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Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c | 1753 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1753 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c b/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c deleted file mode 100644 index 26cbae449e..0000000000 --- a/src/lib/libssl/t1_lib.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,1753 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ | ||
2 | /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) | ||
3 | * All rights reserved. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * This package is an SSL implementation written | ||
6 | * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). | ||
7 | * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as | ||
10 | * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions | ||
11 | * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, | ||
12 | * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation | ||
13 | * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms | ||
14 | * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
15 | * | ||
16 | * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in | ||
17 | * the code are not to be removed. | ||
18 | * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution | ||
19 | * as the author of the parts of the library used. | ||
20 | * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or | ||
21 | * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. | ||
22 | * | ||
23 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
24 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
25 | * are met: | ||
26 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright | ||
27 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
28 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
29 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the | ||
30 | * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. | ||
31 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software | ||
32 | * must display the following acknowledgement: | ||
33 | * "This product includes cryptographic software written by | ||
34 | * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
35 | * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library | ||
36 | * being used are not cryptographic related :-). | ||
37 | * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from | ||
38 | * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: | ||
39 | * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" | ||
40 | * | ||
41 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND | ||
42 | * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
43 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE | ||
44 | * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE | ||
45 | * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL | ||
46 | * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS | ||
47 | * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
48 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT | ||
49 | * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY | ||
50 | * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF | ||
51 | * SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
52 | * | ||
53 | * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or | ||
54 | * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be | ||
55 | * copied and put under another distribution licence | ||
56 | * [including the GNU Public Licence.] | ||
57 | */ | ||
58 | /* ==================================================================== | ||
59 | * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. | ||
60 | * | ||
61 | * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without | ||
62 | * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions | ||
63 | * are met: | ||
64 | * | ||
65 | * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright | ||
66 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. | ||
67 | * | ||
68 | * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright | ||
69 | * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in | ||
70 | * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the | ||
71 | * distribution. | ||
72 | * | ||
73 | * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this | ||
74 | * software must display the following acknowledgment: | ||
75 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
76 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" | ||
77 | * | ||
78 | * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to | ||
79 | * endorse or promote products derived from this software without | ||
80 | * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact | ||
81 | * openssl-core@openssl.org. | ||
82 | * | ||
83 | * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" | ||
84 | * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written | ||
85 | * permission of the OpenSSL Project. | ||
86 | * | ||
87 | * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following | ||
88 | * acknowledgment: | ||
89 | * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project | ||
90 | * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" | ||
91 | * | ||
92 | * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY | ||
93 | * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE | ||
94 | * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR | ||
95 | * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR | ||
96 | * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, | ||
97 | * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT | ||
98 | * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; | ||
99 | * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) | ||
100 | * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, | ||
101 | * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) | ||
102 | * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED | ||
103 | * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. | ||
104 | * ==================================================================== | ||
105 | * | ||
106 | * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young | ||
107 | * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim | ||
108 | * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). | ||
109 | * | ||
110 | */ | ||
111 | |||
112 | #include <stdio.h> | ||
113 | #include <openssl/objects.h> | ||
114 | #include <openssl/evp.h> | ||
115 | #include <openssl/hmac.h> | ||
116 | #include <openssl/ocsp.h> | ||
117 | #include "ssl_locl.h" | ||
118 | |||
119 | const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; | ||
120 | |||
121 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | ||
122 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, | ||
123 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, | ||
124 | SSL_SESSION **psess); | ||
125 | #endif | ||
126 | |||
127 | SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ | ||
128 | tls1_enc, | ||
129 | tls1_mac, | ||
130 | tls1_setup_key_block, | ||
131 | tls1_generate_master_secret, | ||
132 | tls1_change_cipher_state, | ||
133 | tls1_final_finish_mac, | ||
134 | TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, | ||
135 | tls1_cert_verify_mac, | ||
136 | TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | ||
137 | TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, | ||
138 | tls1_alert_code, | ||
139 | }; | ||
140 | |||
141 | long tls1_default_timeout(void) | ||
142 | { | ||
143 | /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec | ||
144 | * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ | ||
145 | return(60*60*2); | ||
146 | } | ||
147 | |||
148 | int tls1_new(SSL *s) | ||
149 | { | ||
150 | if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); | ||
151 | s->method->ssl_clear(s); | ||
152 | return(1); | ||
153 | } | ||
154 | |||
155 | void tls1_free(SSL *s) | ||
156 | { | ||
157 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | ||
158 | if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) | ||
159 | { | ||
160 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); | ||
161 | } | ||
162 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ | ||
163 | ssl3_free(s); | ||
164 | } | ||
165 | |||
166 | void tls1_clear(SSL *s) | ||
167 | { | ||
168 | ssl3_clear(s); | ||
169 | s->version=TLS1_VERSION; | ||
170 | } | ||
171 | |||
172 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
173 | static int nid_list[] = | ||
174 | { | ||
175 | NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ | ||
176 | NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ | ||
