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1/* $OpenBSD: t1_lib.c,v 1.75 2015/03/02 13:43:09 jsing Exp $ */
2/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
3 * All rights reserved.
4 *
5 * This package is an SSL implementation written
6 * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7 * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
8 *
9 * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10 * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11 * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12 * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13 * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14 * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
15 *
16 * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17 * the code are not to be removed.
18 * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19 * as the author of the parts of the library used.
20 * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21 * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
22 *
23 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
25 * are met:
26 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30 * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32 * must display the following acknowledgement:
33 * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34 * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35 * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36 * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37 * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38 * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39 * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
40 *
41 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44 * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
51 * SUCH DAMAGE.
52 *
53 * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54 * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55 * copied and put under another distribution licence
56 * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
57 */
58/* ====================================================================
59 * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
60 *
61 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
62 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
63 * are met:
64 *
65 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
66 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
67 *
68 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
69 * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
70 * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
71 * distribution.
72 *
73 * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
74 * software must display the following acknowledgment:
75 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
76 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
77 *
78 * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
79 * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
80 * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
81 * openssl-core@openssl.org.
82 *
83 * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
84 * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
85 * permission of the OpenSSL Project.
86 *
87 * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
88 * acknowledgment:
89 * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
90 * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
91 *
92 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
93 * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
94 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
95 * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
96 * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
97 * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
98 * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
99 * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
100 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
101 * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
102 * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
103 * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
104 * ====================================================================
105 *
106 * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
107 * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
108 * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
109 *
110 */
111
112#include <stdio.h>
113
114#include <openssl/evp.h>
115#include <openssl/hmac.h>
116#include <openssl/objects.h>
117#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
118
119#include "ssl_locl.h"
120
121static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen,
122 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen,
123 SSL_SESSION **psess);
124
125SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = {
126 .enc = tls1_enc,
127 .mac = tls1_mac,
128 .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block,
129 .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret,
130 .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state,
131 .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac,
132 .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
133 .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac,
134 .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
135 .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
136 .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
137 .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
138 .alert_value = tls1_alert_code,
139 .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material,
140 .enc_flags = 0,
141};
142
143SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data = {
144 .enc = tls1_enc,
145 .mac = tls1_mac,
146 .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block,
147 .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret,
148 .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state,
149 .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac,
150 .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
151 .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac,
152 .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
153 .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
154 .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
155 .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
156 .alert_value = tls1_alert_code,
157 .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material,
158 .enc_flags = SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV,
159};
160
161SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data = {
162 .enc = tls1_enc,
163 .mac = tls1_mac,
164 .setup_key_block = tls1_setup_key_block,
165 .generate_master_secret = tls1_generate_master_secret,
166 .change_cipher_state = tls1_change_cipher_state,
167 .final_finish_mac = tls1_final_finish_mac,
168 .finish_mac_length = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH,
169 .cert_verify_mac = tls1_cert_verify_mac,
170 .client_finished_label = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,
171 .client_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
172 .server_finished_label = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,
173 .server_finished_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE,
174 .alert_value = tls1_alert_code,
175 .export_keying_material = tls1_export_keying_material,
176 .enc_flags = SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV|SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS|
177 SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF|SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS,
178};
179
180long
181tls1_default_timeout(void)
182{
183 /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec
184 * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */
185 return (60 * 60 * 2);
186}
187
188int
189tls1_new(SSL *s)
190{
191 if (!ssl3_new(s))
192 return (0);
193 s->method->ssl_clear(s);
194 return (1);
195}
196
197void
198tls1_free(SSL *s)
199{
200 free(s->tlsext_session_ticket);
201 ssl3_free(s);
202}
203
204void
205tls1_clear(SSL *s)
206{
207 ssl3_clear(s);
208 s->version = s->method->version;
209}
210
211
212static int nid_list[] = {
213 NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
214 NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */
215 NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */
216 NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */
217 NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */
218 NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */
219 NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */
220 NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */
221 NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */
222 NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */
223 NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */
224 NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */
225 NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */
226 NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */
227 NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */
228 NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */
229 NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */
230 NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */
231 NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */
232 NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */
233 NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */
234 NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */
235 NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */
236 NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */
237 NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */
238 NID_brainpoolP256r1, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
239 NID_brainpoolP384r1, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
240 NID_brainpoolP512r1 /* brainpoolP512r1 (28) */
241};
242
243static const uint8_t ecformats_default[] = {
244 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed,
245 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime,
246 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2
247};
248
249static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
250 14, /* sect571r1 (14) */
251 13, /* sect571k1 (13) */
252 25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
253 28, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
254 11, /* sect409k1 (11) */
255 12, /* sect409r1 (12) */
256 27, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
257 24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
258 9, /* sect283k1 (9) */
259 10, /* sect283r1 (10) */
260 26, /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
261 22, /* secp256k1 (22) */
262 23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
263 8, /* sect239k1 (8) */
264 6, /* sect233k1 (6) */
265 7, /* sect233r1 (7) */
266 20, /* secp224k1 (20) */
267 21, /* secp224r1 (21) */
268 4, /* sect193r1 (4) */
269 5, /* sect193r2 (5) */
270 18, /* secp192k1 (18) */
271 19, /* secp192r1 (19) */
272 1, /* sect163k1 (1) */
273 2, /* sect163r1 (2) */
274 3, /* sect163r2 (3) */
275 15, /* secp160k1 (15) */
276 16, /* secp160r1 (16) */
277 17, /* secp160r2 (17) */
278};
279
280int
281tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(uint16_t curve_id)
282{
283 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
284 if ((curve_id < 1) ||
285 ((unsigned int)curve_id > sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0])))
286 return 0;
287 return nid_list[curve_id - 1];
288}
289
290uint16_t
291tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid)
292{
293 /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt (Oct. 17, 2005) */
294 switch (nid) {
295 case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */
296 return 1;
297 case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */
298 return 2;
299 case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */
300 return 3;
301 case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */
302 return 4;
303 case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */
304 return 5;
305 case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */
306 return 6;
307 case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */
308 return 7;
309 case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */
310 return 8;
311 case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */
312 return 9;
313 case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */
314 return 10;
315 case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */
316 return 11;
317 case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */
318 return 12;
319 case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */
320 return 13;
321 case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */
322 return 14;
323 case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */
324 return 15;
325 case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */
326 return 16;
327 case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */
328 return 17;
329 case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */
330 return 18;
331 case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */
332 return 19;
333 case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */
334 return 20;
335 case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */
336 return 21;
337 case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */
338 return 22;
339 case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */
340 return 23;
341 case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */
342 return 24;
343 case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */
344 return 25;
345 case NID_brainpoolP256r1: /* brainpoolP256r1 (26) */
346 return 26;
347 case NID_brainpoolP384r1: /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
348 return 27;
349 case NID_brainpoolP512r1: /* brainpoolP512r1 (28) */
350 return 28;
351 default:
352 return 0;
353 }
354}
355
356/*
357 * Return the appropriate format list. If client_formats is non-zero, return
358 * the client/session formats. Otherwise return the custom format list if one
359 * exists, or the default formats if a custom list has not been specified.
