+=l+3;
3251 }
3252
3253 if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0)
3254 {
3255 /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */
3256 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
3257 {
3258 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3259 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED);
3260 goto f_err;
3261 }
3262 /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */
3263 else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) &&
3264 (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))
3265 {
3266 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
3267 al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
3268 goto f_err;
3269 }
3270 /* No client certificate so digest cached records */
3271 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
3272 {
3273 al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
3274 goto f_err;
3275 }
3276 }
3277 else
3278 {
3279 i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk);
3280 if (i <= 0)
3281 {
3282 al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
3283 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED);
3284 goto f_err;
3285 }
3286 }
3287
3288 if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */
3289 X509_free(s->session->peer);
3290 s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk);
3291 s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
3292
3293 /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL
3294 * when we arrive here. */
3295 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3296 {
3297 s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new();
3298 if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
3299 {
3300 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3301 goto err;
3302 }
3303 }
3304 if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL)
3305 sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free);
3306 s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk;
3307 /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the
3308 * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */
3309
3310 sk=NULL;
3311
3312 ret=1;
3313 if (0)
3314 {
3315f_err:
3316 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
3317 }
3318err:
3319 if (x != NULL) X509_free(x);
3320 if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free);
3321 return(ret);
3322 }
3323
3324int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s)
3325 {
3326 unsigned long l;
3327 X509 *x;
3328
3329 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A)
3330 {
3331 x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s);
3332 if (x == NULL)
3333 {
3334 /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
3335 if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) ||
3336 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5))
3337 {
3338 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
3339 return(0);
3340 }
3341 }
3342
3343 l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x);
3344 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B;
3345 s->init_num=(int)l;
3346 s->init_off=0;
3347 }
3348
3349 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */
3350 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3351 }
3352
3353#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
3354/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */
3355int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s)
3356 {
3357 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A)
3358 {
3359 unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart;
3360 const unsigned char *const_p;
3361 int len, slen_full, slen;
3362 SSL_SESSION *sess;
3363 unsigned int hlen;
3364 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
3365 HMAC_CTX hctx;
3366 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
3367 unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
3368 unsigned char key_name[16];
3369
3370 /* get session encoding length */
3371 slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL);
3372 /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is
3373 * too long
3374 */
3375 if (slen_full > 0xFF00)
3376 return -1;
3377 senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full);
3378 if (!senc)
3379 return -1;
3380 p = senc;
3381 i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p);
3382
3383 /* create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */
3384 const_p = senc;
3385 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full);
3386 if (sess == NULL)
3387 {
3388 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3389 return -1;
3390 }
3391 sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */
3392
3393 slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL);
3394 if (slen > slen_full) /* shouldn't ever happen */
3395 {
3396 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3397 return -1;
3398 }
3399 p = senc;
3400 i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p);
3401 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
3402
3403 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3404 * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length
3405 * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) +
3406 * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) +
3407 * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session
3408 * length) + max_md_size (HMAC).
3409 */
3410 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf,
3411 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH +
3412 EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen))
3413 return -1;
3414
3415 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3416 /* do the header */
3417 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET;
3418 /* Skip message length for now */
3419 p += 3;
3420 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
3421 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
3422 /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present
3423 * it does all the work otherwise use generated values
3424 * from parent ctx.
3425 */
3426 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
3427 {
3428 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx,
3429 &hctx, 1) < 0)
3430 {
3431 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3432 return -1;
3433 }
3434 }
3435 else
3436 {
3437 RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16);
3438 EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
3439 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv);
3440 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
3441 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
3442 memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16);
3443 }
3444
3445 /* Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only):
3446 * We leave this unspecified for resumed session (for simplicity),
3447 * and guess that tickets for new sessions will live as long
3448 * as their sessions. */
3449 l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p);
3450
3451 /* Skip ticket length for now */
3452 p += 2;
3453 /* Output key name */
3454 macstart = p;
3455 memcpy(p, key_name, 16);
3456 p += 16;
3457 /* output IV */
3458 memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx));
3459 p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
3460 /* Encrypt session data */
3461 EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen);
3462 p += len;
3463 EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len);
3464 p += len;
3465 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
3466
3467 HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart);
3468 HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen);
3469 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
3470
3471 p += hlen;
3472 /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */
3473 /* Total length */
3474 len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3475 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1;
3476 l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */
3477 p += 4;
3478 s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */
3479
3480 /* number of bytes to write */
3481 s->init_num= len;
3482 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B;
3483 s->init_off=0;
3484 OPENSSL_free(senc);
3485 }
3486
3487 /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */
3488 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3489 }
3490
3491int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s)
3492 {
3493 if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A)
3494 {
3495 unsigned char *p;
3496 /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as
3497 * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) +
3498 * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length)
3499 * + (ocsp response)
3500 */
3501 if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen))
3502 return -1;
3503
3504 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
3505
3506 /* do the header */
3507 *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS;
3508 /* message length */
3509 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p);
3510 /* status type */
3511 *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type;
3512 /* length of OCSP response */
3513 l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p);
3514 /* actual response */
3515 memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen);
3516 /* number of bytes to write */
3517 s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen;
3518 s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B;
3519 s->init_off = 0;
3520 }
3521
3522 /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */
3523 return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
3524 }
3525
3526# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
3527/* ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. It
3528 * sets the next_proto member in s if found */
3529int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s)
3530 {
3531 int ok;
3532 int proto_len, padding_len;
3533 long n;
3534 const unsigned char *p;
3535
3536 /* Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the
3537 * extension in their ClientHello */
3538 if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen)
3539 {
3540 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION);
3541 return -1;
3542 }
3543
3544 n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s,
3545 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A,
3546 SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B,
3547 SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO,
3548 514, /* See the payload format below */
3549 &ok);
3550
3551 if (!ok)
3552 return((int)n);
3553
3554 /* s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received
3555 * in this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset
3556 * by ssl3_get_finished). */
3557 if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec)
3558 {
3559 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS);
3560 return -1;
3561 }
3562
3563 if (n < 2)
3564 return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */
3565
3566 p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg;
3567
3568 /* The payload looks like:
3569 * uint8 proto_len;
3570 * uint8 proto[proto_len];
3571 * uint8 padding_len;
3572 * uint8 padding[padding_len];
3573 */
3574 proto_len = p[0];
3575 if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num)
3576 return 0;
3577 padding_len = p[proto_len + 1];
3578 if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num)
3579 return 0;
3580
3581 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len);
3582 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
3583 {
3584 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
3585 return 0;
3586 }
3587 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len);
3588 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len;
3589
3590 return 1;
3591 }
3592# endif
3593#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2026-02-09 05:12:30 +0000