177 | NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ | ||
178 | NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ | ||
179 | NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ | ||
180 | NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ | ||
181 | NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ | ||
182 | NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ | ||
183 | NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ | ||
184 | NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ | ||
185 | NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ | ||
186 | NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ | ||
187 | NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ | ||
188 | NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ | ||
189 | NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ | ||
190 | NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ | ||
191 | NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ | ||
192 | NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ | ||
193 | NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ | ||
194 | NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ | ||
195 | NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ | ||
196 | NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ | ||
197 | NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ | ||
198 | NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ | ||
199 | NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ | ||
200 | }; | ||
201 | |||
202 | int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) | ||
203 | { | ||
204 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ | ||
205 | if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > | ||
206 | sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]))) | ||
207 | return 0; | ||
208 | return nid_list[curve_id-1]; | ||
209 | } | ||
210 | |||
211 | int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) | ||
212 | { | ||
213 | /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */ | ||
214 | switch (nid) | ||
215 | { | ||
216 | case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ | ||
217 | return 1; | ||
218 | case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ | ||
219 | return 2; | ||
220 | case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ | ||
221 | return 3; | ||
222 | case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ | ||
223 | return 4; | ||
224 | case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ | ||
225 | return 5; | ||
226 | case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ | ||
227 | return 6; | ||
228 | case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ | ||
229 | return 7; | ||
230 | case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ | ||
231 | return 8; | ||
232 | case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ | ||
233 | return 9; | ||
234 | case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ | ||
235 | return 10; | ||
236 | case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ | ||
237 | return 11; | ||
238 | case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ | ||
239 | return 12; | ||
240 | case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ | ||
241 | return 13; | ||
242 | case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ | ||
243 | return 14; | ||
244 | case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ | ||
245 | return 15; | ||
246 | case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ | ||
247 | return 16; | ||
248 | case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ | ||
249 | return 17; | ||
250 | case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ | ||
251 | return 18; | ||
252 | case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ | ||
253 | return 19; | ||
254 | case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ | ||
255 | return 20; | ||
256 | case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ | ||
257 | return 21; | ||
258 | case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ | ||
259 | return 22; | ||
260 | case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ | ||
261 | return 23; | ||
262 | case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ | ||
263 | return 24; | ||
264 | case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ | ||
265 | return 25; | ||
266 | default: | ||
267 | return 0; | ||
268 | } | ||
269 | } | ||
270 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
271 | |||
272 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT | ||
273 | unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) | ||
274 | { | ||
275 | int extdatalen=0; | ||
276 | unsigned char *ret = p; | ||
277 | |||
278 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ | ||
279 | if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION | ||
280 | && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | ||
281 | return p; | ||
282 | |||
283 | ret+=2; | ||
284 | |||
285 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | ||
286 | |||
287 | if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) | ||
288 | { | ||
289 | /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ | ||
290 | unsigned long size_str; | ||
291 | long lenmax; | ||
292 | |||
293 | /* check for enough space. | ||
294 | 4 for the servername type and entension length | ||
295 | 2 for servernamelist length | ||
296 | 1 for the hostname type | ||
297 | 2 for hostname length | ||
298 | + hostname length | ||
299 | */ | ||
300 | |||
301 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 | ||
302 | || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) | ||
303 | return NULL; | ||
304 | |||
305 | /* extension type and length */ | ||
306 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); | ||
307 | s2n(size_str+5,ret); | ||
308 | |||
309 | /* length of servername list */ | ||
310 | s2n(size_str+3,ret); | ||
311 | |||
312 | /* hostname type, length and hostname */ | ||
313 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; | ||
314 | s2n(size_str,ret); | ||
315 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); | ||
316 | ret+=size_str; | ||
317 | } | ||
318 | |||
319 | /* Add RI if renegotiating */ | ||
320 | if (s->new_session) | ||
321 | { | ||
322 | int el; | ||
323 | |||
324 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) | ||
325 | { | ||
326 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
327 | return NULL; | ||
328 | } | ||
329 | |||
330 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; | ||
331 | |||
332 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); | ||
333 | s2n(el,ret); | ||
334 | |||
335 | if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) | ||
336 | { | ||
337 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
338 | return NULL; | ||
339 | } | ||
340 | |||
341 | ret += el; | ||
342 | } | ||
343 | |||
344 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
345 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && | ||
346 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
347 | { | ||
348 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ | ||
349 | long lenmax; | ||
350 | |||
351 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; | ||
352 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; | ||
353 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) | ||
354 | { | ||
355 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
356 | return NULL; | ||
357 | } | ||
358 | |||
359 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); | ||
360 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); | ||
361 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
362 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
363 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
364 | } | ||
365 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL && | ||
366 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
367 | { | ||
368 | /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */ | ||
369 | long lenmax; | ||
370 | |||
371 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL; | ||
372 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; | ||
373 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) | ||
374 | { | ||
375 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
376 | return NULL; | ||
377 | } | ||
378 | |||
379 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret); | ||
380 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); | ||
381 | |||
382 | /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for | ||
383 | * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes. | ||
