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diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_enc.c
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1/* ssl/t1_enc.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111/* ====================================================================
112 * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
113 *
114 * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
115 * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
116 * license.
117 *
118 * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
119 * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
120 * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
121 *
122 * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
123 * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
124 * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
125 *
126 * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
127 * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
128 * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
129 * to make use of the Contribution.
130 *
131 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
132 * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
133 * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
134 * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
135 * OTHERWISE.
136 */
137
138#include <stdio.h>
139#include "ssl_locl.h"
140#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
141#include <openssl/comp.h>
142#endif
143#include <openssl/evp.h>
144#include <openssl/hmac.h>
145#include <openssl/md5.h>
146#include <openssl/rand.h>
147#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
148#include <openssl/des.h>
149#endif
150
151/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
152static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec,
153 int sec_len,
154 const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
155 const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
156 const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
157 const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
158 const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
159 unsigned char *out, int olen)
160 {
161 int chunk;
162 size_t j;
163 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp;
164 EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
165 unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
166 size_t A1_len;
167 int ret = 0;
168
169 chunk=EVP_MD_size(md);
170 OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
171
172 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
173 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp);
174 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
175 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
176 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
177 if (!mac_key)
178 goto err;
179 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
180 goto err;
181 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
182 goto err;
183 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
184 goto err;
185 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
186 goto err;
187 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
188 goto err;
189 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
190 goto err;
191 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
192 goto err;
193 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
194 goto err;
195
196 for (;;)
197 {
198 /* Reinit mac contexts */
199 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
200 goto err;
201 if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp,NULL,md, NULL, mac_key))
202 goto err;
203 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,A1,A1_len))
204 goto err;
205 if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp,A1,A1_len))
206 goto err;
207 if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed1,seed1_len))
208 goto err;
209 if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed2,seed2_len))
210 goto err;
211 if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed3,seed3_len))
212 goto err;
213 if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed4,seed4_len))
214 goto err;
215 if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx,seed5,seed5_len))
216 goto err;
217
218 if (olen > chunk)
219 {
220 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,out,&j))
221 goto err;
222 out+=j;
223 olen-=j;
224 /* calc the next A1 value */
225 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp,A1,&A1_len))
226 goto err;
227 }
228 else /* last one */
229 {
230 if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx,A1,&A1_len))
231 goto err;
232 memcpy(out,A1,olen);
233 break;
234 }
235 }
236 ret = 1;
237err:
238 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
239 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
240 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp);
241 OPENSSL_cleanse(A1,sizeof(A1));
242 return ret;
243 }
244
245/* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */
246static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask,
247 const void *seed1, int seed1_len,
248 const void *seed2, int seed2_len,
249 const void *seed3, int seed3_len,
250 const void *seed4, int seed4_len,
251 const void *seed5, int seed5_len,
252 const unsigned char *sec, int slen,
253 unsigned char *out1,
254 unsigned char *out2, int olen)
255 {
256 int len,i,idx,count;
257 const unsigned char *S1;
258 long m;
259 const EVP_MD *md;
260 int ret = 0;
261
262 /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */
263 count=0;
264 for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
265 if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) count++;
266 }
267 len=slen/count;
268 if (count == 1)
269 slen = 0;
270 S1=sec;
271 memset(out1,0,olen);
272 for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&m,&md);idx++) {
273 if ((m<<TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) {
274 if (!md) {
275 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF,
276 SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE);
277 goto err;
278 }
279 if (!tls1_P_hash(md ,S1,len+(slen&1),
280 seed1,seed1_len,seed2,seed2_len,seed3,seed3_len,seed4,seed4_len,seed5,seed5_len,
281 out2,olen))
282 goto err;
283 S1+=len;
284 for (i=0; i<olen; i++)
285 {
286 out1[i]^=out2[i];
287 }
288 }
289 }
290 ret = 1;
291err:
292 return ret;
293}
294static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km,
295 unsigned char *tmp, int num)
296 {
297 int ret;
298 ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
299 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE,
300 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
301 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
302 NULL,0,NULL,0,
303 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
304 km,tmp,num);
305#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
306 printf("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t",
307 s->session->master_key_length);
308 {
309 int i;
310 for (i=0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++)
311 {
312 printf("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]);
313 }
314 printf("\n"); }
315#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
