diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c | 225 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 225 deletions
diff --git a/src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c b/src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c deleted file mode 100644 index 496bafb208..0000000000 --- a/src/regress/lib/libc/explicit_bzero/explicit_bzero.c +++ /dev/null | |||
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@ | |||
1 | /* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.9 2022/02/10 08:39:32 tb Exp $ */ | ||
2 | /* | ||
3 | * Copyright (c) 2014 Google Inc. | ||
4 | * | ||
5 | * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any | ||
6 | * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above | ||
7 | * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. | ||
8 | * | ||
9 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES | ||
10 | * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF | ||
11 | * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR | ||
12 | * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES | ||
13 | * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN | ||
14 | * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF | ||
15 | * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. | ||
16 | */ | ||
17 | |||
18 | #include <assert.h> | ||
19 | #include <errno.h> | ||
20 | #include <signal.h> | ||
21 | #include <stdlib.h> | ||
22 | #include <string.h> | ||
23 | #include <unistd.h> | ||
24 | |||
25 | #define ASSERT_EQ(a, b) assert((a) == (b)) | ||
26 | #define ASSERT_NE(a, b) assert((a) != (b)) | ||
27 | #define ASSERT_GE(a, b) assert((a) >= (b)) | ||
28 | |||
29 | #if defined(__has_feature) | ||
30 | #if __has_feature(address_sanitizer) | ||
31 | #define __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ | ||
32 | #endif | ||
33 | #endif | ||
34 | #ifdef __SANITIZE_ADDRESS__ | ||
35 | #define ATTRIBUTE_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS __attribute__((no_sanitize_address)) | ||
36 | #else | ||
37 | #define ATTRIBUTE_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS | ||
38 | #endif | ||
39 | |||
40 | /* 128 bits of random data. */ | ||
41 | static const char secret[16] = { | ||
42 | 0xa0, 0x6c, 0x0c, 0x81, 0xba, 0xd8, 0x5b, 0x0c, | ||
43 | 0xb0, 0xd6, 0xd4, 0xe3, 0xeb, 0x52, 0x5f, 0x96, | ||
44 | }; | ||
45 | |||
46 | enum { | ||
47 | SECRETCOUNT = 64, | ||
48 | SECRETBYTES = SECRETCOUNT * sizeof(secret) | ||
49 | }; | ||
50 | |||
51 | /* | ||
52 | * As of glibc 2.34, when _GNU_SOURCE is defined, SIGSTKSZ is no longer | ||
53 | * constant on Linux. SIGSTKSZ is redefined to sysconf (_SC_SIGSTKSZ). | ||
54 | */ | ||
55 | static char *altstack; | ||
56 | #define ALTSTACK_SIZE (SIGSTKSZ + SECRETBYTES) | ||
57 | |||
58 | static void | ||
59 | setup_stack(void) | ||
60 | { | ||
61 | altstack = calloc(1, ALTSTACK_SIZE); | ||
62 | ASSERT_NE(NULL, altstack); | ||
63 | |||
64 | const stack_t sigstk = { | ||
65 | .ss_sp = altstack, | ||
66 | .ss_size = ALTSTACK_SIZE | ||
67 | }; | ||
68 | |||
69 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(&sigstk, NULL)); | ||
70 | } | ||
71 | |||
72 | static void | ||
73 | cleanup_stack(void) | ||
74 | { | ||
75 | free(altstack); | ||
76 | } | ||
77 | |||
78 | static void | ||
79 | assert_on_stack(void) | ||
80 | { | ||
81 | stack_t cursigstk; | ||
82 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaltstack(NULL, &cursigstk)); | ||
83 | ASSERT_EQ(SS_ONSTACK, cursigstk.ss_flags & (SS_DISABLE|SS_ONSTACK)); | ||
84 | } | ||
85 | |||
86 | static void | ||
87 | call_on_stack(void (*fn)(int)) | ||
88 | { | ||
89 | /* | ||
90 | * This is a bit more complicated than strictly necessary, but | ||
91 | * it ensures we don't have any flaky test failures due to | ||
92 | * inherited signal masks/actions/etc. | ||
93 | * | ||
94 | * On systems where SA_ONSTACK is not supported, this could | ||
95 | * alternatively be implemented using makecontext() or | ||
96 | * pthread_attr_setstack(). | ||
97 | */ | ||
98 | |||
99 | const struct sigaction sigact = { | ||
100 | .sa_handler = fn, | ||
101 | .sa_flags = SA_ONSTACK, | ||
102 | }; | ||
103 | struct sigaction oldsigact; | ||
104 | sigset_t sigset, oldsigset; | ||
105 | |||
106 | /* First, block all signals. */ | ||
107 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigemptyset(&sigset)); | ||
108 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigfillset(&sigset)); | ||