384 | * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html | ||
385 | * resolves this to two bytes. | ||
386 | */ | ||
387 | s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); | ||
388 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
389 | ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; | ||
390 | } | ||
391 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
392 | |||
393 | if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) | ||
394 | { | ||
395 | int ticklen; | ||
396 | if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) | ||
397 | ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; | ||
398 | else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | ||
399 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) | ||
400 | { | ||
401 | ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; | ||
402 | s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); | ||
403 | if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) | ||
404 | return NULL; | ||
405 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, | ||
406 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, | ||
407 | ticklen); | ||
408 | s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; | ||
409 | } | ||
410 | else | ||
411 | ticklen = 0; | ||
412 | if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && | ||
413 | s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) | ||
414 | goto skip_ext; | ||
415 | /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len | ||
416 | * rest for ticket | ||
417 | */ | ||
418 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL; | ||
419 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); | ||
420 | s2n(ticklen,ret); | ||
421 | if (ticklen) | ||
422 | { | ||
423 | memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); | ||
424 | ret += ticklen; | ||
425 | } | ||
426 | } | ||
427 | skip_ext: | ||
428 | |||
429 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
430 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && | ||
431 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
432 | { | ||
433 | size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; | ||
434 | |||
435 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) | ||
436 | return NULL; | ||
437 | if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ | ||
438 | return NULL; | ||
439 | |||
440 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); | ||
441 | s2n(col + 2, ret); | ||
442 | s2n(col, ret); | ||
443 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); | ||
444 | ret += col; | ||
445 | } | ||
446 | #endif | ||
447 | |||
448 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && | ||
449 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
450 | { | ||
451 | int i; | ||
452 | long extlen, idlen, itmp; | ||
453 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | ||
454 | |||
455 | idlen = 0; | ||
456 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) | ||
457 | { | ||
458 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | ||
459 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); | ||
460 | if (itmp <= 0) | ||
461 | return NULL; | ||
462 | idlen += itmp + 2; | ||
463 | } | ||
464 | |||
465 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) | ||
466 | { | ||
467 | extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); | ||
468 | if (extlen < 0) | ||
469 | return NULL; | ||
470 | } | ||
471 | else | ||
472 | extlen = 0; | ||
473 | |||
474 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; | ||
475 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); | ||
476 | if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) | ||
477 | return NULL; | ||
478 | s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); | ||
479 | *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; | ||
480 | s2n(idlen, ret); | ||
481 | for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) | ||
482 | { | ||
483 | /* save position of id len */ | ||
484 | unsigned char *q = ret; | ||
485 | id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); | ||
486 | /* skip over id len */ | ||
487 | ret += 2; | ||
488 | itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); | ||
489 | /* write id len */ | ||
490 | s2n(itmp, q); | ||
491 | } | ||
492 | s2n(extlen, ret); | ||
493 | if (extlen > 0) | ||
494 | i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); | ||
495 | } | ||
496 | |||
497 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) | ||
498 | return p; | ||
499 | |||
500 | s2n(extdatalen,p); | ||
501 | return ret; | ||
502 | } | ||
503 | |||
504 | unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) | ||
505 | { | ||
506 | int extdatalen=0; | ||
507 | unsigned char *ret = p; | ||
508 | |||
509 | /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ | ||
510 | if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) | ||
511 | return p; | ||
512 | |||
513 | ret+=2; | ||
514 | if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ | ||
515 | |||
516 | if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) | ||
517 | { | ||
518 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; | ||
519 | |||
520 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); | ||
521 | s2n(0,ret); | ||
522 | } | ||
523 | |||
524 | if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) | ||
525 | { | ||
526 | int el; | ||
527 | |||
528 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) | ||
529 | { | ||
530 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
531 | return NULL; | ||
532 | } | ||
533 | |||
534 | if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; | ||
535 | |||
536 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); | ||
537 | s2n(el,ret); | ||
538 | |||
539 | if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) | ||
540 | { | ||
541 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
542 | return NULL; | ||
543 | } | ||
544 | |||
545 | ret += el; | ||
546 | } | ||
547 | |||
548 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
549 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL && | ||
550 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
551 | { | ||
552 | /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */ | ||
553 | long lenmax; | ||
554 | |||
555 | if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL; | ||
556 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL; | ||
557 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) | ||
558 | { | ||
559 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); | ||
560 | return NULL; | ||
561 | } | ||
562 | |||
563 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret); | ||
564 | s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret); | ||
565 | *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
566 | memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
567 | ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
568 | |||
569 | } | ||
570 | /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */ | ||
571 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
572 | |||
573 | if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected | ||
574 | && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) | ||
575 | { | ||
576 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; | ||
577 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); | ||
578 | s2n(0,ret); | ||
579 | } | ||
580 | |||
581 | if (s->tlsext_status_expected) | ||
582 | { | ||
583 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; | ||
584 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); | ||
585 | s2n(0,ret); | ||
586 | } | ||
587 | |||
588 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
589 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && | ||
590 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
591 | { | ||
592 | size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; | ||
593 | |||
594 | if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) | ||
595 | return NULL; | ||
596 | if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ | ||
597 | return NULL; | ||
598 | |||
599 | s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); | ||
600 | s2n(sol + 2, ret); | ||
601 | s2n(sol, ret); | ||
602 | memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); | ||
603 | ret += sol; | ||
604 | } | ||
605 | #endif | ||
606 | if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81) | ||
607 | && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) | ||
608 | { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { | ||
609 | 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/ | ||
610 | 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/ | ||