316 return ret;
317 }
318
319int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
320 {
321 static const unsigned char empty[]="";
322 unsigned char *p,*mac_secret;
323 unsigned char *exp_label;
324 unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
325 unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH];
326 unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
327 unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH*2];
328 unsigned char *ms,*key,*iv;
329 int client_write;
330 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd;
331 const EVP_CIPHER *c;
332#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
333 const SSL_COMP *comp;
334#endif
335 const EVP_MD *m;
336 int mac_type;
337 int *mac_secret_size;
338 EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx;
339 EVP_PKEY *mac_key;
340 int is_export,n,i,j,k,exp_label_len,cl;
341 int reuse_dd = 0;
342
343 is_export=SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher);
344 c=s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc;
345 m=s->s3->tmp.new_hash;
346 mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type;
347#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
348 comp=s->s3->tmp.new_compression;
349#endif
350
351#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
352 printf("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which);
353 printf("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n",
354 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey,
355 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth,
356 comp);
357 printf("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c);
358 printf("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n",
359 c->nid,c->block_size,c->key_len,c->iv_len);
360 printf("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", s->s3->tmp.key_block_length);
361 {
362 int i;
363 for (i=0; i<s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++)
364 printf("%02x", key_block[i]); printf("\n");
365 }
366#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
367
368 if (which & SSL3_CC_READ)
369 {
370 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
371 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
372 else
373 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM;
374
375 if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL)
376 reuse_dd = 1;
377 else if ((s->enc_read_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
378 goto err;
379 else
380 /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
381 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx);
382 dd= s->enc_read_ctx;
383 mac_ctx=ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash,NULL);
384#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
385 if (s->expand != NULL)
386 {
387 COMP_CTX_free(s->expand);
388 s->expand=NULL;
389 }
390 if (comp != NULL)
391 {
392 s->expand=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
393 if (s->expand == NULL)
394 {
395 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
396 goto err2;
397 }
398 if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
399 s->s3->rrec.comp=(unsigned char *)
400 OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH);
401 if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL)
402 goto err;
403 }
404#endif
405 /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
406 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
407 memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]),0,8);
408 mac_secret= &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]);
409 mac_secret_size=&(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size);
410 }
411 else
412 {
413 if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC)
414 s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
415 else
416 s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM;
417 if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL)
418 reuse_dd = 1;
419 else if ((s->enc_write_ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL)
420 goto err;
421 else
422 /* make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error */
423 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_write_ctx);
424 dd= s->enc_write_ctx;
425 mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash,NULL);
426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
427 if (s->compress != NULL)
428 {
429 COMP_CTX_free(s->compress);
430 s->compress=NULL;
431 }
432 if (comp != NULL)
433 {
434 s->compress=COMP_CTX_new(comp->method);
435 if (s->compress == NULL)
436 {
437 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR);
438 goto err2;
439 }
440 }
441#endif
442 /* this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION */
443 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
444 memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]),0,8);
445 mac_secret= &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]);
446 mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size);
447 }
448
449 if (reuse_dd)
450 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd);
451
452 p=s->s3->tmp.key_block;
453 i=*mac_secret_size=s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size;
454
455 cl=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c);
456 j=is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ?
457 cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl;
458 /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */
459 /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */
460 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
461 k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
462 else
463 k=EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
464 if ( (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) ||
465 (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ))
466 {
467 ms= &(p[ 0]); n=i+i;
468 key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+j;
469 iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k+k;
470 exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
471 exp_label_len=TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
472 client_write=1;
473 }
474 else
475 {
476 n=i;
477 ms= &(p[ n]); n+=i+j;
478 key= &(p[ n]); n+=j+k;
479 iv= &(p[ n]); n+=k;
480 exp_label=(unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST;
481 exp_label_len=TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE;
482 client_write=0;
483 }
484
485 if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length)
486 {
487 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
488 goto err2;
489 }
490
491 memcpy(mac_secret,ms,i);
492
493 if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
494 {
495 mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL,
496 mac_secret,*mac_secret_size);
497 EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx,NULL,m,NULL,mac_key);
498 EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
499 }
500#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
501printf("which = %04X\nmac key=",which);
502{ int z; for (z=0; z<i; z++) printf("%02X%c",ms[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
503#endif
504 if (is_export)
505 {
506 /* In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the
507 * same value since only the correct one will be used :-).
