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1/* ssl/t1_lib.c */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113#include <openssl/objects.h>
114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
116#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
117#include <openssl/rand.h>
118#include "ssl_locl.h"
119
120const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
121
122#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
123static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
124 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
125 SSL_SESSION **psess);
126#endif
127
128SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={
129 tls1_enc,
130 tls1_mac,
131 tls1_setup_key_block,
132 tls1_generate_master_secret,
133 tls1_change_cipher_state,
134 tls1_final_finish_mac,
135 TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
136 tls1_cert_verify_mac,
137 TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
139 tls1_alert_code,
140 tls1_export_keying_material,
141 };
142
143long tls1_default_timeout(void)
144 {
145 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
146 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
147 return(60*60*2);
148 }
149
150int tls1_new(SSL *s)
151 {
152 if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0);
153 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
154 return(1);
155 }
156
157void tls1_free(SSL *s)
158 {
159#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
160 if (s->tlsext_session_ticket)
161 {
162 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
163 }
164#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
165 ssl3_free(s);
166 }
167
168void tls1_clear(SSL *s)
169 {
170 ssl3_clear(s);
171 s->version = s->method->version;
172 }
173
174#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
175
176static int nid_list[] =
177 {
178 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
179 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
180 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
181 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
182 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
183 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
184 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
185 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
186 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
187 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
188 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
189 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
190 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
191 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
192 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
193 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
194 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
195 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
196 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
197 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
198 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
199 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
200 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
201 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
202 NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */
203 };
204
205static int pref_list[] =
206 {
207 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
208 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
209 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
210 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
211 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
212 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
213 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
214 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
215 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
216 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
217 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
221 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
222 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
223 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
224 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
225 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
226 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
227 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
228 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
229 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
230 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
231 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
232 };
233
234int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id)
235 {
236 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
237 if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id >
238 sizeof(nid_list)/sizeof(nid_list[0])))
239 return 0;
240 return nid_list[curve_id-1];
241 }
242
243int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
244 {
245 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
246 switch (nid)
247 {
248 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
249 return 1;
250 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
251 return 2;
252 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
253 return 3;
254 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
255 return 4;
256 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
257 return 5;
258 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
259 return 6;
260 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
261 return 7;
262 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
263 return 8;
264 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
265 return 9;
266 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
267 return 10;
268 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
269 return 11;
270 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
271 return 12;
272 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
273 return 13;
274 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
275 return 14;
276 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
277 return 15;
278 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
279 return 16;
280 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
281 return 17;
282 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
283 return 18;
284 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
285 return 19;
286 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
287 return 20;
288 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
289 return 21;
290 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
291 return 22;
292 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
293 return 23;
294 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
295 return 24;
296 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
297 return 25;
298 default:
299 return 0;
300 }
301 }
302#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
303
304#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT
305
306/* List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
307 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
308 */
309
310#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
311#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */
312#else
313#define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
314#endif
315
316#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
317#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */
318#else
319#define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
320#endif
321
322#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
323#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) /* */
324#else
325#define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
326#endif
327
328#define tlsext_sigalg(md) \
329 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \
330 tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \
331 tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md)
332
333static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
334#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
335 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512)
336 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384)
337#endif
338#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
339 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256)
340 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224)
341#endif
342#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
343 tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1)
344#endif
345#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
346 tlsext_sigalg_rsa(TLSEXT_hash_md5)
347#endif
348};
349
350int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
351 {
352 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
353#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
354 /* If FIPS mode don't include MD5 which is last */
355 if (FIPS_mode())
356 slen -= 2;
357#endif
358 if (p)
359 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
360 return (int)slen;
361 }
362
363unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
364 {
365 int extdatalen=0;
366 unsigned char *ret = p;
367
368 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
369 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION
370 && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
371 return p;
372
373 ret+=2;
374
375 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
376
377 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
378 {
379 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
380 unsigned long size_str;
381 long lenmax;
382
383 /* check for enough space.
384 4 for the servername type and entension length
385 2 for servernamelist length
386 1 for the hostname type
387 2 for hostname length
388 + hostname length
389 */
390
391 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0
392 || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax)
393 return NULL;
394
395 /* extension type and length */
396 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
397 s2n(size_str+5,ret);
398
399 /* length of servername list */
400 s2n(size_str+3,ret);
401
402 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
403 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
404 s2n(size_str,ret);
405 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
406 ret+=size_str;
407 }
408
409 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
410 if (s->renegotiate)
411 {
412 int el;
413
414 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
415 {
416 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
417 return NULL;
418 }
419
420 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
421
422 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
423 s2n(el,ret);
424
425 if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
426 {
427 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
428 return NULL;
429 }
430
431 ret += el;
432 }
433
434#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
435 /* Add SRP username if there is one */
436 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
437 { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the Client Hello message */
438
439 int login_len = strlen(s->srp_ctx.login);
440 if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0)
441 {
442 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
443 return NULL;
444 }
445
446 /* check for enough space.