611 | 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, | ||
612 | 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, | ||
613 | 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, | ||
614 | 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17}; | ||
615 | if (limit-ret<36) return NULL; | ||
616 | memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36); | ||
617 | ret+=36; | ||
618 | |||
619 | } | ||
620 | |||
621 | if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) | ||
622 | return p; | ||
623 | |||
624 | s2n(extdatalen,p); | ||
625 | return ret; | ||
626 | } | ||
627 | |||
628 | int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) | ||
629 | { | ||
630 | unsigned short type; | ||
631 | unsigned short size; | ||
632 | unsigned short len; | ||
633 | unsigned char *data = *p; | ||
634 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | ||
635 | |||
636 | s->servername_done = 0; | ||
637 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | ||
638 | |||
639 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) | ||
640 | goto ri_check; | ||
641 | n2s(data,len); | ||
642 | |||
643 | if (data > (d+n-len)) | ||
644 | goto ri_check; | ||
645 | |||
646 | while (data <= (d+n-4)) | ||
647 | { | ||
648 | n2s(data,type); | ||
649 | n2s(data,size); | ||
650 | |||
651 | if (data+size > (d+n)) | ||
652 | goto ri_check; | ||
653 | #if 0 | ||
654 | fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size); | ||
655 | #endif | ||
656 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | ||
657 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, | ||
658 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); | ||
659 | /* The servername extension is treated as follows: | ||
660 | |||
661 | - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. | ||
662 | - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, | ||
663 | in which case an fatal alert is generated. | ||
664 | - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. | ||
665 | - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order | ||
666 | to allow the application to position itself to the right context. | ||
667 | - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when | ||
668 | it is identical to a previously used for the same session. | ||
669 | Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time | ||
670 | set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the | ||
671 | case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and | ||
672 | a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername | ||
673 | presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches | ||
674 | the value of the Host: field. | ||
675 | - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION | ||
676 | if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, | ||
677 | i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. | ||
678 | - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. | ||
679 | |||
680 | */ | ||
681 | |||
682 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | ||
683 | { | ||
684 | unsigned char *sdata; | ||
685 | int servname_type; | ||
686 | int dsize; | ||
687 | |||
688 | if (size < 2) | ||
689 | { | ||
690 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
691 | return 0; | ||
692 | } | ||
693 | n2s(data,dsize); | ||
694 | size -= 2; | ||
695 | if (dsize > size ) | ||
696 | { | ||
697 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
698 | return 0; | ||
699 | } | ||
700 | |||
701 | sdata = data; | ||
702 | while (dsize > 3) | ||
703 | { | ||
704 | servname_type = *(sdata++); | ||
705 | n2s(sdata,len); | ||
706 | dsize -= 3; | ||
707 | |||
708 | if (len > dsize) | ||
709 | { | ||
710 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
711 | return 0; | ||
712 | } | ||
713 | if (s->servername_done == 0) | ||
714 | switch (servname_type) | ||
715 | { | ||
716 | case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: | ||
717 | if (!s->hit) | ||
718 | { | ||
719 | if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) | ||
720 | { | ||
721 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
722 | return 0; | ||
723 | } | ||
724 | if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) | ||
725 | { | ||
726 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
727 | return 0; | ||
728 | } | ||
729 | if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) | ||
730 | { | ||
731 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
732 | return 0; | ||
733 | } | ||
734 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); | ||
735 | s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; | ||
736 | if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { | ||
737 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); | ||
738 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; | ||
739 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
740 | return 0; | ||
741 | } | ||
742 | s->servername_done = 1; | ||
743 | |||
744 | } | ||
745 | else | ||
746 | s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname | ||
747 | && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len | ||
748 | && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; | ||
749 | |||
750 | break; | ||
751 | |||
752 | default: | ||
753 | break; | ||
754 | } | ||
755 | |||
756 | dsize -= len; | ||
757 | } | ||
758 | if (dsize != 0) | ||
759 | { | ||
760 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
761 | return 0; | ||
762 | } | ||
763 | |||
764 | } | ||
765 | |||
766 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
767 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && | ||
768 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
769 | { | ||
770 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | ||
771 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); | ||
772 | |||
773 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) | ||
774 | { | ||
775 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
776 | return 0; | ||
777 | } | ||
778 | if (!s->hit) | ||
779 | { | ||
780 | if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) | ||
781 | { | ||
782 | OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | ||
783 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; | ||
784 | } | ||
785 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | ||
786 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) | ||
787 | { | ||
788 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
789 | return 0; | ||
790 | } | ||
791 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
792 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
793 | } | ||
794 | #if 0 | ||
795 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
796 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | ||
797 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) | ||
798 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); | ||
799 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); | ||
800 | #endif | ||
801 | } | ||
802 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves && | ||
803 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
804 | { | ||
805 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | ||
806 | int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); | ||
807 | ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); | ||
808 | |||
809 | if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2) | ||
810 | { | ||
811 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
812 | return 0; | ||
813 | } | ||
814 | if (!s->hit) | ||
815 | { | ||
816 | if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) | ||
817 | { | ||
818 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
819 | return 0; | ||
820 | } | ||
821 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | ||
822 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) | ||
823 | { | ||
824 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
825 | return 0; | ||
826 | } | ||
827 | s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length; | ||
828 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
829 | } | ||
830 | #if 0 | ||
831 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); | ||
832 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; | ||
833 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) | ||
834 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); | ||
835 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); | ||
836 | #endif | ||
837 | } | ||
838 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
839 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
840 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && | ||