109 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, &oldsigset)); | ||
110 | |||
111 | /* Next setup the signal handler for SIGUSR1. */ | ||
112 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sigact, &oldsigact)); | ||
113 | |||
114 | /* Raise SIGUSR1 and momentarily unblock it to run the handler. */ | ||
115 | ASSERT_EQ(0, raise(SIGUSR1)); | ||
116 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigdelset(&sigset, SIGUSR1)); | ||
117 | ASSERT_EQ(-1, sigsuspend(&sigset)); | ||
118 | ASSERT_EQ(EINTR, errno); | ||
119 | |||
120 | /* Restore the original signal action, stack, and mask. */ | ||
121 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigaction(SIGUSR1, &oldsigact, NULL)); | ||
122 | ASSERT_EQ(0, sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldsigset, NULL)); | ||
123 | } | ||
124 | |||
125 | static void | ||
126 | populate_secret(char *buf, size_t len) | ||
127 | { | ||
128 | int i, fds[2]; | ||
129 | ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe(fds)); | ||
130 | |||
131 | for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) | ||
132 | ASSERT_EQ(sizeof(secret), write(fds[1], secret, sizeof(secret))); | ||
133 | ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[1])); | ||
134 | |||
135 | ASSERT_EQ(len, read(fds[0], buf, len)); | ||
136 | ASSERT_EQ(0, close(fds[0])); | ||
137 | } | ||
138 | |||
139 | static int | ||
140 | count_secrets(const char *buf) | ||
141 | { | ||
142 | int res = 0; | ||
143 | size_t i; | ||
144 | for (i = 0; i < SECRETCOUNT; i++) { | ||
145 | if (memcmp(buf + i * sizeof(secret), secret, | ||
146 | sizeof(secret)) == 0) | ||
147 | res += 1; | ||
148 | } | ||
149 | return (res); | ||
150 | } | ||
151 | |||
152 | ATTRIBUTE_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS static char * | ||
153 | test_without_bzero(void) | ||
154 | { | ||
155 | char buf[SECRETBYTES]; | ||
156 | assert_on_stack(); | ||
157 | populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf)); | ||
158 | char *res = memmem(altstack, ALTSTACK_SIZE, buf, sizeof(buf)); | ||
159 | ASSERT_NE(NULL, res); | ||
160 | return (res); | ||
161 | } | ||
162 | |||
163 | ATTRIBUTE_NO_SANITIZE_ADDRESS static char * | ||
164 | test_with_bzero(void) | ||
165 | { | ||
166 | char buf[SECRETBYTES]; | ||
167 | assert_on_stack(); | ||
168 | populate_secret(buf, sizeof(buf)); | ||
169 | char *res = memmem(altstack, ALTSTACK_SIZE, buf, sizeof(buf)); | ||
170 | ASSERT_NE(NULL, res); | ||
171 | explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); | ||
172 | return (res); | ||
173 | } | ||
174 | |||
175 | static void | ||
176 | do_test_without_bzero(int signo) | ||
177 | { | ||
178 | char *buf = test_without_bzero(); | ||
179 | ASSERT_GE(count_secrets(buf), 1); | ||
180 | } | ||
181 | |||
182 | static void | ||
183 | do_test_with_bzero(int signo) | ||
184 | { | ||
185 | char *buf = test_with_bzero(); | ||
186 | ASSERT_EQ(count_secrets(buf), 0); | ||
187 | } | ||
188 | |||
189 | int | ||
190 | main(void) | ||
191 | { | ||
192 | setup_stack(); | ||
193 | |||
194 | /* | ||
195 | * Solaris and OS X clobber the signal stack after returning to the | ||
196 | * normal stack, so we need to inspect altstack while we're still | ||
197 | * running on it. Unfortunately, this means we risk clobbering the | ||
198 | * buffer ourselves. | ||
199 | * | ||
200 | * To minimize this risk, test_with{,out}_bzero() are responsible for | ||
201 | * locating the offset of their buf variable within altstack, and | ||
202 | * and returning that address. Then we can simply memcmp() repeatedly | ||
203 | * to count how many instances of secret we found. | ||
204 | */ | ||
205 | |||
206 | /* | ||
207 | * First, test that if we *don't* call explicit_bzero, that we | ||
208 | * *are* able to find at least one instance of the secret data still | ||
209 | * on the stack. This sanity checks that call_on_stack() and | ||
210 | * populate_secret() work as intended. | ||
211 | */ | ||
212 | memset(altstack, 0, ALTSTACK_SIZE); | ||
213 | call_on_stack(do_test_without_bzero); | ||
214 | |||
215 | /* | ||
216 | * Now test with a call to explicit_bzero() and check that we | ||
217 | * *don't* find any instances of the secret data. | ||
218 | */ | ||
219 | memset(altstack, 0, ALTSTACK_SIZE); | ||
220 | call_on_stack(do_test_with_bzero); | ||
221 | |||
222 | cleanup_stack(); | ||
223 | |||
224 | return (0); | ||
225 | } | ||