447 4 for the srp type type and entension length
448 1 for the srp user identity
449 + srp user identity length
450 */
451 if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) return NULL;
452
453 /* fill in the extension */
454 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp,ret);
455 s2n(login_len+1,ret);
456 (*ret++) = (unsigned char) login_len;
457 memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len);
458 ret+=login_len;
459 }
460#endif
461
462#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
463 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
464 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
465 {
466 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
467 long lenmax;
468
469 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
470 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
471 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
472 {
473 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
474 return NULL;
475 }
476
477 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
478 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
479 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
480 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
481 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
482 }
483 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL &&
484 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
485 {
486 /* Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message */
487 long lenmax;
488
489 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) return NULL;
490 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
491 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532)
492 {
493 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
494 return NULL;
495 }
496
497 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves,ret);
498 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret);
499
500 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
501 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
502 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
503 * resolves this to two bytes.
504 */
505 s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret);
506 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
507 ret+=s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
508 }
509#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
510
511 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
512 {
513 int ticklen;
514 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
515 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
516 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
517 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data)
518 {
519 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
520 s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
521 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
522 return NULL;
523 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
524 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data,
525 ticklen);
526 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
527 }
528 else
529 ticklen = 0;
530 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
531 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
532 goto skip_ext;
533 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
534 * rest for ticket
535 */
536 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) return NULL;
537 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
538 s2n(ticklen,ret);
539 if (ticklen)
540 {
541 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
542 ret += ticklen;
543 }
544 }
545 skip_ext:
546
547 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION)
548 {
549 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
550 return NULL;
551 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms,ret);
552 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
553 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
554 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
555 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
556 }
557
558#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
559 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
560 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
561 {
562 size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len;
563
564 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0))
565 return NULL;
566 if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
567 return NULL;
568
569 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
570 s2n(col + 2, ret);
571 s2n(col, ret);
572 memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col);
573 ret += col;
574 }
575#endif
576
577 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
578 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
579 {
580 int i;
581 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
582 OCSP_RESPID *id;
583
584 idlen = 0;
585 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
586 {
587 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
588 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
589 if (itmp <= 0)
590 return NULL;
591 idlen += itmp + 2;
592 }
593
594 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
595 {
596 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
597 if (extlen < 0)
598 return NULL;
599 }
600 else
601 extlen = 0;
602
603 if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL;
604 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
605 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
606 return NULL;
607 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
608 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
609 s2n(idlen, ret);
610 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++)
611 {
612 /* save position of id len */
613 unsigned char *q = ret;
614 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
615 /* skip over id len */
616 ret += 2;
617 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
618 /* write id len */
619 s2n(itmp, q);
620 }
621 s2n(extlen, ret);
622 if (extlen > 0)
623 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
624 }
625
626#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
627 /* Add Heartbeat extension */
628 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
629 s2n(1,ret);
630 /* Set mode:
631 * 1: peer may send requests
632 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
633 */
634 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
635 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
636 else
637 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
638#endif
639
640#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
641 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len)
642 {
643 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
644 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
645 if (limit - ret - 4 < 0)
646 return NULL;
647 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
648 s2n(0,ret);
649 }
650#endif
651
652 if(SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s))
653 {
654 int el;
655
656 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
657
658 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
659
660 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
661 s2n(el,ret);
662
663 if(ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
664 {
665 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
666 return NULL;
667 }
668 ret += el;
669 }
670
671 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
672 return p;
673
674 s2n(extdatalen,p);
675 return ret;
676 }
677
678unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
679 {
680 int extdatalen=0;
681 unsigned char *ret = p;
682#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
683 int next_proto_neg_seen;
684#endif
685
686 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
687 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
688 return p;
689
690 ret+=2;
691 if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
692
693 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL)
694 {
695 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
696
697 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret);
698 s2n(0,ret);
699 }
700
701 if(s->s3->send_connection_binding)
702 {
703 int el;
704
705 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0))
706 {
707 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
708 return NULL;
709 }
710
711 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
712
713 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret);
714 s2n(el,ret);
715
716 if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
717 {
718 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
719 return NULL;
720 }
721
722 ret += el;
723 }
724
725#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
726 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL &&
727 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
728 {
729 /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message */
730 long lenmax;
731
732 if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) return NULL;
733 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) return NULL;