360 */
361static void
362tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, int client_formats, const uint8_t **pformats,
363 size_t *pformatslen)
364{
365 if (client_formats != 0) {
366 *pformats = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
367 *pformatslen = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
368 return;
369 }
370
371 *pformats = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
372 *pformatslen = s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length;
373 if (*pformats == NULL) {
374 *pformats = ecformats_default;
375 *pformatslen = sizeof(ecformats_default);
376 }
377}
378
379/*
380 * Return the appropriate curve list. If client_curves is non-zero, return
381 * the client/session curves. Otherwise return the custom curve list if one
382 * exists, or the default curves if a custom list has not been specified.
383 */
384static void
385tls1_get_curvelist(SSL *s, int client_curves, const uint16_t **pcurves,
386 size_t *pcurveslen)
387{
388 if (client_curves != 0) {
389 *pcurves = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
390 *pcurveslen = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
391 return;
392 }
393
394 *pcurves = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist;
395 *pcurveslen = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length;
396 if (*pcurves == NULL) {
397 *pcurves = eccurves_default;
398 *pcurveslen = sizeof(eccurves_default) / 2;
399 }
400}
401
402/* Check that a curve is one of our preferences. */
403int
404tls1_check_curve(SSL *s, const unsigned char *p, size_t len)
405{
406 const uint16_t *curves;
407 size_t curveslen, i;
408 uint16_t cid;
409
410 /* Only named curves are supported. */
411 if (len != 3 || p[0] != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE)
412 return (0);
413
414 cid = (p[1] << 8) | p[2];
415
416 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
417
418 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) {
419 if (curves[i] == cid)
420 return (1);
421 }
422 return (0);
423}
424
425int
426tls1_get_shared_curve(SSL *s)
427{
428 size_t preflen, supplen, i, j;
429 const uint16_t *pref, *supp;
430 unsigned long server_pref;
431
432 /* Cannot do anything on the client side. */
433 if (s->server == 0)
434 return (NID_undef);
435
436 /* Return first preference shared curve. */
437 server_pref = (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
438 tls1_get_curvelist(s, (server_pref == 0), &pref, &preflen);
439 tls1_get_curvelist(s, (server_pref != 0), &supp, &supplen);
440
441 for (i = 0; i < preflen; i++) {
442 for (j = 0; j < supplen; j++) {
443 if (pref[i] == supp[j])
444 return (tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(pref[i]));
445 }
446 }
447 return (NID_undef);
448}
449
450/* For an EC key set TLS ID and required compression based on parameters. */
451static int
452tls1_set_ec_id(uint16_t *curve_id, uint8_t *comp_id, EC_KEY *ec)
453{
454 const EC_GROUP *grp;
455 const EC_METHOD *meth;
456 int is_prime = 0;
457 int nid, id;
458
459 if (ec == NULL)
460 return (0);
461
462 /* Determine if it is a prime field. */
463 if ((grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)) == NULL)
464 return (0);
465 if ((meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(grp)) == NULL)
466 return (0);
467 if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field)
468 is_prime = 1;
469
470 /* Determine curve ID. */
471 nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
472 id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid);
473
474 /* If we have an ID set it, otherwise set arbitrary explicit curve. */
475 if (id != 0)
476 *curve_id = id;
477 else
478 *curve_id = is_prime ? 0xff01 : 0xff02;
479
480 /* Specify the compression identifier. */
481 if (comp_id != NULL) {
482 if (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ec) == NULL)
483 return (0);
484
485 if (EC_KEY_get_conv_form(ec) == POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED) {
486 *comp_id = is_prime ?
487 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime :
488 TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2;
489 } else {
490 *comp_id = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed;
491 }
492 }
493 return (1);
494}
495
496/* Check that an EC key is compatible with extensions. */
497static int
498tls1_check_ec_key(SSL *s, const uint16_t *curve_id, const uint8_t *comp_id)
499{
500 size_t curveslen, formatslen, i;
501 const uint16_t *curves;
502 const uint8_t *formats;
503
504 /*
505 * Check point formats extension if present, otherwise everything
506 * is supported (see RFC4492).
507 */
508 tls1_get_formatlist(s, 1, &formats, &formatslen);
509 if (comp_id != NULL && formats != NULL) {
510 for (i = 0; i < formatslen; i++) {
511 if (formats[i] == *comp_id)
512 break;
513 }
514 if (i == formatslen)
515 return (0);
516 }
517
518 /*
519 * Check curve list if present, otherwise everything is supported.
520 */
521 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &curves, &curveslen);
522 if (curve_id != NULL && curves != NULL) {
523 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++) {
524 if (curves[i] == *curve_id)
525 break;
526 }
527 if (i == curveslen)
528 return (0);
529 }
530
531 return (1);
532}
533
534/* Check EC server key is compatible with client extensions. */
535int
536tls1_check_ec_server_key(SSL *s)
537{
538 CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->cert->pkeys + SSL_PKEY_ECC;
539 uint16_t curve_id;
540 uint8_t comp_id;
541 EVP_PKEY *pkey;
542 int rv;
543
544 if (cpk->x509 == NULL || cpk->privatekey == NULL)
545 return (0);
546 if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cpk->x509)) == NULL)
547 return (0);
548 rv = tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, &comp_id, pkey->pkey.ec);
549 EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
550 if (rv != 1)
551 return (0);
552
553 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, &comp_id);
554}
555
556/* Check EC temporary key is compatible with client extensions. */
557int
558tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s)
559{
560 EC_KEY *ec = s->cert->ecdh_tmp;
561 uint16_t curve_id;
562
563 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto != 0) {
564 /* Need a shared curve. */
565 if (tls1_get_shared_curve(s) != NID_undef)
566 return (1);
567 return (0);
568 }
569
570 if (ec == NULL) {
571 if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)
572 return (1);
573 return (0);
574 }
575 if (tls1_set_ec_id(&curve_id, NULL, ec) != 1)
576 return (0);
577
578 return tls1_check_ec_key(s, &curve_id, NULL);
579}
580
581/*
582 * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this
583 * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support.
