diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c | 755 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 755 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c b/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c deleted file mode 100644 index 2ba8b9612e..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libssl/ssl_sess.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,755 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* ssl/ssl_sess.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | |||
59 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
60 | #include <openssl/lhash.h> | ||
61 | #include <openssl/rand.h> | ||
62 | #include "ssl_locl.h" | ||
63 | |||
64 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s); | ||
65 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_SESSION *s); | ||
66 | static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck); | ||
67 | |||
68 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl) | ||
69 | /* aka SSL_get0_session; gets 0 objects, just returns a copy of the pointer */ | ||
70 | { | ||
71 | return(ssl->session); | ||
72 | } | ||
73 | |||
74 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl) | ||
75 | /* variant of SSL_get_session: caller really gets something */ | ||
76 | { | ||
77 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | ||
78 | /* Need to lock this all up rather than just use CRYPTO_add so that | ||
79 | * somebody doesn't free ssl->session between when we check it's | ||
80 | * non-null and when we up the reference count. */ | ||
81 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
82 | sess = ssl->session; | ||
83 | if(sess) | ||
84 | sess->references++; | ||
85 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
86 | return(sess); | ||
87 | } | ||
88 | |||
89 | int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, | ||
90 | CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) | ||
91 | { | ||
92 | return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, argl, argp, | ||
93 | new_func, dup_func, free_func); | ||
94 | } | ||
95 | |||
96 | int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *s, int idx, void *arg) | ||
97 | { | ||
98 | return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); | ||
99 | } | ||
100 | |||
101 | void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *s, int idx) | ||
102 | { | ||
103 | return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); | ||
104 | } | ||
105 | |||
106 | SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void) | ||
107 | { | ||
108 | SSL_SESSION *ss; | ||
109 | |||
110 | ss=(SSL_SESSION *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); | ||
111 | if (ss == NULL) | ||
112 | { | ||
113 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
114 | return(0); | ||
115 | } | ||
116 | memset(ss,0,sizeof(SSL_SESSION)); | ||
117 | |||
118 | ss->verify_result = 1; /* avoid 0 (= X509_V_OK) just in case */ | ||
119 | ss->references=1; | ||
120 | ss->timeout=60*5+4; /* 5 minute timeout by default */ | ||
121 | ss->time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); | ||
122 | ss->prev=NULL; | ||
123 | ss->next=NULL; | ||
124 | ss->compress_meth=0; | ||
125 | CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); | ||
126 | return(ss); | ||
127 | } | ||
128 | |||
129 | /* Even with SSLv2, we have 16 bytes (128 bits) of session ID space. SSLv3/TLSv1 | ||
130 | * has 32 bytes (256 bits). As such, filling the ID with random gunk repeatedly | ||
131 | * until we have no conflict is going to complete in one iteration pretty much | ||
132 | * "most" of the time (btw: understatement). So, if it takes us 10 iterations | ||
133 | * and we still can't avoid a conflict - well that's a reasonable point to call | ||
134 | * it quits. Either the RAND code is broken or someone is trying to open roughly | ||
135 | * very close to 2^128 (or 2^256) SSL sessions to our server. How you might | ||
136 | * store that many sessions is perhaps a more interesting question ... */ | ||
137 | |||
138 | #define MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 | ||
139 | static int def_generate_session_id(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, | ||
140 | unsigned int *id_len) | ||
141 | { | ||
142 | unsigned int retry = 0; | ||
143 | do | ||
144 | if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) | ||
145 | return 0; | ||
146 | while(SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && | ||
147 | (++retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS)); | ||