734 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255)
735 {
736 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
737 return NULL;
738 }
739
740 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats,ret);
741 s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1,ret);
742 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
743 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
744 ret+=s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
745
746 }
747 /* Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves extension */
748#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
749
750 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected
751 && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET))
752 {
753 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
754 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret);
755 s2n(0,ret);
756 }
757
758 if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
759 {
760 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL;
761 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret);
762 s2n(0,ret);
763 }
764
765#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
766 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
767 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
768 {
769 size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len;
770
771 if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0)
772 return NULL;
773 if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */
774 return NULL;
775
776 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret);
777 s2n(sol + 2, ret);
778 s2n(sol, ret);
779 memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol);
780 ret += sol;
781 }
782#endif
783
784 if(s->srtp_profile)
785 {
786 int el;
787
788 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
789
790 if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL;
791
792 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp,ret);
793 s2n(el,ret);
794
795 if(ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el))
796 {
797 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
798 return NULL;
799 }
800 ret+=el;
801 }
802
803 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x80 || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF)==0x81)
804 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG))
805 { const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
806 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
807 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
808 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
809 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
810 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
811 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17};
812 if (limit-ret<36) return NULL;
813 memcpy(ret,cryptopro_ext,36);
814 ret+=36;
815
816 }
817
818#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
819 /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */
820 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED)
821 {
822 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat,ret);
823 s2n(1,ret);
824 /* Set mode:
825 * 1: peer may send requests
826 * 2: peer not allowed to send requests
827 */
828 if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS)
829 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
830 else
831 *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
832
833 }
834#endif
835
836#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
837 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
838 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
839 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb)
840 {
841 const unsigned char *npa;
842 unsigned int npalen;
843 int r;
844
845 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
846 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
847 {
848 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) return NULL;
849 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg,ret);
850 s2n(npalen,ret);
851 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
852 ret += npalen;
853 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
854 }
855 }
856#endif
857
858 if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0)
859 return p;
860
861 s2n(extdatalen,p);
862 return ret;
863 }
864
865int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
866 {
867 unsigned short type;
868 unsigned short size;
869 unsigned short len;
870 unsigned char *data = *p;
871 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
872 int sigalg_seen = 0;
873
874 s->servername_done = 0;
875 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
876#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
877 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
878#endif
879
880#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
881 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
882 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
883#endif
884
885 if (data >= (d+n-2))
886 goto ri_check;
887 n2s(data,len);
888
889 if (data > (d+n-len))
890 goto ri_check;
891
892 while (data <= (d+n-4))
893 {
894 n2s(data,type);
895 n2s(data,size);
896
897 if (data+size > (d+n))
898 goto ri_check;
899#if 0
900 fprintf(stderr,"Received extension type %d size %d\n",type,size);
901#endif
902 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
903 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
904 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
905/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
906
907 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
908 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
909 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
910 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
911 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
912 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
913 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
914 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
915 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
916 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
917 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
918 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
919 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
920 the value of the Host: field.
921 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
922 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
923 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
924 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
925
926*/
927
928 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
929 {
930 unsigned char *sdata;
931 int servname_type;
932 int dsize;
933
934 if (size < 2)
935 {
936 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
937 return 0;
938 }
939 n2s(data,dsize);
940 size -= 2;
941 if (dsize > size )
942 {
943 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
944 return 0;
945 }
946
947 sdata = data;
948 while (dsize > 3)
949 {
950 servname_type = *(sdata++);
951 n2s(sdata,len);
952 dsize -= 3;
953
954 if (len > dsize)
955 {
956 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
957 return 0;
958 }
959 if (s->servername_done == 0)
960 switch (servname_type)
961 {
962 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
963 if (!s->hit)
964 {
965 if(s->session->tlsext_hostname)
966 {
967 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
968 return 0;
969 }
970 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name)
971 {
972 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
973 return 0;
974 }
975 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
976 {
977 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
978 return 0;
979 }
980 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
981 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0';
982 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
983 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
984 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
985 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
986 return 0;
987 }
988 s->servername_done = 1;
989
990 }
991 else
992 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname
993 && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len
994 && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
995
996 break;
997
998 default:
999 break;
1000 }
1001
1002 dsize -= len;
1003 }
1004 if (dsize != 0)
1005 {
1006 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1007 return 0;
1008 }
1009
1010 }
1011#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
1012 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
1013 {
1014 if (size <= 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size -1))
1015 {
1016 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1017 return 0;
1018 }
1019 if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL)
1020 {
1021 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1022 return 0;
1023 }
1024 if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL)
1025 return -1;
1026 memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len);
1027 s->srp_ctx.login[len]='\0';
1028
1029 if (strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len)
1030 {