841 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
842 | { | ||
843 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | ||
844 | |||
845 | if (size < 2) | ||
846 | { | ||
847 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
848 | return 0; | ||
849 | } | ||
850 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
851 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) | ||
852 | { | ||
853 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
854 | return 0; | ||
855 | } | ||
856 | |||
857 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ | ||
858 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); | ||
859 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) | ||
860 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | ||
861 | else | ||
862 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
863 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
864 | { | ||
865 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
866 | return 0; | ||
867 | } | ||
868 | } | ||
869 | #endif | ||
870 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | ||
871 | { | ||
872 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | ||
873 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) | ||
874 | { | ||
875 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
876 | return 0; | ||
877 | } | ||
878 | } | ||
879 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | ||
880 | { | ||
881 | if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | ||
882 | return 0; | ||
883 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | ||
884 | } | ||
885 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && | ||
886 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) | ||
887 | { | ||
888 | |||
889 | if (size < 5) | ||
890 | { | ||
891 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
892 | return 0; | ||
893 | } | ||
894 | |||
895 | s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; | ||
896 | size--; | ||
897 | if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) | ||
898 | { | ||
899 | const unsigned char *sdata; | ||
900 | int dsize; | ||
901 | /* Read in responder_id_list */ | ||
902 | n2s(data,dsize); | ||
903 | size -= 2; | ||
904 | if (dsize > size ) | ||
905 | { | ||
906 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
907 | return 0; | ||
908 | } | ||
909 | while (dsize > 0) | ||
910 | { | ||
911 | OCSP_RESPID *id; | ||
912 | int idsize; | ||
913 | if (dsize < 4) | ||
914 | { | ||
915 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
916 | return 0; | ||
917 | } | ||
918 | n2s(data, idsize); | ||
919 | dsize -= 2 + idsize; | ||
920 | size -= 2 + idsize; | ||
921 | if (dsize < 0) | ||
922 | { | ||
923 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
924 | return 0; | ||
925 | } | ||
926 | sdata = data; | ||
927 | data += idsize; | ||
928 | id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, | ||
929 | &sdata, idsize); | ||
930 | if (!id) | ||
931 | { | ||
932 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
933 | return 0; | ||
934 | } | ||
935 | if (data != sdata) | ||
936 | { | ||
937 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | ||
938 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
939 | return 0; | ||
940 | } | ||
941 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids | ||
942 | && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = | ||
943 | sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) | ||
944 | { | ||
945 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | ||
946 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
947 | return 0; | ||
948 | } | ||
949 | if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( | ||
950 | s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) | ||
951 | { | ||
952 | OCSP_RESPID_free(id); | ||
953 | *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
954 | return 0; | ||
955 | } | ||
956 | } | ||
957 | |||
958 | /* Read in request_extensions */ | ||
959 | if (size < 2) | ||
960 | { | ||
961 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
962 | return 0; | ||
963 | } | ||
964 | n2s(data,dsize); | ||
965 | size -= 2; | ||
966 | if (dsize != size) | ||
967 | { | ||
968 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
969 | return 0; | ||
970 | } | ||
971 | sdata = data; | ||
972 | if (dsize > 0) | ||
973 | { | ||
974 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) | ||
975 | { | ||
976 | sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, | ||
977 | X509_EXTENSION_free); | ||
978 | } | ||
979 | |||
980 | s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = | ||
981 | d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, | ||
982 | &sdata, dsize); | ||
983 | if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts | ||
984 | || (data + dsize != sdata)) | ||
985 | { | ||
986 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
987 | return 0; | ||
988 | } | ||
989 | } | ||
990 | } | ||
991 | /* We don't know what to do with any other type | ||
992 | * so ignore it. | ||
993 | */ | ||
994 | else | ||
995 | s->tlsext_status_type = -1; | ||
996 | } | ||
997 | |||
998 | /* session ticket processed earlier */ | ||
999 | data+=size; | ||
1000 | } | ||
1001 | |||
1002 | *p = data; | ||
1003 | |||
1004 | ri_check: | ||
1005 | |||
1006 | /* Need RI if renegotiating */ | ||
1007 | |||
1008 | if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && | ||
1009 | !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) | ||
1010 | { | ||
1011 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | ||
1012 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, | ||
1013 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | ||
1014 | return 0; | ||
1015 | } | ||
1016 | |||
1017 | return 1; | ||
1018 | } | ||
1019 | |||
1020 | int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) | ||
1021 | { | ||
1022 | unsigned short length; | ||
1023 | unsigned short type; | ||
1024 | unsigned short size; | ||
1025 | unsigned char *data = *p; | ||
1026 | int tlsext_servername = 0; | ||
1027 | int renegotiate_seen = 0; | ||
1028 | |||
1029 | if (data >= (d+n-2)) | ||
1030 | goto ri_check; | ||
1031 | |||
1032 | n2s(data,length); | ||
1033 | if (data+length != d+n) | ||
1034 | { | ||
1035 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1036 | return 0; | ||
1037 | } | ||
1038 | |||
1039 | while(data <= (d+n-4)) | ||
1040 | { | ||
1041 | n2s(data,type); | ||
1042 | n2s(data,size); | ||
1043 | |||
1044 | if (data+size > (d+n)) | ||
1045 | goto ri_check; | ||
1046 | |||
1047 | if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) | ||
1048 | s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, | ||
1049 | s->tlsext_debug_arg); | ||
1050 | |||
1051 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) | ||
1052 | { | ||
1053 | if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) | ||
1054 | { | ||
1055 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
1056 | return 0; | ||
1057 | } | ||
1058 | tlsext_servername = 1; | ||
1059 | } | ||
1060 | |||
1061 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
1062 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats && | ||
1063 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
1064 | { | ||
1065 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | ||
1066 | int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); | ||
1067 | |||
1068 | if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) | ||
1069 | { | ||
1070 | *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1071 | return 0; | ||
1072 | } | ||
1073 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; | ||
1074 | if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | ||
1075 | if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) | ||
1076 | { | ||
1077 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1078 | return 0; | ||
1079 | } | ||
1080 | s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length; | ||
1081 | memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length); | ||
1082 | #if 0 | ||
1083 | fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); | ||
1084 | sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | ||
1085 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) | ||
1086 | fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++)); | ||
1087 | fprintf(stderr,"\n"); | ||
1088 | #endif | ||
1089 | } | ||
1090 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
1091 | |||
1092 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | ||
1093 | { | ||
1094 | if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && | ||
1095 | !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) | ||