584 */
585
586static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = {
587 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
588 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
589 TLSEXT_hash_sha512, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
590#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
591 TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512, TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_512,
592#endif
593
594 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
595 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
596 TLSEXT_hash_sha384, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
597
598 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
599 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
600 TLSEXT_hash_sha256, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
601
602#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
603 TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256, TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_256,
604 TLSEXT_hash_gost94, TLSEXT_signature_gostr01,
605#endif
606
607 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
608 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
609 TLSEXT_hash_sha224, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
610
611 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_rsa,
612 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_dsa,
613 TLSEXT_hash_sha1, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa,
614};
615
616int
617tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p)
618{
619 size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
620
621 if (p)
622 memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen);
623 return (int)slen;
624}
625
626unsigned char *
627ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
628{
629 int extdatalen = 0;
630 unsigned char *ret = p;
631 int using_ecc = 0;
632
633 /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites. */
634 if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION) {
635 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s);
636 unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
637 int i;
638
639 for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) {
640 SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
641
642 alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
643 alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
644
645 if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) ||
646 (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
647 using_ecc = 1;
648 break;
649 }
650 }
651 }
652
653 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */
654 if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION &&
655 !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
656 return p;
657
658 ret += 2;
659
660 if (ret >= limit)
661 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
662
663 if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
664 /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
665 size_t size_str, lenmax;
666
667 /* check for enough space.
668 4 for the servername type and extension length
669 2 for servernamelist length
670 1 for the hostname type
671 2 for hostname length
672 + hostname length
673 */
674
675 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 9)
676 return NULL;
677
678 lenmax = limit - ret - 9;
679 if ((size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > lenmax)
680 return NULL;
681
682 /* extension type and length */
683 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
684
685 s2n(size_str + 5, ret);
686
687 /* length of servername list */
688 s2n(size_str + 3, ret);
689
690 /* hostname type, length and hostname */
691 *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name;
692 s2n(size_str, ret);
693 memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str);
694 ret += size_str;
695 }
696
697 /* Add RI if renegotiating */
698 if (s->renegotiate) {
699 int el;
700
701 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
702 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
703 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
704 return NULL;
705 }
706
707 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el)
708 return NULL;
709
710 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
711 s2n(el, ret);
712
713 if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
714 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
715 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
716 return NULL;
717 }
718
719 ret += el;
720 }
721
722 if (using_ecc) {
723 size_t curveslen, formatslen, lenmax;
724 const uint16_t *curves;
725 const uint8_t *formats;
726 int i;
727
728 /*
729 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message.
730 */
731 tls1_get_formatlist(s, 0, &formats, &formatslen);
732
733 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 5)
734 return NULL;
735
736 lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
737 if (formatslen > lenmax)
738 return NULL;
739 if (formatslen > 255) {
740 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
741 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
742 return NULL;
743 }
744
745 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
746 s2n(formatslen + 1, ret);
747 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formatslen;
748 memcpy(ret, formats, formatslen);
749 ret += formatslen;
750
751 /*
752 * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message.
753 */
754 tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &curves, &curveslen);
755
756 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6)
757 return NULL;
758
759 lenmax = limit - ret - 6;
760 if (curveslen > lenmax)
761 return NULL;
762 if (curveslen > 65532) {
763 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
764 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
765 return NULL;
766 }
767
768 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret);
769 s2n((curveslen * 2) + 2, ret);
770
771 /* NB: draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt uses a one-byte prefix for
772 * elliptic_curve_list, but the examples use two bytes.
773 * http://www1.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg00538.html
774 * resolves this to two bytes.
775 */
776 s2n(curveslen * 2, ret);
777 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++)
778 s2n(curves[i], ret);
779 }
780
781 if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
782 int ticklen;
783 if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick)
784 ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen;
785 else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
786 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) {
787 ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length;
788 s->session->tlsext_tick = malloc(ticklen);
789 if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
790 return NULL;
791 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick,
792 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen);
793 s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen;
794 } else
795 ticklen = 0;
796 if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket &&
797 s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL)
798 goto skip_ext;
799 /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len
800 * rest for ticket
801 */
802 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + ticklen)
803 return NULL;
804 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
805
806 s2n(ticklen, ret);
807 if (ticklen) {
808 memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen);
809 ret += ticklen;
810 }
811 }
812skip_ext:
813
814 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
815 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6)
816 return NULL;
817
818 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret);
819 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret);
820 s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret);
821 memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs));
822 ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs);
823 }
824
825 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp &&
826 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
827 int i;
828 long extlen, idlen, itmp;
829 OCSP_RESPID *id;
830
831 idlen = 0;
832 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
833 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
834 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
835 if (itmp <= 0)
836 return NULL;
837 idlen += itmp + 2;
838 }
839
840 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
841 extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL);
842 if (extlen < 0)
843 return NULL;
844 } else
845 extlen = 0;
846
847 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 7 + extlen + idlen)
848 return NULL;
849 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
850 if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0)
851 return NULL;
852 s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret);
853 *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp;
854 s2n(idlen, ret);
855 for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) {
856 /* save position of id len */
857 unsigned char *q = ret;
858 id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i);
859 /* skip over id len */
860 ret += 2;
861 itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret);
862 /* write id len */
863 s2n(itmp, q);
864 }
865 s2n(extlen, ret);
866 if (extlen > 0)
867 i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret);
868 }
869
870 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) {
871 /* The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its
872 * support for Next Protocol Negotiation */
873 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4)
874 return NULL;
875 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
876 s2n(0, ret);
877 }
878
879 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list != NULL &&
880 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
881 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 6 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len)
882 return (NULL);
883 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
884 s2n(2 + s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
885 s2n(s->alpn_client_proto_list_len, ret);
886 memcpy(ret, s->alpn_client_proto_list,
887 s->alpn_client_proto_list_len);
888 ret += s->alpn_client_proto_list_len;
889 }
890
891#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
892 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) {
893 int el;
894
895 ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
896
897 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el)
898 return NULL;
899
900 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
901 s2n(el, ret);
902
903 if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
905 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
906 return NULL;
907 }
908 ret += el;
909 }
910#endif
911
912 /*
913 * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators.
914 * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03
915 *
916 * Note that this seems to trigger issues with IronPort SMTP
917 * appliances.