1031 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1032 return 0;
1033 }
1034 }
1035#endif
1036
1037#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1038 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1039 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1040 {
1041 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1042 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1043
1044 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1045 {
1046 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1047 return 0;
1048 }
1049 if (!s->hit)
1050 {
1051 if(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist)
1052 {
1053 OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1054 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1055 }
1056 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1057 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1058 {
1059 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1060 return 0;
1061 }
1062 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1063 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1064 }
1065#if 0
1066 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length);
1067 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1068 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1069 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1070 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1071#endif
1072 }
1073 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1074 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1075 {
1076 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1077 int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8);
1078 ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++));
1079
1080 if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2)
1081 {
1082 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1083 return 0;
1084 }
1085 if (!s->hit)
1086 {
1087 if(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist)
1088 {
1089 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1090 return 0;
1091 }
1092 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1093 if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1094 {
1095 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1096 return 0;
1097 }
1098 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = ellipticcurvelist_length;
1099 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, ellipticcurvelist_length);
1100 }
1101#if 0
1102 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length);
1103 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
1104 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++)
1105 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1106 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1107#endif
1108 }
1109#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1110#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1111 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1112 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1113 {
1114 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1115
1116 if (size < 2)
1117 {
1118 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1119 return 0;
1120 }
1121 n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1122 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1123 {
1124 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1125 return 0;
1126 }
1127
1128 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1129 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1130 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1131 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1132 else
1133 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len);
1134 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1135 {
1136 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1137 return 0;
1138 }
1139 }
1140#endif
1141 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1142 {
1143 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1144 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1145 {
1146 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1147 return 0;
1148 }
1149 }
1150 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1151 {
1152 if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1153 return 0;
1154 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1155 }
1156 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
1157 {
1158 int dsize;
1159 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2)
1160 {
1161 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1162 return 0;
1163 }
1164 sigalg_seen = 1;
1165 n2s(data,dsize);
1166 size -= 2;
1167 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1)
1168 {
1169 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1170 return 0;
1171 }
1172 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize))
1173 {
1174 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1175 return 0;
1176 }
1177 }
1178 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1179 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1180 {
1181
1182 if (size < 5)
1183 {
1184 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1185 return 0;
1186 }
1187
1188 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1189 size--;
1190 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
1191 {
1192 const unsigned char *sdata;
1193 int dsize;
1194 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1195 n2s(data,dsize);
1196 size -= 2;
1197 if (dsize > size )
1198 {
1199 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1200 return 0;
1201 }
1202 while (dsize > 0)
1203 {
1204 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1205 int idsize;
1206 if (dsize < 4)
1207 {
1208 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1209 return 0;
1210 }
1211 n2s(data, idsize);
1212 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1213 size -= 2 + idsize;
1214 if (dsize < 0)
1215 {
1216 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1217 return 0;
1218 }
1219 sdata = data;
1220 data += idsize;
1221 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1222 &sdata, idsize);
1223 if (!id)
1224 {
1225 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1226 return 0;
1227 }
1228 if (data != sdata)
1229 {
1230 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1231 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1232 return 0;
1233 }
1234 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids
1235 && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1236 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null()))
1237 {
1238 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1239 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1240 return 0;
1241 }
1242 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1243 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id))
1244 {
1245 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1246 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1247 return 0;
1248 }
1249 }
1250
1251 /* Read in request_extensions */
1252 if (size < 2)
1253 {
1254 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1255 return 0;
1256 }
1257 n2s(data,dsize);
1258 size -= 2;
1259 if (dsize != size)
1260 {
1261 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1262 return 0;
1263 }
1264 sdata = data;
1265 if (dsize > 0)
1266 {
1267 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts)
1268 {
1269 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1270 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1271 }
1272
1273 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1274 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1275 &sdata, dsize);
1276 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts
1277 || (data + dsize != sdata))
1278 {
1279 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1280 return 0;
1281 }
1282 }
1283 }
1284 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1285 * so ignore it.
1286 */
1287 else
1288 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1289 }
1290#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1291 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1292 {
1293 switch(data[0])
1294 {
1295 case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */
1296 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1297 break;
1298 case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */
1299 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1300 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1301 break;
1302 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1303 return 0;
1304 }
1305 }
1306#endif
1307#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1308 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1309 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1310 {
1311 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1312 * renegotiation.
1313 *
1314 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1315 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1316 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1317 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1318 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1319 * anything like that, but this might change).