508 */
509 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
510 exp_label,exp_label_len,
511 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
512 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
513 NULL,0,NULL,0,
514 key,j,tmp1,tmp2,EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)))
515 goto err2;
516 key=tmp1;
517
518 if (k > 0)
519 {
520 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
521 TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST,TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE,
522 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
523 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
524 NULL,0,NULL,0,
525 empty,0,iv1,iv2,k*2))
526 goto err2;
527 if (client_write)
528 iv=iv1;
529 else
530 iv= &(iv1[k]);
531 }
532 }
533
534 s->session->key_arg_length=0;
535#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
536 {
537 int i;
538 printf("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n");
539 printf("\tkey= "); for (i=0; i<c->key_len; i++) printf("%02x", key[i]);
540 printf("\n");
541 printf("\t iv= "); for (i=0; i<c->iv_len; i++) printf("%02x", iv[i]);
542 printf("\n");
543 }
544#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
545
546 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE)
547 {
548 EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,NULL,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
549 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv);
550 }
551 else
552 EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,NULL,key,iv,(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE));
553
554 /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */
555 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size)
556 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY,
557 *mac_secret_size,mac_secret);
558
559#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
560printf("which = %04X\nkey=",which);
561{ int z; for (z=0; z<EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) printf("%02X%c",key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
562printf("\niv=");
563{ int z; for (z=0; z<k; z++) printf("%02X%c",iv[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
564printf("\n");
565#endif
566
567 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1,sizeof(tmp1));
568 OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2,sizeof(tmp1));
569 OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1,sizeof(iv1));
570 OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2,sizeof(iv2));
571 return(1);
572err:
573 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
574err2:
575 return(0);
576 }
577
578int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s)
579 {
580 unsigned char *p1,*p2=NULL;
581 const EVP_CIPHER *c;
582 const EVP_MD *hash;
583 int num;
584 SSL_COMP *comp;
585 int mac_type= NID_undef,mac_secret_size=0;
586 int ret=0;
587
588#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
589 printf ("tls1_setup_key_block()\n");
590#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
591
592 if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0)
593 return(1);
594
595 if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size,&comp))
596 {
597 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE);
598 return(0);
599 }
600
601 s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc=c;
602 s->s3->tmp.new_hash=hash;
603 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type;
604 s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size;
605 num=EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c)+mac_secret_size+EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c);
606 num*=2;
607
608 ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s);
609
610 if ((p1=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
611 {
612 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
613 goto err;
614 }
615
616 s->s3->tmp.key_block_length=num;
617 s->s3->tmp.key_block=p1;
618
619 if ((p2=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
620 {
621 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
622 goto err;
623 }
624
625#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
626printf("client random\n");
627{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->client_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
628printf("server random\n");
629{ int z; for (z=0; z<SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->s3->server_random[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
630printf("pre-master\n");
631{ int z; for (z=0; z<s->session->master_key_length; z++) printf("%02X%c",s->session->master_key[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
632#endif
633 if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s,p1,p2,num))
634 goto err;
635#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
636printf("\nkey block\n");
637{ int z; for (z=0; z<num; z++) printf("%02X%c",p1[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); }
638#endif
639
640 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS)
641 && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION)
642 {
643 /* enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with
644 * known-IV problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt)
645 */
646 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1;
647
648 if (s->session->cipher != NULL)
649 {
650 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL)
651 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
652
653#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
654 if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
655 s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0;
656#endif
657 }
658 }
659
660 ret = 1;
661err:
662 if (p2)
663 {
664 OPENSSL_cleanse(p2,num);
665 OPENSSL_free(p2);
666 }
667 return(ret);
668 }
669
670/* tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively.
671 *
672 * Returns:
673 * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too
674 * short etc).
675 * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful.
676 * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending,
677 * an internal error occured.