918 *
919 * NB: because this code works out the length of all existing
920 * extensions it MUST always appear last.
921 */
922 if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) {
923 int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data;
924
925 /*
926 * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages
927 * includes the 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the
928 * code in s3_clnt.c does not.
929 */
930 if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A)
931 hlen -= 5;
932 if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) {
933 hlen = 0x200 - hlen;
934 if (hlen >= 4)
935 hlen -= 4;
936 else
937 hlen = 0;
938
939 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret);
940 s2n(hlen, ret);
941 memset(ret, 0, hlen);
942 ret += hlen;
943 }
944 }
945
946 if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0)
947 return p;
948
949 s2n(extdatalen, p);
950 return ret;
951}
952
953unsigned char *
954ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit)
955{
956 int using_ecc, extdatalen = 0;
957 unsigned long alg_a, alg_k;
958 unsigned char *ret = p;
959 int next_proto_neg_seen;
960
961 alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
962 alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
963 using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe) ||
964 alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) &&
965 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL;
966
967 /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */
968 if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding)
969 return p;
970
971 ret += 2;
972 if (ret >= limit)
973 return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */
974
975 if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 &&
976 s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) {
977 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4)
978 return NULL;
979
980 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret);
981 s2n(0, ret);
982 }
983
984 if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) {
985 int el;
986
987 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) {
988 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
989 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
990 return NULL;
991 }
992
993 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el)
994 return NULL;
995
996 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret);
997 s2n(el, ret);
998
999 if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1000 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1001 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1002 return NULL;
1003 }
1004
1005 ret += el;
1006 }
1007
1008 if (using_ecc && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1009 const unsigned char *formats;
1010 size_t formatslen, lenmax;
1011
1012 /*
1013 * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message.
1014 */
1015 tls1_get_formatlist(s, 0, &formats, &formatslen);
1016
1017 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 5)
1018 return NULL;
1019
1020 lenmax = limit - ret - 5;
1021 if (formatslen > lenmax)
1022 return NULL;
1023 if (formatslen > 255) {
1024 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1025 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1026 return NULL;
1027 }
1028
1029 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret);
1030 s2n(formatslen + 1, ret);
1031 *(ret++) = (unsigned char)formatslen;
1032 memcpy(ret, formats, formatslen);
1033 ret += formatslen;
1034 }
1035
1036 /*
1037 * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves
1038 * extension.
1039 */
1040
1041 if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected &&
1042 !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) {
1043 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4)
1044 return NULL;
1045
1046 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret);
1047 s2n(0, ret);
1048 }
1049
1050 if (s->tlsext_status_expected) {
1051 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4)
1052 return NULL;
1053
1054 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret);
1055 s2n(0, ret);
1056 }
1057
1058#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1059 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) {
1060 int el;
1061
1062 ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0);
1063
1064 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + el)
1065 return NULL;
1066
1067 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret);
1068 s2n(el, ret);
1069
1070 if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) {
1071 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1072 ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
1073 return NULL;
1074 }
1075 ret += el;
1076 }
1077#endif
1078
1079 if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 ||
1080 (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) &&
1081 (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) {
1082 static const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = {
1083 0xfd, 0xe8, /*65000*/
1084 0x00, 0x20, /*32 bytes length*/
1085 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85,
1086 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06,
1087 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08,
1088 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17
1089 };
1090 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(cryptopro_ext))
1091 return NULL;
1092 memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, sizeof(cryptopro_ext));
1093 ret += sizeof(cryptopro_ext);
1094 }
1095
1096 next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen;
1097 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1098 if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) {
1099 const unsigned char *npa;
1100 unsigned int npalen;
1101 int r;
1102
1103 r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen,
1104 s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg);
1105 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1106 if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < 4 + npalen)
1107 return NULL;
1108 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret);
1109 s2n(npalen, ret);
1110 memcpy(ret, npa, npalen);
1111 ret += npalen;
1112 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1113 }
1114 }
1115
1116 if (s->s3->alpn_selected != NULL) {
1117 const unsigned char *selected = s->s3->alpn_selected;
1118 unsigned int len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len;
1119
1120 if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - 2 - 1 - len) < 0)
1121 return (NULL);
1122 s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
1123 s2n(3 + len, ret);
1124 s2n(1 + len, ret);
1125 *ret++ = len;
1126 memcpy(ret, selected, len);
1127 ret += len;
1128 }
1129
1130 if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0)
1131 return p;
1132
1133 s2n(extdatalen, p);
1134 return ret;
1135}
1136
1137/*
1138 * tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello is called to process the ALPN extension in a
1139 * ClientHello.
1140 * data: the contents of the extension, not including the type and length.
1141 * data_len: the number of bytes in data.
1142 * al: a pointer to the alert value to send in the event of a non-zero
1143 * return.
1144 * returns: 1 on success.
1145 */
1146static int
1147tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
1148 unsigned int data_len, int *al)
1149{
1150 const unsigned char *selected;
1151 unsigned char selected_len;
1152 unsigned int proto_len;
1153 unsigned int i;
1154 int r;
1155
1156 if (s->ctx->alpn_select_cb == NULL)
1157 return (1);
1158
1159 if (data_len < 2)
1160 goto parse_error;
1161
1162 /*
1163 * data should contain a uint16 length followed by a series of 8-bit,
1164 * length-prefixed strings.
1165 */
1166 i = ((unsigned int)data[0]) << 8 | ((unsigned int)data[1]);
1167 data_len -= 2;
1168 data += 2;
1169 if (data_len != i)
1170 goto parse_error;
1171
1172 if (data_len < 2)
1173 goto parse_error;
1174
1175 for (i = 0; i < data_len; ) {
1176 proto_len = data[i];
1177 i++;
1178
1179 if (proto_len == 0)
1180 goto parse_error;
1181
1182 if (i + proto_len < i || i + proto_len > data_len)
1183 goto parse_error;
1184
1185 i += proto_len;
1186 }
1187
1188 r = s->ctx->alpn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len,
1189 data, data_len, s->ctx->alpn_select_cb_arg);
1190 if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1191 free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1192 if ((s->s3->alpn_selected = malloc(selected_len)) == NULL) {
1193 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1194 return (-1);
1195 }
1196 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, selected, selected_len);
1197 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = selected_len;
1198 }
1199
1200 return (1);
1201
1202parse_error:
1203 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1204 return (0);
1205}
1206
1207/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X
1208 * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|.
1209 * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order:
1210 * SNI,
1211 * elliptic_curves
1212 * ec_point_formats
1213 *
1214 * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8,
1215 * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them.