1320
1321 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1322 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1323 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1324 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1325 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1326 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1327 }
1328#endif
1329
1330 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1331 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1332 {
1333 if(ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1334 al))
1335 return 0;
1336 }
1337
1338 data+=size;
1339 }
1340
1341 *p = data;
1342
1343 ri_check:
1344
1345 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1346
1347 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate &&
1348 !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1349 {
1350 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1351 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1352 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1353 return 0;
1354 }
1355
1356 return 1;
1357 }
1358
1359#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1360/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1361 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1362 * the length of the block. */
1363static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1364 {
1365 unsigned int off = 0;
1366
1367 while (off < len)
1368 {
1369 if (d[off] == 0)
1370 return 0;
1371 off += d[off];
1372 off++;
1373 }
1374
1375 return off == len;
1376 }
1377#endif
1378
1379int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al)
1380 {
1381 unsigned short length;
1382 unsigned short type;
1383 unsigned short size;
1384 unsigned char *data = *p;
1385 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1386 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1387
1388#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1389 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1390#endif
1391
1392#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1393 s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED |
1394 SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
1395#endif
1396
1397 if (data >= (d+n-2))
1398 goto ri_check;
1399
1400 n2s(data,length);
1401 if (data+length != d+n)
1402 {
1403 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1404 return 0;
1405 }
1406
1407 while(data <= (d+n-4))
1408 {
1409 n2s(data,type);
1410 n2s(data,size);
1411
1412 if (data+size > (d+n))
1413 goto ri_check;
1414
1415 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1416 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1417 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1418
1419 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1420 {
1421 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0)
1422 {
1423 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1424 return 0;
1425 }
1426 tlsext_servername = 1;
1427 }
1428
1429#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1430 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1431 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1432 {
1433 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1434 int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++);
1435
1436 if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1)
1437 {
1438 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1439 return 0;
1440 }
1441 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1442 if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1443 if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL)
1444 {
1445 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1446 return 0;
1447 }
1448 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = ecpointformatlist_length;
1449 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, ecpointformatlist_length);
1450#if 0
1451 fprintf(stderr,"ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist ");
1452 sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1453 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1454 fprintf(stderr,"%i ",*(sdata++));
1455 fprintf(stderr,"\n");
1456#endif
1457 }
1458#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1459
1460 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
1461 {
1462 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1463 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg))
1464 {
1465 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1466 return 0;
1467 }
1468 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
1469 || (size > 0))
1470 {
1471 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1472 return 0;
1473 }
1474 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1475 }
1476#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1477 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input &&
1478 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1479 {
1480 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1481
1482 if (size < 2)
1483 {
1484 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1485 return 0;
1486 }
1487 n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1488 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2)
1489 {
1490 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1491 return 0;
1492 }
1493
1494 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1495 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1496 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1497 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1498 else
1499 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len);
1500
1501 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1502 {
1503 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1504 return 0;
1505 }
1506 }
1507#endif
1508 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1509 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION)
1510 {
1511 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1512 * a status request message.
1513 */
1514 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0))
1515 {
1516 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1517 return 0;
1518 }
1519 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1520 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1521 }
1522#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
1523 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1524 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0)
1525 {
1526 unsigned char *selected;
1527 unsigned char selected_len;
1528
1529 /* We must have requested it. */
1530 if ((s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL))
1531 {
1532 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1533 return 0;
1534 }
1535 /* The data must be valid */
1536 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size))
1537 {
1538 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1539 return 0;
1540 }
1541 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK)
1542 {
1543 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1544 return 0;
1545 }
1546 s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
1547 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated)
1548 {
1549 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1550 return 0;
1551 }
1552 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1553 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1554 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1555 }
1556#endif
1557 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
1558 {
1559 if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1560 return 0;
1561 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1562 }
1563#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
1564 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat)
1565 {
1566 switch(data[0])
1567 {
1568 case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */
1569 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1570 break;
1571 case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */
1572 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED;
1573 s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS;
1574 break;
1575 default: *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1576 return 0;
1577 }
1578 }
1579#endif
1580 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
1581 {
1582 if(ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size,
1583 al))
1584 return 0;
1585 }
1586
1587 data+=size;
1588 }
1589
1590 if (data != d+n)
1591 {
1592 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1593 return 0;
1594 }
1595
1596 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1)
1597 {
1598 if (s->tlsext_hostname)
1599 {
1600 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL)
1601 {
1602 s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1603 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname)
1604 {
1605 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1606 return 0;
1607 }
1608 }
1609 else
1610 {
1611 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1612 return 0;
1613 }
1614 }
1615 }
1616
1617 *p = data;
1618
1619 ri_check:
1620
1621 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1622 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1623 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1624 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1625 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1626 * absence on initial connect only.
1627 */
1628 if (!renegotiate_seen
1629 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)
1630 && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION))
1631 {
1632 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1633 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1634 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1635 return 0;
1636 }
1637
1638 return 1;
1639 }
1640
1641
1642int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1643 {
1644#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1645 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher suite, send the point formats
1646 * and elliptic curves we support.
1647 */
1648 int using_ecc = 0;
1649 int i;
1650 unsigned char *j;
1651 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
1652 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
1653
1654 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++)
1655 {
1656 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
1657
1658 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
1659 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
1660 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1661 {
1662 using_ecc = 1;
1663 break;
1664 }
1665 }
1666 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION);
1667 if (using_ecc)
1668 {
1669 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1670 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1671 {
1672 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1673 return -1;
1674 }
1675 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1676 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1677 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1678 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1679
1680 /* we support all named elliptic curves in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12 */
1681 if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist);
1682 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2;
1683 if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = OPENSSL_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL)
1684 {
1685 s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1686 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1687 return -1;
1688 }
1689 for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i <
1690 sizeof(pref_list)/sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++)
1691 {
1692 int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]);
1693 s2n(id,j);
1694 }
1695 }
1696#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1697
1698#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1699 {
1700 int r = 1;
1701
1702 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1703 {
1704 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1705 if (!r)
1706 return -1;
1707 }
1708
1709 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1710 {
1711 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1712 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input);
1713
1714 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1715 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1716 else
1717 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1718 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1719 {
1720 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1721 return -1;
1722 }
1723 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1724 }
1725
1726 if (r == 2)
1727 /* at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate server opaque PRF input */
1728 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1729 }
1730#endif
1731
1732 return 1;
1733 }
1734
1735int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1736 {
1737#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1738 /* If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats we support
1739 * if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note that the server is not
1740 * supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension.