1096 | { | ||
1097 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1098 | return 0; | ||
1099 | } | ||
1100 | if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | ||
1101 | || (size > 0)) | ||
1102 | { | ||
1103 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | ||
1104 | return 0; | ||
1105 | } | ||
1106 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | ||
1107 | } | ||
1108 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
1109 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && | ||
1110 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
1111 | { | ||
1112 | unsigned char *sdata = data; | ||
1113 | |||
1114 | if (size < 2) | ||
1115 | { | ||
1116 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1117 | return 0; | ||
1118 | } | ||
1119 | n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
1120 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) | ||
1121 | { | ||
1122 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1123 | return 0; | ||
1124 | } | ||
1125 | |||
1126 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ | ||
1127 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); | ||
1128 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) | ||
1129 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | ||
1130 | else | ||
1131 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
1132 | |||
1133 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
1134 | { | ||
1135 | *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1136 | return 0; | ||
1137 | } | ||
1138 | } | ||
1139 | #endif | ||
1140 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && | ||
1141 | s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) | ||
1142 | { | ||
1143 | /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested | ||
1144 | * a status request message. | ||
1145 | */ | ||
1146 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) | ||
1147 | { | ||
1148 | *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; | ||
1149 | return 0; | ||
1150 | } | ||
1151 | /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ | ||
1152 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | ||
1153 | } | ||
1154 | else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) | ||
1155 | { | ||
1156 | if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) | ||
1157 | return 0; | ||
1158 | renegotiate_seen = 1; | ||
1159 | } | ||
1160 | data+=size; | ||
1161 | } | ||
1162 | |||
1163 | if (data != d+n) | ||
1164 | { | ||
1165 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1166 | return 0; | ||
1167 | } | ||
1168 | |||
1169 | if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) | ||
1170 | { | ||
1171 | if (s->tlsext_hostname) | ||
1172 | { | ||
1173 | if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) | ||
1174 | { | ||
1175 | s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); | ||
1176 | if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) | ||
1177 | { | ||
1178 | *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
1179 | return 0; | ||
1180 | } | ||
1181 | } | ||
1182 | else | ||
1183 | { | ||
1184 | *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; | ||
1185 | return 0; | ||
1186 | } | ||
1187 | } | ||
1188 | } | ||
1189 | |||
1190 | *p = data; | ||
1191 | |||
1192 | ri_check: | ||
1193 | |||
1194 | /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to | ||
1195 | * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server | ||
1196 | * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an | ||
1197 | * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server | ||
1198 | * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI | ||
1199 | * absence on initial connect only. | ||
1200 | */ | ||
1201 | if (!renegotiate_seen | ||
1202 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) | ||
1203 | && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) | ||
1204 | { | ||
1205 | *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | ||
1206 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, | ||
1207 | SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); | ||
1208 | return 0; | ||
1209 | } | ||
1210 | |||
1211 | return 1; | ||
1212 | } | ||
1213 | |||
1214 | |||
1215 | int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) | ||
1216 | { | ||
1217 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
1218 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats | ||
1219 | * and elliptic curves we support. | ||
1220 | */ | ||
1221 | int using_ecc = 0; | ||
1222 | int i; | ||
1223 | unsigned char *j; | ||
1224 | unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; | ||
1225 | STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); | ||
1226 | |||
1227 | for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) | ||
1228 | { | ||
1229 | SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); | ||
1230 | |||
1231 | alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; | ||
1232 | alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; | ||
1233 | if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) | ||
1234 | { | ||
1235 | using_ecc = 1; | ||
1236 | break; | ||
1237 | } | ||
1238 | } | ||
1239 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version == TLS1_VERSION); | ||
1240 | if (using_ecc) | ||
1241 | { | ||
1242 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | ||
1243 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) | ||
1244 | { | ||
1245 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1246 | return -1; | ||
1247 | } | ||
1248 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; | ||
1249 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | ||
1250 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | ||
1251 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | ||
1252 | |||
1253 | /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */ | ||
1254 | if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); | ||
1255 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]) * 2; | ||
1256 | if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) | ||
1257 | { | ||
1258 | s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; | ||
1259 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1260 | return -1; | ||
1261 | } | ||
1262 | for (i = 1, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <= | ||
1263 | sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0]); i++) | ||
1264 | s2n(i,j); | ||
1265 | } | ||
1266 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
1267 | |||
1268 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
1269 | { | ||
1270 | int r = 1; | ||
1271 | |||
1272 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) | ||
1273 | { | ||
1274 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); | ||
1275 | if (!r) | ||
1276 | return -1; | ||
1277 | } | ||
1278 | |||
1279 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) | ||
1280 | { | ||
1281 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ | ||
1282 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); | ||
1283 | |||
1284 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) | ||
1285 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | ||
1286 | else | ||
1287 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
1288 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
1289 | { | ||
1290 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1291 | return -1; | ||
1292 | } | ||
1293 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | ||
1294 | } | ||
1295 | |||
1296 | if (r == 2) | ||
1297 | /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */ | ||
1298 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | ||
1299 | } | ||
1300 | #endif | ||
1301 | |||
1302 | return 1; | ||
1303 | } | ||
1304 | |||
1305 | int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) | ||
1306 | { | ||
1307 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
1308 | /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support | ||
1309 | * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not | ||
1310 | * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. | ||
1311 | */ | ||
1312 | |||
1313 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | ||
1314 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | ||
1315 | int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); | ||
1316 | using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); | ||
1317 | |||
1318 | if (using_ecc) | ||
1319 | { | ||
1320 | if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); | ||
1321 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) | ||
1322 | { | ||
1323 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); | ||