1216 * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from
1217 * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work).
1218 */
1219static void
1220ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d,
1221 int n)
1222{
1223 unsigned short type, size;
1224 static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = {
1225 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */
1226 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */
1227 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */
1228 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */
1229 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */
1230 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */
1231
1232 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */
1233 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */
1234 0x01, /* 1 point format */
1235 0x00, /* uncompressed */
1236 };
1237
1238 /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */
1239 static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = {
1240 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */
1241 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */
1242 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */
1243 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */
1244 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */
1245 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */
1246 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */
1247 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
1248 };
1249
1250 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1251 return;
1252 data += 2;
1253
1254 if (data > (d + n - 4))
1255 return;
1256 n2s(data, type);
1257 n2s(data, size);
1258
1259 if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
1260 return;
1261
1262 if (data + size > d + n)
1263 return;
1264 data += size;
1265
1266 if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) {
1267 const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1268 const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
1269
1270 if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n)
1271 return;
1272 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
1273 return;
1274 if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0)
1275 return;
1276 } else {
1277 const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
1278
1279 if (data + len != d + n)
1280 return;
1281 if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
1282 return;
1283 }
1284
1285 s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1;
1286}
1287
1288int
1289ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
1290 int n, int *al)
1291{
1292 unsigned short type;
1293 unsigned short size;
1294 unsigned short len;
1295 unsigned char *data = *p;
1296 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1297 int sigalg_seen = 0;
1298
1299 s->servername_done = 0;
1300 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1301 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1302 free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1303 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1304
1305 if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG)
1306 ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n);
1307
1308 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1309 goto ri_check;
1310 n2s(data, len);
1311
1312 if (data > (d + n - len))
1313 goto ri_check;
1314
1315 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1316 n2s(data, type);
1317 n2s(data, size);
1318
1319 if (data + size > (d + n))
1320 goto ri_check;
1321 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1322 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size,
1323 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1324/* The servername extension is treated as follows:
1325
1326 - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255.
1327 - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros,
1328 in which case an fatal alert is generated.
1329 - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache.
1330 - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order
1331 to allow the application to position itself to the right context.
1332 - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when
1333 it is identical to a previously used for the same session.
1334 Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time
1335 set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the
1336 case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and
1337 a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername
1338 presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches
1339 the value of the Host: field.
1340 - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
1341 if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session,
1342 i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension.
1343 - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent.
1344
1345*/
1346
1347 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1348 unsigned char *sdata;
1349 int servname_type;
1350 int dsize;
1351
1352 if (size < 2) {
1353 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1354 return 0;
1355 }
1356 n2s(data, dsize);
1357
1358 size -= 2;
1359 if (dsize > size) {
1360 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1361 return 0;
1362 }
1363
1364 sdata = data;
1365 while (dsize > 3) {
1366 servname_type = *(sdata++);
1367
1368 n2s(sdata, len);
1369 dsize -= 3;
1370
1371 if (len > dsize) {
1372 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1373 return 0;
1374 }
1375 if (s->servername_done == 0)
1376 switch (servname_type) {
1377 case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name:
1378 if (!s->hit) {
1379 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1380 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1381 return 0;
1382 }
1383 if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) {
1384 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1385 return 0;
1386 }
1387 if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1388 malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
1389 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1390 return 0;
1391 }
1392 memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len);
1393 s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0';
1394 if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) {
1395 free(s->session->tlsext_hostname);
1396 s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL;
1397 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1398 return 0;
1399 }
1400 s->servername_done = 1;
1401
1402
1403 } else {
1404 s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname &&
1405 strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len &&
1406 strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0;
1407 }
1408 break;
1409
1410 default:
1411 break;
1412 }
1413
1414 dsize -= len;
1415 }
1416 if (dsize != 0) {
1417 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1418 return 0;
1419 }
1420
1421 }
1422
1423 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1424 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1425 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1426 size_t formatslen;
1427 uint8_t *formats;
1428
1429 if (size < 1) {
1430 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1431 return 0;
1432 }
1433 formatslen = *(sdata++);
1434 if (formatslen != size - 1) {
1435 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1436 return 0;
1437 }
1438
1439 if (!s->hit) {
1440 free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1441 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1442 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1443
1444 if ((formats = reallocarray(NULL, formatslen,
1445 sizeof(uint8_t))) == NULL) {
1446 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1447 return 0;
1448 }
1449 memcpy(formats, sdata, formatslen);
1450 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = formats;
1451 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1452 formatslen;
1453 }
1454 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves &&
1455 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1456 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1457 size_t curveslen, i;
1458 uint16_t *curves;
1459
1460 if (size < 2) {
1461 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1462 return 0;
1463 }
1464 n2s(sdata, curveslen);
1465 if (curveslen != size - 2 || curveslen % 2 != 0) {
1466 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1467 return 0;
1468 }
1469 curveslen /= 2;
1470
1471 if (!s->hit) {
1472 if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) {
1473 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1474 return 0;
1475 }
1476 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0;
1477 if ((curves = reallocarray(NULL, curveslen,
1478 sizeof(uint16_t))) == NULL) {
1479 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1480 return 0;
1481 }
1482 for (i = 0; i < curveslen; i++)
1483 n2s(sdata, curves[i]);
1484 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = curves;
1485 s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = curveslen;
1486 }
1487 }
1488 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1489 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1490 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1491 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1492 return 0;
1493 }
1494 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1495 if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1496 return 0;
1497 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1498 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) {
1499 int dsize;
1500 if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) {
1501 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1502 return 0;
1503 }
1504 sigalg_seen = 1;
1505 n2s(data, dsize);
1506 size -= 2;
1507 if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) {
1508 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1509 return 0;
1510 }
1511 if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) {
1512 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1513 return 0;
1514 }
1515 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1516 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1517
1518 if (size < 5) {
1519 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1520 return 0;
1521 }
1522
1523 s->tlsext_status_type = *data++;
1524 size--;
1525 if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
1526 const unsigned char *sdata;
1527 int dsize;
1528 /* Read in responder_id_list */
1529 n2s(data, dsize);
1530 size -= 2;
1531 if (dsize > size ) {
1532 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1533 return 0;
1534 }
1535 while (dsize > 0) {
1536 OCSP_RESPID *id;
1537 int idsize;
1538 if (dsize < 4) {
1539 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1540 return 0;
1541 }
1542 n2s(data, idsize);
1543 dsize -= 2 + idsize;
1544 size -= 2 + idsize;
1545 if (dsize < 0) {
1546 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1547 return 0;
1548 }
1549 sdata = data;
1550 data += idsize;
1551 id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL,
1552 &sdata, idsize);
1553 if (!id) {
1554 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1555 return 0;
1556 }
1557 if (data != sdata) {
1558 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1559 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1560 return 0;
1561 }
1562 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids &&
1563 !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids =
1564 sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) {
1565 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1566 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1567 return 0;
1568 }
1569 if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(
1570 s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) {
1571 OCSP_RESPID_free(id);
1572 *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1573 return 0;
1574 }
1575 }
1576
1577 /* Read in request_extensions */
1578 if (size < 2) {
1579 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1580 return 0;
1581 }
1582 n2s(data, dsize);
1583 size -= 2;
1584 if (dsize != size) {
1585 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1586 return 0;
1587 }
1588 sdata = data;
1589 if (dsize > 0) {
1590 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) {
1591 sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts,
1592 X509_EXTENSION_free);
1593 }
1594
1595 s->tlsext_ocsp_exts =
1596 d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL,
1597 &sdata, dsize);
1598 if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts ||
1599 (data + dsize != sdata)) {
1600 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1601 return 0;
1602 }
1603 }
1604 } else {
1605 /* We don't know what to do with any other type
1606 * so ignore it.