148 | if(retry < MAX_SESS_ID_ATTEMPTS) | ||
149 | return 1; | ||
150 | /* else - woops a session_id match */ | ||
151 | /* XXX We should also check the external cache -- | ||
152 | * but the probability of a collision is negligible, and | ||
153 | * we could not prevent the concurrent creation of sessions | ||
154 | * with identical IDs since we currently don't have means | ||
155 | * to atomically check whether a session ID already exists | ||
156 | * and make a reservation for it if it does not | ||
157 | * (this problem applies to the internal cache as well). | ||
158 | */ | ||
159 | return 0; | ||
160 | } | ||
161 | |||
162 | int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session) | ||
163 | { | ||
164 | /* This gets used by clients and servers. */ | ||
165 | |||
166 | unsigned int tmp; | ||
167 | SSL_SESSION *ss=NULL; | ||
168 | GEN_SESSION_CB cb = def_generate_session_id; | ||
169 | |||
170 | if ((ss=SSL_SESSION_new()) == NULL) return(0); | ||
171 | |||
172 | /* If the context has a default timeout, use it */ | ||
173 | if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0) | ||
174 | ss->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); | ||
175 | else | ||
176 | ss->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; | ||
177 | |||
178 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
179 | { | ||
180 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
181 | s->session=NULL; | ||
182 | } | ||
183 | |||
184 | if (session) | ||
185 | { | ||
186 | if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) | ||
187 | { | ||
188 | ss->ssl_version=SSL2_VERSION; | ||
189 | ss->session_id_length=SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
190 | } | ||
191 | else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) | ||
192 | { | ||
193 | ss->ssl_version=SSL3_VERSION; | ||
194 | ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
195 | } | ||
196 | else if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) | ||
197 | { | ||
198 | ss->ssl_version=TLS1_VERSION; | ||
199 | ss->session_id_length=SSL3_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; | ||
200 | } | ||
201 | else | ||
202 | { | ||
203 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); | ||
204 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
205 | return(0); | ||
206 | } | ||
207 | /* Choose which callback will set the session ID */ | ||
208 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
209 | if(s->generate_session_id) | ||
210 | cb = s->generate_session_id; | ||
211 | else if(s->ctx->generate_session_id) | ||
212 | cb = s->ctx->generate_session_id; | ||
213 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
214 | /* Choose a session ID */ | ||
215 | tmp = ss->session_id_length; | ||
216 | if(!cb(s, ss->session_id, &tmp)) | ||
217 | { | ||
218 | /* The callback failed */ | ||
219 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
220 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED); | ||
221 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
222 | return(0); | ||
223 | } | ||
224 | /* Don't allow the callback to set the session length to zero. | ||
225 | * nor set it higher than it was. */ | ||
226 | if(!tmp || (tmp > ss->session_id_length)) | ||
227 | { | ||
228 | /* The callback set an illegal length */ | ||
229 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
230 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH); | ||
231 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
232 | return(0); | ||
233 | } | ||
234 | /* If the session length was shrunk and we're SSLv2, pad it */ | ||
235 | if((tmp < ss->session_id_length) && (s->version == SSL2_VERSION)) | ||
236 | memset(ss->session_id + tmp, 0, ss->session_id_length - tmp); | ||
237 | else | ||
238 | ss->session_id_length = tmp; | ||
239 | /* Finally, check for a conflict */ | ||
240 | if(SSL_has_matching_session_id(s, ss->session_id, | ||
241 | ss->session_id_length)) | ||
242 | { | ||
243 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, | ||
244 | SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT); | ||
245 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
246 | return(0); | ||
247 | } | ||
248 | } | ||
249 | else | ||
250 | { | ||
251 | ss->session_id_length=0; | ||
252 | } | ||
253 | |||
254 | if (s->sid_ctx_length > sizeof ss->sid_ctx) | ||
255 | { | ||
256 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
257 | SSL_SESSION_free(ss); | ||
258 | return 0; | ||
259 | } | ||
260 | memcpy(ss->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length); | ||