1741 */
1742
1743 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1744 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1745 int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA);
1746 using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL);
1747
1748 if (using_ecc)
1749 {
1750 if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1751 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL)
1752 {
1753 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
1754 return -1;
1755 }
1756 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3;
1757 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
1758 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime;
1759 s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
1760 }
1761#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1762
1763 return 1;
1764 }
1765
1766int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1767 {
1768 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1769 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1770
1771#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1772 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1773 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1774 */
1775 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1776 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1777 */
1778#endif
1779
1780 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1781 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1782 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1783 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1784
1785 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1786 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1787 * the certificate has changed.
1788 */
1789 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1790 {
1791 int r;
1792 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1793 switch (r)
1794 {
1795 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1796 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1797 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1798 break;
1799 /* status request response should be sent */
1800 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1801 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1802 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1803 else
1804 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1805 break;
1806 /* something bad happened */
1807 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1808 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1809 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1810 goto err;
1811 }
1812 }
1813 else
1814 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1815
1816#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1817 {
1818 /* This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(),
1819 * but we might be sending an alert in response to the client hello,
1820 * so this has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext(). */
1821
1822 int r = 1;
1823
1824 if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0)
1825 {
1826 r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg);
1827 if (!r)
1828 {
1829 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1830 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1831 goto err;
1832 }
1833 }
1834
1835 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) /* shouldn't really happen */
1836 OPENSSL_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input);
1837 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL;
1838
1839 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL)
1840 {
1841 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL &&
1842 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len)
1843 {
1844 /* can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF input
1845 * of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! */
1846
1847 if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0)
1848 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */
1849 else
1850 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len);
1851 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1852 {
1853 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1854 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1855 goto err;
1856 }
1857 s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len;
1858 }
1859 }
1860
1861 if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1862 {
1863 /* The callback wants to enforce use of the extension,
1864 * but we can't do that with the client opaque PRF input;
1865 * abort the handshake.
1866 */
1867 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1868 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1869 }
1870 }
1871
1872#endif
1873 err:
1874 switch (ret)
1875 {
1876 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1877 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1878 return -1;
1879
1880 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1881 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1882 return 1;
1883
1884 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1885 s->servername_done=0;
1886 default:
1887 return 1;
1888 }
1889 }
1890
1891int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1892 {
1893 int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1894 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1895
1896#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
1897 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
1898 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
1899 * it must contain uncompressed.
1900 */
1901 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
1902 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
1903 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1904 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
1905 ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)))
1906 {
1907 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
1908 size_t i;
1909 unsigned char *list;
1910 int found_uncompressed = 0;
1911 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
1912 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++)
1913 {
1914 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed)
1915 {
1916 found_uncompressed = 1;
1917 break;
1918 }
1919 }
1920 if (!found_uncompressed)
1921 {
1922 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
1923 return -1;
1924 }
1925 }
1926 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1927#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */
1928
1929 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1930 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1931 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1932 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1933
1934#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input
1935 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0)
1936 {
1937 /* This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on using opaque PRF inputs.
1938 * So first verify that we really have a value from the server too. */
1939
1940 if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL)
1941 {
1942 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1943 al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1944 }
1945
1946 /* Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to check
1947 * that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. */
1948 if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL ||
1949 s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len)
1950 {
1951 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1952 al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
1953 }
1954 }
1955#endif
1956
1957 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
1958 * tell the callback
1959 */
1960 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected)
1961 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb)
1962 {
1963 int r;
1964 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
1965 * there is no response.
1966 */
1967 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1968 {
1969 OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
1970 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
1971 }
1972 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
1973 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1974 if (r == 0)
1975 {
1976 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
1977 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1978 }
1979 if (r < 0)
1980 {
1981 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1982 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1983 }
1984 }
1985
1986 switch (ret)
1987 {
1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1989 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
1990 return -1;
1991
1992 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1993 ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al);
1994 return 1;
1995
1996 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1997 s->servername_done=0;
1998 default:
1999 return 1;
2000 }
2001 }
2002
2003/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2004 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2005 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2006 *
2007 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2008 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2009 * extension, if any.
2010 * len: the length of the session ID.
2011 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2012 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2013 * point to the resulting session.