1607 */
1608 s->tlsext_status_type = -1;
1609 }
1610 }
1611 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1612 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 &&
1613 s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1614 /* We shouldn't accept this extension on a
1615 * renegotiation.
1616 *
1617 * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we
1618 * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on
1619 * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when
1620 * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an
1621 * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing
1622 * anything like that, but this might change).
1623
1624 * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake
1625 * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len >
1626 * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen
1627 * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new
1628 * Finished message could have been computed.) */
1629 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1630 }
1631 else if (type ==
1632 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation &&
1633 s->ctx->alpn_select_cb != NULL &&
1634 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1635 if (tls1_alpn_handle_client_hello(s, data,
1636 size, al) != 1)
1637 return (0);
1638 /* ALPN takes precedence over NPN. */
1639 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1640 }
1641
1642 /* session ticket processed earlier */
1643#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1644 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1645 if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al))
1646 return 0;
1647 }
1648#endif
1649
1650 data += size;
1651 }
1652
1653 *p = data;
1654
1655ri_check:
1656
1657 /* Need RI if renegotiating */
1658
1659 if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate) {
1660 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1661 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT,
1662 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1663 return 0;
1664 }
1665
1666 return 1;
1667}
1668
1669/* ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
1670 * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly fill
1671 * the length of the block. */
1672static char
1673ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len)
1674{
1675 unsigned int off = 0;
1676
1677 while (off < len) {
1678 if (d[off] == 0)
1679 return 0;
1680 off += d[off];
1681 off++;
1682 }
1683
1684 return off == len;
1685}
1686
1687int
1688ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d,
1689 int n, int *al)
1690{
1691 unsigned short length;
1692 unsigned short type;
1693 unsigned short size;
1694 unsigned char *data = *p;
1695 int tlsext_servername = 0;
1696 int renegotiate_seen = 0;
1697
1698 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0;
1699 free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1700 s->s3->alpn_selected = NULL;
1701
1702 if (data >= (d + n - 2))
1703 goto ri_check;
1704
1705 n2s(data, length);
1706 if (data + length != d + n) {
1707 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1708 return 0;
1709 }
1710
1711 while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
1712 n2s(data, type);
1713 n2s(data, size);
1714
1715 if (data + size > (d + n))
1716 goto ri_check;
1717
1718 if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
1719 s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size,
1720 s->tlsext_debug_arg);
1721
1722 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) {
1723 if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) {
1724 *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1725 return 0;
1726 }
1727 tlsext_servername = 1;
1728
1729 }
1730 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats &&
1731 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1732 unsigned char *sdata = data;
1733 size_t formatslen;
1734 uint8_t *formats;
1735
1736 if (size < 1) {
1737 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1738 return 0;
1739 }
1740 formatslen = *(sdata++);
1741 if (formatslen != size - 1) {
1742 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1743 return 0;
1744 }
1745
1746 if (!s->hit) {
1747 free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist);
1748 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL;
1749 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0;
1750
1751 if ((formats = reallocarray(NULL, formatslen,
1752 sizeof(uint8_t))) == NULL) {
1753 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1754 return 0;
1755 }
1756 memcpy(formats, sdata, formatslen);
1757 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = formats;
1758 s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length =
1759 formatslen;
1760 }
1761 }
1762 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
1763 if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb &&
1764 !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) {
1765 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1766 return 0;
1767 }
1768 if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) || (size > 0)) {
1769 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1770 return 0;
1771 }
1772 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
1773 }
1774 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request &&
1775 s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) {
1776 /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested
1777 * a status request message.
1778 */
1779 if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) {
1780 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1781 return 0;
1782 }
1783 /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
1784 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1785 }
1786 else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg &&
1787 s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) {
1788 unsigned char *selected;
1789 unsigned char selected_len;
1790
1791 /* We must have requested it. */
1792 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) {
1793 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1794 return 0;
1795 }
1796 /* The data must be valid */
1797 if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) {
1798 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1799 return 0;
1800 }
1801 if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, size, s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) {
1802 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1803 return 0;
1804 }
1805 s->next_proto_negotiated = malloc(selected_len);
1806 if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) {
1807 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1808 return 0;
1809 }
1810 memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len);
1811 s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len;
1812 s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1;
1813 }
1814 else if (type ==
1815 TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) {
1816 unsigned int len;
1817
1818 /* We must have requested it. */
1819 if (s->alpn_client_proto_list == NULL) {
1820 *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION;
1821 return 0;
1822 }
1823 if (size < 4) {
1824 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1825 return (0);
1826 }
1827
1828 /* The extension data consists of:
1829 * uint16 list_length
1830 * uint8 proto_length;
1831 * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */
1832 len = ((unsigned int)data[0]) << 8 |
1833 ((unsigned int)data[1]);
1834 if (len != (unsigned int)size - 2) {
1835 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1836 return (0);
1837 }
1838 len = data[2];
1839 if (len != (unsigned int)size - 3) {
1840 *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1841 return (0);
1842 }
1843 free(s->s3->alpn_selected);
1844 s->s3->alpn_selected = malloc(len);
1845 if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) {
1846 *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1847 return (0);
1848 }
1849 memcpy(s->s3->alpn_selected, data + 3, len);
1850 s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len;
1851
1852 } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) {
1853 if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al))
1854 return 0;
1855 renegotiate_seen = 1;
1856 }
1857#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
1858 else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) {
1859 if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data,
1860 size, al))
1861 return 0;
1862 }
1863#endif
1864
1865 data += size;
1866
1867 }
1868
1869 if (data != d + n) {
1870 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1871 return 0;
1872 }
1873
1874 if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) {
1875 if (s->tlsext_hostname) {
1876 if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) {
1877 s->session->tlsext_hostname =
1878 strdup(s->tlsext_hostname);
1879
1880 if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) {
1881 *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1882 return 0;
1883 }
1884 } else {
1885 *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
1886 return 0;
1887 }
1888 }
1889 }
1890
1891 *p = data;
1892
1893ri_check:
1894
1895 /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
1896 * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
1897 * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
1898 * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
1899 * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
1900 * absence on initial connect only.