261 | ss->sid_ctx_length=s->sid_ctx_length; | ||
262 | s->session=ss; | ||
263 | ss->ssl_version=s->version; | ||
264 | ss->verify_result = X509_V_OK; | ||
265 | |||
266 | return(1); | ||
267 | } | ||
268 | |||
269 | int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len) | ||
270 | { | ||
271 | /* This is used only by servers. */ | ||
272 | |||
273 | SSL_SESSION *ret=NULL,data; | ||
274 | int fatal = 0; | ||
275 | |||
276 | data.ssl_version=s->version; | ||
277 | data.session_id_length=len; | ||
278 | if (len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) | ||
279 | goto err; | ||
280 | memcpy(data.session_id,session_id,len); | ||
281 | |||
282 | if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP)) | ||
283 | { | ||
284 | CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
285 | ret=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(s->ctx->sessions,&data); | ||
286 | if (ret != NULL) | ||
287 | /* don't allow other threads to steal it: */ | ||
288 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
289 | CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
290 | } | ||
291 | |||
292 | if (ret == NULL) | ||
293 | { | ||
294 | int copy=1; | ||
295 | |||
296 | s->ctx->stats.sess_miss++; | ||
297 | ret=NULL; | ||
298 | if (s->ctx->get_session_cb != NULL | ||
299 | && (ret=s->ctx->get_session_cb(s,session_id,len,©)) | ||
300 | != NULL) | ||
301 | { | ||
302 | s->ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit++; | ||
303 | |||
304 | /* Increment reference count now if the session callback | ||
305 | * asks us to do so (note that if the session structures | ||
306 | * returned by the callback are shared between threads, | ||
307 | * it must handle the reference count itself [i.e. copy == 0], | ||
308 | * or things won't be thread-safe). */ | ||
309 | if (copy) | ||
310 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
311 | |||
312 | /* Add the externally cached session to the internal | ||
313 | * cache as well if and only if we are supposed to. */ | ||
314 | if(!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE)) | ||
315 | /* The following should not return 1, otherwise, | ||
316 | * things are very strange */ | ||
317 | SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,ret); | ||
318 | } | ||
319 | if (ret == NULL) | ||
320 | goto err; | ||
321 | } | ||
322 | |||
323 | /* Now ret is non-NULL, and we own one of its reference counts. */ | ||
324 | |||
325 | if((s->verify_mode&SSL_VERIFY_PEER) | ||
326 | && (!s->sid_ctx_length || ret->sid_ctx_length != s->sid_ctx_length | ||
327 | || memcmp(ret->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,ret->sid_ctx_length))) | ||
328 | { | ||
329 | /* We've found the session named by the client, but we don't | ||
330 | * want to use it in this context. */ | ||
331 | |||
332 | if (s->sid_ctx_length == 0) | ||
333 | { | ||
334 | /* application should have used SSL[_CTX]_set_session_id_context | ||
335 | * -- we could tolerate this and just pretend we never heard | ||
336 | * of this session, but then applications could effectively | ||
337 | * disable the session cache by accident without anyone noticing */ | ||
338 | |||
339 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED); | ||
340 | fatal = 1; | ||
341 | goto err; | ||
342 | } | ||
343 | else | ||
344 | { | ||
345 | #if 0 /* The client cannot always know when a session is not appropriate, | ||
346 | * so we shouldn't generate an error message. */ | ||
347 | |||
348 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); | ||
349 | #endif | ||
350 | goto err; /* treat like cache miss */ | ||
351 | } | ||
352 | } | ||
353 | |||
354 | if (ret->cipher == NULL) | ||
355 | { | ||
356 | unsigned char buf[5],*p; | ||
357 | unsigned long l; | ||
358 | |||
359 | p=buf; | ||
360 | l=ret->cipher_id; | ||
361 | l2n(l,p); | ||
362 | if ((ret->ssl_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) | ||
363 | ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[2])); | ||
364 | else | ||
365 | ret->cipher=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,&(buf[1])); | ||
366 | if (ret->cipher == NULL) | ||
367 | goto err; | ||
368 | } | ||
369 | |||
370 | |||
371 | #if 0 /* This is way too late. */ | ||
372 | |||
373 | /* If a thread got the session, then 'swaped', and another got | ||
374 | * it and then due to a time-out decided to 'OPENSSL_free' it we could | ||
375 | * be in trouble. So I'll increment it now, then double decrement | ||
376 | * later - am I speaking rubbish?. */ | ||
377 | CRYPTO_add(&ret->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