2014 *
2015 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2016 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2017 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2018 *
2019 * Returns:
2020 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2021 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2022 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2023 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2024 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2025 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2026 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2027 *
2028 * Side effects:
2029 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2030 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2031 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2032 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2033 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2034 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2035 */
2036int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2037 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2038 {
2039 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2040 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2041 unsigned short i;
2042
2043 *ret = NULL;
2044 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2045
2046 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2047 * to permit stateful resumption.
2048 */
2049 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2050 return 0;
2051 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2052 return 0;
2053 if (p >= limit)
2054 return -1;
2055 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2056 if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
2057 {
2058 i = *(p++);
2059 p+= i;
2060 if (p >= limit)
2061 return -1;
2062 }
2063 /* Skip past cipher list */
2064 n2s(p, i);
2065 p+= i;
2066 if (p >= limit)
2067 return -1;
2068 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2069 i = *(p++);
2070 p += i;
2071 if (p > limit)
2072 return -1;
2073 /* Now at start of extensions */
2074 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2075 return 0;
2076 n2s(p, i);
2077 while ((p + 4) <= limit)
2078 {
2079 unsigned short type, size;
2080 n2s(p, type);
2081 n2s(p, size);
2082 if (p + size > limit)
2083 return 0;
2084 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
2085 {
2086 int r;
2087 if (size == 0)
2088 {
2089 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2090 * currently have one. */
2091 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2092 return 1;
2093 }
2094 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb)
2095 {
2096 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2097 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2098 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2099 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2100 * calculate the master secret later. */
2101 return 2;
2102 }
2103 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2104 switch (r)
2105 {
2106 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2107 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2108 return 2;
2109 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2110 return r;
2111 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2112 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2113 return 3;
2114 default: /* fatal error */
2115 return -1;
2116 }
2117 }
2118 p += size;
2119 }
2120 return 0;
2121 }
2122
2123/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2124 *
2125 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2126 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2127 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2128 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2129 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2130 * point to the resulting session.
2131 *
2132 * Returns:
2133 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2134 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2135 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2136 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2137 */
2138static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2139 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
2140 SSL_SESSION **psess)
2141 {
2142 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2143 unsigned char *sdec;
2144 const unsigned char *p;
2145 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2146 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2147 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2148 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2149 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2150 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2151 if (eticklen < 48)
2152 return 2;
2153 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2154 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2155 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2156 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb)
2157 {
2158 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2159 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2160 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2161 if (rv < 0)
2162 return -1;
2163 if (rv == 0)
2164 return 2;
2165 if (rv == 2)
2166 renew_ticket = 1;
2167 }
2168 else
2169 {
2170 /* Check key name matches */
2171 if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2172 return 2;
2173 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2174 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2175 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2176 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2177 }
2178 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2179 * integrity checks on ticket.
2180 */
2181 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2182 if (mlen < 0)
2183 {
2184 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2185 return -1;
2186 }
2187 eticklen -= mlen;
2188 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2189 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2190 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2191 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2192 if (timingsafe_bcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen))
2193 return 2;
2194 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2195 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2196 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2197 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2198 sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen);
2199 if (!sdec)
2200 {
2201 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2202 return -1;
2203 }
2204 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2205 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0)
2206 return 2;
2207 slen += mlen;
2208 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2209 p = sdec;
2210
2211 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2212 OPENSSL_free(sdec);
2213 if (sess)
2214 {
2215 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2216 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2217 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2218 * as required by standard.
2219 */
2220 if (sesslen)
2221 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2222 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2223 *psess = sess;
2224 if (renew_ticket)
2225 return 4;
2226 else
2227 return 3;
2228 }
2229 ERR_clear_error();
2230 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2231 * ticket. */
2232 return 2;
2233 }
2234
2235/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2236
2237typedef struct
2238 {
2239 int nid;
2240 int id;
2241 } tls12_lookup;
2242
2243static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2244#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2245 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2246#endif
2247#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2248 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2249#endif
2250#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2251 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2252 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2253#endif
2254#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2255 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2256 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512}
2257#endif
2258};
2259
2260static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2261#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2262 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2263#endif
2264#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2265 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2266#endif
2267#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2268 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa}
2269#endif
2270};
2271
2272static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2273 {
2274 size_t i;
2275 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2276 {
2277 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2278 return table[i].id;
2279 }
2280 return -1;
2281 }
2282#if 0
2283static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2284 {
2285 size_t i;
2286 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++)
2287 {
2288 if (table[i].id == id)
2289 return table[i].nid;
2290 }
2291 return -1;
2292 }
2293#endif
2294
2295int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2296 {
2297 int sig_id, md_id;
2298 if (!md)
2299 return 0;
2300 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2301 sizeof(tls12_md)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2302 if (md_id == -1)
2303 return 0;
2304 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2305 if (sig_id == -1)
2306 return 0;
2307 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2308 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2309 return 1;
2310 }
2311
2312int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2313 {
2314 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2315 sizeof(tls12_sig)/sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2316 }
2317
2318const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2319 {
2320 switch(hash_alg)
2321 {
2322#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
2323 case TLSEXT_hash_md5:
2324#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
2325 if (FIPS_mode())
2326 return NULL;
2327#endif
2328 return EVP_md5();
2329#endif
2330#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
2331 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2332 return EVP_sha1();
2333#endif
2334#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
2335 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2336 return EVP_sha224();
2337
2338 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2339 return EVP_sha256();
2340#endif
2341#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512
2342 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2343 return EVP_sha384();
2344
2345 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2346 return EVP_sha512();
2347#endif
2348 default:
2349 return NULL;
2350
2351 }
2352 }
2353
2354/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2355
2356int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2357 {
2358 int i, idx;
2359 const EVP_MD *md;
2360 CERT *c = s->cert;
2361 /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */
2362 if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION)
2363 return 1;
2364 /* Should never happen */
2365 if (!c)
2366 return 0;
2367
2368 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2369 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2370 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2371 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2372
2373 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2)
2374 {
2375 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i+1];
2376
2377 switch(sig_alg)
2378 {
2379#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2380 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2381 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2382 break;
2383#endif
2384#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2385 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2386 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2387 break;
2388#endif
2389#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2390 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2391 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2392 break;
2393#endif
2394 default:
2395 continue;
2396 }
2397
2398 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL)
2399 {
2400 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2401 if (md)
2402 {
2403 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2404 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2405 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2406 }
2407 }
2408
2409 }
2410
2411
2412 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2413 * supported it stays as NULL.