1901 */
1902 if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) {
1903 *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
1904 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT,
1905 SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
1906 return 0;
1907 }
1908
1909 return 1;
1910}
1911
1912int
1913ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1914{
1915 return 1;
1916}
1917
1918int
1919ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
1920{
1921 return 1;
1922}
1923
1924int
1925ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s)
1926{
1927 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
1928 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
1929
1930 /* The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1931 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1932 */
1933 /* The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely in
1934 * ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c.
1935 */
1936
1937 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1938 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1939 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
1940 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
1941
1942 switch (ret) {
1943 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1944 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
1945 return -1;
1946 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
1947 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
1948 return 1;
1949 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1950 s->servername_done = 0;
1951 default:
1952 return 1;
1953 }
1954}
1955
1956int
1957ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s)
1958{
1959 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
1960 int al = 0; /* XXX gcc3 */
1961
1962 /* If status request then ask callback what to do.
1963 * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case
1964 * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher
1965 * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent
1966 */
1967 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) &&
1968 s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
1969 int r;
1970 CERT_PKEY *certpkey;
1971 certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s);
1972 /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */
1973 if (certpkey == NULL) {
1974 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1975 return 1;
1976 }
1977 /* Set current certificate to one we will use so
1978 * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up.
1979 */
1980 s->cert->key = certpkey;
1981 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
1982 switch (r) {
1983 /* We don't want to send a status request response */
1984 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
1985 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1986 break;
1987 /* status request response should be sent */
1988 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK:
1989 if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp)
1990 s->tlsext_status_expected = 1;
1991 else
1992 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
1993 break;
1994 /* something bad happened */
1995 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
1996 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
1997 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
1998 goto err;
1999 }
2000 } else
2001 s->tlsext_status_expected = 0;
2002
2003err:
2004 switch (ret) {
2005 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2006 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2007 return -1;
2008 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2009 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2010 return 1;
2011 default:
2012 return 1;
2013 }
2014}
2015
2016int
2017ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s)
2018{
2019 int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK;
2020 int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME;
2021
2022 /* If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher
2023 * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension
2024 * it must contain uncompressed.
2025 */
2026 unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
2027 unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth;
2028 if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) &&
2029 (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2030 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) &&
2031 (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) &&
2032 ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE|SSL_kECDHr|SSL_kECDHe)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) {
2033 /* we are using an ECC cipher */
2034 size_t i;
2035 unsigned char *list;
2036 int found_uncompressed = 0;
2037 list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist;
2038 for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) {
2039 if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) {
2040 found_uncompressed = 1;
2041 break;
2042 }
2043 }
2044 if (!found_uncompressed) {
2045 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST);
2046 return -1;
2047 }
2048 }
2049 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
2050
2051 if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2052 ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2053 else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0)
2054 ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg);
2055
2056 /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one
2057 * tell the callback
2058 */
2059 if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) &&
2060 s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
2061 int r;
2062 /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows
2063 * there is no response.
2064 */
2065 free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
2066 s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
2067 s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1;
2068 r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
2069 if (r == 0) {
2070 al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
2071 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2072 }
2073 if (r < 0) {
2074 al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
2075 ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL;
2076 }
2077 }
2078
2079 switch (ret) {
2080 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL:
2081 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
2082
2083 return -1;
2084 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING:
2085 ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al);
2086
2087 return 1;
2088 case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK:
2089 s->servername_done = 0;
2090 default:
2091 return 1;
2092 }
2093}
2094
2095/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the
2096 * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle
2097 * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time.
2098 *
2099 * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will
2100 * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket
2101 * extension, if any.
2102 * len: the length of the session ID.
2103 * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello.
2104 * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2105 * point to the resulting session.
2106 *
2107 * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key
2108 * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will
2109 * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1.
2110 *
2111 * Returns:
2112 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2113 * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings).
2114 * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports
2115 * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer.
2116 * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but
2117 * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error.
2118 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set.
2119 *
2120 * Side effects:
2121 * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue
2122 * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support
2123 * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have
2124 * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if
2125 * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
2126 * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0.
2127 */
2128int
2129tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
2130 const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret)
2131{
2132 /* Point after session ID in client hello */
2133 const unsigned char *p = session_id + len;
2134 unsigned short i;
2135
2136 *ret = NULL;
2137 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0;
2138
2139 /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present
2140 * to permit stateful resumption.
2141 */
2142 if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)
2143 return 0;
2144 if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit)
2145 return 0;
2146 if (p >= limit)
2147 return -1;
2148 /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
2149 if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
2150 i = *(p++);
2151 p += i;
2152 if (p >= limit)
2153 return -1;
2154 }
2155 /* Skip past cipher list */
2156 n2s(p, i);
2157 p += i;
2158 if (p >= limit)
2159 return -1;
2160 /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
2161 i = *(p++);
2162 p += i;
2163 if (p > limit)
2164 return -1;
2165 /* Now at start of extensions */
2166 if ((p + 2) >= limit)
2167 return 0;
2168 n2s(p, i);
2169 while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
2170 unsigned short type, size;
2171 n2s(p, type);
2172 n2s(p, size);
2173 if (p + size > limit)
2174 return 0;
2175 if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
2176 int r;
2177 if (size == 0) {
2178 /* The client will accept a ticket but doesn't
2179 * currently have one. */
2180 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2181 return 1;
2182 }
2183 if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) {
2184 /* Indicate that the ticket couldn't be
2185 * decrypted rather than generating the session
2186 * from ticket now, trigger abbreviated
2187 * handshake based on external mechanism to
2188 * calculate the master secret later. */
2189 return 2;
2190 }
2191 r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret);
2192 switch (r) {
2193 case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */
2194 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2195 return 2;
2196 case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */
2197 return r;
2198 case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */
2199 s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1;
2200 return 3;
2201 default: /* fatal error */
2202 return -1;
2203 }
2204 }
2205 p += size;
2206 }
2207 return 0;
2208}
2209
2210/* tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket.