678 */
679int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send)
680 {
681 SSL3_RECORD *rec;
682 EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds;
683 unsigned long l;
684 int bs,i,j,k,pad=0,ret,mac_size=0;
685 const EVP_CIPHER *enc;
686
687 if (send)
688 {
689 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash))
690 {
691 int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash);
692 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
693 }
694 ds=s->enc_write_ctx;
695 rec= &(s->s3->wrec);
696 if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL)
697 enc=NULL;
698 else
699 {
700 int ivlen;
701 enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx);
702 /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */
703 if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION
704 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
705 ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc);
706 else
707 ivlen = 0;
708 if (ivlen > 1)
709 {
710 if ( rec->data != rec->input)
711 /* we can't write into the input stream:
712 * Can this ever happen?? (steve)
713 */
714 fprintf(stderr,
715 "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n",
716 __FILE__, __LINE__);
717 else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0)
718 return -1;
719 }
720 }
721 }
722 else
723 {
724 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash))
725 {
726 int n=EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
727 OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0);
728 }
729 ds=s->enc_read_ctx;
730 rec= &(s->s3->rrec);
731 if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)
732 enc=NULL;
733 else
734 enc=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx);
735 }
736
737#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
738 printf("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send);
739#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
740
741 if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL))
742 {
743 memmove(rec->data,rec->input,rec->length);
744 rec->input=rec->data;
745 ret = 1;
746 }
747 else
748 {
749 l=rec->length;
750 bs=EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher);
751
752 if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
753 {
754 unsigned char buf[13],*seq;
755
756 seq = send?s->s3->write_sequence:s->s3->read_sequence;
757
758 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
759 {
760 unsigned char dtlsseq[9],*p=dtlsseq;
761
762 s2n(send?s->d1->w_epoch:s->d1->r_epoch,p);
763 memcpy(p,&seq[2],6);
764 memcpy(buf,dtlsseq,8);
765 }
766 else
767 {
768 memcpy(buf,seq,8);
769 for (i=7; i>=0; i--) /* increment */
770 {
771 ++seq[i];
772 if (seq[i] != 0) break;
773 }
774 }
775
776 buf[8]=rec->type;
777 buf[9]=(unsigned char)(s->version>>8);
778 buf[10]=(unsigned char)(s->version);
779 buf[11]=rec->length>>8;
780 buf[12]=rec->length&0xff;
781 pad=EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds,EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,13,buf);
782 if (send)
783 {
784 l+=pad;
785 rec->length+=pad;
786 }
787 }
788 else if ((bs != 1) && send)
789 {
790 i=bs-((int)l%bs);
791
792 /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */
793
794 /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */
795 j=i-1;
796 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG)
797 {
798 if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG)
799 j++;
800 }
801 for (k=(int)l; k<(int)(l+i); k++)
802 rec->input[k]=j;
803 l+=i;
804 rec->length+=i;
805 }
806
807#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
808 {
809 unsigned long ui;
810 printf("EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n",
811 ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
812 printf("\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%d %d], %d iv_len\n",
813 ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len,
814 DES_KEY_SZ, DES_SCHEDULE_SZ,
815 ds->cipher->iv_len);
816 printf("\t\tIV: ");
817 for (i=0; i<ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) printf("%02X", ds->iv[i]);
818 printf("\n");
819 printf("\trec->input=");
820 for (ui=0; ui<l; ui++) printf(" %02x", rec->input[ui]);
821 printf("\n");
822 }
823#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
824
825 if (!send)
826 {
827 if (l == 0 || l%bs != 0)
828 return 0;
829 }
830
831 i = EVP_Cipher(ds,rec->data,rec->input,l);
832 if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER)
833 ?(i<0)
834 :(i==0))
835 return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */
836 if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send)
837 {
838 rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
839 rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
840 rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
841 }
842
843#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
844 {
845 unsigned long i;
846 printf("\trec->data=");
847 for (i=0; i<l; i++)
848 printf(" %02x", rec->data[i]); printf("\n");
849 }
850#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
851
852 ret = 1;
853 if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)
854 mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash);
855 if ((bs != 1) && !send)
856 ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size);
857 if (pad && !send)
858 rec->length -= pad;
859 }
860 return ret;
861 }
862
863int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out)
864 {
865 unsigned int ret;
866 EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d=NULL;
867 int i;
868
869 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
870 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
871 return 0;
872
873 for (i=0;i<SSL_MAX_DIGEST;i++)
874 {
875 if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]&&EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i])==md_nid)
876 {
877 d=s->s3->handshake_dgst[i];
878 break;
879 }
880 }
881 if (!d) {
882 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC,SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST);
883 return 0;
884 }
885
886 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
887 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,d);
888 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,out,&ret);
889 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
890 return((int)ret);
891 }
892
893int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s,
894 const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out)
895 {
896 unsigned int i;
897 EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
898 unsigned char buf[2*EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
899 unsigned char *q,buf2[12];
900 int idx;
901 long mask;
902 int err=0;
903 const EVP_MD *md;
904
905 q=buf;
906
907 if (s->s3->handshake_buffer)
908 if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s))
909 return 0;
910
911 EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
912
913 for (idx=0;ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx,&mask,&md);idx++)
914 {