2414 */
2415#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
2416 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2417 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_dss1();
2418#endif
2419#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
2420 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest)
2421 {
2422 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2423 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2424 }
2425#endif
2426#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA
2427 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2428 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_ecdsa();
2429#endif
2430 return 1;
2431 }
2432
2433#endif
2434
2435#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
2436int
2437tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2438 {
2439 unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl;
2440 unsigned short hbtype;
2441 unsigned int payload;
2442 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2443
2444 /* Read type and payload length first */
2445 hbtype = *p++;
2446 n2s(p, payload);
2447 pl = p;
2448
2449 if (s->msg_callback)
2450 s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2451 &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length,
2452 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2453
2454 if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST)
2455 {
2456 unsigned char *buffer, *bp;
2457 int r;
2458
2459 /* Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes
2460 * message type, plus 2 bytes payload length, plus
2461 * payload, plus padding
2462 */
2463 buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2464 bp = buffer;
2465
2466 /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */
2467 *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE;
2468 s2n(payload, bp);
2469 memcpy(bp, pl, payload);
2470 bp += payload;
2471 /* Random padding */
2472 RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding);
2473
2474 r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, 3 + payload + padding);
2475
2476 if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback)
2477 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2478 buffer, 3 + payload + padding,
2479 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2480
2481 OPENSSL_free(buffer);
2482
2483 if (r < 0)
2484 return r;
2485 }
2486 else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE)
2487 {
2488 unsigned int seq;
2489
2490 /* We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int),
2491 * and 16 random bytes, so we just try to read the
2492 * sequence number */
2493 n2s(pl, seq);
2494
2495 if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq)
2496 {
2497 s->tlsext_hb_seq++;
2498 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0;
2499 }
2500 }
2501
2502 return 0;
2503 }
2504
2505int
2506tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s)
2507 {
2508 unsigned char *buf, *p;
2509 int ret;
2510 unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */
2511 unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */
2512
2513 /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */
2514 if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) ||
2515 s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS)
2516 {
2517 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT);
2518 return -1;
2519 }
2520
2521 /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */
2522 if (s->tlsext_hb_pending)
2523 {
2524 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING);
2525 return -1;
2526 }
2527
2528 /* ...and no handshake in progress. */
2529 if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake)
2530 {
2531 SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
2532 return -1;
2533 }
2534
2535 /* Check if padding is too long, payload and padding
2536 * must not exceed 2^14 - 3 = 16381 bytes in total.
2537 */
2538 OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381);
2539
2540 /* Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number
2541 * as payload to distuingish different messages and add
2542 * some random stuff.
2543 * - Message Type, 1 byte
2544 * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int)
2545 * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint)
2546 * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint)
2547 * - Padding
2548 */
2549 buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding);
2550 p = buf;
2551 /* Message Type */
2552 *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST;
2553 /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */
2554 s2n(payload, p);
2555 /* Sequence number */
2556 s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p);
2557 /* 16 random bytes */
2558 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16);
2559 p += 16;
2560 /* Random padding */
2561 RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding);
2562
2563 ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding);
2564 if (ret >= 0)
2565 {
2566 if (s->msg_callback)
2567 s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT,
2568 buf, 3 + payload + padding,
2569 s, s->msg_callback_arg);
2570
2571 s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1;
2572 }
2573
2574 OPENSSL_free(buf);
2575
2576 return ret;
2577 }
2578#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-03-20 04:01:16 +0000