378 | #endif | ||
379 | |||
380 | if (ret->timeout < (long)(time(NULL) - ret->time)) /* timeout */ | ||
381 | { | ||
382 | s->ctx->stats.sess_timeout++; | ||
383 | /* remove it from the cache */ | ||
384 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,ret); | ||
385 | goto err; | ||
386 | } | ||
387 | |||
388 | s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; | ||
389 | |||
390 | /* ret->time=time(NULL); */ /* rezero timeout? */ | ||
391 | /* again, just leave the session | ||
392 | * if it is the same session, we have just incremented and | ||
393 | * then decremented the reference count :-) */ | ||
394 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
395 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
396 | s->session=ret; | ||
397 | s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; | ||
398 | return(1); | ||
399 | |||
400 | err: | ||
401 | if (ret != NULL) | ||
402 | SSL_SESSION_free(ret); | ||
403 | if (fatal) | ||
404 | return -1; | ||
405 | else | ||
406 | return 0; | ||
407 | } | ||
408 | |||
409 | int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) | ||
410 | { | ||
411 | int ret=0; | ||
412 | SSL_SESSION *s; | ||
413 | |||
414 | /* add just 1 reference count for the SSL_CTX's session cache | ||
415 | * even though it has two ways of access: each session is in a | ||
416 | * doubly linked list and an lhash */ | ||
417 | CRYPTO_add(&c->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
418 | /* if session c is in already in cache, we take back the increment later */ | ||
419 | |||
420 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
421 | s=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_insert(ctx->sessions,c); | ||
422 | |||
423 | /* s != NULL iff we already had a session with the given PID. | ||
424 | * In this case, s == c should hold (then we did not really modify | ||
425 | * ctx->sessions), or we're in trouble. */ | ||
426 | if (s != NULL && s != c) | ||
427 | { | ||
428 | /* We *are* in trouble ... */ | ||
429 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); | ||
430 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); | ||
431 | /* ... so pretend the other session did not exist in cache | ||
432 | * (we cannot handle two SSL_SESSION structures with identical | ||
433 | * session ID in the same cache, which could happen e.g. when | ||
434 | * two threads concurrently obtain the same session from an external | ||
435 | * cache) */ | ||
436 | s = NULL; | ||
437 | } | ||
438 | |||
439 | /* Put at the head of the queue unless it is already in the cache */ | ||
440 | if (s == NULL) | ||
441 | SSL_SESSION_list_add(ctx,c); | ||
442 | |||
443 | if (s != NULL) | ||
444 | { | ||
445 | /* existing cache entry -- decrement previously incremented reference | ||
446 | * count because it already takes into account the cache */ | ||
447 | |||
448 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); /* s == c */ | ||
449 | ret=0; | ||
450 | } | ||
451 | else | ||
452 | { | ||
453 | /* new cache entry -- remove old ones if cache has become too large */ | ||
454 | |||
455 | ret=1; | ||
456 | |||
457 | if (SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) > 0) | ||
458 | { | ||
459 | while (SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) > | ||
460 | SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx)) | ||
461 | { | ||
462 | if (!remove_session_lock(ctx, | ||
463 | ctx->session_cache_tail, 0)) | ||
464 | break; | ||
465 | else | ||
466 | ctx->stats.sess_cache_full++; | ||
467 | } | ||
468 | } | ||
469 | } | ||
470 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
471 | return(ret); | ||
472 | } | ||
473 | |||
474 | int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c) | ||
475 | { | ||
476 | return remove_session_lock(ctx, c, 1); | ||
477 | } | ||
478 | |||
479 | static int remove_session_lock(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *c, int lck) | ||
480 | { | ||
481 | SSL_SESSION *r; | ||
482 | int ret=0; | ||
483 | |||
484 | if ((c != NULL) && (c->session_id_length != 0)) | ||
485 | { | ||
486 | if(lck) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
487 | if ((r = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ctx->sessions,c)) == c) | ||
488 | { | ||
489 | ret=1; | ||
490 | r=(SSL_SESSION *)lh_delete(ctx->sessions,c); | ||
491 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,c); | ||
492 | } | ||
493 | |||
494 | if(lck) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
495 | |||
496 | if (ret) | ||
497 | { | ||
498 | r->not_resumable=1; | ||