915 if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s))
916 {
917 int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
918 if (hashsize < 0 || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q-buf)))
919 {
920 /* internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! */
921 err = 1;
922 }
923 else
924 {
925 EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx,s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]);
926 EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx,q,&i);
927 if (i != (unsigned int)hashsize) /* can't really happen */
928 err = 1;
929 q+=i;
930 }
931 }
932 }
933
934 if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
935 str,slen, buf,(int)(q-buf), NULL,0, NULL,0, NULL,0,
936 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
937 out,buf2,sizeof buf2))
938 err = 1;
939 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
940
941 if (err)
942 return 0;
943 else
944 return sizeof buf2;
945 }
946
947int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
948 {
949 SSL3_RECORD *rec;
950 unsigned char *seq;
951 EVP_MD_CTX *hash;
952 size_t md_size, orig_len;
953 int i;
954 EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx;
955 unsigned char header[13];
956 int stream_mac = (send?(ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM):(ssl->mac_flags&SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM));
957 int t;
958
959 if (send)
960 {
961 rec= &(ssl->s3->wrec);
962 seq= &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]);
963 hash=ssl->write_hash;
964 }
965 else
966 {
967 rec= &(ssl->s3->rrec);
968 seq= &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]);
969 hash=ssl->read_hash;
970 }
971
972 t=EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash);
973 OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0);
974 md_size=t;
975
976 /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */
977 if (stream_mac)
978 {
979 mac_ctx = hash;
980 }
981 else
982 {
983 EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac,hash);
984 mac_ctx = &hmac;
985 }
986
987 if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
988 {
989 unsigned char dtlsseq[8],*p=dtlsseq;
990
991 s2n(send?ssl->d1->w_epoch:ssl->d1->r_epoch, p);
992 memcpy (p,&seq[2],6);
993
994 memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8);
995 }
996 else
997 memcpy(header, seq, 8);
998
999 /* kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type */
1000 orig_len = rec->length+md_size+((unsigned int)rec->type>>8);
1001 rec->type &= 0xff;
1002
1003 header[8]=rec->type;
1004 header[9]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version>>8);
1005 header[10]=(unsigned char)(ssl->version);
1006 header[11]=(rec->length)>>8;
1007 header[12]=(rec->length)&0xff;
1008
1009 if (!send &&
1010 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE &&
1011 ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx))
1012 {
1013 /* This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any
1014 * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of
1015 * data we are hashing because that gives an attacker a
1016 * timing-oracle. */
1017 ssl3_cbc_digest_record(
1018 mac_ctx,
1019 md, &md_size,
1020 header, rec->input,
1021 rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
1022 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
1023 ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
1024 0 /* not SSLv3 */);
1025 }
1026 else
1027 {
1028 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,header,sizeof(header));
1029 EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx,rec->input,rec->length);
1030 t=EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx,md,&md_size);
1031 OPENSSL_assert(t > 0);
1032#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
1033 if (!send && FIPS_mode())
1034 tls_fips_digest_extra(
1035 ssl->enc_read_ctx,
1036 mac_ctx, rec->input,
1037 rec->length, orig_len);
1038#endif
1039 }
1040
1041 if (!stream_mac)
1042 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac);
1043#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
1044printf("sec=");
1045{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",mac_sec[z]); printf("\n"); }
1046printf("seq=");
1047{int z; for (z=0; z<8; z++) printf("%02X ",seq[z]); printf("\n"); }
1048printf("buf=");
1049{int z; for (z=0; z<5; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
1050printf("rec=");
1051{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<rec->length; z++) printf("%02X ",buf[z]); printf("\n"); }
1052#endif
1053
1054 if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)
1055 {
1056 for (i=7; i>=0; i--)
1057 {
1058 ++seq[i];
1059 if (seq[i] != 0) break;
1060 }
1061 }
1062
1063#ifdef TLS_DEBUG
1064{unsigned int z; for (z=0; z<md_size; z++) printf("%02X ",md[z]); printf("\n"); }
1065#endif
1066 return(md_size);
1067 }
1068
1069int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p,
1070 int len)
1071 {
1072 unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
1073 const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL;
1074 int col = 0, sol = 0;
1075
1076
1077#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1078 printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s,out, p,len);
1079#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1080
1081#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1082 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1083 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 &&
1084 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1085 {
1086 co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input;
1087 col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
1088 so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input;
1089 sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; /* must be same as col (see draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) */
1090 }
1091#endif
1092
1093 tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s),
1094 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE,
1095 s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1096 co, col,
1097 s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE,
1098 so, sol,
1099 p,len,
1100 s->session->master_key,buff,sizeof buff);
1101#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
1102 fprintf(stderr, "Premaster Secret:\n");
1103 BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len);
1104 fprintf(stderr, "Client Random:\n");
1105 BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1106 fprintf(stderr, "Server Random:\n");
1107 BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1108 fprintf(stderr, "Master Secret:\n");
1109 BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
1110#endif
1111
1112#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1113 printf ("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n");
1114#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1115 return(SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE);
1116 }