1324 | return -1; | ||
1325 | } | ||
1326 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; | ||
1327 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; | ||
1328 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; | ||
1329 | s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; | ||
1330 | } | ||
1331 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
1332 | |||
1333 | return 1; | ||
1334 | } | ||
1335 | |||
1336 | int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) | ||
1337 | { | ||
1338 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | ||
1339 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
1340 | |||
1341 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
1342 | /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in | ||
1343 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | ||
1344 | */ | ||
1345 | /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in | ||
1346 | * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. | ||
1347 | */ | ||
1348 | #endif | ||
1349 | |||
1350 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | ||
1351 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | ||
1352 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | ||
1353 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | ||
1354 | |||
1355 | /* If status request then ask callback what to do. | ||
1356 | * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case | ||
1357 | * the certificate has changed. | ||
1358 | */ | ||
1359 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) | ||
1360 | { | ||
1361 | int r; | ||
1362 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | ||
1363 | switch (r) | ||
1364 | { | ||
1365 | /* We don't want to send a status request response */ | ||
1366 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | ||
1367 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | ||
1368 | break; | ||
1369 | /* status request response should be sent */ | ||
1370 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: | ||
1371 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) | ||
1372 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; | ||
1373 | else | ||
1374 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | ||
1375 | break; | ||
1376 | /* something bad happened */ | ||
1377 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | ||
1378 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1379 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1380 | goto err; | ||
1381 | } | ||
1382 | } | ||
1383 | else | ||
1384 | s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; | ||
1385 | |||
1386 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
1387 | { | ||
1388 | /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), | ||
1389 | * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, | ||
1390 | * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */ | ||
1391 | |||
1392 | int r = 1; | ||
1393 | |||
1394 | if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) | ||
1395 | { | ||
1396 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); | ||
1397 | if (!r) | ||
1398 | { | ||
1399 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1400 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1401 | goto err; | ||
1402 | } | ||
1403 | } | ||
1404 | |||
1405 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */ | ||
1406 | OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); | ||
1407 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; | ||
1408 | |||
1409 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) | ||
1410 | { | ||
1411 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && | ||
1412 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) | ||
1413 | { | ||
1414 | /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input | ||
1415 | * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */ | ||
1416 | |||
1417 | if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) | ||
1418 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ | ||
1419 | else | ||
1420 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); | ||
1421 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
1422 | { | ||
1423 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1424 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1425 | goto err; | ||
1426 | } | ||
1427 | s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; | ||
1428 | } | ||
1429 | } | ||
1430 | |||
1431 | if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
1432 | { | ||
1433 | /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, | ||
1434 | * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; | ||
1435 | * abort the handshake. | ||
1436 | */ | ||
1437 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1438 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | ||
1439 | } | ||
1440 | } | ||
1441 | |||
1442 | #endif | ||
1443 | err: | ||
1444 | switch (ret) | ||
1445 | { | ||
1446 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | ||
1447 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | ||
1448 | return -1; | ||
1449 | |||
1450 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | ||
1451 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); | ||
1452 | return 1; | ||
1453 | |||
1454 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | ||
1455 | s->servername_done=0; | ||
1456 | default: | ||
1457 | return 1; | ||
1458 | } | ||
1459 | } | ||
1460 | |||
1461 | int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) | ||
1462 | { | ||
1463 | int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; | ||
1464 | int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; | ||
1465 | |||
1466 | #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC | ||
1467 | /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher | ||
1468 | * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension | ||
1469 | * it must contain uncompressed. | ||
1470 | */ | ||
1471 | unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; | ||
1472 | unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; | ||
1473 | if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && | ||
1474 | (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) && | ||
1475 | ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) | ||
1476 | { | ||
1477 | /* we are using an ECC cipher */ | ||
1478 | size_t i; | ||
1479 | unsigned char *list; | ||
1480 | int found_uncompressed = 0; | ||
1481 | list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; | ||
1482 | for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) | ||
1483 | { | ||
1484 | if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) | ||
1485 | { | ||
1486 | found_uncompressed = 1; | ||
1487 | break; | ||
1488 | } | ||
1489 | } | ||
1490 | if (!found_uncompressed) | ||
1491 | { | ||
1492 | SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); | ||
1493 | return -1; | ||
1494 | } | ||
1495 | } | ||
1496 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; | ||
1497 | #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ | ||
1498 | |||
1499 | if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | ||
1500 | ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | ||
1501 | else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) | ||
1502 | ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); | ||
1503 | |||
1504 | #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input | ||
1505 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) | ||
1506 | { | ||
1507 | /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs. | ||
1508 | * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */ | ||
1509 | |||
1510 | if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) | ||
1511 | { | ||
1512 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1513 | al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; | ||
1514 | } | ||
1515 | |||
1516 | /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check | ||
1517 | * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */ | ||
1518 | if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || | ||
1519 | s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) | ||
1520 | { | ||
1521 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1522 | al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; | ||
1523 | } | ||
1524 | } | ||
1525 | #endif | ||
1526 | |||
1527 | /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one | ||
1528 | * tell the callback | ||
1529 | */ | ||
1530 | if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) | ||
1531 | && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) | ||
1532 | { | ||