499 | if (ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) | ||
500 | ctx->remove_session_cb(ctx,r); | ||
501 | SSL_SESSION_free(r); | ||
502 | } | ||
503 | } | ||
504 | else | ||
505 | ret=0; | ||
506 | return(ret); | ||
507 | } | ||
508 | |||
509 | void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ss) | ||
510 | { | ||
511 | int i; | ||
512 | |||
513 | if(ss == NULL) | ||
514 | return; | ||
515 | |||
516 | i=CRYPTO_add(&ss->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
517 | #ifdef REF_PRINT | ||
518 | REF_PRINT("SSL_SESSION",ss); | ||
519 | #endif | ||
520 | if (i > 0) return; | ||
521 | #ifdef REF_CHECK | ||
522 | if (i < 0) | ||
523 | { | ||
524 | fprintf(stderr,"SSL_SESSION_free, bad reference count\n"); | ||
525 | abort(); /* ok */ | ||
526 | } | ||
527 | #endif | ||
528 | |||
529 | CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_SESSION, ss, &ss->ex_data); | ||
530 | |||
531 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->key_arg,sizeof ss->key_arg); | ||
532 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->master_key,sizeof ss->master_key); | ||
533 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss->session_id,sizeof ss->session_id); | ||
534 | if (ss->sess_cert != NULL) ssl_sess_cert_free(ss->sess_cert); | ||
535 | if (ss->peer != NULL) X509_free(ss->peer); | ||
536 | if (ss->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ss->ciphers); | ||
537 | OPENSSL_cleanse(ss,sizeof(*ss)); | ||
538 | OPENSSL_free(ss); | ||
539 | } | ||
540 | |||
541 | int SSL_set_session(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *session) | ||
542 | { | ||
543 | int ret=0; | ||
544 | SSL_METHOD *meth; | ||
545 | |||
546 | if (session != NULL) | ||
547 | { | ||
548 | meth=s->ctx->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); | ||
549 | if (meth == NULL) | ||
550 | meth=s->method->get_ssl_method(session->ssl_version); | ||
551 | if (meth == NULL) | ||
552 | { | ||
553 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD); | ||
554 | return(0); | ||
555 | } | ||
556 | |||
557 | if (meth != s->method) | ||
558 | { | ||
559 | if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) | ||
560 | return(0); | ||
561 | if (s->ctx->session_timeout == 0) | ||
562 | session->timeout=SSL_get_default_timeout(s); | ||
563 | else | ||
564 | session->timeout=s->ctx->session_timeout; | ||
565 | } | ||
566 | |||
567 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 | ||
568 | if (s->kssl_ctx && !s->kssl_ctx->client_princ && | ||
569 | session->krb5_client_princ_len > 0) | ||
570 | { | ||
571 | s->kssl_ctx->client_princ = (char *)malloc(session->krb5_client_princ_len + 1); | ||
572 | memcpy(s->kssl_ctx->client_princ,session->krb5_client_princ, | ||
573 | session->krb5_client_princ_len); | ||
574 | s->kssl_ctx->client_princ[session->krb5_client_princ_len] = '\0'; | ||
575 | } | ||
576 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ | ||
577 | |||
578 | /* CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ | ||
579 | CRYPTO_add(&session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); | ||
580 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
581 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
582 | s->session=session; | ||
583 | s->verify_result = s->session->verify_result; | ||
584 | /* CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL);*/ | ||
585 | ret=1; | ||
586 | } | ||
587 | else | ||
588 | { | ||
589 | if (s->session != NULL) | ||
590 | { | ||
591 | SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); | ||
592 | s->session=NULL; | ||
593 | } | ||
594 | |||
595 | meth=s->ctx->method; | ||
596 | if (meth != s->method) | ||
597 | { | ||
598 | if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(s,meth)) | ||
599 | return(0); | ||
600 | } | ||
601 | ret=1; | ||
602 | } | ||
603 | return(ret); | ||
604 | } | ||
605 | |||
606 | long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) | ||
607 | { | ||
608 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
609 | s->timeout=t; | ||
610 | return(1); | ||
611 | } | ||
612 | |||
613 | long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
614 | { | ||
615 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
616 | return(s->timeout); | ||
617 | } | ||
618 | |||
619 | long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
620 | { | ||
621 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
622 | return(s->time); | ||
623 | } | ||
624 | |||
625 | long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t) | ||
626 | { | ||