2211 *
2212 * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension.
2213 * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion.
2214 * sess_id: points at the session ID.
2215 * sesslen: the length of the session ID.
2216 * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
2217 * point to the resulting session.
2218 *
2219 * Returns:
2220 * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket.
2221 * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted.
2222 * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set.
2223 * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed.
2224 */
2225static int
2226tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen,
2227 const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
2228{
2229 SSL_SESSION *sess;
2230 unsigned char *sdec;
2231 const unsigned char *p;
2232 int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0;
2233 unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
2234 HMAC_CTX hctx;
2235 EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
2236 SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx;
2237 /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */
2238 if (eticklen < 48)
2239 return 2;
2240 /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
2241 HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx);
2242 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
2243 if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) {
2244 unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick;
2245 int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16,
2246 &ctx, &hctx, 0);
2247 if (rv < 0) {
2248 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2249 return -1;
2250 }
2251 if (rv == 0) {
2252 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2253 return 2;
2254 }
2255 if (rv == 2)
2256 renew_ticket = 1;
2257 } else {
2258 /* Check key name matches */
2259 if (timingsafe_memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16))
2260 return 2;
2261 HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16,
2262 tlsext_tick_md(), NULL);
2263 EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL,
2264 tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16);
2265 }
2266 /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and
2267 * integrity checks on ticket.
2268 */
2269 mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx);
2270 if (mlen < 0) {
2271 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2272 return -1;
2273 }
2274 eticklen -= mlen;
2275 /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */
2276 HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen);
2277 HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL);
2278 HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
2279 if (timingsafe_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
2280 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2281 return 2;
2282 }
2283 /* Attempt to decrypt session data */
2284 /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
2285 p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2286 eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx);
2287 sdec = malloc(eticklen);
2288 if (!sdec) {
2289 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2290 return -1;
2291 }
2292 EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen);
2293 if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) {
2294 free(sdec);
2295 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2296 return 2;
2297 }
2298 slen += mlen;
2299 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
2300 p = sdec;
2301
2302 sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen);
2303 free(sdec);
2304 if (sess) {
2305 /* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to
2306 * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to
2307 * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero
2308 * as required by standard.
2309 */
2310 if (sesslen)
2311 memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen);
2312 sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
2313 *psess = sess;
2314 if (renew_ticket)
2315 return 4;
2316 else
2317 return 3;
2318 }
2319 ERR_clear_error();
2320 /* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new
2321 * ticket. */
2322 return 2;
2323}
2324
2325/* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */
2326
2327typedef struct {
2328 int nid;
2329 int id;
2330} tls12_lookup;
2331
2332static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = {
2333 {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5},
2334 {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1},
2335 {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224},
2336 {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256},
2337 {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384},
2338 {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512},
2339 {NID_id_GostR3411_94, TLSEXT_hash_gost94},
2340 {NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_256, TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256},
2341 {NID_id_tc26_gost3411_2012_512, TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512}
2342};
2343
2344static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = {
2345 {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa},
2346 {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa},
2347 {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa},
2348 {EVP_PKEY_GOSTR01, TLSEXT_signature_gostr01},
2349};
2350
2351static int
2352tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen)
2353{
2354 size_t i;
2355 for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
2356 if (table[i].nid == nid)
2357 return table[i].id;
2358 }
2359 return -1;
2360}
2361
2362int
2363tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, const EVP_MD *md)
2364{
2365 int sig_id, md_id;
2366 if (!md)
2367 return 0;
2368 md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md,
2369 sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2370 if (md_id == -1)
2371 return 0;
2372 sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk);
2373 if (sig_id == -1)
2374 return 0;
2375 p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id;
2376 p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id;
2377 return 1;
2378}
2379
2380int
2381tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk)
2382{
2383 return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig,
2384 sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup));
2385}
2386
2387const EVP_MD *
2388tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg)
2389{
2390 switch (hash_alg) {
2391 case TLSEXT_hash_sha1:
2392 return EVP_sha1();
2393 case TLSEXT_hash_sha224:
2394 return EVP_sha224();
2395 case TLSEXT_hash_sha256:
2396 return EVP_sha256();
2397 case TLSEXT_hash_sha384:
2398 return EVP_sha384();
2399 case TLSEXT_hash_sha512:
2400 return EVP_sha512();
2401#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2402 case TLSEXT_hash_gost94:
2403 return EVP_gostr341194();
2404 case TLSEXT_hash_streebog_256:
2405 return EVP_streebog256();
2406 case TLSEXT_hash_streebog_512:
2407 return EVP_streebog512();
2408#endif
2409 default:
2410 return NULL;
2411 }
2412}
2413
2414/* Set preferred digest for each key type */
2415
2416int
2417tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize)
2418{
2419 int i, idx;
2420 const EVP_MD *md;
2421 CERT *c = s->cert;
2422
2423 /* Extension ignored for inappropriate versions */
2424 if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
2425 return 1;
2426
2427 /* Should never happen */
2428 if (!c)
2429 return 0;
2430
2431 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2432 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL;
2433 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL;
2434 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL;
2435 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest = NULL;
2436
2437 for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) {
2438 unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1];
2439
2440 switch (sig_alg) {
2441 case TLSEXT_signature_rsa:
2442 idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN;
2443 break;
2444 case TLSEXT_signature_dsa:
2445 idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN;
2446 break;
2447 case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa:
2448 idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC;
2449 break;
2450 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr01:
2451 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_256:
2452 case TLSEXT_signature_gostr12_512:
2453 idx = SSL_PKEY_GOST01;
2454 break;
2455 default:
2456 continue;
2457 }
2458
2459 if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) {
2460 md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg);
2461 if (md) {
2462 c->pkeys[idx].digest = md;
2463 if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN)
2464 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md;
2465 }
2466 }
2467
2468 }
2469
2470 /* Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not
2471 * supported it stays as NULL.
2472 */
2473 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest)
2474 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2475 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) {
2476 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1();
2477 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2478 }
2479 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest)
2480 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1();
2481#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST
2482 if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest)
2483 c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].digest = EVP_gostr341194();
2484#endif
2485 return 1;
2486}
generated by cgit v1.2.3-55-g6feb (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-15 03:05:07 +0000