1533 | int r; | ||
1534 | /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows | ||
1535 | * there is no response. | ||
1536 | */ | ||
1537 | if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) | ||
1538 | { | ||
1539 | OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); | ||
1540 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; | ||
1541 | } | ||
1542 | s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; | ||
1543 | r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); | ||
1544 | if (r == 0) | ||
1545 | { | ||
1546 | al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; | ||
1547 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1548 | } | ||
1549 | if (r < 0) | ||
1550 | { | ||
1551 | al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; | ||
1552 | ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; | ||
1553 | } | ||
1554 | } | ||
1555 | |||
1556 | switch (ret) | ||
1557 | { | ||
1558 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: | ||
1559 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); | ||
1560 | return -1; | ||
1561 | |||
1562 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: | ||
1563 | ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); | ||
1564 | return 1; | ||
1565 | |||
1566 | case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: | ||
1567 | s->servername_done=0; | ||
1568 | default: | ||
1569 | return 1; | ||
1570 | } | ||
1571 | } | ||
1572 | |||
1573 | /* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client | ||
1574 | * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS | ||
1575 | * session ticket extension at the same time. | ||
1576 | */ | ||
1577 | |||
1578 | int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, | ||
1579 | const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) | ||
1580 | { | ||
1581 | /* Point after session ID in client hello */ | ||
1582 | const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; | ||
1583 | unsigned short i; | ||
1584 | |||
1585 | /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present | ||
1586 | * to permit stateful resumption. | ||
1587 | */ | ||
1588 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | ||
1589 | return 1; | ||
1590 | |||
1591 | if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) | ||
1592 | return 1; | ||
1593 | if (p >= limit) | ||
1594 | return -1; | ||
1595 | /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ | ||
1596 | if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) | ||
1597 | { | ||
1598 | i = *(p++); | ||
1599 | p+= i; | ||
1600 | if (p >= limit) | ||
1601 | return -1; | ||
1602 | } | ||
1603 | /* Skip past cipher list */ | ||
1604 | n2s(p, i); | ||
1605 | p+= i; | ||
1606 | if (p >= limit) | ||
1607 | return -1; | ||
1608 | /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ | ||
1609 | i = *(p++); | ||
1610 | p += i; | ||
1611 | if (p > limit) | ||
1612 | return -1; | ||
1613 | /* Now at start of extensions */ | ||
1614 | if ((p + 2) >= limit) | ||
1615 | return 1; | ||
1616 | n2s(p, i); | ||
1617 | while ((p + 4) <= limit) | ||
1618 | { | ||
1619 | unsigned short type, size; | ||
1620 | n2s(p, type); | ||
1621 | n2s(p, size); | ||
1622 | if (p + size > limit) | ||
1623 | return 1; | ||
1624 | if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) | ||
1625 | { | ||
1626 | /* If tickets disabled indicate cache miss which will | ||
1627 | * trigger a full handshake | ||
1628 | */ | ||
1629 | if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) | ||
1630 | return 1; | ||
1631 | /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket | ||
1632 | * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake | ||
1633 | */ | ||
1634 | if (size == 0) | ||
1635 | { | ||
1636 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | ||
1637 | return 0; /* Cache miss */ | ||
1638 | } | ||
1639 | if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) | ||
1640 | { | ||
1641 | /* Indicate cache miss here and instead of | ||
1642 | * generating the session from ticket now, | ||
1643 | * trigger abbreviated handshake based on | ||
1644 | * external mechanism to calculate the master | ||
1645 | * secret later. */ | ||
1646 | return 0; | ||
1647 | } | ||
1648 | return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, | ||
1649 | ret); | ||
1650 | } | ||
1651 | p += size; | ||
1652 | } | ||
1653 | return 1; | ||
1654 | } | ||
1655 | |||
1656 | static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, | ||
1657 | const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, | ||
1658 | SSL_SESSION **psess) | ||
1659 | { | ||
1660 | SSL_SESSION *sess; | ||
1661 | unsigned char *sdec; | ||
1662 | const unsigned char *p; | ||
1663 | int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; | ||
1664 | unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; | ||
1665 | HMAC_CTX hctx; | ||
1666 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; | ||
1667 | SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; | ||
1668 | /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ | ||
1669 | if (eticklen < 48) | ||
1670 | goto tickerr; | ||
1671 | /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ | ||
1672 | HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); | ||
1673 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); | ||
1674 | if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) | ||
1675 | { | ||
1676 | unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; | ||
1677 | int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, | ||
1678 | &ctx, &hctx, 0); | ||
1679 | if (rv < 0) | ||
1680 | return -1; | ||
1681 | if (rv == 0) | ||
1682 | goto tickerr; | ||
1683 | if (rv == 2) | ||
1684 | renew_ticket = 1; | ||
1685 | } | ||
1686 | else | ||
1687 | { | ||
1688 | /* Check key name matches */ | ||
1689 | if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) | ||
1690 | goto tickerr; | ||
1691 | HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, | ||
1692 | tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); | ||
1693 | EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, | ||
1694 | tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); | ||
1695 | } | ||
1696 | /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and | ||
1697 | * integrity checks on ticket. | ||
1698 | */ | ||
1699 | mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); | ||
1700 | if (mlen < 0) | ||
1701 | { | ||
1702 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | ||
1703 | return -1; | ||
1704 | } | ||
1705 | eticklen -= mlen; | ||
1706 | /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ | ||
1707 | HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); | ||
1708 | HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); | ||
1709 | HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); | ||
1710 | if (memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) | ||
1711 | goto tickerr; | ||
1712 | /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ | ||
1713 | /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ | ||
1714 | p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | ||
1715 | eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); | ||
1716 | sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); | ||
1717 | if (!sdec) | ||
1718 | { | ||
1719 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | ||
1720 | return -1; | ||
1721 | } | ||
1722 | EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); | ||
1723 | if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) | ||
1724 | goto tickerr; | ||
1725 | slen += mlen; | ||
1726 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); | ||
1727 | p = sdec; | ||
1728 | |||
1729 | sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); | ||
1730 | OPENSSL_free(sdec); | ||
1731 | if (sess) | ||
1732 | { | ||
1733 | /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to | ||
1734 | * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to | ||
1735 | * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero | ||
1736 | * as required by standard. | ||
1737 | */ | ||
1738 | if (sesslen) | ||
1739 | memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); | ||
1740 | sess->session_id_length = sesslen; | ||
1741 | *psess = sess; | ||
1742 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; | ||
1743 | return 1; | ||
1744 | } | ||
1745 | /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to | ||
1746 | * send a new ticket | ||
1747 | */ | ||
1748 | tickerr: | ||
1749 | s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; | ||
1750 | return 0; | ||
1751 | } | ||
1752 | |||
1753 | #endif | ||