1117
1118int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen,
1119 const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context,
1120 size_t contextlen, int use_context)
1121 {
1122 unsigned char *buff;
1123 unsigned char *val = NULL;
1124 size_t vallen, currentvalpos;
1125 int rv;
1126
1127#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1128 printf ("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%d,%s,%d,%p,%d)\n", s, out, olen, label, llen, p, plen);
1129#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1130
1131 buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
1132 if (buff == NULL) goto err2;
1133
1134 /* construct PRF arguments
1135 * we construct the PRF argument ourself rather than passing separate
1136 * values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the concatenation of values
1137 * does not create a prohibited label.
1138 */
1139 vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2;
1140 if (use_context)
1141 {
1142 vallen += 2 + contextlen;
1143 }
1144
1145 val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen);
1146 if (val == NULL) goto err2;
1147 currentvalpos = 0;
1148 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *) label, llen);
1149 currentvalpos += llen;
1150 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1151 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1152 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
1153 currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
1154
1155 if (use_context)
1156 {
1157 val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff;
1158 currentvalpos++;
1159 val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff;
1160 currentvalpos++;
1161 if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL))
1162 {
1163 memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen);
1164 }
1165 }
1166
1167 /* disallow prohibited labels
1168 * note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited label len) =
1169 * 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and the
1170 * comparisons won't have buffer overflow
1171 */
1172 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
1173 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1174 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
1175 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1176 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST,
1177 TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1178 if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST,
1179 TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) goto err1;
1180
1181 rv = tls1_PRF(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2,
1182 val, vallen,
1183 NULL, 0,
1184 NULL, 0,
1185 NULL, 0,
1186 NULL, 0,
1187 s->session->master_key,s->session->master_key_length,
1188 out,buff,olen);
1189
1190#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
1191 printf ("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n");
1192#endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */
1193 goto ret;
1194err1:
1195 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL);
1196 rv = 0;
1197 goto ret;
1198err2:
1199 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1200 rv = 0;
1201ret:
1202 if (buff != NULL) OPENSSL_free(buff);
1203 if (val != NULL) OPENSSL_free(val);
1204 return(rv);
1205 }
1206
1207int tls1_alert_code(int code)
1208 {
1209 switch (code)
1210 {
1211 case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: return(SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY);
1212 case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: return(SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
1213 case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
1214 case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
1215 case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: return(TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW);
1216 case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:return(SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE);
1217 case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: return(SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
1218 case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: return(-1);
1219 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: return(SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE);
1220 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:return(SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE);
1221 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED);
1222 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED);
1223 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:return(SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN);
1224 case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: return(SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
1225 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA);
1226 case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: return(TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED);
1227 case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
1228 case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR);
1229 case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: return(TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION);
1230 case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: return(TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
1231 case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:return(TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY);
1232 case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: return(TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1233 case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: return(TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED);
1234 case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: return(TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION);
1235 case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: return(TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION);
1236 case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: return(TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE);
1237 case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: return(TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME);
1238 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE);
1239 case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: return(TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE);
1240 case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY:return(TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY);
1241#if 0 /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */
1242 case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: return
1243 (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE);
1244#endif
1245 default: return(-1);
1246 }
1247 }
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-25 03:31:26 +0000