627 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
628 | s->time=t; | ||
629 | return(t); | ||
630 | } | ||
631 | |||
632 | long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *s, long t) | ||
633 | { | ||
634 | long l; | ||
635 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
636 | l=s->session_timeout; | ||
637 | s->session_timeout=t; | ||
638 | return(l); | ||
639 | } | ||
640 | |||
641 | long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *s) | ||
642 | { | ||
643 | if (s == NULL) return(0); | ||
644 | return(s->session_timeout); | ||
645 | } | ||
646 | |||
647 | typedef struct timeout_param_st | ||
648 | { | ||
649 | SSL_CTX *ctx; | ||
650 | long time; | ||
651 | LHASH *cache; | ||
652 | } TIMEOUT_PARAM; | ||
653 | |||
654 | static void timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, TIMEOUT_PARAM *p) | ||
655 | { | ||
656 | if ((p->time == 0) || (p->time > (s->time+s->timeout))) /* timeout */ | ||
657 | { | ||
658 | /* The reason we don't call SSL_CTX_remove_session() is to | ||
659 | * save on locking overhead */ | ||
660 | lh_delete(p->cache,s); | ||
661 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(p->ctx,s); | ||
662 | s->not_resumable=1; | ||
663 | if (p->ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL) | ||
664 | p->ctx->remove_session_cb(p->ctx,s); | ||
665 | SSL_SESSION_free(s); | ||
666 | } | ||
667 | } | ||
668 | |||
669 | static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout, SSL_SESSION *, TIMEOUT_PARAM *) | ||
670 | |||
671 | void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *s, long t) | ||
672 | { | ||
673 | unsigned long i; | ||
674 | TIMEOUT_PARAM tp; | ||
675 | |||
676 | tp.ctx=s; | ||
677 | tp.cache=s->sessions; | ||
678 | if (tp.cache == NULL) return; | ||
679 | tp.time=t; | ||
680 | CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
681 | i=tp.cache->down_load; | ||
682 | tp.cache->down_load=0; | ||
683 | lh_doall_arg(tp.cache, LHASH_DOALL_ARG_FN(timeout), &tp); | ||
684 | tp.cache->down_load=i; | ||
685 | CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); | ||
686 | } | ||
687 | |||
688 | int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s) | ||
689 | { | ||
690 | if ( (s->session != NULL) && | ||
691 | !(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) && | ||
692 | !(SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))) | ||
693 | { | ||
694 | SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); | ||
695 | return(1); | ||
696 | } | ||
697 | else | ||
698 | return(0); | ||
699 | } | ||
700 | |||
701 | /* locked by SSL_CTX in the calling function */ | ||
702 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_remove(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
703 | { | ||
704 | if ((s->next == NULL) || (s->prev == NULL)) return; | ||
705 | |||
706 | if (s->next == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail)) | ||
707 | { /* last element in list */ | ||
708 | if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) | ||
709 | { /* only one element in list */ | ||
710 | ctx->session_cache_head=NULL; | ||
711 | ctx->session_cache_tail=NULL; | ||
712 | } | ||
713 | else | ||
714 | { | ||
715 | ctx->session_cache_tail=s->prev; | ||
716 | s->prev->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); | ||
717 | } | ||
718 | } | ||
719 | else | ||
720 | { | ||
721 | if (s->prev == (SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head)) | ||
722 | { /* first element in list */ | ||
723 | ctx->session_cache_head=s->next; | ||
724 | s->next->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
725 | } | ||
726 | else | ||
727 | { /* middle of list */ | ||
728 | s->next->prev=s->prev; | ||
729 | s->prev->next=s->next; | ||
730 | } | ||
731 | } | ||
732 | s->prev=s->next=NULL; | ||
733 | } | ||
734 | |||
735 | static void SSL_SESSION_list_add(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *s) | ||
736 | { | ||
737 | if ((s->next != NULL) && (s->prev != NULL)) | ||
738 | SSL_SESSION_list_remove(ctx,s); | ||
739 | |||
740 | if (ctx->session_cache_head == NULL) | ||
741 | { | ||
742 | ctx->session_cache_head=s; | ||
743 | ctx->session_cache_tail=s; | ||
744 | s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
745 | s->next=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_tail); | ||
746 | } | ||
747 | else | ||
748 | { | ||
749 | s->next=ctx->session_cache_head; | ||
750 | s->next->prev=s; | ||
751 | s->prev=(SSL_SESSION *)&(ctx->session_cache_head); | ||
752 | ctx->session_cache_head=s; | ||
753 | } | ||
754 | } | ||
755 | |||